Marriage of Cranston

Filed 8/1/07 Marriage of Cranston CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

After contested postjudgment proceedings, the court below ordered R. M. (Robert) Cranston to pay his ex-wife, Mary E. Cranston, spousal support of $3,000 per month.[1] Robert challenges the support order on appeal. He contends that the court failed to consider, weigh, and apply the statutory factors relevant for making an award of spousal support as required under Family Code section 4320.[2] He argues further that the court abused its discretion by failing to consider the fact that he makes monthly expenditures of approximately $1,150 on behalf of the parties adult son for his college education. Robert also argues that there were miscellaneous errors in the trial courts award of spousal support that require reversal.

We conclude that the lower court did not abuse its discretion by making the spousal support award of $3,000 per month. Accordingly, we will affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND[3]

Robert and Mary were married in 1973 and separated in 2001 after a marriage of over 28 years. They have one adult child, Chuck, who was born in 1981. At the time of trial, Robert was 56 years old and in apparent good health. Mary at the time of trial was 57 years old. She had recently had knee surgery and a hysterectomy. She had also survived colon cancer (diagnosed in 1998) and a stroke suffered during chemotherapy.

Mary holds a bachelor of sciencedegree in home economics from the University of California at Davis. When the parties married in 1973, she was working as a social security claims representative. Mary worked until 1979at which time she was working in Richmond, California as a social security claims authorizerand she stayed at home to help raise the parties son after he was born in 1981. She did not work again until 1989; she ceased working in December 1992, at which time she was working for the Social Security Administration in Manassas, Virginia. Mary did not work again until October 2001, after the parties had separated. At that time, she worked as a full-time decorator consultant for J. C. Penney, earning $7.50 per hour, plus certain commissions (if they exceeded her salary). As of September 2005 (at the time of the second day of trial), Mary was employed as a full-time administrative assistant to a stockbroker at Edward Jones Investments; her salary was $30,000 per year, plus the possibility of unspecified discretionary bonuses.

Mary held approximately $227,000 in stocks, bonds, and liquid assets, as well as approximately $29,000 in cash.[4] She received approximately $750 per month in dividends and interest.[5] Mary held approximately $350,000 in real and personal property; these holdings included the equity in her house and in her automobile. She also disclosed an interest of about $124,000 in Roberts retirement accounts; she cannot access those accounts until she is 59 and one-half years old. Mary reported no debts as of July 2005 other than approximately $500 owed to her attorney. She had paid her attorney approximately $76,000 from savings. Mary reported monthly expenses (excluding attorney fees and charitable contributions) of $4,179.

Robert has a law degree from Abraham Lincoln University; he is a member of the bars in California, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. He worked for Bechtel from approximately 1973 to 1982. Robert then worked for the World Bank in Washington, D.C., and later moved to San Francisco to work for Firemans Fund. He worked for a short time with a small San Francisco law firm and then moved back to Washington, D.C. to open his own law firm. (This was an unsuccessful venture that spanned from 1987 to 1992.) In 1992, Robert returned to Bechtel in 1992 and worked in San Francisco in a management position, starting at approximately $88,000 per year.

Robert and his family moved to Malaysia in 1995, where he worked first as contract manager and then as project director for a light rail transit system. In 1999, he moved to Korea to become the contract director on a high-speed railway system project. Roberts base salary in 2000 was $122,578, plus a bonus of $6,000; his base salary in 2001 was $124,542, plus a bonus of $4,000. He received additional payments for working a longer work week and other adjustments related to working overseas. His employment with Bechtel ceased in March 2002 when the project in Korea was completed. Robert was unemployed until June 2004, when he became contracts manager for Parsons in North Carolina. At the time of trial, he was making $152,230 per year (or $12,590 per month).

