Filed 11/29/18 Marriage of O.T. and Lamdaghri CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. L. Jackson Lucky IV, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Office of Leslie Ellen Shear, Leslie Ellen Shear and Julia C. Shear Kushner for Appellant.

Klinedinst and Gregor A. Hensrude for Respondent.

Appellant O.T. (Wife) appeals the dismissal of her second petition for dissolution (Second Petition) to respondent Abdou El Alaoui Lamdaghri (Husband). This case involves the application of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), Family Code[1] section 3400 et. seq., and the enforcement of a divorce decree obtained in Doha, Qatar. Wife was employed by the United States Department of State (State Department) and met Husband, an airline pilot, in Morocco in 2002. They were married in Morocco in 2003 and moved to France. I.L. (Son) was born in France in 2005. Wife was transferred to Qatar in 2006. Husband got a job working for Qatar Airlines. S.L. (Daughter) was born in 2008, while they were living in Qatar. They also had another son who drowned while they were visiting family in Morocco.

Wife took a leave of absence from the State Department in 2009. She continued living in Qatar, but periodically visited her family in California. In July 2010, Wife, Son and Daughter came to California to visit Wife’ family and stayed. Wife and Husband began having problems. Wife claimed Husband threatened her, and in October 2010, she requested a domestic violence restraining order and emergency child custody orders from the Riverside County Superior Court (Riverside Court). These were granted, based on Wife’s declaration, in November 2010.

In November 2010, Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in Riverside Court case No. RID240246 (First Petition) but voluntarily dismissed it. In the meantime, Husband obtained a divorce decree in Qatar, which was final in January 2011. He also obtained a child visitation order that was final on January 19, 2011.

In February 2011, Wife was assigned to Sweden and had taken the Children with her on her assignment. On March 9, 2011, Wife filed the Second Petition and in that petition she sought legal and physical custody of Son and Daughter (collectively, the Children). The trial court dismissed the Second Petition, finding that pursuant to the UCCJEA, the Riverside Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the marriage and custody because of the first-in-time orders by the Qatar court. Moreover, there was no personal jurisdiction on Husband because it had previously determined he had no minimum contacts with Riverside.

Wife raises the following issues on appeal: (1) comity and constitutionality: California court could not recognize Qatari divorce decree; (2) California has a duty to exercise jurisdiction over marital status, custody and economic issues; (3) the trial court failed to apply the doctrine of divisible divorce; (4) diplomatic immunity under the Geneva Convention makes Qatari decrees void; (5) Wife and the Children continuously resided in Riverside despite postings abroad; (6) Husband’s green card limits him to temporary absences from the United States; (7) section 3405’s “substantial conformity” requirement precludes sister state status for Qatar; (8) Qatari custody law violates fundamental human rights; (9) California has personal jurisdiction over Husband; and (10) the trial court had inherent power to vacate its rulings and in the interests of justice reopen the case for new evidence and argument. We affirm the judgment of dismissal as Husband obtained a first-in-time divorce and child visitation orders in Qatar and there was little to no contacts with Riverside.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND CHILD CUSTODY

On October 20, 2010, Wife filed a domestic violence temporary restraining order form (DVTR) and an accompanying form seeking emergency orders on child custody in Riverside Court case No. RID239844. She listed Husband as the person from whom she needed to be protected. She listed her parent’s address in Riverside and that she lived with her two children ages five and two. Wife sought a “Personal Conduct Order” and a stay-away order for Husband with respect to Wife and the Children. She requested orders from the Riverside Court also on child custody, visitation and child support.

She described the abuse as occurring on September 7, 2010, July 14, 2010, and June 11, 2010. Husband told her that he would slit her throat and let her bleed; he would laugh as she was bleeding. He also “raged out of control” during a Skype conversation in front of the Children. She was afraid of him because he always yelled at her and threatened her. She also sought to have Husband surrender his Moroccan passport when he was in California.

Wife provided a timeline for the Children’s addresses as follows: From birth to 2007, they lived in Paris, France. From 2007 to December 2009, they lived in Doha, Qatar. From December 2009 to the time of the filing of the DVTR, they lived in Riverside. She sought supervised visitation between Husband and the Children.

Wife submitted a declaration that she and the Children had lived in California since December 2009, but had traveled to Qatar and Morocco so Husband could see the Children. She asked for sole legal and physical custody because she was concerned Husband would take the Children to Qatar, Morocco or France when he was scheduled to visit them on October 19, 2010. There was a risk of abduction because Husband worked for Qatar Airlines, he had dual citizenship in Morocco and France, and the Children were linked to his Moroccan passport. It was unlikely she could get the Children back if they were taken to Morocco. Wife insisted that she and the Children had lived in California since December 2009 and visited Morocco for three weeks in June 2010.

The hearing date was set for November 9, 2010. The DVTR was granted until the hearing. Wife was also granted sole legal and physical custody of the Children until the hearing based on the pleading. There was to be no visitation with Husband. Husband was also required to surrender his Moroccan passport while in California. Husband was served on October 21, 2010.

Husband filed a response to the DVTR and child custody request. Husband provided his own history of their relationship. Husband met Wife in September 2002 in Morocco. At the time, Wife worked for the State Department and was stationed in Morocco. Wife and Husband were married in 2003 and moved to Paris. In 2006, the family moved to Doha, Qatar. Wife was assigned to Qatar with the State Department and Husband began flying for Qatar Airlines. They had three children.

In the summer of 2009, Wife took a leave of absence and they visited family in Morocco. During the trip, on June 10, 2009, one of their children drowned. Wife was distraught and wanted to be with her family in California. They all came to California, and after a 10-day stay, Husband returned to Qatar to work. In July 2009, Wife and the Children returned to Qatar and the Children started school in Qatar in August. In December 2009, Wife and the Children returned to California for the holiday vacation. She and the Children returned to Qatar on January 5, 2010. In April 2010, they vacationed for two weeks in Malaysia. In late July 2010, Wife took the Children to California; since that time, Wife had not returned to Qatar. Wife had expressed no intention of returning to Qatar.

Husband insisted he had never threatened Wife. Husband arrived in California on October 19, 2010, to visit the Children. They got together several times, shopping together and going to Disneyland. At the end of the trip, he was served with the DVTR. Husband returned to Qatar the next day. Husband attached several emails between Wife and Husband, which were around the times that Wife accused him of abusing her, wherein Wife professed her love for Husband. On July 15, 2010, she sent him an email discussing her return to Qatar and telling him that she loved him very much. He sent her an email on September 29, 2010, accusing her of taking the Children to California and lying about returning to Qatar. He admitted that in a phone call he had used bad language and lost his temper. On October 14, 2010, Wife emailed Husband that she had to return to work. She complained that he had moved from their Qatar home without asking her. She accused him of using bad language with her and being out of control. She wanted to work on their marriage but told him he had to work at it with her instead of insulting her.

Husband insisted Wife lied that the Children had lived in California since December 2009. Husband also submitted a declaration from his sister who accompanied him while he visited with Wife and the Children.

The DVTR was modified on November 9, 2010, by stipulation of the parties. Wife and Husband agreed that he could communicate with the Children daily. Further, the next hearing would be November 29, 2010, to determine a date in December when Husband would be available. Husband did not waive his right to claim that the court had no jurisdiction. The matter was continued.

B. FIRST PETITION FOR DISSOLUTION

On November 9, 2010, Wife filed the First Petition. She claimed to have been married on April 3, 2003. They were separated on October 20, 2010. She stated she had been a resident of California for at least six months prior to filing the First Petition. The dissolution of marriage was based on irreconcilable differences. She sought legal and physical custody of the Children.

Wife filed a Declaration under the UCCJEA. She declared that Son was born in Paris, France in February 2005. Son resided in Doha, Qatar until “July 17, 2010,” and had been in Riverside since that date. Further, Daughter had been born in Doha, Qatar in May 2008; no other dates were provided. Service of the First Petition was made on November 9, 2010, while Husband was appearing on the DVTR and custody matters.

