Mason v. Romero

Filed 10/27/06 Mason v. Romero CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Donald Alvarez, Judge. Affirmed.

Roland Mason, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

The Hill Law Firm and Timothy A. Hill, for Defendants and Respondents Jimmy Romero, Heather Romero, and Tony’s Restaurant.

O’Rourke & Fong, Denis M. O’Rourke and Marina Manoukian, for Defendant and Respondent Robert W. French.

Law Offices of John G. Wurm and John G. Wurm, for Defendant and Respondent Ronald McAllister.

Plaintiff and appellant Roland Mason (Mason) appeals from the order of the trial court granting the motions of defendants and respondents Jimmy Romero, Heather Romero, Tony’s Restaurant, Robert W. French, and Ronald McAllister (collectively, Defendants) to set aside the defaults and default judgments entered against them. Mason’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the defaults and default judgments. We find no abuse and will affirm the order.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This lawsuit was filed on February 24, 2003, by Mason, in propria persona, apparently stemming from a series of interactions with agents and agencies in San Bernardino County. The complaint was filed against 37 named defendants, including San Bernardino County supervisors, fire officials, sheriffs, county counsel, district attorneys, judges, and 500 Doe defendants. The complaint specifically named defendants Jimmy Romero, Tony’s Restaurant, Robert W. French, and Ronald McAllister. The complaint alleged 12 causes of actions, for: (1) wrongful arrest; (2) false imprisonment; (3) abuse of process; (4) unfair business practices; (5) extortion; (6) defamation; (7) violation of rights; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); (9) threats under color of law; (10) conspiracy; (11) stalking; and (12) invasion of privacy.

Mason’s introductory allegations in the complaint centered around citations and inspections by San Bernardino County officials at Mason’s place of business, known as Ron’s Auto Service, including citations for zoning, unpermitted construction, substandard conditions, the storage of inoperative vehicles, and the removal of trees for firewood, among others. Mason sought $10 million in damages based on allegations that he was the subject of a complex conspiracy involving the government officials as well as the private individuals.

On April 8, 2003, defendants Ada Pressman and the Pressman Trust (collectively, the Pressman defendants), who were also named in the complaint, filed a demurrer to the complaint.

On April 23, 2003, defendant Robert W. French (French), in propria persona, filed his answer to the complaint, generally denying the allegations in the complaint and specifically noting six affirmative defenses. This answer noted “Filed on Demand” (capitalization altered). The proof of service for French’s answer was mailed to Mason and signed by French. The record also notes that French’s answer was mailed by certified mail.

On May 9, 2003, Mason filed a “Proof of Service -- Summons“ as to defendant Jimmy Romero (Jimmy). This document indicated that the summons was personally served on May 5, 2003, at 4:20 p.m. at “29090 Hook Creek Road, Cedar Glen, California,” by “Dave Dube.” It is unknown whether this address was Jimmy’s place of business or home address as both boxes were checked off. On this same date, Mason filed a “Proof of Service -- Summons” as to defendant Tony’s Restaurant (Tony’s), a partnership. This document indicated that the summons was personally served on May 5, 2003, at 4:20 p.m. at “29090 Hook Creek Road, Cedar Glen, California,” by “Dave Dube” at the business.

On May 12, 2003, Mason filed a “Proof of Service -- Summons” as to defendant Ronald McAllister (McAllister). This document indicated that the summons was personally served on March 20, 2003, at 1:32 p.m. at “275 Old Mill Road, Cedar Glen, California,” by “George Radke” at McAllister’s place of business. On this same date, Mason filed a “Proof of Service -- Summons” as to French. This document indicated that the summons was personally served on March 26, 2003, at 3:20 p.m. at “359 Emerald Drive, Lake Arrowhead, California,” by “Dave Dube” at French’s home address.