Robert had approximately $24,000 in cash and liquid accounts. He also noted in his income and expense declaration that he owned approximately $100,000 in personal property. Concerning this entry, the court noted: This presumably includes $94,000 that [Robert] paid to the owner of the house in which he is renting two rooms in Mill Valley, California, in order to obtain an option or a right of first refusal if the owner decides to sell the house. In the future, if the owner agrees to sell the house to [Robert] at an agreed price, the $94,000 will be applied towards the purchase price. If the owner does not sell to [Robert], or if [Robert] wants the money back, the $94,000 will be returned, without interest. Robert also has an interest (valued at approximately $140,000) in a Bechtel retirement plan; he cannot access those funds until he is 59 and one-half years old. He will have vested stock through his employer after six years; Robert anticipated that he will accrue stock with a value of $2,000 to $2,500 for each year of service.

Robert reported monthly expenses (excluding charitable contributions, court costs, miscellaneous expenses that were not itemized, and payments for Chucks college education [reviewed in pt. III.B., of Discussion, post]) of $4,117.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mary filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in July 2001. A judgment of dissolution based upon the stipulation of the parties was filed November 12, 2003. The judgment included an express reservation concerning spousal support: The issue of future [spousal] support and all aspects of Section 4320 will be heard by this court at a date to be determined later.

The court conducted a trial on the issue of spousal support over two days (i.e., on January 21, 2005, and on September 2, 2005). The parties filed extensive written closing arguments and written rebuttals. Mary requested that monthly spousal support in the amount of $4,600 be awarded. Robert argued that no spousal support should be ordered. Both parties made timely requests for a statement of decision. The court filed its proposed statement of decision on January 3, 2006, to which Robert filed written objections. The courts statement of decision was filed March 16, 2006. Robert filed a timely notice of appeal.[6]

DISCUSSION

I. Issue On Appeal

The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in making an award of spousal support to Mary of $3,000 per month. Robert argues that the trial court abused its discretion by making such support order (1) without weighing and applying the statutory factors under section 4320; (2) without considering the fact that Robert pays approximately $1,150 per month for the college education of the parties adult son; and (3) by considering Roberts gross income rather than his net income, by failing to identify the quantitative impact that Marys substantial separate property assets had upon the amount of the award, and by apparently basing the support figure upon calculations used to determine temporary support. We address these contentions below.

II. Spousal Support Orders

Section 4320 provides that the court shall consider 14 factors13 particular factors and one catchall factorin making a spousal support order.[7] As we have observed, these factors are not advisory ones: In ordering spousal support, the trial court must consider and weigh all of the circumstances enumerated in the statute, to the extent they are relevant to the case before it. (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 302, fn. omitted; see also In re Marriage of Zywiciel (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1081.)

The 13 specific factors enumerated in section 4320 consist of (1) an evaluation of the parties respective earning capacities to determine whether they are sufficient to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage (id., subd. (a)); (2) whether the supported party contributed to the supporting partys education, training, . . . career position, or . . . license (id., subd. (b)); (3) the supporting partys ability to pay support (id., subd. (c)); (4) the parties respective needs in reference to the marital standard of living (id., subd. (d)); (5) the parties respective assets and liabilities, including separate property (id., subd. (e)); (6) the length of time the parties were married (id., subd. (f)); (7) the supported partys ability to work without unduly interfering with the interests of dependent children in [that partys] custody (id., subd. (g)); (8) the parties respective health and ages (id., subd. (h)); (9) the documented existence of any domestic violence between the parties (id., subd. (i)); (10) [t]he immediate and specific tax consequences to each party (id., subd. (j)); (11) [t]he balance of the hardships to each party (id., subd. (k)); (12) [t]he goal that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time (id., subd. (l)); and (13) any criminal conviction of an abusive spouse (id., subd. (m)). These 13 factors are not the exclusive matters for the trial court to consider. Section 4320, subdivision (n) provides that an award of spousal support shall also be based upon [a]ny other factors the court determines are just and equitable.

