Filed 2/8/18 Marriage of Vu and Fearn CA4/3






NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


In re Marriage of JIMMY LE VU and LAURA AMY FEARN.

JIMMY LE VU,

Respondent,

v.

LAURA AMY FEARN,

Appellant.


G054234

(Super. Ct. No. 12D001228)

O P I N I O N


Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Sheri L. Honer, Judge. Affirmed.
Laura Amy Fearn, in pro. per., for Appellant Laura Amy Fearn.
No appearance for Respondent.
* * *

INTRODUCTION
Laura Amy Fearn appeals from an order reducing her child support award from Jimmy Le Vu, and an order denying her request that Vu pay for some of her attorney fees. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by issuing the orders challenged by Fearn. We therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND
Our prior opinions in In re Marriage of Vu & Fearn (Jan. 13, 2016, G050313) [nonpub. opn.] and In re Marriage of Vu & Fearn (Sept. 22, 2017, G053116) [nonpub. opn.] review the lengthy procedural history of this marriage case which we do not reiterate here. Instead, we only focus on the aspects of the procedural history that are pertinent to the issues presented in this appeal.
In January 2015, Vu filed a request that the court modify his $1,628 monthly child support obligation regarding Vu and Fearn’s two minor children. In Fearn’s response to Vu’s request, Fearn requested a need-based attorney fees award against Vu. Vu and Fearn each filed a request that the court impose sanctions against the other under Family Code section 271.
Following an evidentiary hearing, Fearn requested that the court issue a statement of decision. The trial court issued a 15-page statement of decision in which the court did not change the amount of income it had imputed to Vu, but found Fearn had a monthly income of $3,000. Given Fearn’s monthly income and fluctuations in the amount of time each party had physical custody of the children, the court calculated child support obligations for time periods starting February 1, 2015 and ending November 1, 2015. The court further ordered that starting November 1, 2015 and continuing thereafter, Vu’s modified child support obligation would be $1,141 per month. The court also denied Fearn’s request for an award of attorney fees and awarded Vu and Fearn $15,000 in Family Code section 271 sanctions against the other.
The court issued the findings and order after hearing. Fearn appealed.