On December 9, 2010, a motion to quash service of the First Petition was filed by Husband for lack of personal jurisdiction. Husband contended he had no connection with California other than that his in-laws lived in Riverside. When Husband came to California on the DVTR hearing on November 9, 2010, he was served with the First Petition. He claimed to have never lived in California and did not consent to California jurisdiction for the dissolution.

Husband was a resident of Qatar and had never been a resident of California. He referred to section 3409 that he was only in California on the DVTR and was not subject to jurisdiction on the First Petition. Husband also alleged there was no subject matter jurisdiction over the Children. They were not born in the United States and did not reside in California until July 17, 2010, which was not six months prior to the filing of the first petition for dissolution. Husband also stated that the marital assets were located outside the United States.

He also attached a response to the First Petition to be considered if the court did not find in his favor on the motion to quash service. In his response, he alleged all of the marital assets and debt were located outside of the United States. He also stated he applied for and obtained a Qatari divorce decree. The marriage would be dissolved effective January 2011. Husband argued under the principle of comity that the court should recognize the Qatari divorce decree.

Husband attached several emails between the parties. He submitted proof of Son being in school the 2009-2010 year in Qatar and was enrolled for the next year. Husband provided a translated copy of the divorce decree from the State of Qatar. The decree provided that the divorce was filed on November 1, 2010, and would be final on January 11, 2011.

On January 5, 2011, Wife filed a Brief Re: Jurisdiction. Wife argued that no other action had been commenced in any other court claiming to have jurisdiction over the Children. Further, on January 13, 2011, the Children would have resided in California for six months so the court would have jurisdiction over the Children. Wife argued she was born in California, had resided with the Children in California since July 17, 2010, (although she had previously declared they moved to California in December 2009) and although she traveled for her work, her domicile remained in Riverside. None of them were citizens of Qatar. Wife was a United States citizen.

Wife also argued that Qatar was not a party to the Hague Convention. Child custody laws in Qatar were based on Islamic (Shari’a) law and child custody was based on religious standards. Further, Husband was the sponsor of Wife’s Visa in Qatar and could order an immigration stop, which would bar her from entering Qatar.

Wife argued section 3424 provided for the state to have temporary jurisdiction if the Children resided in the state and the Children or parent was subject to abuse. Wife also argued that under the UCCJEA nothing about child custody had been filed in another jurisdiction so there was no concern about conflict. The divorce in Qatar only resolved the marriage, not child custody. California was the best state to decide child custody. Further, if Husband was allowed to take the Children to Qatar, Wife would never see them again.

On January 8 2011, Wife filed opposition to Husband’s motion to quash service. Wife insisted that Husband’s appearance in the DVTR matter subjected him to jurisdiction. Wife also argued that she was domiciled in California. It was enough to confer jurisdiction over the divorce proceedings even though she moved around for work. It was similar to a person in the military. She intended to move back to California. Wife had a California driver’s license, filed income taxes in California and had a California bank account.

Wife also filed a declaration in support of her request for a permanent restraining order. Wife claimed that on January 12, 2011, Husband showed up at her house with presents for Son. He told Son to come outside to his car to get the presents. Wife was concerned it was an attempt to take him. Husband was yelling and causing a scene. The police were called. Husband still had possession of the Children’s Moroccan passports.

A hearing was conducted on January 8, 2011, which has not been made a part of the record. According to the minute order, the trial court held that Husband made a special appearance in Riverside Court case No. RID239844 on November 5, 2010, by filing an answer to the DVTR. The answer was limited to custody, visitation and domestic violence. He was solely in the state to participate in the child custody proceeding within the meaning of section 3409. Husband was immune from service of process. His only contact with California was for the child custody and visitation litigation. The motion to quash service of the First Petition was granted. Wife voluntarily dismissed the First Petition on March 8, 2011.

C. SECOND PETITION FOR DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE

On March 9, 2011, Wife filed the Second Petition (case No. RID1101156). She sought legal and physical custody of the Children. She stated that all of the assets and obligations of the parties were unknown to her and would seek leave to amend when they were ascertained. She again alleged she was concerned that Husband would take the Children to Morocco or Qatar and she would never see them again. She filed a request for child abduction prevention orders. Counsel certified that Wife was a resident of Riverside and that she and the Children had lived in Riverside exclusively since July 17, 2010. Wife again filed a declaration under the UCCJEA. She stated that Son had lived from birth to 2007 in France; 2007 to July 17, 2010, in Qatar and since July 17, 2010, in Riverside. No information for Daughter was given except that she was born in Qatar in 2008.

She included as exhibits the DVTR and the child custody and visitation order. Wife also filed an application for an order for child support and spousal support. She claimed she had no money to care for the Children since she took a leave of absence from her job with the State Department in April 2009.

Husband filed points and authorities in opposition to the Second Petition on April 25, 2011. It was his belief that Wife had recently moved with the Children to Sweden. He continued to reside in Qatar. The DVTR expired on December 1, 2010, and was not renewed. Husband argued that the court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the Children. They were not born in the United States and had only lived briefly in California starting in July 17, 2010. They lived in Qatar from 2008 until July 17, 2010. Even Wife agreed in her UCCJEA declaration that the Children had not been in California for six months. California was not their home state under the UCCJEA.

Wife’s counsel filed a declaration in support of a permanent restraining order. If called to testify, he would provide that Wife was a diplomat in the foreign service for the State Department. She was currently assigned to Sweden for an unknown period of time. However, California had jurisdiction. Wife was the same as someone in the military. She was domiciled in Riverside. Further, she and Husband owned a timeshare in California, she filed her income taxes in California, and they both had bank accounts in California. Wife sought a permanent restraining order against Husband because she lived in fear that he would abduct their children. Wife was not served with the divorce proceedings that were decided in Qatar.

Attached to the declaration from Wife’s counsel was a guide to foreign affairs. Also attached were financial records for both Husband and Wife pertaining to the timeshare owned by them in California and their joint bank accounts in California, which at the time contained $500.

On April 29, 2011, the original custody and visitation orders were continued to May 19, 2011. The court also found that the DVTR had expired on November 30, 2010.

Prior to the hearing, on May 10, 2011, Husband filed a notice of intent to lodge a copy of a child visitation order from the Qatar court with translation. The Qatar court declared on January 19, 2011, that Husband should be granted visitation with the Children every Friday. The exchange would take place at a family consultation center in Qatar. This was a temporary decision until “Case No. 64/2011, is decided.” Wife objected to the lodging of the document based on hearsay and lack of certification authentication.

Wife filed another declaration prior to the hearing regarding jurisdiction. Wife insisted that Sweden could not have jurisdiction over the Children. She and the Children were considered only temporary residents of Sweden because they were only in the country for two to three years. Further, any home study that needed to be performed in the case could be conducted by a social services department in Sweden. They had very similar processes to California in Sweden for home studies. Sweden was a Hague Convention country and had divorce and custody laws similar to California’s laws. A history of Wife’s addresses was provided; her residence in Riverside was listed as her place of residence from 1994 to the present. Wife argued that Husband had ties to California based on the timeshare owned by them and joint bank accounts.

D. FIRST HEARING ON MAY 19, 2011

The two cases—the Second Petition and the DVTR—were called for a hearing on May 19, 2011. Counsel for both parties appeared; neither Wife nor Husband were present. The trial court noted that they had met in chambers and discussed the matter. The primary issue in the cases was jurisdiction.

The trial court was concerned there was no subject matter jurisdiction over the Children who had only been in California since July 2010, and the DVTR was filed in October or November 2010. The trial court also expressed concern regarding jurisdiction when the First Petition was dismissed. The trial court noted the Second Petition had been filed after the Children had been in California for six months.

