Martinez v. Joe’s Crab Shack Holdings
Filed 11/12/13 Martinez v. Joe’s Crab Shack Holdings CA2/7
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
SEVEN
>
ROBERTO MARTINEZ et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. JOE’S CRAB SHACK HOLDINGS et al., Defendants and Respondents. | B242807 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC377269) |
APPEAL from
an order of the Superior Court
of
County, Charles F. Palmer, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Righetti
Glugoski, Matthew Righetti and John Glugoski, for Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Roberto Martinez, Lisa Saldana, Chanel Rankin-Stephens and Craig Eriksen.
Epstein
Becker & Green, Michael S. Kun and Ted A. Gehring, for Defendants and
Respondents Crab Addison, Inc. and Ignite Restaurant Group, Inc.
Law Offices
of Mary E. Lynch and Mary E. Lynch; Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton and
Charles F. Barker, for Defendant and Respondent Landry’s Restaurants, Inc.
_____________________________
>
Litigation
by class action has long been recognized as a superior method of resolving wage
and hour claims in California (see Brinker
Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1033 (
redress for unpaid overtime wages.
Nonetheless, when confronted with the myriad individual facts asserted
by employers in support of the executive exemption as a defense to a wage
claim, courts at all levels have struggled to answer the question central to
certification of a class—that is, “whether the theory of recovery advanced by
the proponents of certification is, as an analytical matter, likely to prove
amenable to class treatment.†(
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 327 (Sav-on);
accord, Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.
(2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1524, 1531.)
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] Here, the trial court, after wrestling with
the factual issues raised by Defendants Crab Addison, Inc., Ignite Restaurant
Group, Inc. and Landry’s Restaurants, Inc.,
denied class certification to a putative class consisting of managerial
employees allegedly misclassified as exempt on the grounds plaintiffs had
failed to establish (a) their claims are typical of the class, (b) they
can adequately represent the class, or (c) common questions predominate the
class claims such that a class action is the superior means of resolving the
litigation. (See Brinker, at p. 1021; Code Civ. Proc. § 382.) We reverse and remand for reconsideration in
light of our recent decision in Benton v.
Telecom Network Specialists, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 701 (
factual and procedural background
Roberto Martinez, Lisa
Saldana, Craig Eriksen and Chanel Rankin-Stephens are current or former
employees of different Joe’s Crab Shack (JCS) restaurants in California. Martinez filed the original complaint in September
2007, seeking to represent a class of salaried managerial employees who worked
at JCS restaurants in California on claims they had been misclassified as
exempt employees and were entitled to overtime pay.
motion for class certification on the ground he was not an adequate class
representative. Martinez did not appeal
that order.
The trial court permitted
Saldana, Eriksen and Rankin-Stephens to join the lawsuit as named
plaintiffs. In June 2011 plaintiffs
moved for certification of a class consisting of “[a]ll persons employed by
Defendants in California as a salaried restaurant employee in a Joe’s Crab
Shack restaurant at any time since September 7, 2003.†In support of their motion plaintiffs presented
training and operations manuals, as well as deposition testimony from various
witnesses employed by CAI and Landry’s. According
to this evidence, JCS’s hiring and training practices are uniform throughout
the chain; it utilizes an operations manual that applies to all restaurants and
every employee; each restaurant offers the same menu; and managerial employees
are evaluated using the same form and procedure. All managerial employees are classified as
exempt employees and are expected to work a minimum of 50 hours per week.
managerial employees, who are cross-trained in positions throughout the
restaurant and perform the same general tasks.
Plaintiffs also filed 22
declarations from current and former salaried employees who held managerial
positions during the relevant time period.
same. Most of the declarants were
employed in assistant managerial positions.
Although they were told they would be working 50 to 55 hours per week,
all stated they had routinely worked more than 55 hours per week; and some
reported working more than 70 hours per week. JCS did not keep track of the hours worked by
managerial employees. Because labor
budgets were set by district or regional managers and, in general, did not
provide adequate staffing, managerial employees were required to perform
“utility†functions, filling in where needed as cooks, servers, bussers, hosts,
stockers, bartenders or kitchen staff. Managerial
employees were also required to fill in when hourly employees failed to show up
and conduct inventory one night a week after the restaurant closed, which could
take as long as three to four hours to complete. As a result, the declarants stated they had
worked extended time in positions ordinarily occupied by hourly employees but
had received no overtime compensation for those tasks. Each of the declarants estimated he or she had
spent the majority of their time performing hourly tasks; estimates ranged from
more than 50 percent to 95 percent. Several
employees, some of whom had worked in more than one restaurant or under both
Landry’s and CAI ownership, stated that these practices were common across the
board.
