Marriage of Heierle and Assawasuksant

Filed 10/30/06 Marriage of Heierle and Assawasuksant CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In this marital dissolution action, Yupa Assawasuksant contends that her former husband, James Heierle, breached his fiduciary duty to her by failing to disclose the extent or the value of certain community property at the time she agreed to two property settlements, and that the trial court should have set aside the judgment incorporating those settlements, on grounds of fraud, perjury, and mistake. (See Fam. Code,^[1] § 2122, subd. (a), (b) & (e).) Additionally, she asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request for a continuance. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND^[2]

Yupa and James^[3] were married in May 1993 and separated in October 1999. They have one minor child born in 1997. James operates a business known as Brookside Orchids (Brookside), which he formed in 1980. Brookside sells orchids on a nationwide basis, as well as at local farmers’ markets. During the marriage, James co-owned Brookside with his father, with each partner having a 50 percent interest. Prior to the separation, Yupa had worked for Brookside as a bookkeeper, and had also operated Brookside’s stands at several farmers’ markets.

In late 1999, James used $100,000 of community funds, together with cash from Brookside and a contribution from his father, to purchase a 25 percent interest in another orchid business, Stribling Vanderfin Associates (SVA). The purchase price for the 25 percent interest was $495,960.

In February 2002, the parties’ jointly retained forensic accountant, William Archer, prepared a valuation of Brookside. Archer stated that the cash basis accounting utilized by plant nurseries, such as Brookside, created problems in ascertaining a business’s value because this accounting method did not “clearly reflect financial performance.“ In any event, after various adjustments, Archer concluded that Brookside’s increase in value during the marital period was $251,693 and that the community interest would be limited to a value representing a percentage of this increase. Archer’s evaluation took into consideration unreported cash income from sales at the farmers’ markets. Archer estimated this income to be $50,000 in 1993, and increased this amount by 5 percent in each subsequent year through 1999. Archer further determined that as of December 31, 2001, using a 16 percent rate of return, the community’s investment in SVA, by virtue of James’s contribution of $100,000 of community funds in 1999, was worth $134,500.

On May 13, 2002, the parties entered into a stipulated property settlement. Pursuant to the terms of the May 2002 agreement, James agreed to pay Yupa $630,000 in exchange for all of the community property; by prior court order, Yupa had received a $50,000 advance of her share of the community property. James also agreed to pay $45,000 to cover Yupa’s attorney fees. At the time the parties signed the May 2002 agreement, James had not yet prepared his final declaration of disclosure. The May 2002 agreement provided that it was a final, comprehensive settlement of all of the property issues in this case and that it would be incorporated into a marital settlement agreement to be filed with the court.

On July 9, 2002, Bernard Vanderfin, a minority shareholder of SVA, offered James $1 million to acquire Brookside’s 25 percent interest in SVA. At the time the offer was made, various co-owners of SVA were engaged in a struggle for the control of SVA. On July 2, 2002, one week before the Vanderfin offer, James was made general manager of SVA. Vanderfin and another SVA owner, who together held a 40 percent interest in SVA, were voted out by the other owners; Vanderfin, who had been the general manager, was then fired. James did not consider Vanderfin’s offer to be valid and he did not accept it. Ultimately, the dispute over control of SVA resulted in a shareholders’ derivative action filed in Santa Barbara County. (See Vanderfin, et al. v. Stribling, et al. (Super. Ct. Santa Barbara County, 2004, No. 1097073) [hereinafter referred to as the “Santa Barbara litigation”].)

In January 2003, after several attempts to negotiate a marital settlement agreement that incorporated the terms of the May 2002 agreement, the parties entered into a second agreement. The second agreement was filed with the court on January 16, 2003, and was entitled “Stipulation and Order Re: Reimbursement and Other Issues.” The January 2003 order provided, in relevant part, that James’s attorney would prepare a marital settlement agreement on or before January 31, 2003. The parties agreed to exchange final declarations of disclosure on or before January 27, 2003.

In his final declaration of disclosure, James did not disclose the July 2002 offer by Vanderfin to acquire Brookside’s 25 percent interest in SVA. James reported that the value of his 50 percent interest in Brookside was “unknown.” However, he attached and referenced Archer’s February 2002 valuation report. James also provided separate values for three bank accounts and one brokerage account belonging to Brookside, which had an aggregate value of $505,136.