The trial court also stated it had conducted research of Qatar. It was not a Hague Convention country and did not appear to have statutes consistent with the UCCJEA. At a prior hearing, not included in this record, the trial court had advised the parties that it wanted to be advised as to any custody or visitation orders in addition to the divorce decree that had been filed in Qatar because it was concerned about competing jurisdictions pursuant to section 3426. Since that time, Husband had filed a translated document that purported to show that visitation orders were made by the Qatar court in January 2011. Husband’s counsel was given time to produce a certified copy of the order from Qatar.

The trial court believed the restraining order was filed before the Children had been in California for six months. California was not the home state pursuant to section 3421. For the Second Petition, since the Children had been in the state for six months prior to filing, California was the home state. However, if an action on custody and visitation was filed in Qatar, then the trial court did not have the ability to modify those orders pursuant to section 3421. The trial court was not prepared to make a final decision and intended to continue the matter.

Wife’s counsel represented that she had never been served with any of the Qatar proceedings. The trial court responded, “I think that I am—again, assuming that [Husband’s counsel] can show me that there are orders made from Qatar, I’m not the reviewing Court for whatever the trial court did in Qatar. If they made unlawful orders, I don’t believe I would be the person to make that determination. I think that I am to—in light—unless there is evidence to the contrary to show me that somehow the order is just a fake, I’m to presume that the Qatari Court did what it was supposed to do, just as I would assume they would have to respect my decision under California law and not try to second guess me on my interpretation of California law.” It further stated, “[I]f Qatar has made an order and there is sufficient evidence of that order, I think that robs me of jurisdiction pursuant to 3421 no matter what I might think of Qatari law on custody, visitation, divorce, due process, or anything else. I don’t believe that the fact that I’m a U.S. Court gives me the ability to say that they are wrong in interpreting their own laws or making the orders that are within their sovereignty.”

The hearing on the motion to quash the Second Petition was continued. The custody and visitation order was extended but the DVTR had expired. The decision on the permanent restraining order was continued.

E. ADDITIONAL FILINGS

On June 22, 2011, a proof of service of the Second Petition was filed showing that Husband was served at an airport in Australia.

On July 5, 2011, Husband filed a motion to quash service of and to dismiss the Second Petition. He submitted an accompanying memorandum of points and authorities. He argued that this was the second petition for dissolution and the first dissolution petition service was quashed due to lack of personal jurisdiction over Husband. No new facts or circumstances would confer the Riverside Court with personal jurisdiction. Further, there was no subject matter jurisdiction because the marital status had been terminated by a Qatari court. Additionally, there was no subject matter jurisdiction over the Children because the Qatari court had taken jurisdiction and had made orders regarding custody. Qatar was the home state of the Children pursuant to the UCCJEA. Finally, California was an inconvenient forum because the parties never resided in California during the marriage, there is no known marital property in California, and Wife and the Children currently resided in Sweden.

Husband attached as an exhibit a certified copy of the translated divorce decree from Qatar and the visitation order of the Qatari court, which was requested on January 17, 2011. It was ordered that Husband had the right to visit with the Children once each week, which impliedly gave custody to Wife. It provided, “Commit whom required against to enable [Husband] to see and visit his two children from her [Son] and [Daughter] on Thursday of every week at four o’clock in the afternoon until eight o’clock in the evening that the visit to be inside the Family Consulting Center.” (Sic.)

On August 12, 2011, Wife filed a brief regarding jurisdiction. Wife insisted that Husband had never provided certified copies of the visitation order or divorce in Qatar. She was never served with the orders. Wife also provided that Husband was properly served with the Second Petition in Australia. Husband had significant ties to California. Wife and Husband owned a timeshare together in Riverside County.

Wife discussed the difference between residence and domicile. Domicile meant more than mere residency; it connoted a legal relationship with a place that usually included residency and an intention to remain. Wife stated that she was born and raised in California. She only was overseas for her employment with the State Department. Just as though she was in the military, her domicile was in California. She always intended to return to California.

Wife also claimed that the Children had resided exclusively in Riverside between July 17, 2010, and February 1, 2011, even though they were temporarily absent from California in Sweden. They intended to return to California at the end of Wife’s work assignment. She insisted that upon the end of each assignment she always returned to California.

Wife dismissed the First Petition in order to comply with the six month home state requirement of the UCCJEA. As of January 13, 2011, the Children had been in Riverside for six months. She also presented documents from the State Department that she could not obtain a divorce in the country of assignment unless the United States government waived the diplomatic and consular immunity.

Wife also stated that no one in the family was a citizen of Qatar. Wife was an American citizen and Husband held French and Moroccan citizenship. The family was only in Qatar because of her assignment through the State Department. She also relied on section 3427 that California was the best place for jurisdiction. Although the Children and Wife were in Sweden, they kept in contact with counsel in California. She also alleged that Qatar was not a Hague Convention country and would not cooperate with California courts. The Qatari courts were based on Islamic (Shari’a) law which is religion based.

Wife attached a letter from the American Foreign Service Association that those who were employed by the State Department but serving overseas were considered to be domiciled in the state where they entered into government service. As such, Wife was serving in Sweden, but she owned property, had extended family, and maintained bank accounts in California. She was domiciled in California.

Also attached were documents prepared by the American Foreign Service Association regarding those working overseas and needing a divorce or child custody determinations. Residence was defined as “place or abode” which was where both were currently living. A domicile is where a person is considered to reside for tax purposes. Further, the information provided that a foreign service employee posted abroad may not get a divorce in the country of assignment unless the United States waived the individual’s diplomatic or consular immunity.

On August 24, 2011, Wife filed a responsive declaration to the motion to quash service of the Second Petition. She insisted that Husband was properly served in Australia. Further, he had significant contacts with California. Attached was the minute order from the first hearing on the motion to quash the First Petition. It included the finding, “Father has no minimum contacts with California except for the child custody and visitation litigation.”

Wife also objected to Husband’s notice of intent to lodge the certified copy of the visitation order from Qatar. Wife objected on the grounds of hearsay and that the filing did not comply with the court’s order to file by July 22, 2011. Further, it was irrelevant because the order provided did not precede the filing of the Second Petition.

F. HEARING ON OCTOBER 6, 2011

Hearing on all matters was conducted on October 6, 2011. Wife was not present; Husband was present. Wife’s counsel contended that she had to be present; Husband’s counsel responded that these were law and motion matters, which did not require her presence. Husband had traveled over 20 hours to be present and there was an Arabic translator present being paid for by Husband. Counsel for Wife argued Wife would testify about the lack of service of the Qatari court orders.

The trial court inquired if there was anything in writing that Wife had tried to get time off to attend the hearing but was denied. The trial court took a break. It asked Wife’s counsel to address after the break whether the Qatari court orders had to comport with California’s notions of due process. The trial court only thought it should address the matter if there was jurisdiction. It asked for case law and argument. The trial court felt that someone testifying as to the validity of the Qatari order was all that was required. Wife would have to fight the order in Qatar. It was not necessary for her to testify as to service. Since the trial court was only addressing jurisdiction, her presence was not necessary.

The parties returned to court. The trial court asked for argument on the continuance. Wife’s counsel represented that Wife had asked for the time off for the hearing and was denied. She had a due process right to be present. Wife would provide testimony pertaining to personal jurisdiction over Husband. Husband’s counsel responded that no due process violation in Qatar could be raised in the California court. Wife would have no relevant testimony on the validity of the Qatari orders. Further, the minimum contacts issue was resolved in the motion to quash as to the First Petition; it was res judicata.

The trial court noted that the problem it had with the case from the beginning was the situation of the parties. No one could appear because they lived thousands of miles from California. The only contact in California was the filing of the case. The trial court noted it was concerned that Wife had chosen Riverside as the forum but even she could not be present.

The trial court overruled Wife’s objections to the Qatar orders. Shirak Khojayan, a certified translator of Arabic into English, testified. He testified to the translation of the Qatari visitation order issued on January 19, 2011. The document had the seals from the Qatar court and a signature. There was also an authentication of signatures on the document. The document was signed by a Qatar family law judge. The trial court admitted the Qatari court orders as official records.

