Marriage of Pichardo

Filed 7/26/07 Marriage of Pichardo CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, William A. Allen, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI,  21.) Reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded with directions.

Law Offices of James P. Karmy and James P. Karmy for Appellant Jose Pichardo.

Law Offices of Jeffrey W. Doeringer and Jeffrey W. Doeringer for Appellant Maria Pichardo.

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A husband quitclaimed his interest in community real property to his wife but (30 years later) claimed during the parties marital dissolution proceedings that he had not understood the transaction. The family court rejected the husbands claim and awarded the property to the wife, but ordered her to reimburse the husband for his pre-quitclaim interest in the property. Both parties appeal. We affirm the judgment insofar as it confirms the asset as the wifes separate property but reverse insofar as it requires her to reimburse the husband.

FACTS

Jose and Maria Pichardo were married in 1972. In 1974, they bought a house and took title in both names, as husband and wife. In October 1977, Jose executed a quitclaim deed conveying the house to Maria, a married woman, as her sole and separate property. The deed was recorded on October 19, 1977.

Jose and Maria separated in 2004, and Jose filed a petition to dissolve their marriage in June 2005. On December 15, 2005, the court approved a settlement agreement disposing of all but two issues -- spousal support (which is not an issue on this appeal) and the characterization of the house (she claimed it as her separate property, he claimed it as a community asset). The issue about the house was tried to the court.

According to Maria: In September 1977, a deputy sheriff appeared at the door and served Jose with papers for child support that he was not paying (for children from a previous relationship with Felisa). The quitclaim deed was Joses idea -- he said he could sign the house over to Maria because he was not going to pay a penny to the bitch (Felisa). Jose arranged for his friend, Manny Gomes, to prepare the quitclaim deed, which Jose signed in October 1977; he gave it to Maria and she had it recorded. Thereafter, Maria made the mortgage payments and paid for the maintenance of the house.

According to Jose: The day that I signed that document, I think it was a Sunday morning. I was playing with my children. They were about four and five years of age. I was very happy with them. And [Maria] came up to me and she showed me the paper and she said sign this paper. I signed it practically without looking to see what it was that I was signing. Because when one is happy, you dont ask questions about anything. Our life was perfect. . . . I didnt think anything about it. She was my mate. I couldnt think anything bad about her. . . . I just didnt think about anything. He said they had agreed that he would pay for the utilities and food, and she would pay the mortgage.

The trial court accepted Marias testimony, found there was no fraud or undue influence, and that Jose understood exactly what he was signing. The judgment of dissolution ultimately entered in February 2006 (I) awards the house to Maria as her sole and separate property and (II) awards to Jose such sum as was one-half . . . of the parties equity in the family residence on October 4, 1977, payable without interest by Maria to Jose (with the amount to be determined by the parties lawyers). Jose appeals from the first part of the judgment, Maria from the second part.

DISCUSSION

I.

In related arguments, Jose contends the trial court failed to follow the rule announced in In re Marriage of Mathews (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 624 and, as a result, reached a conclusion that is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.

Mathews holds that, under Family Code section 721, a rebuttable presumption of undue influence arises when one spouse obtains an advantage over another in an interspousal property transaction, and that the burden of rebutting the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence is on the spouse who acquired the advantage. (In re Marriage of Mathews, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pp. 630-631.) On this appeal, the question is not whether the trial court applied the correct standard but, as always, whether the trial courts decision is supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 632; see also In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614; Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630-631.)

Substantial evidence in the form of Marias testimony supports the trial courts findings that there was no fraud or undue influence, and that Jose knew exactly what he was doing when he quitclaimed the house to Maria. (In re Marriage of Alexander (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 677, 682 [the testimony of a single witness is sufficient]; In re Marriage of Dick (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 144, 160 [the trial courts credibility calls are binding on appeal].) By accepting Marias testimony and rejecting Joses, the trial court found that both parties fully understood the reason for the transfer of property and the effect of the quitclaim deed. No more was required (although it is worth noting that Marias testimony is corroborated by the undisputed fact that, following execution of the deed, she personally paid all the mortgage and maintenance payments for the house).[1]

II.

Maria contends the trial court erred in awarding an equity interest to Jose for the period between the purchase of the house and the transfer to Maria (1974 to 1977). We agree.

A quitclaim deed transfers the grantors entire interest in the property -- and when a husband executes a quitclaim deed in favor of his wife, he transfers all of his interest in the property, including the community interest which had accrued up to that point as a result of their joint acquisition of the property. (In re Marriage of Broderick (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 489, 503.)

DISPOSITION

Paragraph 10 of the February 7, 2006 judgment is reversed; in all other respects, the judgment is affirmed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to enter a corrected judgment. Maria is awarded her costs of appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

VOGEL, J.

We concur:

MALLANO, Acting P.J.

ROTHSCHILD, J.

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[1] Joses contention that the quitclaim deed is void because it was made to illegally defraud a third person is factually inconsistent with his position at trial and legally irrelevant. (Tognazzi v. Wilhelm (1936) 6 Cal.2d 123; see also Simon v. Steelman (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1007.) His claim that the quitclaim deed fails for a want of consideration is simply wrong. (Odone v. Marzocchi (1949) 34 Cal.2d 431, 436 [a deed does not require consideration and, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, cannot be rescinded due to a lack of consideration].)