Mason v. Presbytery of
Francisco
Filed 6/25/13 Mason v. Presbytery of San Francisco CA1/5
NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
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as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
CAROLINE MASON,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
THE PRESBYTERY OF
Defendant and Respondent.
A135185
(
Super.
Plaintiff
Caroline Mason (appellant) appeals from the trial court’s judgment following
its order sustaining, without leave to amend, the demurrer of defendant The
Presbytery of
Francisco (respondent) to her first amended complaint. We affirm.
Background
In
1996, appellant commenced respondent’s process to become a minister. She alleges she did so pursuant to a contract
entitled the “1996 Steps and Procedures†manual (Manual). The Manual provided that when a candidate
received a “call†to ministry, the file containing all the materials
accumulated during the course of the candidacy would be provided to the
candidate.
Appellant’s
candidacy was terminated at a hearing in March 2006. Subsequently, appellant requested that respondent
provide her with her candidacy file, but respondent refused. On August
2, 2010, respondent refused in writing to provide appellant the
file.
In
May 2011, appellant filed a lawsuit against respondent alleging a claim for
breach of contract. Among other things,
she alleged respondent’s refusal to provide her candidacy file to her was a
breach of contract. Respondent demurred
to the complaint and appellant filed a first amended complaint (FAC) prior to
the trial court’s ruling on the demurrer.
The FAC contains two causes of action for
candidacy file be provided to her and seeks $400,000 for lost wages and
$700,000 for punitive and medical damages.
Respondent
demurred to the FAC and the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to
amend. The court concluded that
appellant “failed to allege sufficient facts that clearly and specifically
state a cognizable claim(s) against [respondent] or a claim that is not barred
by the ‘ecclesiastical’ rule.†The court
entered judgment in respondent’s favor.
This appeal followed.
Discussion
Appellant
contends the trial court erred in concluding her breach of contract claim
relating to access to her candidacy file is barred by the “rule of deference to
ecclesiastical decisions.†(
Pacific Latin American Dist. of Assemblies of God (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th
420, 440.)
I. Standard
of Review
On
appeal, we “ ‘review the complaint de novo to determine whether or not
[it] alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal
theory, [citation], or in other words, to determine whether or not the trial
court erroneously sustained the demurrer as a matter of law. [Citation.]’
[Citation.]†(
“ ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts which were
properly pleaded. [Citation.] However, we will not assume the truth of
contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law [citation], and we may
disregard any allegations that are contrary to the law or to a fact of which
judicial notice may be taken.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]†(Ibid.)
II. The
Rule of Ecclesiastical Deference
“The
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal
Constitution—and their counterpart in the California Constitution (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 4)—impose limitations on the jurisdiction of civil
courts over the internal affairs and administration of ecclesiastical
institutions. The scope of these
limitations depends on a number of factors, including whether a given church is
hierarchical or congregational and the nature of the specific matters in
dispute in a given case.†(
132 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1409 (Concord
Christian).)
The
California Supreme Court recently summarized the contours of this rule of
deference to ecclesiastical decisions in the context of a church property dispute;
the principles articulated by the court are equally applicable in the context
of appellant’s contract claim:
“Decisions from both this court and the United States Supreme Court have
made clear that, when asked to do so, secular courts may, indeed must, resolve
internal church disputes over ownership of church property. As the high court put it in the seminal
19th-century case involving a church property dispute, ‘an appeal is made to
the secular authority; the courts when so called on must perform their
functions as in other cases.
[¶] Religious organizations come before us in the same attitude as
other voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their
rights of property, or of contract, are equally under the protection of the
law, and the actions of their members subject to its restraints.’ [Citation.]
Similarly, in its most recent decision involving a church property
dispute, the court stated, ‘There can be little doubt about the general
authority of civil courts to resolve
this question. The State has an obvious
and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in
providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can be
determined conclusively.’ [Citations.]
“But
when called on to resolve church property disputes, secular courts must not
entangle themselves in disputes over church doctrine or infringe on the right
to free exercise of religion. In this
regard, the United States Supreme Court has made two points clear: (1) how state courts resolve church property
disputes is a matter of state law; but (2) the method a state chooses must not
violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. ‘[T]he First Amendment prohibits civil courts
from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and
practice. [Citations.] As a corollary to this commandment, the
Amendment requires that civil courts defer to the resolution of issues of
religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a hierarchical church
organization. [Citations.] Subject to these limitations, however, the
First Amendment does not dictate that a State must follow a particular method
of resolving church property disputes.
Indeed, “a State may adopt any
one of various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it
involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy
of worship or the tenets of faith.†’
[Citation.]†(
467, 478-479, fn. omitted.)
