Filed 7/24/17 Marriage of MacRobie CA4/3






NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


In re the Marriage of GRAHAM C. and DIANA A. MACROBIE.

GRAHAM C. MACROBIE,

Appellant,

v.

DIANA A. MACROBIE,

Respondent.


G053034

(Super. Ct. No. 15FL000033)

O P I N I O N


Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Nathan R. Scott, Judge. Affirmed.
Graham C. MacRobie, in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.

* * *
In connection with a registration of foreign judgment of an out-of-state marital dissolution judgment filed by respondent Diana A. MacRobie (Diana), the court made a finding of spousal support arrearages owed her by appellant Graham C. MacRobie (Graham). Graham appeals from the order claiming the court had no jurisdiction to consider arrearages at the hearing on the registration. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Graham and Diana’s 17-year marriage was dissolved in 2011 by a judgment entered in Guam (Judgment). The Judgment included, among other things, a provision for Graham to pay $5,000 per month spousal support to Diana and $1,000 per month for child support.
In January 2015, Diana filed a registration of foreign judgment to have the Judgment registered in Orange County. Her supporting declaration stated she intended to file a motion to determine arrearages. Graham objected to the registration on several grounds, including that it did not contain a required sworn statement of arrearages. The court sustained the objection on that ground, granting Diana leave to amend the registration.
In June Diana filed a second registration of foreign judgment (Registration), which included a sworn statement of child and spousal support arrearages in the sum of approximately $182,850. She included an exhibit setting out each payment due and the amount of payment made, if any.
Graham objected, arguing, among other things, the amount of the arrearage was incorrect. Included in his objection were copies of various documents including text messages and bank statements showing certain payments he claimed he had made.
Both parties also testified as to the claimed arrearages. The court found Graham owed Diana a net balance of $70,100 in spousal support arrearages through October 2015. It granted Diana leave to file another registration of foreign judgment stating the correct amount of arrearages. The Register of Actions included in the record does not show another registration filed as of March 2016.
DISCUSSION
Under Family Code section 5700.601 (all further statutory references are to this code), part of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (§ 5700.101 et seq.), an order for spousal support issued by a foreign jurisdiction may be registered in California so it may be enforced.
Graham argues the court lacked jurisdiction to make any findings as to the amount of arrearages owed because it never confirmed registration of the Judgment. He contends the court erroneously conducted a hearing on the amount of arrearages when the only issue was whether the Judgment should be registered. He further asserts the statute does not permit enforcement of the Judgment because it was not registered. On that basis he seeks to have the order specifying the amount of arrearages vacated. Graham’s arguments fail for several reasons.
Under section 5700.602, subdivision (b), once the court received the Registration it was required to file it. Once filed, the Judgment was registered (§ 5700.603, subd. (a)) and subject to enforcement in the same manner as any domestic judgment or order (§ 5700.603, subd. (b)).
Section 5700.606, subdivision (b) allows a nonregistering party to “contest the validity or enforcement” of the judgment by challenging the amount of arrearages. This may be done by proving full or partial payment. (§ 5700.607, subd. (a)(6).) Thus, the statutory scheme specifically contemplates litigating the amount of arrearages claimed.
By making a finding as to the amount of arrearages, the court did not enforce the Judgment. That the court did not confirm the registration with the amended amount of arrearages does not invalidate its findings as to the amount of those arrearages. Graham cites no authority to the contrary.
We are not persuaded by Graham’s argument Diana improperly conducted a “‘fishing expedition’” by filing the Registration using an incorrect statement of arrearages, to force him to prove the correct amount. Diana testified she provided the best number she was able to, given that certain documents were not available to her because some of the payments Graham made were not to her but to her creditors. As the trial court noted, the mere fact the amount Diana claimed was incorrect did not exonerate Graham from liability for any support payment at all.
Moreover, Graham’s claim the Family Code does not require him to prove the amount of arrearages is erroneous. Section 5700.607 provides the party challenging the validity of a registered support order has the burden of proof. (§ 5700.607, subd. (a).)
Although in the context of arguing he has standing to appeal, Graham also complains he did not have “a proper chance” to contest the court’s finding he owed $70,100 in arrearages. He asserts he was “not prepared to defend against a motion to determine arrearages.” The record belies this claim.
When Diana filed the initial registration, Graham objected to it on the ground Diana had not included the sworn statement of arrearages. Thus he knew the amount of arrearages was in issue. Further, in his objection to the Registration, Graham filed documentary evidence of payments he had made.
At the hearing on his objections to the Registration Graham advised the court he did not have all the payment information at hand, and did not bring records with him to the hearing. But that was not due to lack of notice. Rather, as Graham himself explained, it was because the records were voluminous, making it time consuming to determine payments he had made. Thus, after he had calculated five months of payments, he stopped making any further calculations. In addition, Graham claimed, some evidence was contained in e-mails or texts between the parties, and because he had made many payments in cash, it made tracing more difficult. But, as the court noted, the matter had been pending for almost one year, so Graham had had ample time to gather the documents and total up the amounts he had paid. He should have been prepared to do so at the hearing.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.



THOMPSON, J.

WE CONCUR:



ARONSON, ACTING P. J.



FYBEL, J.