Marriage of Ross

Filed 6/7/07 Marriage of Ross CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Robert P. Dahlquist, Judge. Affirmed.

This marital dissolution case involves a pro per appellant husband who has consistently refused or failed to comply with any of the trial court orders, and has repeatedly engaged in fraudulent conduct to evade his lawful responsibilities to the detriment of the respondent wife and undoubtedly to the great frustration of her counsel and the trial court. Appellant Calvin Belnap Ross now has heaped misery upon this court, counsel and respondent Gail B. Ross, by filing an utterly incomprehensible, meritless appeal, which adds only cost and delay to the progress of this family law matter.^[1]In all fairness to Gail and her counsel, we should strike Calvin's opening and reply briefs, which make no effort to comply with the rules of court and offer no rational authority for the positions taken, and dismiss this meritless appeal. However, because the case is "fully briefed" and the appeal presents no substantive challenge to the trial court's orders, we will resolve the case on the merits in an effort to foreclose at least one avenue of Calvin's obfuscation.

Calvin essentially appeals from the family court judgment entered on March 3, 2006.^[2] As best we can decipher, Calvin challenges the trial court's computation of child and spousal support amounts, claims the Family Law Attorney's Real Property Lien (FLARPL) filed pursuant to Family Code section 2033 is invalid, asserts Gail's attorneys have no right to attorney fees, contends the California codes are not valid law, and the trial court erred in finding the family residence was community property, in setting the value of his business, and in finding he had breached any fiduciary duties. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

After a two-day trial in January 2006, the court took the matter of the remaining issues in Gail's and Calvin's marital dissolution under submission. On January 23, 2006, the trial court filed a 22-page "ORDER AFTER TRIAL," which addressed and resolved those issues. For purposes of this appeal, we adopt the trial court's summary of facts as background for our discussion.

"Gail and Calvin were married on April 5, 1971. They separated on October 5, 2004. The length of their marriage was 33 1/2 years. Gail's Petition for Dissolution was filed on October 29, 2004. A judgment dissolving the marriage, but reserving other issues for later resolution, was filed on December 14, 2005.

"The parties have six children. The five older children are over the age of 18, and are legal adults. The youngest child, Braden, is 17 years old.

"During the marriage, Gail was primarily a homemaker and a full-time mother to the parties' six children. At the time of marriage, Calvin worked for Union Pacific Railroad. During the marriage, Calvin attended school to obtain his Doctor of Chiropractic degree and chiropractic license. After obtaining his degree and license, Calvin became self-employed as a chiropractic doctor, beginning in approximately 1981. For the past 25 years, Calvin has worked as a chiropractic doctor and Gail has been a homemaker.

"The primary issues in this case involve the marital residence, located in Bonsall, and the chiropractic business. Although Gail and Calvin are no longer living together as a married couple, they both continue to reside in the Bonsall residence with three of their six children. The parties anticipate moving into separate residences after the Court issues its decision regarding the disposition of the Bonsall residence.

"The Bonsall residence was acquired in 1999. Prior to the purchase of the Bonsall residence, the parties had experienced some significant financial difficulties. Those difficulties arose after Calvin's chiropractic business in Huntington Beach was sold to a purchaser who promised to pay over time for the practice but the purchaser subsequently defaulted on his obligation. Thereafter, the parties lost the home that they owned at the time to foreclosure. They also experienced problems with the federal and state taxing authorities, and Calvin ended up filing for bankruptcy. In fact, Calvin testified at trial that he has filed for bankruptcy approximately four times, the most recent being in 1999. The 1999 bankruptcy filing was made by Calvin alone, and did not include Gail.

"In or about September of 1999, Gail was asked by Calvin to sign a proposed Interspousal Transfer Deed concerning the Bonsall property. . . . Calvin explained to Gail that she needed to sign the Interspousal Transfer Deed in order to protect the parties and their new home from potential tax liabilities. Calvin told Gail that Calvin's recent bankruptcy filing had insulated him from certain tax liabilities but, according to Calvin, Gail was still exposed to the tax liabilities because she had not been included in the bankruptcy filing. Calvin told Gail that he wanted to protect the home by having her sign the Interspousal Transfer Deed. Based on her discussions with Calvin, Gail thought that if she did not sign the deed, the taxing authorities could potentially take the Bonsall residence in order to satisfy outstanding tax liabilities.