The trial court first noted that it may not agree with the laws of custody and visitation in Qatar; however, it had to determine if it had subject matter jurisdiction. It noted under section 3421, the Children had to be in Riverside for six months in order to be considered the home state. It was undisputed the Second Petition was filed on March 9, 2011, after the Children had been in Riverside for six months. However, section 3426, subdivision (a) provided that if another jurisdiction had commenced a child custody proceeding “substantially in conformity with this part, unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the Court or of the other state, because the Court of this state is a more convenient forum under 3427” a competing jurisdiction could not take jurisdiction. It interpreted “substantially in conformance with this part” as requiring compliance with the UCCJEA.

The trial court took judicial notice that Qatar had not signed a Hague Convention. However, the trial court did not see that its recognition of another jurisdiction was dependent upon it adopting the Hague Convention or following the UCCJEA. Qatar had jurisdiction over the Children. The order for visitation was signed on January 19, 2011, and the Second Petition was filed after that date. It found that Qatar’s jurisdiction was exclusive. The Riverside Court did not have jurisdiction over the custody and visitation.

The trial court then addressed personal jurisdiction over Husband to resolve the motion to quash service. Husband testified as to the service of the Second Petition in Australia. He denied that he was ever served. Husband testified that he was a green card holder for the United States and filed federal taxes only. He had no knowledge of ever filing a state tax return. The only document provided to the court were federal income tax returns. The time share they owned had been used around the world. He set up a bank account in his name in California because they intended to move to California sometime in the future.

Wife’s counsel argued at the close of evidence that the issue of service of the motion to quash was not res judicata. Husband argued that since the trial court already found that California was not the proper forum for the child custody issues it was not the proper forum for the dissolution.

The trial court found that the issue of minimum contacts was res judicata. The trial court granted the motion to quash service of the Second Petition. It had no jurisdiction to make child or spousal support orders or determine attorney fees. Wife’s counsel argued to the court that by allowing only the Qatar proceedings, that would not be enforced in Sweden, there was nowhere that was going to enforce any orders of support or custody.

G. MOTION TO VACATE FILED BY WIFE

Wife filed a motion to vacate, reconsider or grant a new hearing (Motion to Vacate) from the trial court’s order issued on October 6, 2011. Wife submitted points and authorities.

Wife stated that no formal order had ever been served or mailed to the parties regarding the October 6, 2011, hearing. Wife summarized the order as finding (1) since Qatar had exercised jurisdiction over the Children on January 19, 2011, the Riverside Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over child custody and visitation; and (2) it did not have personal jurisdiction over Husband because he was not served in California and Husband lacked sufficient minimum contacts.

Wife argued she was working for the State Department in 1999 and that she was domiciled in Riverside. Although Son was born in Paris, France, and Daughter was born in Doha, Qatar, it was at the time Wife was assigned to the U.S. Embassy in those countries. As such, the Children were United States citizens. Wife complained she was never served with any of the orders entered in Qatar. Wife claimed that Sweden would not recognize orders from Qatar because that country violated fundamental principles of human rights. Further, Mother had diplomatic immunity.

Wife argued the trial court should have disregarded the Qatari judgment. Wife complained that the trial court did not consider when making its orders whether Qatar was in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of the UCCJEA; or consider section 3405, subdivision (c), e.g. whether Qatar violated fundamental principles of human rights. She insisted Qatar followed Shari’a law and based custody determinations on arbitrary factors such as age, gender and religion. The trial court should have invoked section 3405, subdivision (c) and ignored the Qatari court orders.

Wife also argued that the trial court issued temporary orders for legal and physical custody of the Children in October 20, 2010, when she requested the DVTR. She argued for the first time that the Children were actually in Riverside for six months prior to this filing because as children of a State Department employee, they were considered domiciled in the same place as the parent, which would be Riverside. California had always been the home state of the Children. The restraining order action was active when she filed the Second Petition. The Qatari court made orders on custody and visitation after the Riverside Court had made the orders in connection with the request for a restraining order. Qatar could not meet the six month requirement because the Children were not considered domiciled there for six months.

Wife insisted that while in Qatar, the Children were subject to diplomatic immunity and the Qatari court had no right to jurisdiction on the custody or visitation. She would never return to Qatar because Qatari law automatically granted custody to the father when the Children reached a certain age. As long as Wife continued to be assigned to Hague Convention countries, Husband could never enforce orders from Qatar. Wife additionally argued that since she was domiciled in California, the trial court had jurisdiction over the marriage.

Wife included a declaration from Jeremy D. Morley. He was an attorney admitted to practice in New York specializing in international family law. He authored the treatise International Family Law Practice. He had testified numerous times as an international family law expert. He had researched family law in the Middle East. It was his opinion that Qatar’s law and practices concerning child custody did not comply with fundamental norms of human rights. He relied on numerous reports regarding Qatar issued by the United States government, college professors, and Canada.[2]

Morley declared that Qatar’s laws on child custody were based on Shari’a law, which was “overtly offensive.” First, the Qatari courts based all decisions on Shari’a law regardless of the religion of the parents. Further, child custody law was expressly and overtly based on gender discrimination. Mothers were given express statutory preference for physical custody up to a certain age. A mother’s right to custody was severely limited if the mother was not Muslim. Morley relied upon a 2012 world report of human rights published by the United Nations that provided family law in Qatar discriminated against women. Custody in Qatar was automatically given to the mother who was Muslim until the child was either 13 (if male) or 15 (if female) years old; if the mother was not Muslim then the age was seven. Morley emphasized that all child custody decisions were based on Islamic law.

Morley concluded that Qatar’s legal system concerning child custody clearly violated fundamental principles of human rights. He referred to the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” He insisted that Qatar child custody law blatantly discriminated against female parents. It was based on religious discrimination.

Wife submitted a declaration. She learned that Husband was able to get a divorce in Qatar just by saying he was divorced, in front of witnesses. Under Qatari law, custody of Son would be given to Husband when Son turned 13 years old. She and the Children never intended to return to Qatar.

Wife submitted a declaration from an attorney in Sweden who specialized in international family matters. Wife and the Children were not considered residents of Sweden. Wife would be assigned to the embassy in Sweden until 2014. Based on the attorney’s knowledge of the Swedish courts, she believed that Sweden would not recognize orders from Qatar.

Wife submitted a declaration from the process server who personally served Husband with the Second Petition in Australia. Husband had denied his identity and discarded the documents served on him. She also submitted a declaration from a process server in Doha, Qatar who personally served Husband with the Motion to Vacate.

Husband filed opposition. Husband considered the filing by Wife as requesting a motion to vacate, a motion to reconsider and a motion for new trial. She had failed to meet the requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 because she did not provide new or different evidence. As for the motion for new trial, it was filed untimely.

Wife filed a reply to the opposition. In support of the Motion to Vacate, Wife argued that the court erred in four ways: (1) the court did not actually analyze and rule that the laws of Qatar were substantially in conformity with the UCCJEA; (2) it ignored section 3405, subdivision (c) because Qatar child custody laws violate fundamental principles of human rights; (3) the trial court failed to communicate with the Qatari court as required by section 3426; and (4) it mistakenly believed that it did not have jurisdiction over the Children at the time the Qatari court made its orders. Wife argued that the trial court did not properly apply the facts to California law. The motion for reconsideration could be granted based on a determination by the trial court that its ruling was erroneous.

A hearing on the Motion to Vacate was held on August 28, 2012. Wife was present at the hearing but Husband was not. The trial court recognized that Wife was raising four errors. First, it noted as to section 3405, it had invited Wife’s prior counsel to submit evidence on the issue and counsel chose not to admit the evidence. The trial court believed that section 3426 and contacting Qatar were a limitation only when the court sought to exercise its jurisdiction. The trial court also noted that a motion for reconsideration had to be based on the evidence originally presented to the court. The trial court noted that the expert testimony regarding the laws of Qatar was never presented at the original hearing. The trial court’s tentative ruling was to deny the Motion to Vacate.