In making an award of spousal support, the court is required to make specific factual findings with respect to the standard of living during the marriage . . . . ( 4332; see also Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law, supra, 6:1080, p. 6-401.) Where there is a request by either party, the court must make appropriate factual determinations with respect to other circumstances concerning a spousal support order. ( 4332; see also Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law, supra, 6:1086, p. 6-404.)

An order awarding spousal support is reviewable for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of McTiernan & Dubrow (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1106.) But the trial courts exercise of discretion must be grounded on a consideration of the factors itemized in section 4320. In balancing the applicable statutory factors, the trial court has discretion to determine the appropriate weight to accord to each. [Citation.] But the court may not be arbitrary; it must exercise its discretion along legal lines, taking into consideration the applicable circumstances of the parties set forth in [the statute], especially reasonable needs and their financial abilities. [Citation.] Furthermore, the court does not have discretion to ignore any relevant circumstance enumerated in the statute. To the contrary, the trial judge must both recognize and apply each applicable statutory factor in setting spousal support. [Citations.] Failure to do so is reversible error. [Citations.] (In re Marriage of Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 304; see also In re Marriage of Lynn (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 120, 133 [reversal of spousal support order required where it could not be determined whether trial court considered all statutory factors].)

We review the trial courts order here with these standards in mind.

III. Whether Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding Spousal Support

A. Consideration of Section 4320 Factors

Robert does not dispute that the courts 12-page statement of decision refers to each of the 13 specific factors identified in section 4320. Nor does he argue that the court failed to note [a]ny other factors the court determines are just and equitable as required in section 4320, subdivision (n). Instead, Robert asserts that while the court paid lip service to the statutory criteria, it failed to weigh or apply those factors in reaching its determination that Robert should pay spousal support of $3,000 per month. We find this argument to be without merit.

The court conducted extensive proceedings over a two-day period on the issue of spousal support.[8] It also had before it various documents submitted by the parties, including trial briefs, income and expense declarations submitted both before the trial and between the first and second sessions of the trial, closing argument briefs, and rebuttal briefs.

A review of the statement of decision shows that the court identified and resolved many of the specific arguments advanced by the parties. In particular, the court considered the parties arguments about (1) the appropriate manner of determining the marital standard of living; (2) whether Mary had the present ability to earn higher wages based upon possible reemployment with the Social Security Administration; (3) whether Roberts payments to support the college education of the parties adult son should be considered in determining spousal support (discussed in detail in sec. III.B, post); (4) whether Mary was presently able to properly and fully support herself; and (5) the ultimate issue of the appropriate amount of support that should be ordered. And the statement of decision specifically identified each of the 14 factors specified in section 4320, and in many instances, the court cited to specific evidence in making its findings concerning those factors. The record therefore demonstrates that the court gave proper consideration of the statutory criteria in exercising its discretion concerning the award of spousal support.

Robert argues that the statement of decision fails to reflect that the court properly weighed each of the statutory factors in reaching its conclusion concerning spousal support. In essence, Roberts contention suggests that the court must assign specific figures to each of the 14 factors identified in section 4320. Nothing in the statute requires the court to mechanically keep score when it considers and applies the relevant factors in determining an appropriate spousal support award.

The one case cited by Robert does not support his position that the court in this instance abused its discretion. In In re Marriage of Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 269, we found abuse of discretion because the record did not establish that the trial court even considered some of the requisite statutory factors in rendering its spousal support award. Specifically, we concluded that the trial court did not consider the husbands assets (id. at p. 305), his ability to pay support (id. at pp. 305-306), and the wifes reasonable needs (id. at p. 307). Here, as we have noted, the trial court specifically identified and considered each of the statutory factors. (Cf. In re Marriage of Zywiciel, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1083 [spousal support order reversed where record did not disclose that trial court considered section 4320 factors]; In re Marriage of Fenton (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 451, 458 [reversal of spousal support order where trial court did not determine wifes earning capacity or amount of net income available to her from distributed assets].)