"Gail signed the Interspousal Transfer Deed. It was recorded on December 30, 1999. Thereafter, title to the Bonsall property was held by Calvin as 'a married man as his sole and separate property.' Title was held in this fashion at the time of filing of Gail's petition for dissolution.

"In the present proceeding, Calvin has argued that the Bonsall property is his sole and separate property. Calvin has argued that the Court should confirm the property to him as his sole and separate property. In contrast, Gail has argued that the Bonsall property is community property.

"During the course of these proceedings, in or about June 2005, Calvin recorded a quitclaim deed, transferring the Bonsall residence to the Presiding Elder of the Body Best Unitarian Church. This church was founded by Calvin (apparently during the time that this case has been pending), and Calvin is the Presiding Elder of the church. The 'Body Best' name arises from a chiropractic technique developed by Calvin.

"By Order After Hearing filed October 11, 2005, the Court found that Calvin's transfer of the Bonsall residence by quitclaim deed to the Body Best Unitarian Church violated the automatic restraining orders applicable in every dissolution case by virtue of Family Code [section] 2040. These automatic restraining orders were printed on the summons received by Calvin in this case.

"During the course of these proceedings, in February 2005, Calvin also sold his then-existing chiropractic business, located in San Clemente, to another chiropractic doctor in San Clemente for the sum of one dollar. Calvin then opened a new chiropractic office in San Juan Capistrano. Calvin sent a letter to his patients, explaining that they could either see the chiropractic doctor in San Clemente or 'follow' Calvin to the 'new location' in San Juan Capistrano. Some but not all of Calvin's patients have followed Calvin to his new office location in San Juan Capistrano.

"During the latter part of the marriage, the parties owned a large life insurance policy on Calvin's life, with Gail as the beneficiary. There is conflicting evidence concerning the amount of the policy. It was either $1 million or $500,000. In any event, there is no dispute that Calvin stopped paying the premiums on the policy during the course of these proceedings, and the policy has lapsed.

"At a hearing conducted on February 8, 2005, the Court made the following pendente lite orders, among others: (1) the parties were awarded joint legal and joint physical custody of Braden; (2) Calvin was ordered to pay child support of $1,404 per month to Gail; (3) Calvin was ordered to pay spousal support of $2,450 per month to Gail; (4) Calvin was ordered to pay $5,000 in attorney's fees to Gail's attorney. . . .

"To date, Calvin has not paid any of the child support ordered in the Order After Hearing filed April 7, 2005. He has paid only a relatively small portion of the spousal support that he was ordered to pay. After the order was made, Calvin gave Gail 'spending money' of $200 per week.

"In addition to the attorney fee order contained in the April 7, 2005 order, the Court subsequently ordered Calvin to make two additional contributions towards Gail's attorney's fees, in an amount totaling $3,750. Calvin has not complied with any of the orders requiring him to make contributions towards Gail's attorney's fees."

The court thereafter set out its findings, supported by facts and law, regarding custody and visitation, child support, spousal support, support arrearages, characterization of the family residence as community property, characterization of Calvin's chiropractic practice as community property, characterization of automobiles and household furniture as community property with the exception of a list of separate property items confirmed to Gail, insurance issues (life, health and house), breaches of fiduciary duties by Calvin, Gail's request for attorney fees, assignment of community property assets and accounting for monies owed, and taxes (reserving jurisdiction to make further orders concerning any such debts). The court ordered Gail's attorney to prepare a proposed judgment on the reserved issues which incorporated the court's orders made that day.