The trial court noted that it only had emergency jurisdiction under section 3424 when it issued the DVTR. The Children had not been in Riverside for the required six months. The DVTR was not consolidated with the divorce because of this difference. The trial court also noted that the UCCJEA was not reliant upon domicile but rather adopted subject matter jurisdiction. Domicile was irrelevant under section 3421. The UCCJEA defined home state, which referred to physical presence. The trial court felt that the only reason for it to have granted a continuance of the October 6, 2011, hearing was to present additional evidence pursuant to section 3405 and 3426. The trial court wanted more time to review the section 3426 issue. The trial court did find it could not consider the additional declarations filed with the Motion to Vacate. The matter was taken under submission

The trial court issued a statement of decision on November 16, 2012. It provided that the case involved determining proper subject matter jurisdiction for child custody between California and Qatar. The trial court recounted the facts. It stated that Wife had filed the DVTR on October 20, 2010. Wife had incorrectly stated in support of the DVTR that she and the Children had lived in California since 1999.

The trial court clarified that the DVTR expired on December 1, 2010, and Wife did not pursue it. The matter of a permanent restraining order was dismissed on October 6, 2011. Wife filed the First Petition on November 9, 2010; Husband filed a motion to quash service; on March 8, 2011, Wife voluntarily dismissed the First Petition; and the Second Petition was filed on March 9, 2011. The trial court determined that Wife’s declaration under the UCCJEA filed on March 9, 2011, incorrectly stated the Children lived in Riverside despite moving to Sweden the previous month.

Husband filed the motion to quash and dismiss the Second Petition on July 8, 2011, attaching Qatari orders on November 1, 2010, terminating marital status and the child visitation order dated January 19, 2011. The court reiterated its October 6, 2011, ruling that it denied Wife’s objections to the evidence of the Qatari orders, and found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Husband and lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Children.

Initially, the trial court found that Wife failed to raise the issue of section 3405 regarding Qatari law violating fundamental human rights in the original proceeding. She failed to present any evidence in support of the claim. Further, section 3405, subdivision (c) was discretionary. Wife’s claim that she was denied a continuance of the original hearing, and that she had intended to present evidence regarding section 3405, subdivision (c), did not entitle her to relief. She never indicated as a ground for the continuance that she wanted to present such evidence.

As to the finding of home state jurisdiction, Wife had the burden of proof. It was undisputed the Children lived in Qatar until July 2010, lived in Riverside from July 2010 to February 2011, and had since lived in Sweden. The Second Petition was filed while they were living in Sweden. The trial court found that the “domicile” had no bearing on child custody orders. No published cases in California made a finding that domicile was sufficient for child custody orders. The trial court referred to several out-of-state cases in which domicile was found not sufficient. The trial court found that the home state when the First Petition and request for restraining order was filed was Qatar.

Further, the issuance of the temporary orders on custody and visitation when the request for a restraining order was filed was based on an incorrect declaration by Wife that she and the Children had lived in California since December 2009. The trial court found that the court did not have home state jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the request for a restraining order and First Petition. The trial court noted that emergency orders under 3424 expired when the home state made a child custody order. When Qatar issued its child custody order on January 17, 2011, California lost its emergency jurisdiction under section 3424. By the time of the filing of the Second Petition, the Children and Wife had been in California for six months; however, Qatar had already made its child custody order preventing California from exercising jurisdiction.

The trial court also found that it had no duty to contact the Qatari court under section 3426. There were no simultaneous proceedings. Qatar was the home state and California had no jurisdiction. Finally, since Qatar entered a divorce decree, California had no jurisdiction over the marriage.

The trial court denied the Motion to Vacate. The entire case (RID1101156) was dismissed on April 19, 2013, pursuant to the following order: “For the reasons set forth in the Court’s November 6, 2012 Ruling on Submitted Matter, the Court hereby dismisses the Petitioner in this action and directs the Clerk to enter this dismissal in the register per Code of Civil Procedure §581d. As provided by Code of Civil Procedure §581d, the dismissal is effective upon entry into the register by the Clerk.” It was entered on April 25, 2013.

DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Wife states she is appealing the dismissal of her family law action under Code of Civil Procedure section 581d following the grant of Husband’s motion to quash and the denial of her Motion to Vacate. This court has outlined extensively, ante, that this case involved several different filings. First, Wife filed the DVTR and the accompanying emergency custody orders in Riverside Court case No. RID239844. The restraining order expired in December 2010. That matter was dismissed effective October 6, 2011. The First Petition filed in Riverside Court case No. RID240246 was voluntarily dismissed by Wife on March 8, 2011. The trial court determined at the hearing on October 6, 2011, that Husband’s motion to quash service of the Second Petition filed in Riverside Court case No. RID1101156 should be granted for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Wife then filed the Motion to Vacate, which was denied and an order of dismissal of case No. RID1101156 was entered on April 25, 2013. Wife’s notice of appeal was from the “order of dismissal signed 4/19/13 and entered 4/25/13.” The only matter properly before this court is the dismissal of the Second Petition. However, the trial court relied on records from all three cases in making its decision on jurisdiction. To the extent those records are not properly considered part of case No. RID1101156, we take judicial notice of the record in case Nos. RID240246 and RID239844.

Wife contends de novo review applies to the refusal of the family court to exercise personal and subject matter jurisdiction. She contends the trial court failed to apply any of the governing legal standards when ruling on the Motion to Vacate and the motion to quash. She also states the jurisdictional facts were uncontested and that this court may independently weigh the jurisdictional facts without any deference to the trial court’s findings. Husband provides that courts independently review questions of jurisdiction when the underlying facts are undisputed, including after a trial court denies a motion to vacate. If the facts are disputed, the trial court’s factual determinations are not disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.

Initially, it is well settled that interpretation of the law, e.g., the UCCJEA, is de novo. This court has found that the following standard of review of the trial court’s factual findings is properly utilized: “[W]hen the facts are contested, a trial court’s jurisdictional finding under the UCCJEA is reviewed under the deferential substantial evidence standard. [Citations.] When conducting a substantial evidence review, we must review the entire record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the ruling or judgment being reviewed, and indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the family court’s findings. The family court’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence and credibility assessments are binding on this court.” (Schneer v. Llaurado (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1286-1287 fn. omitted.) “When the facts are uncontested, the ultimate determination of jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. . . . But even when reviewing de novo the legal determination of jurisdiction, an appellate court does not reweigh evidence.” (Id. at pp. 1286, fn. 5.)

Several courts had adopted the standard of review in Schneer, supra. (See In re Aiden L. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 508, 520 [“Our role, once the juvenile court has evaluated witnesses’ credibility, resolved conflicts in the evidence and made its findings, is to ensure that the provisions of the UCCJEA have been properly interpreted and that substantial evidence supports the factual basis for the juvenile court’s determination whether California may properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction in the case”]; In re A.C., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 669 & fn. 5.)

B. THE UCCJEA

“The exclusive method of determining subject matter jurisdiction in custody cases is the UCCJEA.” (In re Marriage of Nurie (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 478, 490 (Nurie).) The existence of subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA is determined at the time a child custody action is commenced; such jurisdiction cannot be conferred by stipulation, consent, waiver or estoppel. (In re A.C., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 860.) “The UCCJEA takes a strict ‘first in time’ approach to jurisdiction.” (In re Marriage of Paillier (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 461, 469.)

Section 3421, subdivision (a) provides, “Except as otherwise provided in Section 3424, a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if any of the following are true: [¶] (1) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state.” Subdivision (b) provides, “Subdivision (a) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this state.”

“ ‘Commencement’ means the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding.” (§ 3402, subd. (e).) A child custody proceeding means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue. It includes a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation of the parties, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic violence. (§ 3402, subd. (d).) A “[c]hild custody determination” is defined as “a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child.” (§ 3402, subd. (c).)

Section 3426 provides “Except as otherwise provided in Section 3424, a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under this chapter if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child has been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this part, unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a court of this state is a more convenient forum under section 3427.”