CAI and Landry submitted
declarations from approximately 27 putative class members, each of whom
reported significant variance among the duties associated with specific management
positions, the amount of time they routinely spent on particular tasks and the
total amount of time worked each week. More
than half of the declarations were provided by general managers, most of whom
had served in subordinate managerial positions in the past.
Landry’s owned the chain and had signed acknowledgements of the duties associated
with their job and their exempt status.
duties as primarily managerial in nature and, with only a couple of exceptions,
opted out of the putative class proposed by plaintiffs.
they spent weekly performing discrete “primary†(that is, managerial) duties
and “additional†(that is, nonexempt) duties and stated that, even when they
were performing tasks ordinarily associated with hourly workers, they were
monitoring the restaurant and supervising and directing employees.
who oversees the 13 California JCS restaurants, stated the activities of
managerial employees differed based on the sales volume, seating capacity, amenities
and staffing of the particular restaurant, no two of which are the same. While CAI centralized management makes policy
decisions affecting JCS restaurants across the board, “the day-to-day
decision-making and daily running of the restaurants is left to each
restaurant’s management team.â€
CAI and Landry’s also
submitted evidence impeaching the statements of the named plaintiffs. In deposition testimony the named plaintiffs
each conceded he or she was unable to estimate the amount of time spent on exempt
tasks as opposed to nonexempt tasks and that every day was different. Eriksen testified it would be “unrealisticâ€
to guess how much time he spent on particular tasks and admitted there were
weeks when he devoted more than 50 percent of his time to managerial tasks.
also contradicted statements each had made in declarations concerning hours
worked and the time spent on hourly tasks.
Presented with this evidence,
the trial court denied the motion for class certification on the grounds plaintiffs
had failed to establish (1) their claims were typical of the class, (2) they
could adequately represent the class, (3) common questions predominated the
claims, and (4) a class action is the superior means of resolving the
litigation. The first two findings were
based on plaintiffs’ inability to estimate the number of hours spent on
individual exempt and nonexempt tasks and their admission the amount of time
spent on particular tasks varied from day to day. As to the third and fourth findings, the
court acknowledged the existence of common questions of law and fact,
but concluded there remained significant individual disputed issues of fact
relating to the amount of time spent by individual class members on particular
tasks. The variability among individual
members of the putative class would require adjudication of the affirmative
defense of exemption for each class member, “a time- and resource-consuming
process.†The court rejected as unfair plaintiffs’
proffered trial plan, under which their expert, Richard Drogin, proposed to assess
the rate at which managerial employees are engaged in nonexempt tasks through
statistical sampling methods. (See
Litigation (N.D.Cal. 2010) 268 F.R.D. 604, 612 [“Assume that the court
permitted proof through random sampling of class members, and that the data, in
fact, indicated that one out of every ten [class members] is exempt. How would the finder of fact separate the one
exempt [class member] from the nine nonexempt [class members] without resorting
to individual mini-trials.â€].)
concluded, a class action would not be the superior means of resolving the
litigation.
discussion
1.
The Standard of Review for a Ruling
on Class Certification
Class actions are statutorily
authorized “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many
persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring
them all before the court . . . .†(Code Civ. Proc., § 382.)
The party seeking class certification
must establish (1) “the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous
classâ€; (2) “a well-defined community of interestâ€; and (3) “substantial
benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the
alternatives.†(Brinker, supra, 53
Cal.4th at p. 1021.) The community of
interest requirement in turn requires three additional inquiries: (1) whether
common questions of law or fact predominate; (2) whether the class
representatives have claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) whether
the class representatives can adequately represent the class. (Ibid.)