On March 3, 2006, the final judgment on the reserved issues was filed and entered. To effectuate an equal division of the community property pursuant to Family Code section 2550, the court set forth its assignment of the properties, outlined the amounts Calvin had failed to pay under past and current orders and noted that in lieu of Gail making an equalization payment to Calvin, those amounts would be "deemed satisfied" and the end result was that Calvin still owed Gail $37,970.54 as an award under Family Code section 1101, subdivision (g); $17,674.63 as child support arrears; and $23,083.00 as spousal support arrears, for a total of $78,728.17.

The court denied Calvin's new trial motion on grounds he had failed to show either a factual basis or error of law for a new trial. Calvin subsequently filed this appeal.

DISCUSSION

At the outset, we note that we decline to elaborate on many of Calvin's "issues" raised in his briefs that are utterly without support. For example, Calvin goes on at some length in both his opening and reply briefs to contend all of California's statutes which have been codified in the various codes are void under the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, arguing that only common law exists and therefore the trial court had no jurisdiction to determine any of the marital dissolution issues in this case. Although a court could well engage in some scholarly analysis of the plenary power of the California Legislature to enact laws and the irrelevance of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 to any examination of the validity of the California codes and the trial court's jurisdiction, we decline the opportunity to do so. Propositions raised in the briefs which are patently absurd do not require in-depth analysis or discussion.

This is also particularly true for Calvin's argument, contrary to his contention the California codes are invalid, that the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is the "supreme codified law of the planet" which makes his separate claim to all property in this dissolution matter superior to any purported community property claim. With apologies to the former television series Star Trek, we decline "to boldly go where no [rational analysis] has gone before." (Star Trek: Episode Introduction monologue.)

To the extent we can discern other issues raised by Calvin, we briefly address them in turn. As noted earlier, Calvin challenges the trial court's computations of child and spousal support, arguing the court failed to follow the guidelines for child support and failed to consider his evidence of income and standard of living for purposes of setting spousal support. Calvin, however, did not request a statement of decision below or provide any reporter's transcripts on appeal. The scant record before us shows that the trial court meticulously stated the grounds for its decisions based on the evidence presented by the parties and the pertinent law. Because Calvin has failed to affirmatively show that the court incorrectly followed Family Code section 4055 in calculating child support or that the court did not consider his evidence in calculating income for determining spousal support, we presume the trial court properly performed its duties. (See Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913.) Consequently, we will conclusively presume the trial court's findings regarding the matters of child and spousal support, including arrearages, are supported by the evidence and will imply all findings necessary to support the judgment. (In re Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992; In re Marriage of Cohn (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 923, 928.)

Similarly, we presume the trial court's rulings regarding the FLARPL filed as to the family residence, its determination that the residence was community property, even in the face of an interspousal transfer to Calvin as his separate property, and its findings that Calvin breached his fiduciary duties to Gail regarding the family residence and his business are fully supported by the evidence.

Further, Calvin's additional arguments that any attorney fees orders are invalid because Gail's attorneys do not have licenses to practice law, only "BAR CARDS," and the court erred in setting the value of his business are specious. As to the latter, the record reflects the parties stipulated "that the value of the chiropractic business operated during the marriage, currently named Ross Life Center, is valued at $175,000 as of the date of trial." As to the former, we decline to play Calvin's game of semantics.

In sum, as to each of Calvin's contentions, "[t]he trial court's judgment is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness. [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Nichols (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 661, 670.) Because of this presumption, a party challenging such judgment has the burden of providing an adequate record to overcome the presumption and to show

reversible error. (Ballad v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574-575.) Calvin has simply failed to do so in this case.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

McDONALD, J.

IRION, J.

Publication Courtesy of California attorney directory.

Analysis and review provided by Oceanside Property line attorney.

^[1] For purposes of clarity and not out of disrespect, we refer to the parties by their first names.

^[2] We have liberally construed Calvin's notice of appeal from the judgment entered because he checked the appropriate box for "Judgment after court trial," and identified, among other things, that the appeal was also from the denial of his new trial motion, which may be deemed to be an appeal from the underlying judgment. (Walker v. Los AngelesCounty Metropolitan Transp. Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15, 19-22.) We have also denied Gail's motion to dismiss Calvin's appeal on grounds he has failed to comply with the trial court's orders and judgment.