“Under the UCCJEA, a California court must ‘treat a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States for the purpose of’ determining jurisdiction. [Citation.] Moreover, with limited exception, ‘a child custody determination made in a foreign country under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this part must be recognized and enforced’ in California.” (Nurie, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 490; § 3405.) Section 3405, subdivision (c) provides an exception as follows: “A court of this state need not apply this part if the child custody law of a foreign country violates fundamental principles of human rights.”

Section 3424 does provide for emergency jurisdiction in a state even if it is not the home state. It provides that even where California is not a child’s home state for purposes of the UCCJEA, a California court may exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction over that child if he or she is in California and has been abandoned or other emergency circumstances necessitate court action to protect him or her from actual or threatened “mistreatment or abuse.” (§§ 3424, subd. (a), 3421, subds. (a) & (b).) A court’s custody determination remains in effect under the court’s emergency jurisdiction until a child custody proceeding is initiated in a state that has subject matter jurisdiction over the child. (§ 3424. subd. (b).)

C. JURISDICTION OVER CHILD CUSTODY MATTERS

Based on this framework, we address Wife’s numerous claims that the trial court erred by rejecting it had subject matter jurisdiction over the child custody matters. We note at the outset that Wife’s opening brief is difficult to follow. First, she raises arguments in several different places regarding personal jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the divorce. She then raises numerous issues regarding the subject matter jurisdiction in the child custody determination by the trial court. We will make every attempt to address each of the issues although many are not supported by legal argument or citation to authority. This is especially prevalent in her reply brief. If an argument in an appellate brief is supported by only an opinion or argument of counsel without “citation to any recognized legal authority,” that argument may be deemed waived for failure to present supporting substantive legal analysis. (Kim v. Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979; see also People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 (Stanley).) In those instances we find that Wife either failed to provide legal authority or any argument to support her claim, she has forfeited or waived those arguments.

We will first address the issues regarding the finding by the trial court that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the child custody matters because the Qatar court issued a first-in-time visitation order.

1. SUBSTANTIAL CONFORMITY

Initially, we find that the trial court properly recognized the Qatar custody visitation order as being the first-in-time order. As noted, section 3421, subdivision (a)(1) provides for the exercise of jurisdiction over child custody determinations. The court has jurisdiction if it is the home state or was the home state within six months before the commencement of the proceeding. Home state is defined as “the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” (§ 3402, subd. (g).)

Husband submitted to the trial court a copy of his request for visitation petition filed on January 17, 2011, in Qatar. The Qatar court issued its visitation order on January 19, 2011. The evidence supported that Husband “commenced” the child custody proceeding on January 17, 2011, while Qatar was still the home state of the Children. The Qatar court exercised its jurisdiction on January 19, 2011, as found by the trial court. These facts were undisputed and supported by substantial evidence.

Further, the evidence clearly supported that the Children moved to California on July 17, 2010, thereby establishing that the Qatar proceeding commenced while the Children were still considered to be in the home state of Qatar. Despite Wife initially claiming that she and the Children moved to Riverside in December 2009, Wife twice declared in the UCCJEA declarations filed with the First and Second Petitions that she and the Children had lived in Qatar and then came to California on July 17, 2010. In the Second Petition, her counsel declared Wife and the Children had moved to Riverside on July 17, 2010. The evidence supported that Qatar was the home state of the Children at the time the visitation order was filed.

For the first time in the reply brief, Wife contends she and the Children left Qatar on June 24, 2010; as such, the jurisdiction of Qatar expired in December 2010. Wife cites to her own declaration that she and the Children went to Morocco on June 24, 2010, and then to California. However, this is in the same declaration in which she claims they came to California in December 2009. Such declaration is not credible. Even if it were, we will not address this issue raised for the first time in the reply brief and which is not supported by anything more than vague references to a vacation in Morocco prior to coming to California. (American Drug Stores, Inc. v Stroh (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1453 [“Points raised for the first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not be considered, because such consideration would deprive the respondent of an opportunity to counter the argument”].)

Wife argues the Qatar visitation order could not be recognized because it was not in “substantial conformity” with the UCCJEA. She insists with a citation only to section 3408 that “substantial conformity” requires actual notice to her; California was the home state because it exercised jurisdiction over the child custody matters when it issued its emergency orders on October 20, 2010; Qatar did not apply the temporary absence doctrine; and ignored diplomatic immunity.

“Section 3421 provides that except as authorized by section 3424 (the temporary emergency jurisdiction statute), California courts must recognize and enforce another forum’s child custody determination, even if that forum has not adopted the UCCJEA, if the forum court exercised jurisdiction in substantial conformity with the UCCJEA or the determination was made under factual circumstances meeting UCCJEA jurisdictional standards.” (In re Marriage of Fernandez-Abin (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1039.) “Thus, a ‘child custody determination made in a foreign country under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of [the UCCJEA] must be recognized and enforced.’ ” (Id. at p. 1040; see also Nurie, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 508.)

Here, the Qatar court issued its visitation order in substantial conformity with section 3421, subdivision (a). Husband commenced his proceeding when Qatar was still the home state. (See In re Marriage of Sareen (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 371, 377 (Sareen) [a father’s filing of a custody petition in India after living only nine days in India did not confer jurisdiction because it was not in substantial conformity with section 3421 of the UCCJEA].) Further, at the time, no child custody determinations were in place so the Qatari order did not conflict with any determination already made in Riverside. (See Nurie, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 508.)

The fact that Wife had filed a request for a DVTR and emergency custody orders in October 2010, did not divest Qatar of home state jurisdiction. When Wife filed the DVTR and request for emergency child custody orders, California did not have jurisdiction because it was not the home state at the time. Wife provided incorrect information at the time, that she and the Children had been in California since 1999. The minimum six-months forum state residence must exist at the time the custody petition is filed. “[T]ime spent in a forum after the filing of a child custody petition may not be counted towards the time necessary for home state jurisdiction.” (Sareen, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at pp. 379.)

Moreover, assuming that the trial court could impose the temporary emergency orders pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 3424, under that section once the home state makes a custody determination, the emergency orders are terminated. Hence, the DVTR and emergency custody orders were terminated once the request for the visitation order in Qatar was filed. The proceedings commenced in Riverside when the Second Petition was filed, not on October 20, 2010. At the point when the Second Petition was filed, the proceedings in Qatar had commenced and, as we have found, the Qatar visitation order was in “substantial conformity” with the UCCJEA.

Relying on section 3408, Wife further contends that UCCJEA requires the responding party receive actual notice of the proceeding. Section 3408 entitled “Notice to persons outside California” provides that notice of the proceedings “may” be performed under the rules of the state or the state in which service is made. “Notice must be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice but may be by publication if other means are not effective.” (§ 3408, subd. (a).) Wife’s failure to provide any further argument as to how she never received actual notice of the Qatar order, and how it was insufficient, waives the claim on appeal. (Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793.) Even if we were to address the claim, it is clear that she received actual notice of the proceeding, which is all that is required under section 3408.

Further, without any argument or citation to authority, she claims the Qatar court was not in substantial conformity with the UCCJEA because it did not apply the “temporary absence doctrine” and “ignored diplomatic immunity.” Again, without any further argument and citation to authority, the issue has been waived.[3] (Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793.)

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s recognition of the Qatar custody determination. Since Qatar exercised its jurisdiction over the custody dispute, California could not decide Wife’s Second Petition—filed after the Qatar orders—requesting orders giving her custody of the Children. (§ 3426, subd. (a).)

2. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Wife contends that the orders obtained by Husband in Qatar were void because she had diplomatic immunity. She relies on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, Articles 27 and 29. She insists California could not give any force or effect to the void orders, including the visitation order, which deprived the Riverside Court of jurisdiction.

Husband argues that this claim is barred on appeal for failing to raise it at the time of the hearing on the motion to quash on the Second Petition and custody matters. It was only briefly raised in the Motion to Vacate and the trial court refused to address new issues.