Once it has been determined that the trial court considered the factors enumerated in section 4320as we have found herethe ultimate decision as to amount and duration of spousal support rests within its broad discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. [Citation.] (In re Marriage of Kerr (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 87, 93.) Because trial courts have such broad discretion, appellate courts must act with cautious judicial restraint in reviewing these orders. (In re Marriage of Ostler & Smith (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 33, 50; see also In re Marriage of Drapeau (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1086, 1096.) Here, in making its spousal support award, the court gave consideration, inter alia, to the following circumstances: (1) the fact that the marriage was a lengthy one (i.e., over 28 years); (2) Marys ability to support herself was impaired by the two 10-year periods of unemployment that were incurred during the marriage to permit [her] to devote time to domestic duties; (3) Marys claimed monthly expenses (excluding attorney fees) were over $4,100, an amount that greatly exceeded her wage and other monthly income;[9] (4) Roberts gross monthly wage income was $12,686 and his monthly expenses (excluding savings, court costs, and expenses for the college education of the parties son) were $4,117; (5) the fact that Mary had paid approximately $76,000 from her savings for attorney fees; (6) Mary and Robert were 57 and 56 years old, respectively; (7) that Mary had several health issues, including a history of colon cancer; and (8) given Marys age and earning capacity, it could not be specified when she would be self-supporting. The court found that the parties would have enjoyed an upper income standard of living. It concluded that it was not possible to fashion a spousal support order that would provide sufficient funds to allow each party to live separately in a manner completely consistent with the marital standard of living. These findings have substantial evidentiary support and provide a sound basis for the courts decision.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Mary $3,000 in monthly spousal support based upon its required consideration and weighing of the factors identified in section 4320.

B. College Expenses Paid for Adult Son

Robert asked the trial court to consider the monthly expenditures (approximately $1,150) that he made to fund the college education of the parties adult son, Chuck. The court rejected that request on two grounds. First, it concluded that considering the supporting spouses voluntary contributions to an adult child to determine spousal support was improper under the law. Second, the court held that it was inappropriate to consider Roberts contributions to Chucks education in this instance, where such support was against the express wishes of Mary. We conclude that the court acted properly under both rationales.

Robert cites In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76 in support of his position that the court erred by failing to consider his expenses for Chucks college education. There, the wifes (supported spouses) challenge to the trial courts award of $750 in monthly spousal support was rejected. In the course of its discussion, the Supreme Court noted that the husbands income was inadequate both to sustain two separate households at the standard of living previously enjoyed by the parties and to provide for the [adult] daughters college education. (Id. at p. 90.) The issue of whether it was proper to consider the expenditure of funds for the college education of an adult child in fixing spousal support was not expressly raised or considered in In re Marriage of Epstein. Indeed, there is no indication that the wife objected to this expense.  [C]ases are not authority for propositions not considered. [Citation.] (People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 198.) We therefore reject Roberts assertion that the trial court was compelled, under In re Marriage of Epstein, to consider his expenditures on behalf of Chucks college education in determining appropriate child support.[10]

Mary cites In re Marriage of Serna (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 482a case relied on by the trial courtin support of her position that the court correctly disregarded Roberts expenditures on behalf of Chuck in determining appropriate spousal support. There, the Fourth District Court of Appeal (Division Three) held that it was improper to consider the voluntary expenditures made by the supported spouse for the support of the parties adult children in fixing spousal support. The court reasoned that since section 3901 terminates the obligation to support a child at age 19, at the latest,[11] considering one spouses voluntary support payments to an adult child in determining appropriate spousal support was prohibited in that it indirectly compelled support for adult children. (In re Marriage of Serna, supra, at p. 491; see also In re Marriage of Lynn, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 133.)