“The certification question is
‘essentially a procedural one’†(Sav-on,
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 326) that examines “whether the theory of
recovery advanced by the proponents of certification is, as an analytical
matter, likely to prove amenable to class treatment†(id. at p. 327). A
certification motion “‘does not ask whether an action is legally or factually
meritorious’ [citation],†but rather whether the common issues it presents
“‘are so numerous or substantial that the maintenance of a class action would
be advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants.’†(Id. at p. 326;
Lots Stores, Inc. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 496, 507 [“the
central issue in
a class certification
motion is whether
the questions that
will arise in
the action are
common or individual,
not plaintiffs’ likelihood
of success on
the merits of
their claimsâ€].) The court must assume the class claims have
merit and resolve disputes regarding the claims’ merits only when necessary to
determine whether an element for class certification is satisfied. (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp.
1023-1025.) “‘As a general rule if the
defendant’s liability can be determined by facts common to all members of the
class, a class will be certified even if the members must individually prove
their damages.’†(Id. at pp. 1021-1022;
see also Sav-on, at p. 334 [“‘the necessity for class members to
individually establish eligibility and damages does not mean individual fact
questions predominate’â€].)
A trial court is generally
afforded great latitude in granting or denying class certification, and we
normally review a ruling on certification for an abuse of discretion. (Sav-on, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 326-327;
see Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1022
[“‘[b]ecause trial courts are ideally situated to evaluate the efficiencies and
practicalities of permitting group action, they are afforded great discretion
in granting or denying certification’â€].) This deferential standard of review, however,
is inapplicable if the trial court has evaluated class certification using
improper criteria or an incorrect legal analysis: “[A] trial court ruling supported by
substantial evidence generally will not be disturbed ‘unless (1) improper
criteria were used [citation]; or (2) erroneous legal assumptions were made.’†(Sav-on, at pp. 326-327; accord,
40 Cal.4th 1069, 1089; Ghazaryan v. Diva
Limousine, Ltd., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1530.) In conducting our review, we “‘must examine
the trial court’s reasons for denying class certification.’ [Citation.] . . . [We] ‘consider only the
reasons cited by the trial court for the denial, and ignore other reasons that
might support denial.’†(
Cal.App.4th 1286, 1297-1298; accord, Benton,
supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 716.)
2.
The Class Is Adequately
Represented by Plaintiffs, Whose Claims Are Typical of the Class
Although the questions whether
a plaintiff has claims typical of the class and will be able to adequately
represent the class members are related, they are not synonymous. The typicality requirement’s purpose “‘is to
assure that the interest of the named representative aligns with the interests
of the class. [Citation.] “‘Typicality refers to the nature of the claim
or defense of the class representative, and not to the specific facts from
which it arose or the relief sought.’†[Citations.]
The test of typicality “is whether other
members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct
which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members
have been injured by the same course of conduct.â€â€™â€ (Seastrom v. Neways, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th
1496, 1502.) A class representative who
does not have a claim against the defendants cannot satisfy the typicality
requirement. (Medrazo v. Honda of
North Hollywood (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 89, 98.)
“The adequacy of
representation component of the community of interest requirement for class
certification comes into play when the party opposing certification brings
forth evidence indicating widespread antagonism
Developmental Services (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 676, 696; see J.P. Morgan
& Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 195, 212 [“‘[t]he
adequacy inquiry . . . serves to uncover conflicts of interest
between named parties and the class they seek to represent’â€].) “To resolve the adequacy question the court ‘will
evaluate “the seriousness and extent of conflicts involved compared to the
importance of issues uniting the class; the alternatives to class
representation available; the procedures available to limit and prevent
unfairness; and any other facts bearing on the fairness with which the absent
class member is represented.â€â€™â€ (
J.P. Morgan & Co., at p. 213.) A party’s claim of representative status will
only be defeated by a conflict that “‘goes to the very subject matter of the
litigation . . . .’†(Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.)