On May 23, 2003, Mason filed a document entitled “DOE Amendment,” (capitalization altered) designating DOE 3 as defendant Heather Romero (Heather). Mason noted her address as “29090 Hook Creek Road, Cedar Glen, Ca.” On this same date, Mason filed a “Proof of Service -- Summons” as to Heather, which indicated that the summons was personally served on April 10, 2003, at 6:05 p.m. at “29090 Hook Creek Road (in driveway), Cedar Glen, California,” by “Dave Dube” at Heather’s place of business.

On May 23, 2003, the same date that Heather was identified as DOE 3, Mason filed a request for entry of default against Heather, requesting $10 million in damages plus costs. This request for entry of default was mailed to the address as previously noted on the proof of service The default against Heather was entered by the clerk on May 23, 2003.

Mason also requested an entry of default on May 23, 2003, against McAllister and on June 9, 2003, against Jimmy and Tony’s, for $10 million plus costs. These requests for entry of default were mailed to the addresses as noted on the respective proofs of service. Default was entered against McAllister on May 23, 2003, and against Jimmy and Tony’s on June 9, 2003.

The Pressman defendants’ demurrer was heard on June 9, 2003. The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend and ordered Mason to file a first amended complaint on or before June 23, 2003.

Two days later, on June 11, 2003, Mason filed his first amended complaint, which contained the same 12 causes of action and named the same defendants with substantially similar allegations as set forth in the original complaint. The proof of service as to the first amended complaint contained French’s name and address, as well as the names and addresses for the San Bernardino County Office of County Counsel, attorneys for the Pressman defendants, and defendant Stephen C. Peretz.^[1]

On July 7, 2003, the trial court heard demurrers to the first amended complaint filed by the other defendants, namely the government defendants.^[2] The trial court sustained the demurrers with leave to amend, in part, and without leave to amend, in part. Mason was ordered to file a second amended complaint by August 7, 2003.

On August 7 and 12, 2003, Mason filed a request for dismissal, dismissing all of the government defendants and some of the private defendants, with the exception of the defendants in this appeal.

On August 7, 2003, Mason also filed a request for entry of default against French, which was addressed to a “Susan Sappok” at “385 N. Arrowhead Avenue, San Bernardino, Ca. 92415.”

On April 25, 2005, Mason filed a document entitled, “Response to Information Requested in ‘Judge’s Notes’” (capitalization altered), which apparently noted the statement of damages in support of his entry of judgment on the defaults which were entered in 2003. This document does not contain a proof of service. The record also does not indicate whether this document was served on Defendants. In addition, it is unknown whether a prove-up hearing to establish Mason’s damages was ever held by the trial court. Also on April 25, default judgment in the amount of $1.6 million was entered against Defendants.

Mason thereafter obtained an abstract of judgment and writ of execution against Defendants and began to levy monies from some of Defendants’ bank accounts.

On October 20, 2005, French filed his motion to set aside default judgment and leave to defend action, with supporting exhibits and declarations. French argued, in his motion, that (1) Mason had failed to comply with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure Section 587^[3]; (2) the default should not have been entered, as French had an answer on file; (3) the default of judgment should not have been entered, as there was no operative complaint; and (4) the default of judgment should be set aside in the interest of justice.

On October 21, 2005, McAllister filed his motion to set aside default judgment and leave to defend action, with supporting exhibits and declarations. McAllister argued, in his motion, that (1) Mason had failed to comply with the requirements section 587; (2) Mason had failed to serve the first amended complaint; (3) the default of judgment should not have been entered, as there was no operative complaint; (4) Mason had failed to serve a copy of the judgment or a statement of damages on McAllister; (5) the default of judgment should be set aside in the interest of justice; and (6) the default and default judgment were as a result of a mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect under section 473.

On October 24, 2005, Jimmy, Heather, and Tony’s filed their motion to set aside default and default judgment and to stay execution of the judgment, with supporting exhibits and declarations. These defendants argued, among other things, that they were being denied their due process rights, as service of the complaint was fatally flawed.

Mason thereafter filed his oppositions to the motions to set aside the defaults and default judgments, arguing, among other things, that Defendants had failed to show any evidence of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. Defendants subsequently filed their replies.