In January 2004, after several failed attempts to negotiate another marital settlement agreement, James filed a motion for entry of judgment, which the trial court granted on March 11, 2004. The March 2004 order provided that the judgment would incorporate the May 2002 agreement and the January 2003 order. The trial court found that all of the property issues between the parties were resolved by the May 2002 agreement and the January 2003 order. Issues regarding child support and spousal support were reserved for trial.

On November 18, 2004, the trial court signed the judgment, but ordered that it would be held for two weeks to allow counsel “to submit additional papers.” On December 2, 2004, Yupa, acting in propria persona, filed objections to the entry of the proposed judgment. Yupa objected to the entry of judgment on the grounds that James had been pocketing the cash income generated from sales at the farmers’ markets and had failed to disclose the $1 million offer to purchase the community interest in SVA.^[4]

On December 27, 2004, the trial court rejected Yupa’s objections and entered a judgment of dissolution, which incorporated the May 2002 settlement and January 2003 order regarding the property issues.

On April 15, 2005, Yupa, again acting in propria persona, filed a motion to set aside the judgment. In her supporting declaration, Yupa claimed relief was required because the judgment was the product of fraud, perjury, and mistake. (See § 2122, subds. (a), (b) & (e).) Yupa argued that she had agreed to the property settlements without knowing that: 1) James had received a $1 million offer to purchase a “community business interest” in July 2002; 2) James had been pocketing cash proceeds from Brookside during the dissolution proceedings; and 3) James had been manipulating his business interests during the dissolution proceedings, which distorted his income and asset information. Yupa claimed that James “accumulated very large sums of cash from Brookside retail sales during [the] marriage.” According to Yupa, the parties were able to purchase a “rambling home” in San Anselmo for cash. She further claimed that on one occasion James made a $100,000 cash loan to a friend; the $100,000 purportedly had been taken from a safe in their home.

Additionally, Yupa asserted that Brookside’s bookkeeper revealed that James had sole control over the cash income generated from the farmers’ markets and that he never deposited this income into the business account. Yupa, however, provided no declaration or other evidence supporting the alleged statements made by the bookkeeper.

In support of her motion to set aside the judgment, Yupa provided a copy of the

statement of decision rendered by the trial court in the Santa Barbara litigation. She also provided Archer’s February 2002 evaluation, as well as an undated “preliminary summary of cash flow” that Archer prepared, which purportedly contradicted James’s prior answers to special interrogatories regarding the extent of his income.

James opposed the motion to set aside the judgment arguing that, among other things, Brookside was separate property, and as such, its valuation must be determined by the increases in value between the date of marriage and the date of separation. James further argued that Yupa’s allegations did not affect the value of Brookside. He provided a detailed supporting declaration, which included a revised valuation by Archer, as well as Vanderfin’s 2002 “offer.”^[5] On January 13, 2005, Archer provided a revised valuation of Brookside, which factored in the $1 million offer. According to Archer, if the $1 million had been paid in full, the increase in value to the community’s 25 percent interest in SVA, after various adjustments, would have been $21,983.

James attached a copy of the “Acquisition Term Sheet” prepared by Vanderfin in July 2002, in which he offered $1 million for Brookside’s interest in SVA. The term sheet provided that it was contingent upon the execution of a purchase agreement and subject to further negotiation.

James also provided a declaration from Mas Takahashi, a shareholder of SVA. In his declaration, Takahashi stated that the majority shareholders of SVA viewed Vanderfin’s offer as nothing more than a tactic to gain control over SVA’s management and/or an attempt to inflate the price of SVA shares. Takahashi further stated that “Vanderfin never made an actual comprehensive offer.”

On June 7, 2005, two days before the scheduled hearing on the motion to set aside, Yupa made an ex parte request for a continuance. The basis for Yupa’s request was that she had just received James’s amended tax returns for the years 2001 through 2003, on June 6, 2005, and was not presently able to ascertain the damage to her accurately. The ex parte request was actually made by the attorney representing Yupa in the custody and support aspects of the dissolution proceedings. Counsel advised the trial court that she would be substituting in as the attorney of record in the pending motion to set aside the judgment. The trial court did not rule on the ex parte request and put the matter over to the scheduled hearing, at which time the court would address the continuance and the merits of the motion to set aside the judgment. Following the contested hearing on June 9, 2005, the trial court denied the motion to set aside the judgment on the ground that Yupa failed to meet her burden under section 2121, subdivision (b).^[6] The trial court found that Yupa had not presented facts sufficient to find that the original outcome would have been materially affected and that she would have materially benefited from setting the judgment aside.