In so holding, the court noted (as we have here) that In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76 never decided the issue of the propriety of considering expenses paid by the supporting spouse for an adult child in fixing spousal support. (In re Marriage of Serna, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 488, 492.) It therefore chose not to follow In re Marriage of Siegel (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 88, or In re Marriage of Paul (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 913two cases cited by Robert here. The Serna court noted that the courts in those earlier cases were somewhat less than strict in allowing a supported spouses subsidy to adult children to be a consideration in spousal support. (In re Marriage of Serna, supra, at p. 489.) In rejecting the two earlier decisions, the court held: The central flaw in both Siegel and Paul is that they allow for the naked circumvention of a decision that has already been made by the Legislaturenamely, that child support ends at age 19 at the latest, absent incapacity to earn a living. Neither case ever quite confronted the idea that it was allowing something to be done indirectly what could not be done directly. Siegel rather conclusorily dismissed the point as [n]it-picking [In re Marriage of Siegel, supra, at p. 93] without even attempting to articulate any meaningful difference between adult child support and using it as a factor to increase a legal obligation to pay spousal support. It never dealt with the point that some money was still being required of a payor spouse to pay for what, under Jones [v. Jones (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1011], he or she clearly is otherwise not obligated. (Id. at p. 491.)

We find the Fourth Districts reasoning in In re Marriage of Serna to be persuasive. We conclude therefore that the court below correctly refused to consider Roberts voluntary expenditures for the parties adult child in awarding spousal support. (See also In re Marriage of Chandler (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 124, 130 [court generally has no authority to order parent to support an adult child]; In re Marriage of McElwee (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 902 [adult child support accomplished indirectly by increased spousal support award held improper].)

But even were it legally permissible to factor Roberts expenditures to the parties adult son in determining spousal supporta position which we have rejectedthe court, in the exercise of its discretion, properly could have disregarded (and did disregard) those expenses. The court noted that Mary originally agreed with Robert that they should contribute to their sons college education for four years. And they did contribute approximately $20,000 per year until 2002, and released $21,000 in trust funds to their son in 2003 or 2004. Chuck began college in August 1999, but dropped out for one year. The court noted further that [w]hen questioned at trial, [Robert] testified that he has no expectation concerning when Chuck will graduate, . . . [Robert] refused to answer whether Chuck was able to apply for scholarships.^[[12]] (In fact, [Mary] testified that Chuck had missed two deadlines that had precluded him from receiving any aid for two earlier college years.) The court therefore held: Under these circumstances, it would not be appropriate to require [Mary] to continue contributing, against her wishes and parental judgment, to Chucks continuing, presumably open-ended education, in the guise of reduced spousal support.

The trial court did not err when it refused to consider Roberts voluntary payments for the support of the parties adult son in making the spousal support award.

C. Other Claims of Error

Citing In re Marriage of Burlini (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 65, Robert contends that the court erred by impermissibly basing the spousal support award upon a figure derived from a computer program (DissoMaster[13]) used in an application filed by Mary for temporary spousal support. That case did hold that permanent spousal support may not be based upon temporary support schedules (which reflect the different objectives of temporary support). (In re Marriage of Burlini, supra, at pp. 68-69.) And Robert correctly notes that the permanent [spousal support] order is to be based on an independent, ground-up evaluation of the statutory factors in light of circumstances existing at trial [citation] . . . . (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law, supra, 6:892, p. 6-320, citing In re Marriage of Zywiciel, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1082.)

But there is nothing here that demonstrates that the court used the DissoMaster figure submitted by Mary in her application for temporary support as the basis for the permanent support order. While the amount of temporary support suggested in the DissoMaster ($3,221) is within 10 percent of the permanent support ultimately awarded, this fact alone does not support the conclusion that the trial court based the permanent award on the computer-generated figure. Indeed, Robert argues only that one can not [sic] but suspect that [Marys] Disso[M]aster printout played an impermissible role and at least subliminally contaminated the trial judges analysis. We will not find error on the basis of mere speculationas Robert suggests that we do here. The burden of affirmatively demonstrating error is on the appellant. This is a general principle of appellate practice as well as an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error. [Citation.] The order of the lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness. [Citation.] (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 610.)