III. Application
of the Rule of Ecclesiastical Deference in the Present Case
Respondent
contends the civil courts lack jurisdiction over appellant’s contract claim
because it involves the resolution of ecclesiastical matters. The following language from
context, is instructive: “Civil courts
may employ ‘ “neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property
disputes,†’ as the basis for resolving [property] disputes,
resolution of an ecclesiastical controversy over religious doctrine, practice
or polity. [Citations.] Difficulties arise when application of the
neutral principles approach to a particular dispute requires a civil court to
examine the governing documents of a religious organization, such as a church
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws or instruments of property
ownership. To the extent the
interpretation or construction of these documents involves the resolution of a
matter of ecclesiastical doctrine, polity or administration, the civil court
must defer to the resolution of the issue by the ‘authoritative ecclesiastical
body.’ [Citation.] Significantly, such ecclesiastical matters
include not only issues of religious doctrine per se, but also issues of
membership, clergy credentials and discipline, and church polity and
administration. [Citations.]â€
In
the present case, appellant claims she entered into a contract with respondent
which required respondent to provide her candidacy file to her at the end of
the candidacy process, which in this case ended in termination of her
candidacy. To resolve the present case,
we need not decide whether such contract claims necessarily require the courts
to become entangled in questions of religious doctrine or polity. If the Manual clearly provided for delivery
of the entire candidacy file to appellant, then enforcement of the contractual
language arguably would turn on neutral principles of contract law and arguably
not be barred by the rule of deference to ecclesiastical decisions. However, the FAC does not allege such
unambiguous contract language. Instead,
the FAC alleges, “The [Manual] stated that the file — the accumulation of
documents over the entire course of the process — would be given to a
ministerial candidate when the candidate received a ‘Call’ to ministry. The [Manual] did not directly address the
disposition of file when the process ended by termination. However, when [appellant] entered the
contract with [respondent], she was given the impression that however the
process ended, [respondent] would give to [appellant] the entire file —
including third party documents . . . . In addition to this, during the course of the
process (10 years) members of [respondent’s] organization repeatedly verbalized
to [appellant] that the file would be given to her at process end.†Thus, at best appellant alleges the contract
was ambiguous as to whether the file would be provided to her if her candidacy
were terminated.
title="">[3]
“ ‘If
a contract is capable of two constructions courts are bound to give such an
interpretation as will make it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and
capable of being carried into effect . . . .’ [Citations.]â€
(Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 937, 953-954; see also Civ. Code, § 1643.) Moreover, in determining the meaning actually
intended by the parties’ language, courts are obligated to take “into account
‘ “all the facts, circumstances and conditions surrounding the execution
of the contract.†’
[Citation.]†(
Cal.App.4th 499, 509.) In the present
case, resolving the ambiguity in the alleged contract would require the courts
to consider, in addition to appellant’s evidence of oral representations made
by respondent’s representatives, the role of the candidacy file in respondent’s
process for the evaluation and selection of ministers, as well as any evidence
of respondent’s policies and practices surrounding disposition of candidacy
files at the end of the candidacy process.
Determining which construction of the contract is most reasonable and
feasible would require the courts to become embroiled in matters of church
polity relating to the consideration of candidates for ministry and the
handling of confidential or sensitive information received during the candidacy
process. Thus, it is not possible for
the courts to resolve the contract dispute alleged in the FAC without becoming
entangled in matters of church polity.
Moreover,
any construction of the Manual that permitted the disclosure of confidential
materials in appellant’s candidacy file would be contrary to an October 2003
decision of the Permanent Judicial Commission of the General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church, which concluded, in a different matter, that respondent
was not required to provide a candidate confidential documents relating to
termination of the candidate.
name="_ftnref4" title="">[4] Thus, the relief requested in the FAC is
contrary to the rule that the courts “must defer to the resolution of†matters of ecclesiastical polity and
administration “by the ‘authoritative ecclesiastical body.’ [Citation.]â€
(Concord Christian,
The
trial court did not err in concluding that the ecclesiastical deference rule
required it to sustain respondent’s demurrer to the FAC.
IV. The
Trial Court Did Not Err in Sustaining the Demurrer Without Leave to Amend
Appellant
contends the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer without leave to
amend. She has not shown the trial court
abused its discretion.
“Generally
it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if
there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.
[Citation.] . . . However, the burden is on the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion. [Citations.]
[The p]laintiff must show in what manner [she] can amend [her] complaint
and how that amendment will change the legal effect of [her] pleading. [Citation.].â€
(Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co.
(1969) 70 Cal.2d 627, 636 (Cooper);
see also Westamerica Bank v. City of
Berkeley (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 598, 613-614 (Westamerica).)
In
the present case, appellant has not identified any amendments to her complaint
she could make that would allow the trial court to adjudicate her contract
claim without running afoul of the ecclesiastical deference rule. Appellant also requests leave to amend her
complaint to add a claim of a civil
rights violation and new causes of action asserting one or more torts. However, she has not identified the civil
rights violation or the tort causes of action she seeks to allege and has not
indicated what allegations could state a claim for relief without running afoul
of the ecclesiastical deference rule.
(See Cooper,
[Cooper] has never advanced, either in the trial court or before us, any
effective allegation which he could now make if further amendment to the
complaint were to be permitted. Although
he insinuates multiple wrongs by respondents, he never points out in what
manner those insinuations could be combined to state a cause of action. [Citation.]â€]; Westamerica, supra, 201
Cal.App.4th at pp. 613-614 [“[The plaintiff] bears the burden of demonstrating
that the trial court’s ruling—sustaining the demurrer without leave to
amend—was an abuse of discretion.
[Citation.] If the plaintiff does
not proffer a proposed amendment, and does not advance on appeal any proposed
allegations that will cure the defect or otherwise state a claim, the burden of
proof has not been satisfied.
[Citations.]â€].)
The
trial court did not err in sustaining respondent’s demurrer to the FAC without leave
to amend.
Disposition
The trial court’s judgment is
affirmed. In the interest of justice
each side shall bear its own costs on appeal.
SIMONS,
Acting P.J.
We concur.
NEEDHAM, J.
BRUINIERS, J.
the trial court’s order sustaining respondent’s demurrer, this court is
obligated to “ ‘treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts which
were properly pleaded.’ †(
Co. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 161, 166 (Total
Call).) Our factual summary reflects
this standard of review. (See
1051, 1056, fn. 1.)
erred in concluding she failed to state a claim with respect to any other
aspects of her breach of contract claims.
Any such contention has been forfeited.
(Badie v. Bank of America
(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785.)
