Filed 4/16/18 Mary Anne H. v. Superior Court CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA



MARY ANNE H. et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY,

Respondent;
D073233


(San Diego County
Super. Ct. No. EJ4042A-C)

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.


PROCEEDINGS in mandate after referral to a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Gary M. Bubis, Judge. Petitions denied; requests for stay denied.

Mary Anne H., in pro. per., for petitioner.
Jarred W., in pro. per., for petitioner.
No appearance by Respondent.
Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Tahra Broderson, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Parties in Interest San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency.
Mary Anne H. and Jarred W. seek review of juvenile court orders setting hearings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to select a permanency plan for their children. They assert that Mary Anne did not receive reasonable family reunification services. Mary Anne contends that the court erroneously excluded the attachments to her declaration and improperly admitted the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency's (Agency) report in evidence. She asks this court to reverse the orders setting section 366.26 hearings and to reinstate her reunification services.
Jarred argues that the court erred in denying Mary Anne's requests for continuances and granting the Agency's request for a continuance, by disregarding and not ruling on his objections, and by admitting the social study report in evidence. He also complains that he was denied his right to a trial by jury and to present witnesses on his own behalf, that he did not receive proper notice of a hearing, that there was inadequate review of his case plan, that the court ignored Mary Anne's request for an attorney, and that the court did not rule on certain of his objections. He requests that this court reverse the rulings of the juvenile court and reinstate reunification services for Mary Anne.
We deny the petitions.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mary Anne H. and Jarred W. (together, parents) have three children—10-year-old J.W., nine-year-old C.W., and five-year-old L.W. (collectively, the children). The parents have an extensive, multistate history of domestic abuse, methamphetamine addiction, and child welfare intervention. The children's paternal grandfather (Grandfather) has repeatedly taken the children into his care. This history is described in our nonpublished opinion, In re J.W. (D070885, Feb. 3, 2017).
In June 2016, the Agency detained the children in protective custody after Jarred threatened Mary Anne with a knife and she responded by firing a gun at him at least five times, striking him once in the upper thigh. During the altercation, J.W. and C.W. were in their bedrooms. Three of the bullets struck the hallway wall outside J.W.'s bedroom. L.W., then three years old, was with Mary Anne. She told the social worker, "Mommy almost shot me." J.W. and C.W. reported that they often went hungry. The investigating social worker characterized the conditions of the family's home as "deplorable, unsanitary and otherwise hazardous-to-health."
On August 16, 2016, the court sustained the dependency petitions, removed the children from the custody of their parents, and ordered the Agency to offer or provide reunification services to the parents. The social worker referred Jarred to a domestic violence program, general counseling, parenting education, and substance abuse testing and recovery meetings. Jarred told the social worker that he did not want to participate in services. To reunify her family, Mary Anne was required to undergo a psychological evaluation, and to participate in domestic violence treatment, general counseling, parenting education, and substance abuse testing and recovery meetings.
In August, the substance abuse specialist (SAS) recommended that Mary Anne participate in inpatient treatment. Mary Anne refused an offered place at an inpatient substance abuse treatment center. She informed the social worker that she was arranging for outpatient treatment. In October, Mary Anne asked for the social worker's help in entering a rehabilitation program. Mary Anne refused to drug test, saying that she had recently used methamphetamine and did not want to have a "dirty" test on her record. Mary Anne was admitted to an inpatient substance abuse program on October 10 but left the program on October 17.
Mary Anne consented to the children's placement in Rhode Island with Grandfather. Grandfather stayed in San Diego with the children until his home in Rhode Island was approved. The children moved to Rhode Island in November 2016.
Jarred refused to participate in reunification services until December 19, 2016, when he and Mary Anne told the social worker that they had been clean and sober for nine days and requested services. On January 3, 2017, Mary Anne said that they had been wait-listed for outpatient substance abuse treatment programs but questioned whether she and Jarred needed to participate in substance abuse treatment.
Mary Anne completed a psychological evaluation on February 8, 2017. The psychologist assessed Mary Anne with methamphetamine dependence, anxiety disorder, a history of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and epilepsy. ParentCare, an outpatient substance abuse program, reported that Mary Anne's progress was fair but that she had tested positive for methamphetamine in January 2017. As of March, Mary Anne was attending ParentCare five days a week and attending NA meetings. She had recently moved into a sober living facility. Mary Anne continued to telephone or videoconference with her children approximately four times a week. She denied having any contact with Jarred.
Grandfather reported that Mary Anne telephoned or videoconferenced the children three to four times a week after their move to Rhode Island. He and the children could hear Jarred in the background during Mary Anne's calls. When the children asked to talk with Jarred, Mary Anne said that he was not there. Jarred telephoned the children twice. The children were happy to be back in Rhode Island and they were doing well both at home and at school.
At the six-month review hearing on March 3, 2017, the court granted the Agency's section 388 petition to terminate Jarred's reunification services. The court found that the case plan was appropriate and ordered the Agency to continue to provide family reunification services to Mary Anne.
At a special hearing in July, the court granted Jarred's request to represent himself in further proceedings. In August, the court denied Mary Anne's request for a new attorney under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). Several weeks later, Mary Anne requested another Marsden hearing but left the courtroom before the court could hear her motion. On September 7, the court granted Mary Anne's request to represent herself and advised her that she would be held to the same standards as an attorney qualified to practice in dependency court. The court denied Mary Anne's request for a continuance of the 12-month review hearing, which was scheduled for September 18. On September 18, the court granted Mary Anne's request for a continuance, and rescheduled the hearing for October 31. On October 31, the Agency requested a continuance in view of new information that they had received about the children's possible American Indian heritage. The court set a contested 12-month review hearing for December 5, the 18-month review date.
In reports prepared in August for the 12-month review hearing, the social worker reported that Mary Anne had not maintained regular contact with the Agency and that she had not made substantial progress with her case plan objectives. Mary Anne had stopped attending ParentCare in late March. She used methamphetamine for three days and went to Arizona to detox. The social worker asked Mary Anne to submit to a drug test and gave her the telephone number for Dr. Vanessa Rodriguez's domestic violence treatment group. Mary Anne did not drug test or contact the treatment group. By mid-April, Mary Anne was homeless. She tested positive for methamphetamine on April 18. She attended ParentCare on April 20 and 25, and on May 3. ParentCare discharged her on May 31 for nonattendance.
Grandfather reported that after April 16, Mary Anne's contact with the children decreased significantly. At times, the children would not hear from her for a week or more. Grandfather had the children evaluated for therapeutic services in March 2017. The evaluator said that the children presented as well adjusted in Grandfather's home and did not recommend services.