On June 27, 2005, the trial court issued a statement of decision, which set forth several factual findings, including: (1) the business valuation would not have been affected by a speculative offer that was not accepted or considered valid by James and at least one other business partner; the offer was made two months after the settlement was entered into by the parties; (2) Yupa was involved in Brookside and was aware of the receipt of unreported cash and this unreported income was included in Archer’s valuation of the business; (3) Yupa did not factually support the allegation that James manipulated business interests, prior to separation, so as to materially affect the valuation of the community share of Brookside; (4) Yupa had knowledge of, or could have had knowledge of, the alleged acts of fraud, perjury, and/or mistake at the time of the May 2002 and January 2003 property agreements; (5) Yupa accepted the February 2002 business evaluation prepared by Archer; (6) Yupa chose not to challenge James’s declarations of disclosure within a reasonable time; and (7) Yupa had received the benefit of $680,000 in the property division and $82,000 in attorney fees; the court found no evidence that she would receive a greater benefit if the judgment were set aside. This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A trial court’s decision in ruling on a motion to set aside a judgment under section 2122 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Brewer & Federici (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1346 (Brewer); In re Marriage of Rosevear (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 673,682-683 (Rosevear); In re Marriage of Varner (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 128, 138 (Varner).) In reviewing such a determination, we “must not merely substitute [our] own view as to the proper decision: ‘[T]he showing on appeal is wholly insufficient if it presents a state of facts . . . which . . . merely affords an opportunity for a difference of opinion. An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’ [Citation.]” (Varner, supra, at p. 138.)

Thus, a trial court’s order granting or denying a motion to set aside a judgment under section 2122 “will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, resulting in injury sufficiently grave as to amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (Rosevear, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 682.) “A proper exercise of judicial discretion requires the exercise of discriminating judgment within the bounds of reason, and an absence of arbitrary determination, capricious disposition, or whimsical thinking. . . . ‘Discretion is abused in the legal sense “ ‘whenever it may be fairly said that in its exercise the court . . . contravened the uncontradicted evidence. [Citations.]’ “ [Citation.]’ “ (Id. at pp. 682-683.)

To the extent the trial court makes factual findings while ruling on a motion to set aside a judgment under section 2122, we review such findings for substantial evidence. (See Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.) Under that standard of review, “we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the judgment. [Citations.] . . . Even in cases where the evidence is undisputed or uncontradicted, if two or more different inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence this court is without power to substitute its own inferences or deductions for those of the trier of fact, which must resolve such conflicting inferences in the absence of a rule of law specifying the inference to be drawn. We must accept as true all evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s findings and decision, resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment. [Citations.]” (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630-631.)

If “ ‘substantial’ evidence is present, no matter how slight it may appear in comparison with contradictory evidence, the judgment must be upheld . . . . In short, even if the judgment of the trial court is against the weight of the evidence, we are bound to uphold it so long as the record is free from prejudicial error and the judgment is supported by evidence which is ‘substantial,’ that is of ‘ “ponderable legal significance,” ‘ ‘ “reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value . . . .” ‘ [Citations.]” (Howard v. Owens Corning, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 631.)

We review the trial court’s order denying Yupa’s motion to set aside the judgment with the above standards of review in mind.

B. Applicable Legal Principals

1. Fiduciary Duty Between Spouses

“Marriage creates a fiduciary relationship between spouses. ([] §§ 721, subd. (b), 1100, subd. (e), 2102.) The confidential relationship between spouses ‘imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse . . . .’ ([] § 721, subd. (b).) As part of these obligations, each spouse is required to provide the other spouse with access to all books regarding transactions for purposes of inspection and copying ([] § 721, subd. (b)(1)), and rendering upon request ‘true and full information of all things affecting any transaction which concerns the community property.’ (b)(2).) Additionally, spouses must make full and accurate disclosure and account for separate and community property. ([] § 2100, subds. (b) & (c) [sound public policy favors reducing adversarial nature of marital dissolution and attendant costs by fostering full disclosure and cooperative discovery]; [] § 2102 [requiring accurate and complete disclosures]; [] § 2103 [requiring both preliminary and final declarations of disclosure]; [] § 2104 [requiring preliminary declaration of disclosure]; [] § 2105, subd. (a) [requiring final declaration of disclosure].) The duty of disclosure ‘includes the obligation to make full disclosure to the other spouse of all material facts and information regarding the existence, characterization, and valuation of all assets in which the community has or may have an interest . . . .’ ([] § 1100, subd. (e) [].)” (Brewer, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1342-1343, fns. and italics omitted.)