Robert also contends that the court erred by using his gross (rather than net) income to establish the appropriate level of permanent spousal support. This claim is similarly without merit. While it is true that the courts statement of decision makes reference to Roberts gross monthly income of $12,686, it does not follow that the court did not consider his after-tax income in making the spousal support award. To the contrary, the court noted that it had considered the immediate and specific tax consequences for the parties wages and other taxable and nontaxable income, and for the ordered spousal support. And the statement of decision contains no less than six specific references to Roberts July 25, 2005 income and expenses declaration; that declaration included pay stubs as exhibits, and those pay stubs clearly reflected Roberts gross and net income figures.

The record evidences that the court considered the parties respective net income (as well as gross income), and we will not presume that the court erred where the record does not support that presumption.[14] In reaching this conclusion, we observe the well admonished rule of appellate review which finds a presumption that the court performed its duties in a regular and correct manner absent a clear showing to the contrary. (In re Marriage of Fransen (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 419, 424.)

Lastly, Robert argues that the trial court erred because it failed to indicate in its statement of decision exactly what quantitative impact [Marys] separate estate had on the final support award. As we have explained (see sec. III.A. of Discussion, ante), the court need not keep a scorecard with respect to any of the factors specified in section 4320. Although the law requires consideration of each of the statutory factors in making a spousal support award, it does not require that the judge assign a particular quantitative impact for any of the factors. The court in its statement of decision specifically recognized that Mary had significant assets (between $227,000 and $238,000 in stocks, bonds and liquid assets), and that she derived between $750 to $834 in monthly income from those assets. And it concluded that Marys income and separate estate [were] not sufficient for her proper support. In making its award, the court further considered and rejected Roberts contention that Mary should not receive any support in view of her separate assets. There was no error in failing to provide any more specific findings on the subject of Marys inherited assets and their impact on the spousal support award. (Cf. In re Marriage of McTiernan & Dubrow, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1105-1108 [two-year limitation on spousal support held improper where court gave undue emphasis to supported spouses separate assets without giving sufficient consideration to her needs or supporting spouses ability to pay].)

DISPOSITION

The order awarding permanent spousal support to Mary in the monthly amount of $3,000 is affirmed.

Duffy, J.

WE CONCUR:

Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.

McAdams, J.

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[1] As is customary in family law cases, we refer to the parties by their first names for purposes of clarity and not out of disrespect. (Kuehn v. Kuehn (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 824, 828, fn. 2.)

[2] All statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise specified.

[3] There were few controverted material facts. The basic facts pertinent to the spousal support award are taken primarily from the courts statement of decision.

[4] Mary and Robert filed income and expense declarations in July 2005. Unless otherwise specified, the asset and liability information concerning the parties is derived from these two declarations.

[5] The court noted a slight discrepancy between Marys income and expense declaration and exhibits to that declaration; an account statement attached to the declaration showed a balance of approximately $238,000 and monthly earnings of approximately $834. In addition, the court noted that although Marys income and expense declaration listed $29,000 in cash, Mary testified in September 2005 that the cash had been reduced to approximately $10,000.

[6] Although captioned a statement of decision, the matter from which an appeal was taken here was in essence an order fixing permanent spousal support. As such, it was a directly appealable collateral order because it finally determine[d] the rights of the parties in relation to that matter, leaving no further judicial acts to be done in regard thereto. In effect, such a decision [was] the equivalent of a final judgment in an independent proceeding. [Citations.] (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2007) 16:268, pp. 16-78 to 16-79; see also In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368-369; In re Marriage of de Guigne (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1359.)