The social worker met with Mary Anne and Jarred on August 3. Mary Anne said that she had been attending NA programs but did not have any meeting slips to prove her attendance. She was not in a substance abuse treatment program. Mary Anne agreed to drug test but failed to show up at her testing appointment. She met with an SAS who scheduled an appointment for her at Action Central, an agency that works with chronically homeless parents with mental health problems. The social worker stated that during Mary Anne's assessment at Action Central, Mary Anne may have provided information that led the intake coordinator to believe that she no longer needed services. The SAS met with Mary Anne again and set up an appointment for her at Central East Recovery on September 8, but Mary Anne did not show up for that appointment.
On September 11, Mary Anne sent an e-mail to the social worker stating that she would communicate with the social worker only by e-mail. On September 26, the social worker e-mailed Mary Anne and gave her the contact information for Dr. Rodriguez's domestic violence treatment group. Two days later, the social worker left bus passes and a TERM therapy provider list at the front desk for Mary Anne, and notified Mary Anne by e-mail that she could pick them up. On October 3, Mary Anne e-mailed the social worker to report that she had telephoned Dr. Rodriguez and was interested in attending the program. The social worker completed the authorization for the program that same day. While the social worker was on vacation, another social worker completed an authorization for individual therapy, at Mary Anne's request. Mary Anne started a domestic violence treatment group on October 12 and began attending individual therapy on October 16.
On October 30, Mary Anne filed a document with the court entitled "Declaration[:] Response to STATUS REVIEW REPORT." She asserted that the Agency's report contained many errors with respect to her services. Mary Anne stated that the social worker had not referred her to services, and claimed that the service providers had not received the Agency's authorizations. Mary Anne stated that the only services that she had received, other than the psychological evaluation, were those that she acquired on her own. Although she had been allowed to participate in a domestic violence treatment group, the treatment program had yet to receive authorization from the Agency.
Mary Anne declared that she had maintained her sobriety since January, with only one relapse. She said that the biggest obstacle to family reunification was the physical distance between herself and her children. Mary Anne accused Grandfather of parental alienation. She said that she telephoned the children five or more times each week and claimed that Grandfather interfered with, and sabotaged, her telephone calls with her children.
At the 12-month review hearing on December 5, Mary Anne moved for a continuance due to the unavailability of a witness—the paternal grandmother, who was undergoing eye surgery that day. The court noted that there were other witnesses and said that they would start the hearing. The court indicated that it might consider continuing the trial to allow the paternal grandmother to testify. Over Jarred's objection, the court admitted the Agency's reports in evidence. The court admitted Mary Anne's statements in her declaration but excluded the attachments to her declaration as hearsay. After the court excluded the attachments to Mary Anne's declaration, Jarred asserted that he had a constitutional right to a jury trial. The court informed him that he did not have a right to a jury trial in dependency proceedings. Jarred told the court not to interrupt him and claimed that the government had taken his property—his children—and that he required the court to restore his property to him, as a matter of common law.
Mary Anne cross-examined the social worker. The social worker said that she had submitted an authorization for Mary Anne's services at La Mesa Counseling on February 6, 2017, and telephoned Optum Health to verify that they had approved the authorization and had sent it to La Mesa Counseling. After the social worker verified the authorization, she did not hear from Mary Anne about attending services at La Mesa Counseling. In April, the social worker provided Mary Anne with a referral to a different domestic violence treatment group.
Mary Anne testified that she believed the social worker was biased against her and Jarred, and that the social worker's bias made it impossible to foster family reunification. Mary Anne said that she and Jarred were more than willing to participate in services, but that services had not truly been offered to them. She maintained that the children were doing well because she telephoned them every night and sang to them. Mary Anne stated that she merely wanted to be allowed to legitimately complete her services.
Mary Anne called Jarred to testify. He said that Grandfather's health was poor because Grandfather had abused alcohol and drugs most of his life. The court sustained a motion to strike. In response, Jarred said, "[Grandfather] has no business having children, especially mine. Strike. Strike. Strike." When the court sustained an objection to a nonresponsive answer, Jarred said, "Absolutely. The man in the robe will. Should I sing? Want to do karaoke? Anybody got any requests? Anybody got any requests? I'm a pretty good singer. No humor? I don't think you guys—you are a bunch of robots and monsters, children stealing biting monsters . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] This is a sham proceeding, sir. You're just a man in a robe." After the court struck several nonresponsive comments from the record, Jarred said, "You are far from fair and impartial. In fact, I think you're a jerk. I have nothing more to say. I'm out of here. I've had it. It fucking gives me—have a heart. You are all monsters. Karma is a bitch. You're all going to go to hell." Jarred then left the witness stand and exited the courtroom.
Mary Anne expressed relief when Jarred left the courtroom. The court asked Mary Anne whether she had any other witnesses. Mary Anne identified the paternal grandmother, who was unavailable. The court asked Mary Anne to describe what the grandmother would say if she were to testify. Mary Anne said that she wanted to ask the grandmother about the children's placement and how often the grandmother was able to speak with the children. In addition, the grandmother knew how frustrated Mary Anne was in trying to obtain services. The court asked Mary Anne to specifically describe the witness's testimony, explaining that if the proposed testimony was not relevant to the issues at the 12-month review hearing, the court would not continue the proceedings to allow the grandmother to testify. At this point in the exchange, Mary Anne asked for a Marsden hearing. The court pointed out that Mary Anne did not have an attorney. Mary Anne said that she wanted to argue why she should have an attorney. The court again asked Mary Anne to specifically describe the witness's proposed testimony. Mary Anne said that she would not know what the grandmother would say until the grandmother was on the stand and Mary Anne asked questions that occurred to her at that time. The court asked Mary Anne whether she had any other witnesses. Mary Anne named Grandfather and her son, and asserted that Jarred had subpoenaed Grandfather. The court noted that Jarred had not completed any proof of notice, and that he therefore did not have any witnesses under subpoena. The court said that it was tired of arguing with Mary Anne, and asked county counsel and minors' counsel whether they had any evidence to present. Both responded in the negative.
During closing arguments, the court permitted Jarred to reenter the courtroom, at Jarred's request, but repeatedly had to admonish him and to a lesser extent, Mary Anne, to remain silent while the other parties spoke.
The juvenile court found that returning the children to the custody of the parents would create a substantial risk of detriment to their physical and emotional well-being, and that reasonable services had been provided to Mary Anne. The court terminated reunification services and set section 366.26 hearings for the children.