“The parties also have ‘a continuing duty to update and augment that disclosure to the extent there have been any material changes so that at the time the parties enter into an agreement for the resolution of any of these issues, . . . each party will have as full and complete knowledge of the relevant underlying facts as is reasonably possible . . . .’ ([] § 2100, subd. (c).) The final declarations of disclosure must include, among other items, ‘[a]ll material facts and information regarding the valuation of all assets that are contended to be community property or in which it is contended the community has an interest.’ ([] § 2105, subd. (b)(2) [].) These duties arise without reference to any wrongdoing. [Citations.]” (Brewer, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1343-1344, fn. & italics omitted.)

2. Section 2122

Under section 2122, the court may set aside a judgment on any one of six statutory bases, namely, where the judgment was the result of (1) actual fraud, (2) perjury in connection with financial disclosures filed by the parties, (3) duress, (4) mental incapacity, (5) mutual or unilateral mistake (in the case of stipulated or uncontested judgments only), or (6) the noncompliance with financial disclosure requirements as provided in section 2100 et seq. These are “the exclusive grounds” for setting aside a dissolution judgment. (Rosevear, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 684.)^[7]

In addition to establishing one of the six statutory grounds for relief, the moving party must show that the statutory ground materially affected the outcome and that he or she would materially benefit if the judgment were set aside. (§ 2121, subd. (b); In re Marriage of Steiner & Hosseini (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 519, 527 (Steiner); Brewer, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1345; Rosevear, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 685, fn. 11; Varner, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 137.) Furthermore, a judgment may not be set aside under section 2122 “simply because the court finds that it was inequitable when made, nor simply because subsequent circumstances caused the division of assets or liabilities to become inequitable, or the support to become inadequate.” (§ 2123; see also Brewer, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1344.) Indeed, if the moving party presents nothing more than the fact that the judgment was inequitable when made, the court has no discretion to grant relief under the statute. (In re Marriage of Heggie (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 28, 29-30, 34 (Heggie).)

C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Yupa’s Motion to Set Aside the Judgment

Yupa contends she is entitled to relief from judgment because the property agreements were the product of fraud (§ 2122, subd. (a)), perjury (§ 2122, subd. (b)), and mistake (§ 2122, subd. (e)). As discussed, we review the trial court’s order denying the motion to set aside the judgment for an abuse of discretion. (Rosevear, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 681; Varner, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 140.) None appears. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings that Yupa failed to establish that the alleged fraud, perjury, and mistake materially affected the judgment and that she would materially benefit from granting the relief.^[8]

1. The Facts Alleged Regarding James’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty Did Not Materially Affect Judgment

Yupa contends that the record in the instant case compels a finding that James breached his fiduciary duty to provide an “accurate and complete disclosure of all assets and liabilities” of the parties in his final declaration of disclosure. Yupa argues that her motion should have been granted based upon Varner, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th 128, and Brewer, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 1334.

In Varner, the court held that the trial court should have granted the wife’s motion to set aside a stipulated judgment under section 2122, where the wife submitted evidence that the husband had undervalued certain assets dramatically, including an undervaluation of his business by at least $2 million. (Varner, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 134.) There, the wife supported her argument by submitting valuations of the property submitted by her experts, and even the husband’s experts, and compared them to the husband’s testimony at trial regarding the valuation of community property. (Id. at p. 143.) She also provided loan applications submitted by the husband near to the time of his testimony showing substantially higher values given to the properties on the loan applications than were testified to by the husband at trial. (Ibid.) The appellate court concluded that relief was warranted because the facts “compel[led] a finding that husband breached his duty [under section 2102, subdivision (a)] to provide an ‘accurate and complete disclosure of all assets and liabilities’ of the parties at the time of the negotiations surrounding the stipulated judgment.” (Ibid.)