Citing the identical rationale
for finding plaintiffs’ claims were not typical of the class and, consequently,
they would not be adequate class representatives, the trial court stated
plaintiffs’ claims would be “vulnerable to the defense that each of them
performed exempt tasks more than 50% of their work time. This contrasts with the putative class
members who [allegedly] spent more than 50% of their work time performing
non-exempt tasks.â€
With respect to typicality,
this analysis suffers from an overly focused examination of the facts that looked
toward individual differences rather than commonality. In essence, the trial court resolved the
factual conflict between plaintiffs’ declarations, in which they stated
nonexempt tasks routinely occupied more than 50 percent of their time, and
their deposition testimony that they could not estimate the number of hours
they spent on individual tasks because those tasks varied day to day. The inability of the witnesses to specify
time spent on particular tasks is hardly surprising, however, and does not
create an issue that must be resolved on a motion for class certification. What was common to plaintiffs, in addition to
the standard policies implemented by CAI at each of their restaurants, were
their assertions their tasks did not change once they became managers; they
performed a utility function and routinely filled in for hourly workers in
performing nonexempt tasks; and they worked far in excess of 40 hours per week
without being paid overtime wages. Their
claims—and the defense of executive exemption to those claims—are thus typical
of the class. (See Sav-on, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 336-337.)
The larger problem with the
adequacy of plaintiffs to represent the class as defined arises from the
antagonism voiced by general managers, who overwhelmingly opposed the litigation. Again, this conflict is not unexpected: A general manager is hardly likely to share
the duties of assistant managers, many of whom worked exclusively as kitchen-
or front-managers. CAI stresses the fact
that JCS restaurants vary in size and volume and were staffed according to need
by three to seven managers. It is not
hard to conceive that the lower the rung occupied by a particular manager the
more likely he or she is to engage in tasks common to the hourly employee. This apparent conflict, however, is not
fatal. In the interest of preserving the
claims of subordinate managerial employees, the trial court may on remand
exercise its discretion to create a general managers subclass or to exclude
general managers entirely from the class definition. (See, e.g., Richmond v. Dart Industries,
Inc., supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 470-471
[class action need not be dismissed when trial court can use subclasses to
remove any antagonism among members of the putative class];
166 Cal.App.4th at p. 99 [when class representative’s “‘“interests
are antagonistic to
or in conflict
with the objectives
of those [s]he
purports to represent’â€
[citation], . . . court should determine if it
would be feasible to divide the class into subclasses to eliminate the conflict
and allow the class action to be maintainedâ€]; Capitol People First v. State Dept. of Developmental Services, supra, 155
Cal.App.4th at p. 697 [“where factual circumstances differ, or class
members disagree as to the proper theory of liability, the trial judge, through
resort to subclasses, intervention, and the like, may incorporate class
differences into the litigation process and afford all members their due in
deciding the proper outcomeâ€]; Aguiar v.
Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 121, 133 [“[t]he use of
subclasses is an appropriate device to facilitate class treatmentâ€].)
3.
The Trial Court Failed To
Assess Means by Which Plaintiffs’ Theory of Recovery Could Be Proved Through Resolution
of Common Questions of Fact and Law
In Benton, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th
701, we considered whether a proposed class of cell-phone tower technicians
asserting meal and rest break violations and failure to pay overtime could
establish the employer’s liability through common proof.
decision in Brinker, supra, 53
Cal.4th 1004, in which the Court granted review “to resolve uncertainties in
the handling of wage and hour class certification motions.†(Id.
at p. 1021.) In keeping with the Court’s
rationale in Brinker, we reversed the
trial court’s order denying class certification because we concluded individual
issues of proof did not predominate over common issues in assessing whether the
defendants’ meal period and rest break policies were valid under California law. (See Benton,
at pp. 725-726.) Quoting
another post-Brinker decision (
(2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 220), we stated, “‘the employer’s liability arises by
adopting a uniform policy that violates the wage and hour laws. Whether or not the employee was able to take
the required break goes to damages, and “[t]he fact that individual [employees]
may have different damages does not require denial of the class certification
motion.â€â€™â€ (Benton, at p. 726, quoting Faulkinbury,
at p. 235; see also Bradley v.
Networkers Internat. LLC (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1151 (
authorized and not provided legally required meal and/or rest breaks, the
employer has violated the law and the fact that an employee
able to [take a break] during the workday does not show that individual issues
will predominate in the litigationâ€].)
We extended this rationale to
the claim for overtime compensation. We
reasoned the trial court had “failed to evaluate whether plaintiffs’ theory of
recovery could be proved (or disproved) through common facts and law†(
p. 731) and had apparently concluded each technician would be required to
make an “individualized showing that he or she incurred overtime†(
As we explained, however, “Those issues . . . relate to the existence
and amount of each technician’s damages.â€
(Ibid.; see also
[certification was proper despite evidence that “the amount of overtime pay
damages potentially due each class member [would] require[] individualized
analysis because the number of hours worked each day was not uniformâ€].)