Mary Anne and Jarred petitioned for review of the juvenile court's orders under California Rules of Court, rule 8.452. They requested that this court reverse the orders setting the section 366.26 hearings. This court issued an order to show cause, the Agency responded and the parties waived oral argument.
DISCUSSION
I
EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
Mary Anne and Jarred contend that the juvenile court erred in admitting Agency reports because the reports are inaccurate and contain hearsay. Mary Anne also contends that the court erred in admitting reports by her therapist and domestic violence treatment therapist, arguing that those reports should have been excluded as not having been timely filed. The parents further claim that the court erred when it excluded as hearsay the attachments to Mary Anne's declaration.
A
Additional factual background
On August 1, Jarred filed a written objection to the status review report on the grounds that the social worker's statements and claims were not factual, and that the statements by Grandfather and his wife were hearsay and should be removed from the report or the declarants be made available for cross-examination.
At the December 5 hearing, the Agency asked the court to admit in evidence the Agency's status review report, dated August 3, 2017 (filed July 24, 2017), and addendum reports dated September 18 (filed Sept. 14, 2017) and December 5, 2017 (filed Dec. 1, 2017) (collectively, Agency's reports or reports). Jarred and Mary Anne objected to the admission of the reports, asserting that they contained "falsifications and lies," and that not all of the declarants were available for cross-examination. The court overruled the objection and admitted the status review reports in evidence.
Mary Anne asked the court to admit her declaration and attachments in evidence. The attachments to the declaration included the Agency's delivered service log from March 30 to May 26, 2017, undated screenshots of cell phone numbers, an e-mail exchange between the social worker and Mary Anne's former attorney from August 27, 2017, an undated, unsigned letter from "Donna G." concerning Mary Anne's recovery in substance abuse treatment, text messages between Mary Anne and Grandfather in which she objected to his choice of a preschool for L.W., and three pages of what appear to be call logs from a 619 area code telephone number to unidentified persons in April and May of an unidentified year.
County counsel objected to the attachments to Mary Anne's declaration on the grounds of hearsay and lack of authentication. The court admitted Mary Anne's declaration, subject to cross-examination, but sustained the objections to the attachments. Mary Anne pointed out that everything in the status review report was hearsay and asked the court what made the Agency's evidence more valuable than her evidence. The court informed Mary Anne that the Welfare and Institutions Code allows the Agency to introduce hearsay in evidence, subject to the right to subpoena and cross-examine the declarants, but that the Legislature has not extended the same right to other parties in a dependency proceeding.
B
Relevant legal standards and standard of review
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement that is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) "Hearsay is generally excluded because the out-of-court declarant is not under oath and cannot be cross-examined to test perception, memory, clarity of expression, and veracity, and because the jury (or other trier of fact) is unable to observe the declarant's demeanor." (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 608; People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1307-1308 (Seumanu).) "Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered against the declarant in an action to which he is a party in either his individual or representative capacity, regardless of whether the statement was made in his individual or representative capacity." (Evid. Code, § 1220.)
In 1990, the California Supreme Court held that "a social study report is admissible in a dependency hearing even where it includes multiple levels of hearsay. The report may be relied upon in determining whether a minor falls within the court's jurisdiction because the parties' due process rights are protected by procedures in which each party (1) receives a copy of the report, (2) is given an opportunity to cross-examine the investigative officer and to subpoena and examine persons whose hearsay statements are contained in the report, and (3) is permitted to introduce rebuttal evidence." (In re Nemis M. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1353, citing In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 368, 382 [superseded by statutes on another part].) In 1995, the Legislature enacted section 366.21, which provides that at least 10 calendar days before each review hearing, the social worker must file a supplemental report with the court addressing a number of defined subjects. (§ 366.21, subd. (c).) The juvenile court is required to "review and consider" the social worker's report and recommendations. (Id., subd. (f)(1)(C).)
A trial court's decision to admit a hearsay statement will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. (Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1308.) The abuse of discretion standard gives the court substantial latitude. However, the scope of the court's discretion is determined by the legal principles governing the subject of the action. A judicial determination that falls outside the applicable principles of law constitutes an abuse of discretion. (Nickolas F. v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 92, 119.) Error, if any, is reviewed under the Watson standard. (People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 618-619; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson) [error is harmless if it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error].)
C
The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the agency's reports
We first address Mary Anne's contention that the court should have excluded the reports entitled "Term counselor review" and "Domestic Violence Class Instructor Review" because the reports were not provided to the parents in advance of the hearing. Mary Anne does not cite to the record to identify the documents and we have not been able to locate those documents, or any reference to them, in the record. Those reports are not attached to the social worker's December 5 addendum report (addendum). "[A]n appellant has the burden of producing an adequate record that demonstrates reversible error." (In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 708.) Mary Anne has not met her burden to do so.
The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Agency's August 3 report and the September 18 addendum in evidence; it was required to do so by law. (§ 366.21, subd. (f)(1)(C).) Mary Anne and Jarred had the opportunity to present evidence to the contrary and cross-examined the social worker at the hearing. They did not issue subpoenas for any of the other hearsay declarants.
The parents claim that they were handed the addendum during the proceedings on the day of the hearing. The record shows that the addendum was filed on December 1. It does not contain a proof of service. We need not resolve whether the addendum was served on the parents on December 1 or December 5 because it is clear that the addendum was not filed at least 10 calendar days before the hearing, as required by section 366.21, subdivision (c).
The parents did not object to the admission of the December 5 report on the ground that it was untimely. Instead, Jarred objected to the admission of the report and addendum because they were "fictions" and Mary Anne objected because she had "evidence to the contrary." Those objections go to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility. However, the late filing and admission in evidence of the addendum implicates the parents' due process rights to receive a copy of the report in a timely manner and to subpoena hearsay declarants. (See In re Nemis M., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1353.) Despite the untimely filing of the report, we conclude that any error was harmless.
In addition to the parents' statements, the addendum contains out-of-court statements by the social worker, ParentCare, therapist Dr. Judy Matthews, domestic violence counselor Dr. Vanessa Rodriguez, and SAS Jolene Silvas. The social worker was available for cross-examination. The information from ParentCare was previously reported in the August 3 report, which was timely served and admitted in evidence. Thus, the admission of statements by the social worker and ParentCare does not implicate due process concerns. However, the parents did not have the opportunity to subpoena and examine Drs. Matthews and Rodriguez, or SAS Silva (collectively, service providers).
