Filed 4/2/18 Marriage of Weston CA4/3




NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


In re Marriage of STEPHEN AND AMANDA WESTON.

STEPHEN WESTON,

Respondent,

v.

AMANDA WESTON,

Appellant.
G052394
(consol. w/ G053379)

(Super. Ct. No. 08D011599)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment and postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Nathan R. Scott and Frank Ospino, Judges. Motion to substitute parties denied. Appeal dismissed as moot.
Warren Law Group, Randy Warren and Lawrence Hellmann for Appellant.
Law Offices of John S. Cowhig and John S. Cowhig for Respondent.
Warren Law Group, Randy Warren and Lawrence Hellmann as Movant.
* * *
Amanda Weston initiated this appeal from the trial court’s judgment granting only a portion of her request to compel her former husband, Stephen Weston, to pay her attorney fees (Fam. Code, § 2030) in their dissolution proceedings, after a trial on reserved issues, including custody of their minor daughter. Although the exact figures are difficult to determine, it appears the trial court ordered Stephen to pay approximately 20 percent of the fees Amanda incurred in the dissolution proceedings, and Amanda paid about $216,000 of her remaining attorney fees from her proceeds of the parties’ division of assets under a marital settlement agreement, leaving a substantial unpaid balance. The consolidated appeal involves Amanda’s similar challenge to the trial court’s postjudgment order granting only a portion ($12,500) of her request for attorney fees to pursue the appeal.
Amanda died during the pendency of the appeals, tragically taking her own life in June 2017. The law firm representing her below and on appeal moved to substitute itself as her successor in interest to pursue the appeals. As we explained in the related appeal (G053716) involving a partial grant of attorney fees in other postjudgment proceedings, the substitution motion lacks merit. Invoking the trial court’s authority under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.33, the law firm had requested the court to appoint it as Amanda’s successor in interest to pursue the appeals, but the court denied the request, appointing Amanda and Stephen’s only child, their nearly 12-year-old minor daughter, as Amanda’s sole successor in interest. The law firm did not appeal, challenge by a writ petition, or indeed even advise us of the trial court’s successor in interest ruling, which the law firm characterized in its substitution motion as a nonfinal order.
Meanwhile, the minor through her appointed counsel declined to pursue the appeals, with counsel concluding after consulting with the child’s therapist that it was not in her best interest, “[b]ased upon my client’s young age, fragile mental health, and emotional state as she grieves the death of her mother.”
As we explained in G053716, because section 377.33 vests the trial court with authority to determine the decedent’s successor in interest in an action, and the law firm did not appeal or challenge by a writ petition the court’s ruling below, there is no basis for us to grant the firm’s substitution motion claiming to be Amanda’s true successor in interest for the appeals. To the contrary, as a cardinal rule of appellate practice, we presume in the absence of error demonstrated by an appeal or writ petition that the trial court’s decisions are correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566 [“An order is presumed correct”]; see Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58 [fundamental principles of appellate review include: “(1) a judgment is presumed correct; (2) all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of correctness; and (3) the appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record affirmatively proving error”].) We therefore deny the law firm’s substitution motion.
Because the Law Firm has not challenged the trial court’s successor in interest determination, and Amanda’s successor in interest has declined to pursue the appeal, there is no “live controversy” between parties to resolve. Instead, the matter is moot and we dismiss the appeal. (See Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2015) ¶ 5.22, p. 5-6 [“policy behind a mootness dismissal is that courts decide ‘actual controversies’”]; Torres v. City of Yorba Linda (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1046 [“California decisions, like the federal courts, generally require a [party] to have a personal interest in the litigation’s outcome. The courts of this state are not authorized to issue advisory opinions”].)


DISPOSITION
The Law Firm’s motion to substitute itself as a party for the deceased appellant is denied. The appeal is dismissed as moot for lack of a live controversy between proper parties. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.



ARONSON, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:



FYBEL, J.



GOETHALS, J.