Likewise, in Brewer, the appellate court affirmed an order setting aside a judgment entered pursuant to a marital settlement agreement, where the property distribution had included an equalization payment to the husband based upon an undervaluation of the wife’s pension plan interests by at least $343,000. (Brewer, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1341.) The wife’s pension plans were the largest community assets. (Id. at p. 1346.) As such, the parties conceded that the valuation of these assets materially affected the original outcome and husband would materially benefit from granting relief. (Ibid.) Wife, however, argued that there could be no mistake because she met her disclosure obligations by fully disclosing the existence of both pension plans, the information known to her, and information from which the assets could be valued. (Id. at p. 1347.) The appellate court disagreed and concluded that the wife’s nondisclosure of material information concerning the largest community assets (i.e., her understatement of one pension plan by approximately $64,000 and her listing as “unknown” the value of the other pension plan that had a value of at least $278,784 (ibid.)), given fiduciary obligations imposed upon both spouses, justified a finding of mistake under section 2122 subdivision (e). (Brewer, supra, at pp. 1347-1348.) In so holding, the court explained that the wife did not meet her disclosure obligation by merely disclosing the existence of both plans, and listing the valuation of one as “unknown,” as its value was readily ascertainable. (Ibid.)

Varner and Brewer are readily distinguishable from the instant case. Here, Yupa presented no evidence that James had dramatically undervalued Brookside or the community’s interest therein. James’s partnership interest in Brookside was known to Yupa at the time she agreed to the property settlements, as was the fact that Brookside owned a 25 percent in SVA. While it is true that James listed the value of Brookside as “unknown” in his final declaration of disclosure,^[9] he also referenced and attached Archer’s February 2002 report. In his report, Archer stated that the cash basis accounting utilized by plant nurseries, such as Brookside, created problems in ascertaining a business’s value because this accounting method did not “clearly reflect financial performance.” Arguably, the valuation of Brookside, unlike the financial information regarding the wife’s pensions in Brewer, was not readily ascertainable information. In any event, after various adjustments, Archer concluded that Brookside’s increase in value during the marital period was $251,693 and that the community interest would be limited to a value representing a percentage of this increase. Archer’s report further estimated that the community’s interest in Brookside’s 25 percent ownership in SVA would amount to $134,500.

Yupa, however, contends that James’s final declaration of disclosure was inadequate because it did not also disclose Vanderfin’s July 2002 offer to acquire Brookside’s 25 percent interest in SVA for $1 million. In support of this contention, she relies on the December 2004 statement of decision in the Santa Barbara litigation as establishing that Vanderfin’s offer was made in good faith. Yupa ignores the fact that James never accepted this offer. Accordingly, any purported increase to the community’s interest in SVA is pure speculation. Moreover, Archer’s revised valuation in January 2005 establishes that James’s failure to include the Vanderfin offer in his final statement of disclosure did not result in a dramatic undervaluation of the community’s interest in Brookside. Archer concluded that if Vanderfin actually paid $1 million for Brookside’s 25 percent interest in SVA, the value of the community’s interest would have been $156,483, which amounted to a $21,983 difference from his February 2002 valuation.^[10] This slight, speculative increase in the community’s interest in SVA cannot reasonably be equated to the dramatic undervaluation of the major community assets involved in Varner and Brewer.

Yupa criticizes James’s reliance on In re Marriage of Jones (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 685 (Jones) and Steiner, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th 519, claiming that the “lack of evidentiary showing in Jones and Steiner is in sharp contrast to the instant matter.” We disagree.

In Jones, the wife attempted to have the judgment set aside on the grounds that the property division was unequal, that the husband had prevented her from attending the trial, and that the husband did not file a mandatory final declaration of disclosure. (Jones, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 688.) She believed a different and more equitable division of property would have resulted if she had been present at trial. (Ibid.) In affirming the order denying the motion to set aside the judgment, the Jones court contrasted the unsubstantiated claims made by wife with extensive evidentiary showing made in Varner: “[Wife’s] lack of evidentiary showing contrasts starkly with the record reviewed in [] Varner, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th 128. There the wife supported her motion for order vacating the judgment with property appraisals and declarations indicating the husband had significantly undervalued the marital assets. (55 Cal.App.4th at pp. 134-135, 143.) In this case [wife] merely relied on undocumented statements of her attorney that: the division of property was not equal, [husband] received the ‘lion’s share’ of the assets, and the failure to award spousal support was ‘unconscionable’; [husband] ‘actively’ kept wife ignorant of the terms of the judgment by failing to contact her when she was out of state and notify her of the trial date; [husband] undervalued assets, failed to provide proof of the value of assets and subjected [wife] to duress. None of the contentions was supported by evidence, however . . . .” (Id. at p. 695, italics added.)