In the addendum, the social worker reported that Dr. Matthews said that Mary Anne started participating in individual therapy with her on October 16, 2017, and had not missed any sessions. During therapy sessions, Mary Anne was focused on the injustices of her children's dependency proceedings, not on her treatment goals. The social worker reported that Dr. Rodriguez said that Mary Anne started domestic violence group treatment on October 12, 2017, and missed one session and a scheduled assessment. She characterized Mary Anne as "defensive." The social worker reported that Silvas said that she set up an appointment for Mary Anne with Action Central, but because of some misinformation, the intake coordinator believed that Mary Anne no longer needed their services. Silvas met with Mary Anne again on August 31 and set up an appointment for her at Central Recovery on September 8. Mary Anne did not show up for that appointment. Silvas said that she encouraged Mary Anne to enter an inpatient program but Mary Anne continued to refuse to do so.
An error is harmless if it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) In this case, a more favorable ruling would have been an order returning the children to parental custody or an extension of Mary Anne's reunification services, instead of orders terminating services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. In view of the other evidence before the court, we conclude that even if the service providers' out-of-court statements had been omitted from the addendum, it is not reasonably probable that the outcome of the hearing would have been more favorable to the parents.
The extension of Jarred's reunification services was not at issue because his services had been terminated at the six-month review hearing. Jarred's refusal to engage in services, his lack of contact with the children, and his outbursts of anger in the courtroom left little doubt that he had not mitigated the conditions that led to the children's dependency cases and their continued placement in out-of-home care, and that the return of the children to his care would create a substantial risk of detriment to their safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being. (§ 366.21, subd. (f)(1).)
Similarly, the record shows that Mary Anne did not make substantial progress with services, particularly with substance abuse treatment. The record permits the reasonable inference that Mary Anne continued to use methamphetamine for a significant period of time during the dependency proceedings. The failure of the parent to participate regularly and to make substantial progress in court-ordered treatment programs is prima facie evidence that return of the children would be detrimental. (§ 366.21, subd. (f)(1)(B).) There is nothing in the record to show that Mary Anne understood how domestic violence placed her children at substantial risk of harm. She continued to dispute that a serious domestic violence incident had led to the children's dependency proceedings, despite the physical evidence of the shooting, the children's observations of the shooting, and her own account of the altercation at the time. Although Mary Anne claimed that she had no contact with Jarred, the record supports the reasonable inference that the parents remained together as a couple despite the issuance of a restraining order prohibiting contact. Mary Anne would not disclose to the social worker where she was living. Even if Mary Anne had separated from Jarred, she did not present any evidence to show that her home environment was safe for the children.
To extend reunification services to a parent at the 12-month review hearing, the parent must show that there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of the parent and safely maintained in the home within the extended period of time, or if reasonable services have not been provided. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(2).) As we will explain, there is substantial evidence to show that the Agency provided Mary Anne with reasonable services. (See Discussion, pt. D.) In addition, Mary Anne received services to the 18-month hearing date without having to make the showing required under section 366.21, subdivision (g)(2). The court may extend services to the 24-month date only if the parent is making significant and consistent progress in a court-ordered residential substance abuse program, or was recently released from incarceration or institutionalization. Mary Anne does not meet these criteria. We conclude that any error in admitting the service providers' statements in evidence was harmless. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
D
The court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Mary Anne's attachments to her declaration

A court's decision to exclude evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. (Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1308.) The parents have not met their burden on appeal to show that the court abused its discretion in excluding the attachments to Mary Anne's declaration. The Agency objected to the admission of the attachments on two grounds—hearsay and lack of authentication. Mary Anne asserts that several of the attachments come within hearsay exceptions. She does not address the issue of authentication, which is the "introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is" or "the establishment of such facts by any other means provided by law." (Evid. Code, § 1400.) Authentication of a writing is required before it may be received in evidence. (Id., § 1401.)
The court did not err when it excluded as hearsay the undated, unsigned letter from an unknown person describing Mary Anne's commitment to her sobriety, and the e-mail exchange between Mary Anne and Grandfather. Although the Agency's delivered service log, and the e-mails between the social worker and Mary Anne's former attorney, may have been admissible under Evidence Code section 1220 as statements offered against a party/declarant, those statements were not authenticated at the time they were offered in evidence. Mary Anne could have asked the social worker to authenticate those documents, or elicited her direct testimony on the subject matter, but did not. Similarly, the undated screenshots of cell phone numbers and what appear to be call logs from a 619 area code telephone number to unidentified persons in April and May of an unidentified year were not authenticated. Moreover, it was not clear what the screenshots and call logs represented. They would thus not have had any evidentiary value if they had been admitted in evidence, as requested, without further testimony to establish their significance. Mary Anne could have directly testified about the telephone calls that she made to other individuals, but did not. We conclude that Mary Anne has not shown that the court abused its discretion by excluding the attachments to her declaration. (Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1308.)
II
REUNIFICATION SERVICES
Mary Anne argues that the court's finding that she was provided reasonable services is not supported by substantial evidence. Mary Anne asserts that the social worker merely told her to see the substance abuse specialist for a referral, and that the required services, other than substance abuse treatment, were impossible to obtain. Mary Anne states that she was unable to obtain any referrals for counseling before the 12-month review hearing date in August. She contends that visitation services were inadequate because she had to coordinate contact with the children through Grandfather without any assistance from the social worker, the Agency allowed Grandfather to impede the parents' contact with the children, and the social worker made no effort to arrange or facilitate visitation after the children moved to Rhode Island.
Jarred contends that the Agency did not offer services to Mary Anne that were designed to remedy the problems caused by her mental health condition, which includes ADHD, learning disabilities, and epilepsy, and did not make any effort to assist her where compliance proved difficult because of her disabilities.
A
Relevant legal standards and standard of review
Family reunification services play a critical role in dependency proceedings. (§ 361.5; In re Alanna A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 555, 563; In re Joshua M. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 467; see 42 U.S.C. § 629a(a)(7).) Services "may include provision of a full array of social and health services to help the child and family and to prevent reabuse of children." (§ 300.2.) Reunification services should be tailored to the particular needs of the family. (David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 793-794, citing In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972 (Alvin R.).) At each review hearing, if the child is not returned to his or her parent, the juvenile court is required to determine whether "reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent . . . in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent . . ." (reasonable services finding). (§§ 366.21, subds. (e)(8) & (f)(1)(A), 366.22, subd. (a).)
The "adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of the [Agency's] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case." (Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1164.) To support a finding that reasonable services were offered or provided to the parent, "the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . ." (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.)
