Filed 10/25/18 Marriage of Ozmon & Singelyn CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge. Affirmed.

Edward J. Singelyn, Appellant in pro. per.

No appearance for Respondent.

Edward J. Singelyn appeals from the final judgment in a proceeding for dissolution of his marriage to Kelly D. Ozmon.[1] He raises several challenges to the trial court’s division of property and debt. We will hold that, because he has not provided us with a complete record — and cannot, as he waived a court reporter — he cannot show error. Hence, we will affirm.

I

THE RECORD IS INADEQUATE

Both parties waived a court reporter. As a result, there is no reporter’s transcript of the trial. In addition, Edward has had some but not all of his trial exhibits transmitted to us; he has not had any of Kelly’s trial exhibits transmitted to us. As we will discuss, this lack of a complete record is fatal to Edward’s contentions.

“‘Where findings of fact are challenged on a civil appeal, we are bound by the “elementary, but often overlooked principle of law, that . . . the power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,” to support the findings below. [Citation.]” (Bickel v. City of Piedmont (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1040, 1053.)

“It is fundamental that an order is presumed correct, and the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error is on the appellant. [Citation.] This places on appellant the burden to provide an adequate record on appeal to allow the reviewing court to assess the purported error [citation], and if the record on appeal does not contain all of the documents or other evidence considered by the trial court, a reviewing court will ‘decline to find error on a silent record, and thus infer that substantial evidence’ supports the trial court’s findings. [Citation.]” (569 E. County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 434, fn. 9.)

First, Edward contends that the trial court erred by imposing Watts charges[2] on him for rents he received after separation while denying him Epstein credits[3] for mortgage payments he made after separation. Because he had the burden of proving any Epstein credits, this issue turns on whether there was not only substantial, but “‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’” evidence that he made such mortgage payments. (See Patricia A. Murray Dental Corp. v. Dentsply Internat., Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 258, 270.) Once again, without a complete record, he cannot show this.

Indeed, on this record, it is not even clear that the trial court did impose Watts charges on Edward. The judgment awarded the rents received to Edward as his separate property; it then stated, “[Edward] owes [Kelly] an offset of $10,333.00 . . . .” However, the record does not indicate how this offset was calculated nor what it represented.

In a subsidiary contention, Edward argues that, in calculating the Watts charges, the trial court should have subtracted interest due on the mortgage from rent received. However, he cannot cite any evidence supporting this.

In a further subsidiary contention, Edward also claims that he lacked notice that Kelly was seeking Watts charges. In the absence of a complete record, however, he cannot show that he did, in fact, lack notice. He also cannot show that he raised lack of notice below. (Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 591-592 [“arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally deemed forfeited.”].)

Second, Edward contends that the “park model”[4] was partly his separate property, because he started building it before separation and he completed it after separation; thus, the trial court erred by awarding it to Kelly without giving him an equalization payment. “Courts typically apply a substantial evidence standard of review to the court’s characterization of property as separate or community. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Brandes (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1472.) This issue therefore turns on whether there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the park model was, in fact, community property. Without a complete record, Edward cannot show that there was not.

Third, Edward contends that the trial court failed to require Kelly to pay her fair share of community debts, including a car loan, cell phone bills, and credit card bills. Without a complete record, he cannot substantiate this contention. A fortiori, he cannot show that there was no contrary evidence. Indeed, he concedes that the document on which he intended to rely to prove these debts at trial was excluded as hearsay. He does not claim that this evidentiary ruling was erroneous, nor, on this record, could he.

For these reasons, we must affirm the judgment.

II

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Because Kelly has not appeared, we do not award costs against either party.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAMIREZ

P. J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON

J.

RAPHAEL

J.