Here, contrary to Yupa’s assertion, the evidentiary showing in the instant case is actually quite similar to the unsubstantiated claims asserted in Jones. Like the wife in Jones, Yupa relied on undocumented statements to support her claim that James had undervalued the community’s interest in SVA. For example, Yupa claims that in April 2004 she learned from Brookside’s bookkeeper that James had been “pocketing cash” from the orchid sales at the farmers’ markets. However, she provides no declaration from the bookkeeper nor any other competent evidence to support her claim. Moreover, Archer’s February 2002 valuation report of Brookside took into consideration James’s unreported cash income. Yupa counters this evidence by asserting that Archer’s evaluation was only an estimate and not based on actual, verified information. As such, she claims she was not fully aware of the nature and extent of the unreported cash income. This contention is belied by the fact that Yupa had previously been a bookkeeper for Brookside, and had operated Brookside’s stands at several farmers’ markets. Moreover, Yupa claimed that James had accumulated “very large sums of cash” from Brookside throughout the marriage.

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Yupa was not fully aware of the nature and extent of the unreported cash income at the time she signed the property settlements, by the time she moved to set aside the judgment she could have provided a declaration from the bookkeeper. The bookkeeper’s hearsay statements, which Yupa references in her declaration in support of the motion to set aside the judgment, do not constitute “facts” that materially affected the judgment. (See § 2121, subd. (b).)

In Steiner, neither party submitted a final declaration of disclosure. (Steiner, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at pp. 522-523.) The primary issue before the court was whether this failure was enough, by itself, to compel granting a new trial or the reversal of a judgment on appeal. (Id. at p. 525.) In affirming, the trial court held that the wife had “not attempted to identify any part of the judgment where she suffered a loss because of the non-exchange of final disclosure statements.” (Id. at p. 528, fn. omitted.)

Here, as in Steiner, Yupa has not identified any part of the judgment that was materially affected because of James’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty. For example, Yupa failed to present evidence of any “business manipulation” during the marital period that would have affected the value of the community’s interest in Brookside. Rather, she argues that the record in this case establishes “not only that James manipulated the business prior to separation so as to materially affect its value, but [also] that he knowingly concealed this information” from her at the time he signed his final declaration of disclosure. In support of this claim, Yupa argues that James consistently misrepresented his income in 2001 and 2002. She further claims that James took a draw in 2002 from the business account in the amount of $454,150 for attorney fees, expert fees, and an equalizing payment to her, which James wrote off as “business expenses.”^[11] However, Yupa fails to substantiate her claims and fails to establish how the alleged “business manipulation” materially affected the judgment. To the extent Yupa relies on James’s failure to disclose the Vanderfin offer and his unreported cash income as further examples of “business manipulation” affecting the community interest in Brookside, she has failed to substantiate these claims and establish that they materially affected the judgment.

Thus, despite Yupa’s contentions to the contrary, the instant case is closer to Jones and Steiner, than to Varner or Brewer. In sum, the trial court acted well within its discretion in finding that the facts alleged as fraud, perjury, or mistake did not materially affect the judgment.

2. The Trial Court Properly Found that Yupa Would Not Materially Benefit From the Judgment Being Set Aside

The trial court found that there was no evidence that Yupa would materially benefit from the judgment being set aside. We agree. Yupa has received $680,000, representing her share of the approximate $1,360,000 community estate, as well as $82,000 in attorney fees. Yupa presumes, without presenting any supporting evidence, that if the judgment were set aside and the Vanderfin offer were taken into consideration in valuing the community’s interest in Brookside, she would gain a material benefit. In order for Yupa to receive any benefit, let alone a material one, we would have to assume the Vanderfin offer was accepted for the $1 million price. Even assuming that the offer had been accepted at this price, the parties’ jointly retained forensic accountant determined that, after various calculations, the increase in value would be approximately $21,983, which translates into a 1.6 percent increase in the community estate (based on an estimated total value of $1,360,000), of which $10,991 would be Yupa’s share. This purported inequity is not sufficient, in and of itself, to warrant setting the judgment aside. (Heggie, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 29-30; Brewer, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1344-1345.)