In addition, to promote reunification, visitation must be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child. (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A); Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 972.) "Visitation between a dependent child and his or her parents is an essential component of a reunification plan, even if actual physical custody is not the outcome of the proceedings." (In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580; In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 458.)
We review a reasonable services finding to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 413-414.) The burden is on the petitioner to show that the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court's findings. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
B
Substantial evidence supports the court's reasonable services finding
In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the court's reasonable services finding, we review the record in the light most favorable to the court's finding and draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders. We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine whether there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court. (Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 688-689.)
We reject Jarred's assertion that the Agency did not offer or provide reasonable services to Mary Anne in view of her mental health condition. Mary Anne's court-ordered services included a psychological evaluation, domestic violence treatment, general counseling, parenting education, and substance abuse testing and recovery meetings. The SAS recommended that Mary Anne participate in inpatient substance abuse treatment.
Mary Anne did not participate in a psychological assessment until February 2017, more than six months after the Agency first offered the service to her. Mary Anne's primary diagnosis was methamphetamine dependence. The clinical psychologist noted that Mary Anne displayed clinically significant impairment from methamphetamine use, a need for markedly increased amounts of methamphetamine, and withdrawal symptoms. Her efforts to mitigate her methamphetamine use were unsuccessful. She spent a great deal of time in activities related to obtaining or using methamphetamine, and her social and occupational activities were impacted by her dependency on it. Mary Anne continued using methamphetamine despite the persistent problems associated with her use. The psychologist stated that, for a client with substance dependence, significant improvements in functioning could be seen after detoxification as the client began treatment to initiate and maintain sobriety. Unless Mary Anne was able to maintain her sobriety, it was unlikely that she would be able to safely parent her children.
The psychologist also diagnosed Mary Anne with anxiety disorder, a history of ADHD, and epilepsy, but found no evidence of cognitive impairments that would prevent Mary Anne from substantially benefitting from services within legal timelines. However, without support or intervention, ADHD symptoms such as lack of attention, difficulty following tasks and directions, forgetfulness, restlessness, and impulsive behavior could impair her ability to follow through and complete services. The psychologist recommended that Mary Anne participate in regular psychotherapy and consult a physician to determine whether psychiatric medication might be useful in managing her ADHD symptoms. The Agency recommended that Mary Anne follow up by contacting her doctor and complying with any medication prescribed by the doctor. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Mary Anne needed assistance or asked the social worker for help securing a doctor's appointment.
In view of Mary Anne's diagnosis of methamphetamine dependency, it was reasonable for the Agency to focus on providing her with inpatient substance abuse treatment. In August 2016, Mary Anne refused an offered place at an inpatient substance abuse treatment center. In October, Mary Anne admitted to using methamphetamine and refused to drug test. Mary Anne did not start participating in services until October 10 when she entered an inpatient substance abuse program. However, she left the program on October 17. In December 2016, Mary Anne and Jarred asked the social worker for services and told her that they had been clean for nine days. These facts permit the reasonable inference that Mary Anne continued to use methamphetamine for an extended period of time after the children were detained in protective custody.
On January 3, 2017, the social worker provided Mary Anne with referrals to a domestic violence treatment group and a list of individual TERM therapists. Mary Anne entered ParentCare, an outpatient substance abuse program, on January 18. She tested positive for methamphetamine when she entered the program. Mary Anne admitted using methamphetamine from March 24 through 26. On March 27, the social worker asked Mary Anne to submit to a drug test and gave her the telephone number for Dr. Rodriguez's domestic violence treatment group. Mary Anne did not drug test or contact the treatment group, and failed to remain in contact with the social worker. On April 18, Mary Anne returned to ParentCare and tested positive for methamphetamine. She attended ParentCare on April 20 and 25, but refused to submit to drug tests on those dates. On April 27, she reported to ParentCare staff that she could not stop using drugs and needed a detox and inpatient program. ParentCare referred her to the substance abuse specialist. Mary Anne attended ParentCare on May 3. She refused to drug test. ParentCare discharged Mary Anne on May 31 for lack of attendance.
The social worker tried to contact Mary Anne four times in April, three times in May, three times in June, and once in July. Mary Anne left a voicemail message for the social worker on June 12. On August 3, the 12-month hearing date, the social worker met with Mary Anne. Mary Anne agreed to drug test but did not. She met with an SAS who scheduled an appointment for her at Action Central. After Mary Anne was denied services through that agency, the SAS set up an appointment for Mary Anne at Central East Recovery on September 8. Mary Anne did not keep the appointment.
In late September, the social worker sent the contact information for Dr. Rodriguez's domestic violence treatment group to Mary Anne and provided her with a list of TERM therapy providers. On October 3, Mary Anne e-mailed the social worker saying that she was interested in attending Dr. Rodriguez's domestic violence treatment group. The social worker completed the authorization the same day and Mary Anne started on October 12. At Mary Anne's request, another social worker completed an authorization for individual therapy. Mary Anne started attending individual therapy on October 16.
The record shows that the Agency offered or provided family reunification services to Mary Anne from June 2016, when the social worker gave her a list of referrals that included substance abuse treatment, parenting classes, domestic violence treatment classes, and counseling, until December 5, 2017, the 18-month hearing date. Mary Anne continued to use methamphetamine for more than a year after her children were detained in protective custody. She entered an inpatient substance abuse treatment program in October but left after a week. Mary Anne asked the social worker for services in December 2016. The services that she requested were provided to her beginning in January 2017. After the six-month review hearing, Mary Anne relapsed on methamphetamine and did not attend her substance abuse treatment program. Mary Anne's contention that she was unable to obtain any referrals for counseling before the 12-month review hearing date in August is belied by the record, which shows that the social worker made consistent efforts to contact her. Despite the social worker's efforts to contact Mary Anne, Mary Anne did not meet with the social worker from March 27 until August 3, and did not request counseling services until October, two months after the 12-month review date.
The Agency cannot force an unwilling or indifferent parent to participate in reunification services. (In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1233.) The social worker is not required to "take the parent by the hand" and lead the parent to classes or counseling. (In re Michael S. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1463, fn. 5.) The standard is whether the social services agency and the juvenile court exercised a good faith effort to assess and address the family's needs. (Amanda H. v. Superior Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1345.) There is ample evidence to show that both the Agency and court acted in good faith in providing multiple service referrals to Mary Anne during the entire reunification period.