On November 30, 2005, the trial court granted Defendants’ motions to set aside the defaults and default judgments. As to Jimmy, Heather, and Tony’s, the court ordered them to file answers within 30 days of being served with an operative pleading and vacated the levy against them. As to McAllister, the court noted there was no operative pleading on file because the second amended complaint was not filed after prior rulings on demurrers were made, and it ordered all levied funds to be returned to McAllister. As to French, the court found French’s answer filed on April 23, 2003, to be sufficient and again reminded Mason that there was no operative complaint on file, as Mason had failed to file a second amended complaint.

Mason timely filed his notice of appeal.

II

DISCUSSION

Mason contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting Defendants’ motions to set aside the defaults and default judgments. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

Section 473 permits the trial court to “relieve a party . . . from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” (§ 473, subd. (b).) To support such a claim, “the moving party must show good cause for that relief by proving the existence of ‘a satisfactory excuse for the occurrence of that mistake.’ [Citation.]” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1440.)

“It is axiomatic that a motion for relief under section 473 is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse. More importantly, the discretion to be exercised is that of the trial court, not that of the reviewing court. Thus, even if the reviewing court might have ruled otherwise in the first instance, the trial court’s order will yet not be reversed unless, as a matter of law, it is not supported by the record. [Citation.]” (Martin v. Johnson (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 595, 604; see also Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233.)

“[A]n ‘order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.’ [Citation.]” (Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 718.) “The burden of affirmatively demonstrating error is on the appellant. This is a general principle of appellate practice as well as an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error. [Citation.]” (Fundamental Investment etc. Realty Fund v. Gradow (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 966, 971.) We will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. (Falahati v. Kondo (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823, 828.) But whether the default or the default judgment complied with constitutional and statutory requirements are questions of law which we review de novo. (Ibid.)

“With respect to setting aside a default judgment, it is the policy of the law to favor, whenever possible, a hearing on the merits, and appellate courts are much more disposed to affirm an order where the result is to compel a trial on the merits than they are when the judgment by default is allowed to stand and it appears that a substantial defense could be made. [Citation.]” (Orange Empire Nat. Bank v. Kirk (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 347, 352; see also Martin v. Johnson, supra, 88 Cal.App.3d 595, 604-605.)

B. Defendant French

As to French, we can easily decide this appeal without reaching the numerous issues raised by the parties.

Section 473, subdivision (d) authorizes the trial court to “set aside any void judgment or order” upon a noticed motion. (See Stevenson v. Turner (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 315, 317-318.) The motion may be made at any time. (Heidary v. Yadollahi (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 857, 862; Plotitsa v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 755, 761 (Plotitsa).) It is immaterial how the invalidity is called to the court’s attention. (Baird v. Smith (1932) 216 Cal. 408, 410.) A prematurely entered default is invalid, and any judgment entered after an invalid default is also invalid. (Ibid.; accord, Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1286.)

Section 585 establishes procedures for obtaining defaults and default judgments. A default may be entered only after the defendant has been served with a summons and has failed to answer or file other responsive papers within the time prescribed in the summons, or such further time as may be allowed. (§ 585, subds. (a)-(c) & (e).)

Here, Mason filed his complaint against all of the defendants on February 24, 2003. On April 23, 2003, French filed his answer to the complaint. On August 7, 2003, Mason filed a request for entry of default against French. The clerk entered default against French on that date. However, the clerk erred in entering a default against French, as French had an answer on file.^[4] (Baske v. Burke (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 38, 45 [“[t]he clerk in possession of a responsive pleading has no authority to enter the default”]; Baird v. Smith, supra, 216 Cal. at p. 411 [“‘[t]he clerk is not authorized to enter a default for failure to file an answer when such answer is on file at the time such default is attempted to be entered’”].) The fact that Mason had filed his first amended complaint on June 11, 2003, after French had answered the original complaint, is of no consequence, as the complaint had not substantially changed. (Carrasco v. Craft (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 796, 808-809.) Indeed, the court below found French’s answer to be sufficient, and we have no reason to refute that determination.