On this record, we cannot say that the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason when it concluded that Yupa failed to establish that she would materially benefit from setting the judgment aside. (§ 2121, subd. (b); Brewer, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1345; Rosevear, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 684.)

D. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Yupa’s Request for a Continuance

Yupa contends the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to continue the set aside hearing. She claims a continuance was necessary for her to review James’s amended tax returns, which she had just received three days before the scheduled hearing. We disagree.

Continuances are granted on a showing of good cause. (In re Marriage of Hoffmeister (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1163, 1169 (Hoffmeister); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 375(a).) Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in ruling on motions for a continuance, and a reviewing court must uphold a trial court’s choice not to grant a continuance unless the court has abused that discretion. (Mahoney v. Southland Mental Health Associates Medical Group (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 167, 170.) “ ‘ “Discretion is abused whenever, in its exercise, the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered.” ‘ “ (Ibid., quoting Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.) In determining whether the denial of a continuance was so arbitrary as to violate due process, the reviewing court looks to the circumstances of each case, particularly the reasons presented to the trial court at the time the request was denied, whether a continuance is necessary to present relevant evidence, and whether the refusal of a continuance will have the practical effect of denying the applicant a fair hearing. (Hoffmeister, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d 1163.) The complaining party has the burden of showing an abuse of discretion and prejudice as a result of the denial of his request. (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1126.)

According to Yupa, the amended tax returns directly related to her set aside motion. She contends that she had inadequate time to review the amended tax returns because she had received them just three days before the scheduled hearing, which deprived her of a fair hearing. In support of this contention Yupa relies on Hoffmeister, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d 1163. There, the wife sought modification of a spousal support order. (Id. at p. 1166.) Shortly before the hearing on her motion, the wife filed a reply memorandum of points and authorities, together with new financial information (additional expenses of $321 per month) that differed from the information she originally submitted. (Id. at pp. 1167-1168.) At the scheduled hearing, the husband moved for a continuance, arguing that he had just received the amended financial information and points and authorities on the Friday prior to the hearing, and had inadequate time to respond to the newly raised legal and factual issues. (Id. at p. 1168.) The trial court initially granted the motion, but later reversed this ruling and allowed the financial information into evidence. (Ibid.) The appellate court held that the husband was denied a fair hearing by the trial court’s failure to grant the continuance. (Ibid.)

Here, unlike in Hoffmeister, Yupa was not confronted with new factual or legal issues in the form of a reply memorandum of points and authorities on the eve of the hearing. Moreover, in Hoffmeister, the significance of the new financial information was readily apparent, as the wife’s purported new living expenses was directly relevant to her motion for increased spousal support. Here, in contrast, Yupa failed to articulate what impact the amended tax returns had on the prior property stipulations incorporated into the judgment, but simply made vague, unsubstantiated assertions regarding James’s purported lack of full disclosure. Hoffmeister expressly provides that continuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause, stating that: “Generally speaking, the courts have repudiated the view that the trial court should exercise great liberality in granting continuances. As stated by the court in County of San Bernardino v. Doria Mining & Engineering Corp. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 776 [], ‘[C]onsidering the need for efficient use of judicial resources, we conclude that there is no policy in this state of indulgence or liberality in favor of parties seeking continuances. Rather, such parties must make a proper showing of good cause . . . . And, if the law must have some kind of litany or Gregorian chant in this field, we respectfully suggest that “continuances be granted sparingly, nay grudgingly, and then only on a proper and adequate showing of good cause.” ([County of San Bernardino v. Doria Mining & Engineering Corp., supra, 72 Cal.App.3d] at p. 781, fn. omitted.)’ “ (Hoffmeister, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1168-1169.) Here, Yupa did not make the requisite showing of “good cause” because she failed to show that amended tax returns had any impact on the valuation of the community’s interest in Brookside.