We are not persuaded by Mary Anne's contention that visitation services were inadequate. Mary Anne consented to the children's placement in Rhode Island with Grandfather. In February 2017, Grandfather said that Mary Anne was considering moving to Rhode Island to be closer to the children, but that she had changed her mind because she had active warrants for her arrest in that state. A review of Mary Anne's criminal history shows that she had an active warrant in Rhode Island from August 2015 for domestic battery. There is no indication in the record to show that Mary Anne requested in-person visitation after the children left for Rhode Island or that the Agency disregarded such a request. The record shows that she was aware of the outstanding warrant for her arrest in Rhode Island. Further, Grandfather remained in San Diego for more than five months to care for the children. During that time, the Agency facilitated visitation between Mary Anne and the children. Mary Anne failed to maintain contact with the social worker from April through July 2017, when arrangements might have been made to bring the children to San Diego during their summer vacation. The record also supports the reasonable inference that Mary Anne was using methamphetamine during this time and that in-person visitation with the children would not have been consistent with the children's well-being. (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).)
Grandfather reported that Mary Anne consistently telephoned the children three or four times a week until April 16, 2017, when her contact with the children decreased significantly. This period of time correlates with Mary Anne's relapse on methamphetamine. In her declaration, Mary Anne stated that she telephoned or videoconferenced with her children approximately four times a week. At the 12-month hearing, she testified that the reason her children were doing so well in Grandfather's care was because she telephoned them every night, sang to them, and took care of them as best she could from San Diego. There is no showing that the Agency allowed Grandfather to impede Mary Anne's contact with the children or that the Agency did not make reasonable efforts to provide visitation services that were reasonable under the circumstances.
III
CONTINUANCES
Jarred claims that the court abused its discretion in denying Mary Anne's request for a continuance (1) on September 7 to prepare for trial and (2) on December 5 to allow a witness to testify. He contends that the denial of a continuance to secure the witness's testimony violated the parents' due process right to present a defense. Jarred complains of disparate treatment, noting that the court granted the Agency's request to continue the 12-month review hearing from October 31 to December 5. He further asserts that the court erred in granting the Agency's request for a continuance.
A
Relevant legal issues and standard of review
The juvenile court has the power to "control all proceedings during the hearings with a view to the expeditious and effective ascertainment of the jurisdictional facts and the ascertainment of all information relative to the present condition and future welfare of the person upon whose behalf the petition is brought." (§ 350, subd. (a)(1); Renee S. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 187, 193.) In some cases, there may be "tension between the timely resolution of dependency cases and the thoughtful exercise of judicial discretion." (In re Sean E. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1594, 1599.) In cases that necessitate additional time, there is no legal impediment for slight and justified delays provided the court complies with the statutory requirements authorizing continuances under section 352. (In re Sean E., at p. 1599.)
Under section 352, the juvenile court may continue any dependency hearing beyond the time limit within which the hearing is otherwise required to be held, provided that no continuance shall be granted that is contrary to the interests of the child. In considering the child's interests, the court is required to give substantial weight to a child's need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments and the damage to a child from prolonged temporary placements. Continuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause and only for that period of time shown to be necessary for the continuance. (§ 352, subd. (a).)
A reviewing court will reverse an order denying a continuance only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. (In re Gerald J. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1187.)
B
The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for a continuance on September 7
Jarred's assertion that the court erred in denying Mary Anne's request for a continuance on September 7 is without merit. The record shows that the 12-month review hearing was originally scheduled for August 3. On August 3, the court set a pretrial status hearing for September 7 and set the 12-month review hearing for September 18. On September 7, after the court granted Mary Anne's request to represent herself, she asked for a continuance of the review hearing on September 18, stating that 10 days was not enough time for her to prepare her case. The court denied the request for a continuance without prejudice. The court said that Mary Anne should try to be ready for trial, but that if she had good cause to request a continuance on September 18, the court would reconsider her motion.
On Monday, September 18, Mary Anne requested a continuance, noting that she had asked the social worker to send her the case file documents on Friday, September 8, and again on Monday, September 11, but she did not receive the case file until Friday, September 15, and needed more time to review it. The court granted Mary Anne's request for a continuance and continued the hearing to October 31.
The court did not abuse its discretion in encouraging Mary Anne to prepare for the 12-month review hearing on September 18. The 12-month review date in this case was August 16, 2017. The court was required to give substantial weight to the children's need for prompt resolution of their custody status. (§ 352, subd. (a).) On September 18, when Mary Anne again asked for a continuance to prepare for the hearing, the court granted the request. The court thus allowed her the time she needed to prepare for the hearing. There is no error.
C
Any error in granting the agency's request for a continuance on October 31 was harmless
The parents have not met their burden on appeal to show that the court prejudicially erred, or treated them unfairly, when it granted the Agency's request to continue the 12-month review hearing from October 31 to December 5. The Agency had learned, through minors' counsel, that Jarred had asserted that there was Indian heritage through Mary Anne's family. Mary Anne did not claim that she had any American Indian heritage, but said that her brother and her deceased father were members of an Indian tribe. She was unable to provide any further information or contact information for her brother. The court said that based on the little information it had, there was no reason to believe that ICWA applied, but it would acquiesce to the Agency's representation that a continuance was required to effect proper ICWA notice.
ICWA protects the interests of Indian children, their tribes and families by establishing minimum federal standards for proceedings involving foster care placement or termination of parental rights. (25 U.S.C. § 1912; In re K.P. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1071.) If the court receives information suggesting that one or more of the child's biological parents, grandparents or great-grandparents are or were a member of a tribe, the social worker must make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child by interviewing the parents and extended family members, contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) for assistance in identifying the tribe and contacting the tribes and any other person that can reasonably be expected to have information regarding the child's membership or eligibility. (§ 224.3, subd. (c).) If, after further inquiry, the court or social worker knows or has reason to know the child is an Indian child, the social worker must provide notice pursuant to section 224.2, subdivision (a)(5). (§ 224.3, subd. (d).)
In view of the status of the proceedings and the paucity of information about the children's alleged Indian heritage, the court should have ordered the Agency to make further inquiry by contacting the BIA and others under section 224.3, subdivision (c) but denied the motion for a continuance. Nevertheless, the parents have not met their burden to show prejudicial error or that the court was biased against them. ICWA is a complicated law and its rules, particularly its notice requirements, have been strictly construed by reviewing courts. (In re Charlotte V. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 51, 56-57; In re A.G. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1397; In re Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 174.) At the insistence of the Agency and minors' counsel, the court reluctantly continued the hearing out of an abundance of caution. This delay inured to the parents' benefit, giving them more than a month to prepare for the hearing and allowing Mary Anne additional time to participate in services. Therefore, any error was harmless.