Admittedly, the overtime
exemption claim in this case differs from the overtime claims in
for each employee of hours worked in excess of the mandated 40-hour work week,
the factfinder here will ultimately have to decide whether CAI and Landry
properly classified the members of the class as exempt from overtime pay
requirements. Defendants contend this is
a question of liability rather than damages and assert individual mini-trials
will be required to establish whether each member of the class was properly
treated as exempt.
The trial court, however, by accepting
defendants’ argument and focusing on the employer’s affirmative defense of exemption
failed to consider Sav-on’s explicit
direction on issues of proof in such cases:
“Any dispute over ‘how the employee actually spends his or her time’
[citation] . . . has the potential to generate individual
issues. But considerations such as ‘the
employer’s realistic expectations’ [citation] and ‘the actual overall
requirements of the job,’ [citation] are likely to prove susceptible of common
proof.†(Sav-on, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 336-337; see Sotelo v.
Medianews Group, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 639, 654 [“[a] class . . . may
establish liability by proving
a uniform policy or practice by
the employer that has the effect on
the group of making it likely that group members will work overtime
hours without overtime pay, or to miss rest/meal breaksâ€].) Thus, Sav-on
instructs courts in overtime exemption cases to proceed through analysis of
the employer’s realistic expectations and classification of tasks rather than whether
the employee can identify in retrospect whether, at a particular time, he or
she was engaged in an exempt or nonexempt task.
(Sav-on, at p. 330 [“task
classification is a mixed question of law and fact appropriate for a court to
address separately from calculating the amount of time specific employees
actually spend on specific tasksâ€].)
exempt job descriptions, but implemented policies and practices that failed to
afford its [managerial employees] true managerial discretion, and standardized
store operations so that managers were obliged to spend over 50 percent of
their time doing the same tasks as their subordinates.†(Id. at
p. 337.) Indeed, Sav-on recognizes that focusing on an employee’s ability to
individually reconstruct the time spent on particular tasks improperly shifts
the burden of proving the executive exemption from the employer to the
employee. (Id. at pp. 337-338.)
name="_ftnref20" title="">[20]
The trial court’s failure here
to focus on the impact of JCS policies and practices on its managerial
employees essentially shifted the burden of disproving the executive exemption
to plaintiffs. Indeed, although the
court recognized the evidence established the existence of a finite task list
that could aid in the identification of common issues among the putative class
members, its analysis effectively omitted any consideration of this potential
class-wide proof.
A recent decision from our colleagues in
Division Two of this court simplifies this endeavor and illustrates the enormous
cost of resolving these claims on an individual, rather than a class-wide basis. (See Heyen
v. Safeway Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 795 (Heyen).)
name="_ftnref21" title="">[21] After reviewing analogous regulations for
mercantile workers, Heyen articulated
the appropriate manner of evaluating an employer’s duties: “Several general principles emerge from these
regulations. First, work of the same
kind performed by a supervisor’s nonexempt employees generally is ‘nonexempt,’
even when that work is performed by the supervisor. If such work takes up a large part of a
supervisor’s time, the supervisor likely is a ‘nonexempt’ employee. [Citations.]
[¶] Second, the regulations do
not recognize ‘hybrid’ activities—i.e., activities that have both ‘exempt’ and
‘nonexempt’ aspects. Rather, the
regulations require that each discrete task be separately classified as either
‘exempt’ or ‘nonexempt.’ [Citations.]
[¶] Third, identical tasks may be
‘exempt’ or ‘nonexempt’ based on the purpose they serve within the organization
or department. Understanding the
manager’s purpose in engaging in such tasks, or a task’s role in the work of
the organization, is critical to the task’s proper categorization. A task performed because it is ‘helpful in
supervising the employees or contribute[s] to the smooth functioning of the
department’ is exempt, even though the identical task performed for a
different, nonmanagerial reason would be nonexempt. [Citations.]