Yupa next contends the trial court abused its discretion in delaying its ruling on her request for a continuance until the hearing itself, and then further abused its discretion by failing to make any ruling on her request at the hearing on the motion to set aside the judgment. We disagree. The trial court’s denial of the request was implicit in its decision to proceed with the hearing. Moreover, contrary to Yupa’s assertion, the trial court was not required to include a formal ruling on her request for continuance in its statement of decision. (See § 2127 [statement of decision appropriate where trial court has resolved controverted factual evidence]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 232; Code Civ. Proc., § 632; see also In re Marriage of Askmo (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1040 [party not entitled to a statement of decision in connection with an ordinary motion].)

Finally, Yupa appears to contend that the trial court abused its discretion because there would have been no prejudice to James if the hearing had been continued. Even if James would have suffered no prejudice from the continuance of the hearing, the absence of prejudice does not create good cause for a continuance. Good cause is required because “the court is interested in the orderly and effective dispatch of legal business, and to avoid congestion and confusion in its calendar . . . .” (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Trial, § 8, p. 34.) As discussed, Yupa failed to establish good cause for continuing the hearing.

Accordingly, on this record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Yupa’s request for a continuance.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. James is entitled to his costs on appeal, in an amount to be determined by the trial court.

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Sepulveda, J.

We concur:

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Ruvolo, P. J.

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Rivera, J.

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^[1] All statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise indicated.

^[2] We glean the facts as best we can from the record before us. The appendix contains no index (see Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.1(a) & 9(b)), and fails to include significant portions of James’s opposition to the motion to set aside the judgment (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.1(b)(1)(B)). Our consideration of this appeal is further hindered by Yupa’s repeated references to facts without citation to the record. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 14(a)(1)(C).) When record references are provided, they invariably do not point to an exact page, but refer to ranges of pages, which in some instances, exceed 60 pages. It is not the responsibility of this court to comb the appellate record for facts to support the contentions on appeal. (Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.) Rather, “ ‘[i]t is the duty of a party to support the arguments in its briefs by appropriate reference to the record, which includes providing exact page citations.’ “ (Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.) Thus, to the extent that Yupa’s briefs contain references to facts that are unsupported by appropriate citations to the record, we have ignored them.

^[3] We refer to the parties by their first names for the sake of convenience and clarity only, and intend no disrespect. (Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2001) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1136, fn. 1.)

^[4] In her objections to the entry of judgment, Yupa also claimed that James had acquired an additional interest in SVA and that Archer determined that Brookside had a profit of $149,195 in 2002. In her opening brief, Yupa cites to a record reference spanning more than 60 pages that purportedly supports these assertions. Inasmuch as Yupa has failed to support these factual assertions with an appropriate citation to the record, we ignore them.

^[5] Yupa’s appendix fails to include James’s supporting declaration and exhibits. James, however, filed his own appendix that includes his responsive declaration and exhibits.

^[6] Section 2121, subdivision (b) provides that before relieving a spouse from a judgment, “the court shall find that the facts alleged as the grounds for relief materially affected the original outcome and that the moving party would materially benefit from the granting of relief.”

^[7] At the time Rosevear was decided, there were only five “exclusive” statutory grounds for setting aside a judgment of dissolution under section 2122. (See Rosevear, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 684 & fn. 10.) In 2001, the statute was amended, inter alia, to add subdivision (f), making noncompliance with financial disclosure requirements an additional ground for relief. (See Stats. 2001, ch. 703, § 7, pp. 4359-4360.)

^[8] By reason of our conclusion that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings that the facts alleged did not materially affect the judgment and that Yupa would not materially benefit from setting aside the judgment, we do not address the litany of other challenges raised by Yupa, except to note they are largely unsupported by any meaningful legal analysis or appropriate citations to the record.

^[9] James asserts that following Brewer there is no basis for concluding that he committed perjury by describing Brookside’s value as “unknown” in either his preliminary or final declaration of disclosure. However, Brewer did not consider this issue, and cases are not authority for propositions not considered. (People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 198.)

^[10] Not surprisingly, Yupa fails to reference this revised report in her briefs and does not include it in her appendix.

^[11] Yupa argued in the trial court that the judgment should be set aside because she had recently learned that James had prepared amended tax returns for the years 2000 through 2004. It is not entirely clear from Yupa’s briefs if she is claiming that the amended tax returns are evidence of James’s purported “business manipulation.” To the extent she relies on the amended tax returns as establishing James’s “business manipulation,” she once again fails to provide any competent evidence that the amended tax returns materially affected the judgment.