D
The court did not err in denying the motion for a continuance on December 5
On the day of the December 5 hearing, Mary Anne asked the court to continue the hearing to allow the paternal grandmother, who was undergoing eye surgery, to testify on her behalf. When asked to make an offer of proof, Mary Anne said that the grandmother would testify about how often Grandfather allowed grandmother to contact the children, which was not relevant to the legal issues at the 12-month review hearing. Mary Anne said that the grandmother would also testify about how frustrated Mary Anne was in trying to obtain services, but she did not describe any information the grandmother possessed that could not be presented through Mary Anne's or Jarred's testimony. After the court explained why it needed to know specifically what grandmother's testimony would be, Mary Anne said, "I don't know specifically until I have her in front of me and it starts coming to me."
The parents assert that the paternal grandmother's testimony was critical to their case. They had three months to prepare their case. Mary Anne did not contact the court before the December 5 hearing to notify the court that her witness would be unavailable on that date and to ask that her testimony be heard on another date. Further, based on Mary Anne's offer of proof, the court was unable to ascertain whether grandmother's testimony would be relevant, much less critical, to the legal issues at a 12-month review hearing. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mary Anne's motion to continue the December 5 hearing.
IV
OTHER CLAIMS
A
Alleged notice error
Jarred contends that he was denied due process because "there is no evidence on [sic] the record that the mother[']s lawyer or department made any attempt to serve [him] with notice of the proceedings even though they were a special hearing and closed proceedings only involving the mother." Jarred does not cite to the record to support this assertion.
Out of an abundance of caution, the Agency discusses the notices of the proceedings that were provided to Jarred from the detention hearing on June 8, 2016, to the 12-month review hearing on December 5, 2017. We agree with the Agency that the record shows that proper notice was provided to Jarred throughout the dependency proceedings. It is unnecessary to detail the complete history of service of notice that Jarred received in the dependency proceedings because in his petition, he asserts only that he did not receive notice of a closed, special hearing involving Mary Anne. There is only one such hearing in the record.
The record shows that on August 24, Mary Anne's attorney asked the court to set a special hearing on August 31 to address her client's request for a Marsden hearing. On August 24, the attorney noticed the social worker, county counsel, and minors' counsel by e-mail, and noticed Jarred by telephone and e-mail about the special hearing on August 31. Jarred did not appear on August 31. Mary Anne left the courthouse before the hearing and the court continued the matter to September 7. Mary Anne's attorney said that she would make her best efforts to notify Jarred of the next court date. Jarred was present in court for the September 7 hearing and for all subsequent proceedings related to the 12-month review hearing.
The record, thus, does not support Jarred's assertion that no attempt was made to notify him of the special hearing on August 31. The record shows that Jarred was notified of the special hearing by telephone and e-mail. Further, even if notice of that hearing was in some way deficient, Jarred had no due process right to be heard on the issue of the attorney/client relationship between Mary Anne and her attorney. (See People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 419 [right to effective assistance of counsel is personal to defendant].) Further, to the extent that a Marsden hearing on the issue of the breakdown of the attorney/client relationship between Mary Anne and her attorney implicated Jarred's interests, which it did not, the court continued the matter and Jarred was present at the next hearing; thus, Jarred cannot show prejudicial error.
B
Right to jury trial
Jarred contends that the court violated his due process rights when it denied his request for a jury trial. "Dependency proceedings in the juvenile court are special proceedings governed by their own rules and statutes." (In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 678; In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 711.) Juvenile dependency proceedings are special civil proceedings, not criminal proceedings. In dependency cases, the juvenile court intervenes to protect a child, not to punish the parent. (In re Nolan W., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1233.) There is no right to a jury trial in a dependency case; the juvenile court makes all factual and legal determinations. (In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 915.) Thus, Jarred did not have a due process right to a trial by jury in his children's dependency proceedings and there was no violation of his rights.
C
Case plan review
Jarred asserts that the social worker was obligated to update the case plan every six months or as the needs of his children and family dictated. He contends that section 16501.1 required the social worker to update his case plan after the court terminated his services, and further contends that the court was required to, but did not, discuss his case plan at each review hearing.
"The Legislature finds and declares that the foundation and central unifying tool in child welfare services is the case plan." (§ 16501.1, subd. (a)(1).) "[A] case plan ensures that the child receives protection and safe and proper care and case management, and that services are provided to the child and parents or other caretakers, as appropriate, in order to improve conditions in the parent's home, to facilitate the safe return of the child to a safe home or the permanent placement of the child, and to address the needs of the child while in foster care." (§ 16501.1, subd. (a)(2).) If the child has been removed from the home, the Agency is required to complete a written case plan within a maximum of 60 days of the initial removal of the child or by the date of the dispositional hearing, whichever occurs first. "The case plan shall be updated, as the service needs of the child and family dictate. At a minimum, the case plan shall be updated in conjunction with each status review hearing conducted pursuant to Sections 364, 366, 366.3, and 366.31, and the hearing conducted pursuant to Section 366.26, but no less frequently than once every six months. Each updated case plan shall include a description of the services that have been provided to the child under the plan and an evaluation of the appropriateness and effectiveness of those services." (§ 16501.1, subd. (e).) "The case plan shall be included in the court report, and shall be considered by the court at the initial hearing and each review hearing." (Id., subd. (g)(14).)
The record shows that the social worker included an updated "Child Welfare Services Case Plan Update" for the 12-month hearing in the Agency's August 3 report. The report, including the case plan update, was admitted in evidence. Jarred misconstrues the phrase "considered by the court" (§ 16501.1, subd. (g)(14)) as "discussed by the court." The court stated that it had read and considered the reports admitted in evidence (and the testimony of the witnesses, the manner in which they testified, and the parties' arguments). The social worker and the court thus met their obligations under section 16501.1 and there is no error.
D
Mary Anne's request for an attorney
Jarred argues that the juvenile court misunderstood Mary Anne's request for a Marsden hearing. Jarred contends that when Mary Anne requested a Marsden hearing, she in fact was asking for a court-appointed attorney. Jarred asserts that parents have a due process right to the effective assistance of counsel in dependency cases.
In August, the court denied Mary Anne's request for a new attorney. On September 7, the court granted Mary Anne's request to represent herself. The court cautioned Mary Anne that it was not a good idea to represent herself and advised her that she would be held to the same standards as an attorney qualified to practice in dependency court. On September 18, the court told the parents that juvenile dependency was a very complicated area of the law and that the parents needed to know the applicable laws and rules to adequately represent themselves. The court said that it always recommends that a parent be represented by someone who knows juvenile dependency law. The court advised the parents that if they decided that they wanted representation, they should not wait until the last minute because the court was not likely to continue the matter again.