We agree with Husband that this issue is waived on appeal. Wife never advised the trial court—when it was deciding the motion to quash the Second Petition—that she was claiming diplomatic immunity voided the Qatar orders. Although she mentioned briefly in support of the Second Petition that she could not obtain a divorce in a foreign country unless she waived her diplomatic immunity, she never presented any evidence that she was subject to diplomatic immunity for child custody matters. She never presented her argument that the Qatar orders were void to the trial court at the time of the October 6, 2011, hearing. Such failure to raise the issue below and provide argument and evidence to the trial court waives the issue on appeal. Further, she only briefly argued in the Motion to Vacate that her diplomatic immunity barred the Qatari court from entering orders. Again, she presented no evidence to support the claim and it was disregarded by the trial court.

Further, Wife had taken a leave of absence from the State Department starting in the spring of 2009, which apparently continued until she moved to Sweden in February 2010. She expressed concern that she could be barred from returning to Qatar because Husband had sponsored her Visa. Hence, at the time of all the filings in Qatar and the Riverside Court, she was on a leave of absence. Wife admits the temporary leave from her posting but claims she “retained diplomatic status.” However, there is no supporting evidence that she was entitled to immunity during her leave of absence. Wife failed to provide evidence that during her leave of absence she was entitled to diplomatic immunity. There was no adequate evidence presented below to support that she was entitled to diplomatic immunity in Qatar.

3. CONTINUALLY RESIDING IN CALIFORNIA

Wife contends that since she was an employee of the State Department, she and the Children were considered legal residents of Riverside, not Qatar. She relies upon Government Code section 244 for definition of place of residence. She insists that her absences from California were temporary. Husband responds that the residence was immaterial to the UCCJEA finding. It was the finding of the “home state” under the UCCJEA that was important.

Husband has argued that Wife is raising the argument for the first time on appeal, that Wife and the Children continually resided in California and thus it was their home state. In the trial court, Wife referred to the fact that since she was employed by the State Department, the permanent residence of both her and the Children was in Riverside. She insisted she dismissed the First Petition so there would not be confusion as to the jurisdiction of the Riverside Court, not because she was conceding the issue. While it is true Wife did not raise this exact argument in the lower court, we will review the claim.

“The term ‘lived’ for the purpose of conferring home state jurisdiction is properly interpreted to mean physical presence. . . . [I]t was ‘ “significant that the Legislature chose the word ‘lived’ [in section 3402, subd. (g)] as opposed to ‘resided’ or ‘was domiciled.’ The test for ‘residence’ or ‘domicile’ typically involves an inquiry into a person’s intent. [Citation.] In our view, the Legislature used the word ‘lived’ ‘precisely to avoid complicating the determination of a child’s home state with inquiries into the states of mind of the child or the child’s adult caretakers.’ ” ’ ” (In re Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 518.)

Here, Wife’s claim that her permanent residence or domicile was in California has no bearing on the child custody matter. The trial court was to look at the factors in section 3421 to determine where the Children “lived.” Her claim of “residence” has no bearing on the issue. Moreover, Wife’s claim is not supported by the record. After taking a leave of absence in early 2009, she did not immediately return to California but stayed in Qatar and vacationed nearby. No evidence is presented to support that she and the Children “always” returned to California. Further, there is little or no evidence of the connection of the family with Riverside. Again, the Children were not born in California and spent little time in the state. The evidence established that Husband never lived in the state. The Children were enrolled in school in Qatar and never attended school in California. Wife has failed to show the trial court erred in finding that the home state was Qatar.

4. RIPENING OF EMERGENCY ORDER

Wife further contends the original emergency jurisdiction taken by the Riverside Court pursuant to the DVTR ripened to full jurisdiction by January 17, 2011. The Qatari visitation order did not get filed until January 19, 2011, after California had jurisdiction. Husband responds the child visitation proceeding in Qatar commenced on January 17, 2011, exactly before the six months expired. Even if it were to be interpreted as when the determination was made, January 19, it was in substantial compliance.

As previously noted, section 3424, subdivision (b) provides, “If there is no previous child custody determination that is entitled to be enforced under this part and a child custody proceeding has not been commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 3421 to 3423, inclusive, a child custody determination made under this section remains in effect until an order is obtained from a court of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 3421 to 3423, inclusive. If a child custody proceeding has not been or is not commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 3421 to 3423, inclusive, a child custody determination made under this section becomes a final determination, if it so provides and this state becomes the home state of the child.”

“Assumption of emergency jurisdiction does not confer upon the state exercising emergency jurisdiction the authority to make a permanent custody disposition.” (In re C.T. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 101, 108.)

Here, the trial court issued emergency orders based on Wife’s declaration that she and the Children had been in Riverside since December 2009. The trial court later determined this was false. The trial court dismissed the emergency orders and the temporary order expired in December 2010. We cannot see how under these facts that the DVTR and child custody temporary orders could have ripened into a custody determination. Moreover, as we have found, the “commencement” of the proceedings in Qatar was January 17, 2011. We reject Wife’s claim that the trial court’s emergency orders ripened into a permanent child custody determination because Qatar did not act in time.

5. FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 3405, SUBDIVISION (C)

Wife contends that under section 3405, subdivision (c), Qatari custody law violates fundamental human rights barring the Riverside Court from recognizing the orders in Qatar. She cites to several treatises but no case law. Wife insists the trial court refused to consider the argument in either dismissing the Second Petition or denying her Motion to Vacate. Wife asks this court to find that “fundamental human rights include gender equity, secular criteria, basic due process, and an independent judiciary.” She asks this court to declare as a matter of law that Qatar’s version of Shari’a law violates fundamental human rights. In her reply brief, Wife contends she clearly articulated throughout the proceedings how Qatar family law violates fundamental human rights. Counsel argued at oral argument numerous concerns about Qatari law, which were not part of the record. Wife insists that since she is appealing the Motion to Vacate, this court can consider the evidence presented with the motion.

Even though Wife was found to have waived the issue by the trial court based on (1) the fact that she failed to raise the issue properly below; (2) had provided no evidence of the actual custody laws in Qatar; and (3) had failed to identify the specific laws on appeal which violate the fundamental rights, we will review the claim on the merits because jurisdiction can be raised at any time.

Section 3405, subdivision (c) requires a showing that a country violates fundamental principles or human rights. The UCCJEA provides no definition of this term. In California, no case has found that the custody laws of any country meet this exception. (See In re Marriage of Fernandez-Abin, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1040, fn. 20 [Mexico custody laws do not violate fundamental principles of human rights]; Sareen, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 376 [India custody laws do not violate principles of human rights].) Further, in the federal courts under the related Hague Convention, which was the foundation for the UCCJEA, it has not found a country that meets such a high standard. (See Souratgar v. Fair (2d Cir. 2013) 720 F.3d 96, 108 [in addressing exception of denying fundamental rights and freedoms when Shari’a courts were involved the United States Court of Appeals found that no federal court had applied the exception and it also would not]; In re Matter of Yaman (2014) 167 N.H. 82, 93-94.) In Yaman, the court found the Turkish custody laws, which did not allow for joint custody or due process, were not so “egregious” or “utterly shocking” as to violate fundamental principles of human rights. (Id. at pp. 93-94.)

Considering the evidence presented by Wife with the Motion to Vacate, she never presented evidence of the custody laws of Qatar but rather opinions from international family law experts. From the evidence she did present, she was entitled to custody of the Children at least until they were 13 and 15 years old. In fact, in this case, Husband was granted visitation one day each week, which implied Mother was given custody. The evidence before this court does not meet the “utterly shocking” definition of violating fundamental human rights. The exception in section 3405, subdivision (c) is not applicable here. The trial court properly found that Qatar had jurisdiction over the child custody issues.

D. JURISDICTION OVER THE DIVORCE

Wife argues that the trial court erred by dismissing the Second Petition because it had jurisdiction over the divorce.

1. COMITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF QATAR DIVORCE DECREE

Wife contends the unilateral, status-only divorce secretly obtained by Husband in Qatar is not cognizable in California. California cannot recognize foreign decrees obtained in violation of due process. Principles of comity bar recognition of foreign decrees where the process does not meet the American fair trial standard. She insists that Husband had the burden in seeking a dismissal of the Second Petition in favor of a foreign country to establish the fundamental fairness of the foreign tribunal.

A foreign divorce decree is governed by considerations of comity. (Montemurro v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (9th Cir. 1969) 409 F.2d 832 [per curiam opinion].) Such foreign decree would be subject to collateral attack if the party obtaining the divorce did not reside in the foreign jurisdiction. (Ryder v. Ryder (1934) 2 Cal.App.2d 426, 431.) We do not take Wife’s argument to be that Husband did not reside in Qatar at the time he obtained the divorce decree. To the extent that she does make this claim, we reject that he was a resident of California, post.

Wife relies upon a case involving adoption and a treatise to support her claim that even if the foreign divorce decree was properly obtained in Qatar, the trial court should not recognize it because she was not afforded due process in the proceeding.

“ ‘The doctrine of comity prescribes that a court of this nation recognize the judgment of a court of a foreign nation when the foreign court had proper jurisdiction and enforcement does not prejudice the rights of United States citizens or violate domestic public policy.’ ” (Levin v. Ligon (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1475.) We review the ultimate decision to extend comity for an abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 314.)

Here, the trial court was considering whether it had jurisdiction to hear the dissolution petition filed by Wife. Wife and Husband were married in Morocco. Husband resided in Qatar and sought a divorce in that country. Husband submitted the divorce to the court in Qatar. He stated that he was divorced on November 1, 2010, but had to wait three months until the judgment of divorce was final on January 11, 2011. Wife received notice of the divorce while the matter was still pending before the Qatar court, when Husband served the motion to quash the First Petition on December 8, 2010. We have no reason to doubt the validity of the Qatar divorce decree since Wife had an opportunity to respond before the matter was final. She did not respond. (Chaudry v. Chaudry (1978) 159 N.J. Super. 566, 575 [recognized talaq divorce when confirmed by court in Pakistan after contest by wife].) The marriage had already been dissolved by the time that Wife filed the Second Petition in the trial court. The trial court properly recognized the status of the parties as divorced and the divorce decree was entitled to comity.

Wife also contends that the Riverside Court had a duty to exercise jurisdiction because otherwise it would leave the family without a forum. Husband responds that in order to exercise jurisdiction, the court must possess the ability to invoke jurisdiction. We have already discussed at length the UCCJEA and the reasons California did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the custody matters.

2. PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Wife contends the trial court erred by finding it lacked personal jurisdiction over Husband. By filing a reply in the DVTR case, Wife insists he submitted himself to the jurisdiction. She contends the cursory jurisdictional hearing on minimum contacts when addressing the motion to quash the First Petition, which did not result in an order—because she voluntarily dismissed the First Petition—was not sufficient to establish the issue was res judicata. The trial court should have reviewed her evidence that Husband had substantial contact with California to support personal jurisdiction.[4]

Initially, the trial court specifically ruled that Husband was not submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by replying to the DVTR. Further, making an appearance in the DVTR matter did not subject him to personal jurisdiction for the divorce. (See In re Marriage of Fitzgerald and King (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1428 [“a parent may participate in proceedings leading to custody or visitation determinations without exposing himself or herself to the personal jurisdiction of the forum state court”]; see also In re Marriage of Malak (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1023.)

Additionally, the trial court granted the motion to quash service of the First Petition on January 8, 2011. Wife then dismissed the First Petition on March 8, 2011, and never appealed the finding of the trial court on the motion to quash the First Petition. The trial court later ruled that the issue of minimum contacts was res judicata based on the finding on the motion to quash the First Petition. Although Wife argues that the hearing on the First Petition was “cursory” she has failed to provide the reporter’s transcript of the hearing for this court’s review. Further, she provides no legal authority or argument to support her bald assertion that the trial court’s prior decision on the motion to quash the First Petition was a tentative decision that could not be considered adjudication of the issue. We find no reason to disturb the trial court’s finding on personal jurisdiction.

3. DIVISIBLE DIVORCE

Wife contends the trial court erred by finding that since Qatar had issued a divorce decree, it had jurisdiction over all other issues including child custody, spousal support and division of marital property. The trial court should have recognized the doctrine of divisible divorce: that matters of divorce, financial consequences of the divorce and child custody are all separate matters.

The concept of divisible divorce is discretionary. (See Irwin v. Irwin (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 317, 320 [“controversies over matters collateral to the issue of the dissolution of the marriage, such as the division of marital property, the custody of minor children and under appropriate circumstances, spousal support, may be litigated in a separate action,” italics added].) The Second Petition requested division of property and spousal support but provided no further financial information. Husband had stated all marital assets were outside the United States. It does not appear that Wife expressed her desire to the trial court that she wanted to address these matters in separate proceedings.

Moreover, as detailed extensively in this opinion, the trial court considered whether it had jurisdiction over the marriage separately from the determination whether it could consider custody of the Children. It determined it did not have jurisdiction and Wife provides no argument on appeal as to what parts of the proceedings could or should have been heard in the Riverside Court. Finally, since the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction, it could not enforce awards of support and division of marital property. (In re Marriage of Malak, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 1024.)

4. GREEN CARD

Wife contends Husband was a permanent resident of the United States because parties lose their “green cards” by residing outside the United States. He could only be temporarily absent from the United States to maintain his green card. His testimony about developing a credit history supports this claim.

Husband testified at the hearing on October 6, 2011, that he was “a green card holder” for the United States. However, the green card was never presented to the trial court. Husband’s one sentence statement about his green card is not convincing evidence that he was a permanent resident of the United States. It certainly does not establish he was a permanent resident of California. At all other times, Husband stated he was a resident of Qatar. Further, Husband stated that he only set up a bank account in California in case they all tried to move to California in the future. None of this evidence supports that Husband was a permanent resident of California.

E. THE TRIAL COURT HAD INHERENT POWER TO VACATE ITS RULING

Wife finally contends the trial court had the inherent authority to overrule the orders it issued on October 6, 2011, and have a new trial. A court possesses the inherent authority to reconsider its own interim orders prior to entry of final judgment, even in the absence of new law or new facts. (See Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1096.) We have reviewed all of Wife’s arguments properly raised on appeal, including the merits of her claim that Qatari child custody law violates fundamental principles of human rights. We have also recognized that the UCCJEA is the only basis for determining subject matter jurisdiction in California. We see no error that should have been corrected by the trial court.

We also note that at the time the matter was heard by the trial court, custody was impliedly given to Wife and Husband was only given a few hours of visitation by the Qatar court. Further, there was no evidence of any marital property in California except for a small bank account. Nothing before the trial court at the time of the filing of the Second Petition required that it “step in” because the law did not work “justice.” We also note that if that Wife can show that Husband is no longer a resident of Qatar she can seek to modify the custody determination. (§§ 3422, 3423.) We reject that the trial court erred by refusing to vacate its prior rulings.

In sum, the Children and Husband had little or no connection to Riverside. Daughter was born in Qatar and lived there her entire life until she was brought to Riverside on July 17, 2010. Son was born in France, lived in Qatar and only moved to Riverside on July 17, 2010. Husband and Wife were married in Morocco and spent a few vacations in California. Husband did not move to California with the Children and Wife. Wife, who we recognize is a United States citizen, had only been in California for a few months when she filed for the DVTR and sought emergency custody orders. Finally, when she filed the Second Petition, Wife and the Children had already moved to Sweden. Simply, this family had minimal connection with Riverside and any attack on the Qatari orders should be addressed in Qatar. Further, the evidence before this court was not supportive of the claim that the Qatari family law orders violated fundamental human rights. As such, we must affirm the orders of the trial court.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MILLER

J.

We concur:

McKINSTER

Acting P. J.

FIELDS

J.