DISCUSSION
Fearn argues the trial court erred by (1) imputing income to her and modifying Vu’s child support obligation accordingly; and (2) denying her request for need-based attorney fees. We address and reject each of Fearn’s arguments in turn.
I.
Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Finding Fearn Had a Monthly
Income of $3,000.
We review orders granting or denying a request for modification of child support under the abuse of discretion standard. (Plumas County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Rodriguez (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1021, 1026.) The trial court’s exercise of its discretion must be informed and considered, the court may not ignore or contravene the purposes of the law, and the court’s discretion is limited by the statutes and rules regulating child support. (Ibid.; In re Marriage of Williams (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1234.) We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence and consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed in the trial court. (Plumas County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Rodriguez, supra, at p. 1026.)
Fearn argues the trial court erred by modifying Vu’s child support obligation after imputing $3,000 in monthly income to Fearn because insufficient evidence showed (1) she had an ability and opportunity to earn such an income and (2) imputing such income would be in the children’s best interests. In its statement of decision, however, the trial court clarified that it found Fearn’s monthly income to be $3,000, and that the court did not impute income to Fearn. In its statement of decision, the court explained: “The court finds respondent receives income of at least $3,000 per month based on respondent’s testimony that she claimed monthly income of $3,000 to $4,000 on two loan application[s]. This was prior to respondent claiming to have started work in September 2015. Thus, the $3,000 per month is not imputed. Instead, the court finds it is monthly income received by respondent, and it was income received monthly prior to September 2015.”
Fearn does not dispute that she claimed a monthly income of $3,000 to $4,000 on two loan applications. That evidence was sufficient in and of itself to support the trial court’s finding Fearn had a monthly income of $3,000. (In re Marriage of Chakko (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 104, 107 [appellate court upheld trial court’s reliance on a statement in the father’s loan application that his income was $40,000]; In re Marriage of Calcaterra & Badakhsh (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 28, 34-35 [trial court did not err by finding the father’s income to be that stated on a loan application and not on a recent tax return].) Fearn does not cite any legal authority suggesting otherwise.
The trial court explained that it chose the lesser number ($3,000) Fearn listed on loan applications instead of the higher number ($4,000) because evidence showed that after Fearn submitted those two loan applications, she became employed at an hourly rate of $17, which would yield a monthly income of $2,947 were she to work full time (e.g. 40 hours a week). Thus, the court found Fearn had income of at least $3,000 a month.
Fearn argues that notwithstanding the court’s express statements in the statement of decision that it found Fearn’s monthly income to be $3,000, and did not impute such income, the trial court’s oral comments following the evidentiary hearing reflect the court’s actual ruling imputing income. Fearn states: “[I]n its Statement of Decision, the court sidesteps the best interest analysis by finding that it is not imputing income to [Fearn] because she ‘receives’ $3,000 per month based on statements she made on her loan applications. . . . The problem with the court’s position is that it clearly sought to impute income to [Fearn] in its Oral Ruling when it found as follows: ‘[Fearn] is capable of working 40 hours a week; 40 hours a week at $17 per hour comes to approximately $2,947 a month. That is how the court came to the $3,000 a month that it’s imputing to [Fearn].’”
We review the trial court’s final statement of decision and the findings and order after hearing, and not the court’s prior oral comments. (See Diaz v. Professional Community Management, Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1190, 1206 [“while a court’s oral statements may be illustrative of its thinking, it is the court’s written order that constitutes the ruling”].) In any event, in the statement of decision, the trial court stated that even if it had imputed $3,000 in monthly income to Fearn, such imputation would be in the best interests of the children: “Because the court finds respondent receives income of $3,000 per month, as opposed to imputing $3,000 per month, a best interest of the child analysis is not required, as the court is required to take into consideration all income (with the exceptions noted above) of both the noncustodial and custodial parent in applying child support guidelines. Even if, however, the court were to have imputed $3,000 income to respondent, the court would find it is in the best interest of the children to do so, because considering the income would incentivize the respondent to work, which will increase resources available to the children and set a good example for the children.”
Fearn also argues the court should not have found she earned $3,000 per month because that money reflected loan money. The court stated it gave “very little, if any, weight to [Fearn]’s claim that the income she claimed on the loan applications was comprised of child support payments and loans. [Fearn] failed to produce the loan applications,[ ] which she was ordered to do and which would have provided stronger evidence as to the amount she actually claimed and the source of same. Moreover, the court found [Fearn] was not a credible witness regarding her income and sources of same.”
As substantial evidence supported the court’s finding that Fearn had a monthly income of $3,000, and Fearn does not contend the trial court otherwise miscalculated child support obligations, we find no error.
II.
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Fearn Attorney Fees.
Fearn argues the trial court erred by denying her request that Vu pay her $50,000 for attorney fees. “Awards of attorney fees are reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] Guidance concerning the use of the trial court’s discretion is found in Family Code section 2032, which provides in pertinent part: ‘(a) The court may make an award of attorney’s fees and costs under Section 2030 . . . where the making of the award, and the amount of the award, are just and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective parties. [¶] (b) In determining what is just and reasonable under the relative circumstances, the court shall take into consideration the need for the award to enable each party, to the extent practical, to have sufficient financial resources to present the party’s case adequately . . . . The fact that the party requesting an award of attorney’s fees and costs has resources from which the party could pay the party’s own attorney’s fees and costs is not itself a bar to an order that the other party pay part or all of the fees and costs requested. Financial resources are only one factor for the court to consider in determining how to apportion the overall cost of the litigation equitably between the parties under their relative circumstances.’ [¶] In view of Family Code section 2032, ‘[a] disparity in the parties’ respective circumstances may itself demonstrate relative “need” even though the applicant spouse admittedly has the funds to pay his or her fees.’ [Citation.] In assessing one party’s relative ‘need’ and the other party’s ability to pay, the court may consider all evidence concerning the parties’ current incomes, assets, and abilities, including investment and income-producing properties. [Citation.] Furthermore, in determining whether to award attorney fees to one party, the court may also consider the other party’s trial tactics. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1166-1167.)
In the statement of decision, the trial court stated Fearn failed to meet her burden of establishing her entitlement to attorney fees. In denying her request for attorney fees, the court cited the following circumstances: (1) both parties receive recurring gifts and the court does not believe the parties’ claims that such gifts are loans; (2) although the court, for purposes of calculating child support, imputed $8,000 in monthly income to Vu and found Fearn earned at least $3,000 in income, the court found “no disparity in funds, as any expenses the parties are unable to cover, including attorney fees, are paid by others in the form of gifts”; (3) Fearn lives in the same home as her friend Mr. Ly, and drives a Mercedes registered to him; (4) Ly and another friend of Fearn assist Fearn in paying her monthly expenses and provides her the use of a credit card (along with another friend of Fearn’s) to pay her attorney fees; (5) Vu resides with his parents rent-free, drives vehicles registered in their name, and is assisted by them in paying his monthly expenses; (6) Fearn has failed to establish any significant assets owned by Vu or access to funds outside of gifts from his parents; (7) both parties have been able to pay their reasonable attorney fees and costs; (8) there is no inequality in the parties’ ability to retain counsel and Fearn in particular had frequently retained more than one attorney at a time and retained experts on her behalf over the course of the parties’ litigation; and (9) Fearn failed to establish the reasonableness of the attorney fees she incurred as she over litigated the case and retained multiple attorneys to represent her “often at the same time relating to the same issues, thereby duplicating services.”
Fearn does not argue the court’s findings are supported by insufficient evidence. We find no abuse of discretion.


DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. Respondent did not file an appellate brief so no party shall recover costs on appeal.



FYBEL, J.

WE CONCUR:



O’LEARY, P. J.



MOORE, J.