Filed 5/12/17 Marriage of Patel CA4/2


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



In re the Marriage of NEENA and VIPUL PATEL.

NEENA PATEL,

Respondent,

v.

VIPUL PATEL,

Appellant.


E065139

(Super.Ct.No. FAMRS700214)

OPINION


APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. David A. Williams, Judge. Affirmed.
Lawrence P. Bellomo for Appellant.
Law Office of Anju Multani and Anju Multani for Respondent.
Appellant Vipul Patel appeals a judgment on reserved issues in the dissolution of his marriage to respondent Neena Patel. On appeal, he contends that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a new trial. A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for new trial. (Walker v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15, 18.) An abuse of discretion occurs if, in light of the applicable law and considering all of the relevant circumstances, the court’s decision exceeds the bounds of reason and results in a miscarriage of justice. (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478-479.) We find no abuse of discretion, and we will therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The parties were married in 1988 and separated in 2007. Neena filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage on April 19, 2007, and the marriage was dissolved as of November 24, 2009. A trial on reserved issues was held on December 17, 2014. The issues at trial were limited to “property, debt, the 271 sanctions,[ ] and . . . breach of fiduciary duty.”
The issues raised in this appeal do not require an extensive discussion of the evidence at trial. The trial court made the following findings:
The only witnesses at trial were the parties. The court found Neena’s testimony credible and found Vipul’s testimony “less than credible.”
With respect to Neena’s claim of breach of fiduciary duty, the court found “multiple instances” where Vipul signed Neena’s name to checks transferring community funds to a company he operated named Stone Choice. The checks came from an account in Neena’s name only and were written without Neena’s consent or authorization. Vipul also took a check from the sale of a property on Prospector Lane in the amount of $353,492.85, signed Neena’s name to it, and deposited $300,000 of the money into a joint stock account against Neena’s wishes and without her permission. Over a period of years, Vipul took $463,200 in community funds without Neena’s consent and lost the money in the stock market and in the failed Stone Choice business.
As to the marital home on Nimes Court, the court found that the parties purchased the property in 1992, taking title as “married-joint tenants.” In October 1997, Vipul deeded the property to Neena as her sole and separate property as a married woman. Vipul did not present any evidence to contradict Neena’s claim that the house was her separate property, nor did he present any evidence of the community interest in that property. The court awarded the property to Neena as her sole and separate property.
As to a rental property on Prospector Lane, the court found that it was purchased by the community in 1989 as married joint tenants. In 1999, Vipul deeded the property to Neena as her sole and separate property as a married woman. Vipul did not present any evidence to establish any community interest in the proceeds of the sale of the house in 2005.
Personal property addressed at trial was Vipul’s collection of sports memorabilia. The court found that the evidence was insufficient to establish either the exact number of items at the time of separation or the value of those items at the time of separation. The only reliable evidence was Vipul’s testimony as to a list of items he removed from the residence and a value of $91,169, arrived at based on eBay sales of the items. Because the court found that Vipul breached his fiduciary duty, the court awarded that property to Neena.
The court found the evidence insufficient to warrant sanctions pursuant to Family Code section 271.
Judgment on reserved issues was entered on September 30, 2105. Vipul filed a timely notice of appeal.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Code of Civil Procedure section 657 provides that a judgment may be vacated for any of seven enumerated reasons. In his motion, Vipul asserted three grounds on which he was entitled to a new trial:
Irregularity in the proceedings (§ 657, subd. 1);
Accident or surprise (§ 657, subd. 3); and
Insufficiency of the evidence (§ 657, subd. 6).
As we have previously noted, an order granting or denying a motion for new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Walker v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 18.) Although Vipul states that he believes there has been an abuse of discretion, he does not structure his argument with that standard of review in mind. Rather, because the argument portion of his brief consists almost entirely of a verbatim reproduction of the new trial motion itself, it appears that he believes that we are to review the new trial motion independently. Where an appellant fails to conform his or her arguments to the appropriate standard of review, we may disregard the arguments entirely. (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465.) Nevertheless, we will briefly address Vipul’s contentions.
1. Irregularity in the Proceedings
Vipul contends that the trial court failed to rule on his objections to the first amended statement of decision. He states that his objections were filed on July 28, 2015. The record shows the following: The trial court issued its tentative statement of decision on March 4, 2015. On March 13, 2015, Vipul filed objections to the tentative statement of decision. On April 16, 2015, the court ruled on Vipul’s objections and issued an amended statement of decision. On April 30, 2015, Vipul filed objections to the amended statement of decision. On July 9, 2015, the court addressed the objections. In part, it agreed that the amended statement of decision was ambiguous. On July 10, 2015, the court issued its first amended statement of decision. On July 28, 2015, Vipul filed objections to the first amended statement of decision. On August 26, 2015, he filed objections to the proposed judgment. On September 16, 2015, the court overruled the objections filed on August 26, 2015, i.e., the objections to the proposed judgment.