[¶] Finally, in a large retail
establishment where the replenishing of stocks of merchandise on the sales
floor ‘is customarily assigned to a nonexempt employee, the performance of such
work by the manager or buyer of the department
is nonexempt.’ [Citation.] Similarly, in such a large retail
establishment, a manager’s participation in making sales to customers is
nonexempt, unless the sales are made for
training or demonstration purposes.’†(
Applying these principles to
the tasks identified by CAI and Landry’s, inventory, restocking, serving,
cooking, bussing tables, cleaning and other tasks ordinarily performed by
nonexempt employees remain nonexempt when performed by a managerial
employee. Likewise, when a managerial
employee fills in for a nonexempt employee, the task remains nonexempt. On the other hand, if the managerial employee
is performing the task for the purpose of supervisory training or
demonstration, the task is exempt.
California law does not recognize a hybrid category in which the
employee is deemed to be performing an exempt task at the same time he or she
is performing a nonexempt task. (
As in Heyen, the gist of plaintiffs’ claim here is that regardless of the
patina of managerial discretion expressed in their job description, they
functioned consistently as utility workers, cross-trained in all tasks, who
could be assigned to fill in where needed without affecting the labor budget or
requiring overtime compensation. Assessing
whether modes of proof exist that will allow common resolution of these claims
does not require that we evaluate whether plaintiffs are likely to prevail on
those claims. Indeed, the trial court’s
rejection of the statistical evidence proffered by plaintiff’s expert is
essentially flawed because it imputes to that evidence a weight it need not
bear. Rather than constrain a
factfinder, such evidence is simply an additional mode of proof of the
essential question whether CAI’s and Landry’s policies exploited subordinate
managers. (Cf. Mora v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at pp.
509-510 [trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering observational
survey proffered by defendants to refute plaintiff’s theory of
misclassification]; see also Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2004) 115
Cal.App.4th 715, 750 [statistical sampling in an overtime class action “does
not dispense with proof of damages but rather offers a different method of
proofâ€].)
title="">[23] In other words, even if there were individual
managerial employees whose work remained more than 50 percent managerial in
nature, if CAI’s and Landry’s policies as implemented across California
resulted in managerial employees being undercompensated for performing exempt
work, class relief is appropriate.
4.
The Trial Court Must
Reconsider Whether Class Certification Provides a Superior Method of Resolving Plaintiffs’
Claim
We have not ignored the
substantial case authority, including our own, upholding trial court decisions
not to certify class actions for claims similar to those raised here (see,
e.g., Dailey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (2013)
214 Cal.App.4th 974; Mora v. Big Lots
Stores, Inc., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th 496; Arenas v. El Torito Restaurants, Inc. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th
723); nor do we express any disagreement with the outcome of those cases. However, we understand from
renewed direction that class-wide relief remains the preferred method of resolving
wage and hour claims, even those in which the facts appear to present difficult
issues of proof. By refocusing its
analysis on the policies and practices of the employer and the effect those
policies and practices have on the putative class, as well as narrowing the
class if appropriate, the trial court may in fact find class analysis a more
efficient and effective means of resolving plaintiffs’ overtime claim.
>
disposition
The order denying class
certification is reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
Plaintiffs are to recover their costs on appeal.
PERLUSS,
P. J.
We
concur:
WOODS, J.
SEGAL, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] “The Legislature
has commanded that ‘[a]ny work in excess of eight hours in one workday and any
work in excess of 40 hours in any one workweek . . . shall be
compensated at the rate of no less than one and one-half times the regular rate
of pay for an employee.’ (Lab. Code, §
510, subd. (a).) The Industrial Welfare
Commission (IWC), however, is statutorily authorized to ‘establish exemptions
from the requirement that an overtime rate of compensation be paid . . . for
executive, administrative, and professional employees, provided [inter alia]
that the employee is primarily engaged in duties that meet the test of the
exemption, [and] customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent
judgment in performing those duties . . . .’ (Id., § 515,
subd. (a).)†(Sav-on, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 324.)
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] Until November 2006
Joe’s Crab Shack, a nationwide restaurant chain, was owned by Landry’s
Restaurants, Inc. (Landry’s). The chain
is now owned by Crab Addison, Inc., a subsidiary of Ignite Restaurant Group,
Inc. (collectively CAI). CAI was sued
erroneously under its former name, Joe’s Crab Shack Holdings.