At the December 5 hearing, after Mary Anne had called the social worker and Jarred as witnesses, she told the court that she wanted to call the paternal grandmother to testify. The court asked Mary Anne what the grandmother's testimony would be. Mary Anne was unable to provide an offer of proof that grandmother would provide testimony relevant to any issue at the hearing. The court stated that it was not going to continue the hearing "to have someone come in and not give the court any relevant testimony." Mary Anne stated, "I want another Marsden hearing actually." In response, the court noted that Mary Anne did not have an attorney. She then said, "I want to argue why I should have an attorney now. How about that? I want a Marsden hearing because I have proof of why my attorney was adequate now."
At this point, the record shows that Mary Anne and the court were distracted by Jarred, who was apparently talking loudly enough outside of the courtroom to be heard inside the courtroom. Mary Anne referred to Jarred's "rattling" and said, "He's mad now. He is. He's completely and totally mad. Who wouldn't be?" The court asked Mary Anne "one more time" to specifically state what grandmother's testimony would be; when she was unable to do so, the court proceeded with the 12-month review hearing.
"Although a parent's right to counsel in dependency proceedings derives from statute (§ 317), a parent has a constitutional right to counsel at some stages of those proceedings." (In re O.S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1407.) A parent may in some cases have a due process right to counsel where termination of parental rights may result. (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1659.) We will assume, without deciding, that a parent has a due process right to counsel at a hearing that may result in the setting of a hearing to terminate parental rights.
Jarred states that the court did not understand that Mary Anne was asking for a court-appointed attorney when she requested a Marsden hearing. If that were the case, and Mary Anne wanted the court to reappoint counsel, it was her responsibility to request counsel and ask the court to rule on her motion. (See People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1017, fn. 20 [defendant's failure to press the court for a ruling resulted in forfeiture of assignment of error].) On review, Mary Anne does not complain that she was denied her constitutional right to assistance of counsel and does not join with Jarred's arguments. Instead, she mentions only that her former counsel did not adequately represent her at previous hearings, a claim that is irrelevant to the issues raised in this proceeding.
"The constitutional right to counsel is personal to the defendant and ordinarily cannot be asserted vicariously." (People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 419, citing People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 343-344; see People v. Tena (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 598, 613 [describing the personal nature of the right to present a defense, and to counsel]; see generally, In re Joshua M. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 801, 807 [an appellant cannot urge errors which affect only another party who does not appeal].) Mary Anne chose to represent herself in the proceedings. "The right to self-representation honors the defendant's capacities for choice and responsibility, whereas the right to counsel rests on the recognition that most defendants are incapable of mounting an effective defense by themselves." (People v. Tena, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 613, citing Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 832-835.) It is " 'the state's duty to refrain from unreasonable interference with the individual's desire to defend himself in whatever manner he deems best, using every legitimate resource at his command." ' " (People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 419.) While Mary Anne may have had some misgivings in the middle of the hearing about her decision to represent herself, she does not assert error on appeal.
E
Jarred's claim that the court did not rule on certain objections
Jarred asserts that the court did not rule on his objection that all of the petitions and findings of the court violated his constitutional rights, including his property rights to his children. He further contends that the court did not rule on his formal, written objection to the admission of the Agency's reports in evidence.
The Agency filed its status review report, dated August 3, 2017, on July 24, 2017. On August 1, Jarred filed "Objection to Status Review Report," objecting to the admission of the report in evidence.
The record shows that the court ruled on Jarred's objection to the admission of the Agency's reports in evidence. At the 12-month hearing, Jarred renewed his objection to the admission of the Agency's reports in evidence. The court properly overruled his objection. As we previously explained, the court was required by law to admit the Agency's reports in evidence, subject to the right to cross-examine the social worker. (§ 366.21, subds. (c), (f)(1)(C).) There is no error.
At the court proceedings on August 3, Jarred stated, "I'd also like the record to state that I object to all petitions and findings of this court on constitutional grounds. And I object to my due process being violated, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Fifth Amendment. I object to all orders and that all orders have been falsified by Health and Human Services Agencies since the beginning." The court responded, "Your objections are noted for the record." Jarred said, "Thank you."
The record shows that the court complied with Jarred's request to allow the record to state his objections to the dependency proceedings on constitutional grounds. Jarred did not expressly request a ruling on his objections or renew his objections at the 12-month review hearing. Jarred has not demonstrated that the court erred in noting his objections for the record. (See Demps v. San Francisco Housing Authority (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 564, 579.)
To the extent that Jarred is claiming on review that the dependency process violated his constitutional rights, it is axiomatic that Jarred has a fundamental interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his children. However, his children have interests in safety and security that are independent of Jarred's interests in raising them. It has long been recognized that children have "a compelling interest to live free from abuse and neglect in a stable, permanent placement with an emotionally committed caregiver." (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 223; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306.) "Although a parent's interest in the care, custody and companionship of a child is a liberty interest that may not be interfered with in the absence of a compelling state interest, the welfare of a child is a compelling state interest that a state has not only a right, but a duty, to protect." (In re Marilyn H., at p. 307; Stanley v. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 645, 649.)
While Jarred focuses on only his own interests, the dependency process takes his children's interests into consideration. "The dependency scheme, when viewed as a whole, provides the parent due process and fundamental fairness while also accommodating the child's right to stability and permanency. Significant safeguards have been built into the current dependency scheme. They include representation by counsel to assist parents at every stage of the proceedings (§ 317), notice of all hearings and rights (§§ 307.4, 308, 311, 316, 335-336, 364-366.23), clear and convincing evidence for removal from custody (§ 361, subd. (b)), reunification services (§ 361.5), and review hearings at which services and progress are reviewed (§§ 366.21, 366.22)." (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 307–308.) We have addressed Jarred's specific claims that he has a right to trial by jury (see Discussion, pt. IV.B), and that he was deprived of his right to proper notice (see Discussion, pt. IV.A) and to call witnesses on his behalf (see Discussion, pt. III.D). The record shows that Jarred received or was offered all of these constitutional safeguards and chose not to avail himself of reunification services, to protect his interests in the care and custody of his children or of his right to be represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings. The record shows that Jarred received the process that was due.
DISPOSITION
The petitions are denied. The requests for a stay are denied.



AARON, J.

WE CONCUR:




NARES, Acting P. J.




GUERRERO, J.