[7] In ordering spousal support under this part, the court shall consider all of the following circumstances: [] (a) The extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into account all of the following: [] (1) The marketable skills of the supported party; the job market for those skills; the time and expenses required for the supported party to acquire the appropriate education or training to develop those skills; and the possible need for retraining or education to acquire other, more marketable skills or employment. [] (2) The extent to which the supported partys present or future earning capacity is impaired by periods of unemployment that were incurred during the marriage to permit the supported party to devote time to domestic duties. [] (b) The extent to which the supported party contributed to the attainment of an education, training, a career position, or a license by the supporting party. [] (c) The ability of the supporting party to pay spousal support, taking into account the supporting partys earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and standard of living. [] (d) The needs of each party based on the standard of living established during the marriage. [] (e) The obligations and assets, including the separate property, of each party. [] (f) The duration of the marriage. [] (g) The ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without unduly interfering with the interests of dependent children in the custody of the party. [] (h) The age and health of the parties. [] (i) Documented evidence of any history of domestic violence, as defined in Section 6211, between the parties, including, but not limited to, consideration of emotional distress resulting from domestic violence perpetrated against the supported party by the supporting party, and consideration of any history of violence against the supporting party by the supported party. [] (j) The immediate and specific tax consequences to each party. [] (k) The balance of the hardships to each party. [] (l) The goal that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time. Except in the case of a marriage of long duration as described in Section 4336, a reasonable period of time for purposes of this section generally shall be one-half the length of the marriage. However, nothing in this section is intended to limit the courts discretion to order support for a greater or lesser length of time, based on any of the other factors listed in this section, Section 4336, and the circumstances of the parties. [] (m) The criminal conviction of an abusive spouse shall be considered in making a reduction or elimination of a spousal support award in accordance with Section 4325. [] (n) Any other factors the court determines are just and equitable. ( 4320.)

[8] Although the record does not reflect the number of hours that the trial consumed, we note that the reporters transcript consists of a total of 249 pages.

[9] The court noted that Marys gross monthly wages were $2,500 and her monthly dividend income was approximately $834.

[10] Roberts reliance upon In re Marriage of Kelley (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 82 is similarly unavailing. Although the court there cited the fact that the husband was anticipating the additional expense of funding the college education of the parties daughter as justification for the trial courts reduction of spousal support (id. at p. 95), there is nothing in the record indicating that the wife objected to consideration of this expense in deciding appropriate spousal support. Likewise, In re Marriage of Meegan (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 156, relied on by Robert, does not support his position. Although the court mentioned in passing that the husband was contributing toward the college education of his two adult daughters (id. at pp. 159), the appellate court did not address whether it was appropriate to consider these expenses in making an award of spousal support.

[11] The duty of support imposed by Section 3900 continues as to an unmarried child who has attained the age of 18 years, is a full-time high school student, and who is not self-supporting, until the time the child completes the 12th grade or attains the age of 19 years, whichever occurs first. ( 3901, subd. (a).)

[12] When asked by Marys counsel if he thought that Chuck was intelligent enough to obtain scholarships, Robert responded: I dont think thats any of your damn business. The court noted at the time: Ill accept that as the answer and use it to evaluate the testimony and the credibility.

[13] For assistance in setting child support and temporary spousal support, two computer programs appear to be used by most family law judges in California. DissoMaster was developed by Stephen Adams, Esq., and is produced by California Family Law Reports, while Supportax was developed by George Norton, Esq., and is produced by The Rutter Group. The computer programs determine child support according to the statutory formula and calculate temporary spousal support as provided by local rules for the ordinary case. The benefit of the programs is that they enable a family law judge to input appropriate factual information about the income of the parties and have temporary spousal support computed in accordance with local rules, automatically taking into account the tax consequences of the order to each party. (In re Marriage of Olson (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1, 5, fn. 3.)

[14] Robert makes the related argument that in making the spousal support award, the court did not properly consider the parties respective income and expenses to arrive at an equitable result. In doing so, Robert engages in fuzzy math of the kind that he (incorrectly) accuses the trial court of performing. He calculates his needs based upon subtraction of his monthly expenses from his net income, and calculates Marys needs by subtracting her monthly expenses from her gross income. It suffices to say that we conclude that the record discloses that the court considered all of the financial information relevant to making a support award, including information concerning the parties gross income, net income, expenses, and tax consequences associated with any spousal support award.