At the hearing on the new trial motion, the court acknowledged that it had not issued a ruling on the objections to the first amended statement of decision, but stated that the omission was not material, in that the objections to the first amended statement of decision and the objections to the proposed judgment were the same. Vipul’s attorney acknowledged that the two sets of objections were “pretty similar.” Later, the court stated that the objections to the first amended statement of decision were the same objections Vipul had previously made, i.e., insufficient evidence to support some of the court’s rulings. The court explained why the evidence was sufficient, i.e., that it found Neena’s testimony on the disputed issues to be credible and therefore sufficient. The court acknowledged the irregularity, i.e., the omission of a ruling on the objections to the first amended statement of decision, but repeated that the omission was not material.
Vipul’s contention that a new trial was required because the trial court failed to rule on his objection to the first amended statement of decision is incorrect. Reversal may be required if the court fails to issue a statement of decision upon a timely request. That issue is currently under review by the California Supreme Court in F.P. v. Monier, review granted April 16, 2014, S216566. However, a deficient statement of decision rarely, if ever, mandates reversal for a new trial. The purpose of a statement of decision is to apprise the parties and the appellate courts of the legal and factual basis for the trial court’s rulings on the material issues in the case. (People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 509, 524-525, overruled on other grounds in Cel–Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 184.) Because a judgment is presumed to be correct, a party must object to any deficiencies in the statement of decision in order to avoid the effect of the doctrine of implied findings. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) If a party fails to bring deficiencies in the statement of decision to the attention of the trial court, a reviewing court will conclusively presume that the trial court made all findings necessary to support the judgment. If a party does make timely and sufficient objections to a proposed statement of decision, the presumption does not apply with respect to the specific issues addressed in the party’s objections. (Id. at pp. 1133-1134.) Moreover, even if the statement of decision is insufficient because it fails to make findings on a material issue, the omission is harmless error unless the evidence is “sufficient to sustain a finding in the complaining party’s favor which would have the effect of countervailing or destroying other findings. [Citation.]” (Hellman v. La Cumbre Golf & Country Club (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1230.) Accordingly, the trial court’s failure to address Vipul’s objections to the first amended statement of decision does not support either the new trial motion or reversal on appeal.
2. Accident or Surprise
Appellant contended in his new trial motion that he was surprised by the trial court’s finding of breach of fiduciary duty, because at the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the trial, the court’s comments did not indicate that the court believed that appellant breached his fiduciary duty. A claim of accident or surprise in support of a new trial motion “‘denotes some condition or a situation in which a party to an action is unexpectedly placed to his detriment. The condition or situation must have been such that ordinary prudence on the part of the person claiming surprise could not have guarded against and prevented it. Such party must not have been negligent in the circumstances. [Citations.]’” (Hata v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1791, 1806.) Under this standard, Vipul could claim surprise only if the issue of breach of fiduciary duty had not been litigated; it is not sufficient that he did not anticipate the court’s finding of breach of fiduciary duty, based on the court’s comments after the close of evidence. However, it was clear from the beginning of the trial that Neena was seeking a ruling on breach of fiduciary duty. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the motion on this ground.
3. Insufficiency of the Evidence
Section 657 states: “A new trial shall not be granted upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, nor upon the ground of excessive or inadequate damages, unless after weighing the evidence the court is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision.” Accordingly, we can reverse the denial of a new trial motion based on insufficiency of the evidence only if there is no substantial conflict in the evidence and the evidence compels the conclusion that the motion should have been granted. (Fassberg Construction Co. v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 720, 751-752.)
Vipul’s motion does not meet this standard. Indeed, although the third ground for seeking a new trial is entitled “insufficiency of the evidence,” that part of the motion presents a hodgepodge of contentions, most of which do not even pertain to the sufficiency of the evidence. The first paragraph states that Vipul objected to an ambiguity in the statement of decision because the court omitted a factual and legal basis for the award of the Nimes property to Neena as her separate property. It does not assert that the evidence was insufficient. The second paragraph is incomprehensible, but also does not state that evidence was insufficient as to any material issue.
The third paragraph quotes the trial court as saying that there was insufficient evidence to permit the court to calculate either the community interest or Neena’s separate interest in the two properties. It then asks the court to order a new trial pertaining to community and separate interests in the properties. The first amended statement of decision, however, stated that Vipul had failed to present any evidence to establish the community’s interest, if any, in either property, both of which were held by Neena as her sole and separate property. Rather than asserting insufficiency of the evidence relied upon by the court, Vipul was seeking a new trial so that he could present evidence he had failed to present at trial. It was not an abuse of discretion to deny the motion on that ground.
The fourth paragraph of the motion is also incomprehensible, but it unquestionably does not assert the insufficiency of the evidence as to any material issue.
The remainder of the motion asks the court to order a new trial to adjudicate a number of issues. However, appellant did not bring any of those issues to the court’s attention during the trial. Accordingly, these contentions are not based on insufficiency of the evidence as to any material issue that was before the court, and it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the motion on those grounds.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Neena Patel is awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

McKINSTER
J.
We concur:



RAMIREZ
P. J.



SLOUGH
J.