Moreover, the record is clear that the request for entry of default against French was not served on French, but on a “Susan Sappok” (an apparent employee of San Bernardino County). French declared that he had never received notice of the request for entry of default. Mason does not claim otherwise, and we have no reason to dispute French’s declaration.

For these reasons, the trial court properly set aside the default and default judgment against French.

C. Defendants Heather, Jimmy, Tony’s, and McAllister

Among other things, Heather, Jimmy, Tony’s, and McAllister raise three interrelated grounds which purportedly render the defaults and default judgments against them void: (1) the failure to serve them properly with request for entry of default, (2) the failure to serve them properly with a statement of damages, and (3) the failure to serve them properly with the original complaint and amended complaint. Because Mason’s failure to give proper notice of damages renders the default judgments void, we need not consider the remaining grounds.

Sections 425.10 and 425.11 guarantee defendants notice of the damages sought against them. In most cases, the complaint provides such notice: “[i]f the recovery of money or damages is demanded [in a complaint], the amount demanded shall be stated.” (§ 425.10, subd. (a)(2).) However, the statute carves out an exception for personal injury and wrongful death claims; for these claims, any statement of damages in the complaint is forbidden. (§ 425.10, subd. (b).) Instead, a separate statement of damages is used to give the defendant information about the amount being claimed. (§ 425.11, subd. (b); Candelaria v. Avitia (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1436, 1441.) If a personal injury defendant fails to appear and fails to request a statement of damages, a plaintiff is under an affirmative duty to provide notice of the amount of damages: “plaintiff shall serve the statement on the defendant before a default may be taken.” (§ 425.11, subd. (c), emphasis added.) Section 425.11 also specifies the method of service: “[i]f a party has not appeared in the action, the statement shall be served in the same manner as a summons.” (§ 425.11, subd. (d)(1).)

We consider whether Mason gave adequate notice of damages under either section 425.10 or 425.11.

Mason’s original complaint (and first amended complaint) alleged 12 causes of action as set forth, ante. The complaint itself makes clear that all of Mason’s causes of action, with the possible exception of the fourth cause of action (unfair business practices), were personal injury claims subject to section 425.11. All of these causes of action seek compensatory damages for mental and emotional distress as well as punitive damages “in excess of $10,000,000.00 and equal to the damages suffered by [Mason] as a result of the defendants’ wrongful conduct.”^[5] Indeed, there is no question that these causes of action (with the possible exception of the fourth) seek to recover damages for personal injury Mason allegedly incurred as a result of the actions by Defendants. For example, Mason asserts in his complaint, at paragraph 88, as to the first and second causes of action, “False imprisonment occurred the moment Ruvolo, Begley, and Lingenfelter restricted Mason’s free movement and ordered him to sign the above referenced citations . . . .” As to the third cause of action (abuse of process), Mason, at paragraph 91, alleges, “ . . . Marnell and Stout attempted to prosecute Mason for these citations, knowing full well that such a prosecution was improper and unlawful . . . . This resulted in emotional distress and additional legal expenses for plaintiff. . . .” As to the fifth cause of action (extortion), Mason alleges, at paragraph 142, “To prosecute a landlord for fabricated allegations of violations allegedly committed by his tenant amounts to punitive harassment,” and at paragraph 143, Mason alleges, “To place liens against the landlord’s property based on those same factors is unconscionable.” As to the sixth cause of action (defamation), Mason, at paragraph 159, states, “Such conduct, policies, practices and customs constituted malice, oppression or fraud, and thereby entitle plaintiff to an award of punitive or exemplary damages in an amount according to proof.” (See Schwab v. Rondel Homes, Inc. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 428, 432 [complaint which seeks “‘[d]amages for mental and emotional distress in an amount as may be according to proof’” is a personal injury action subject to section 425.11].) Again, as to the seventh cause of action (violation of rights), Mason, at paragraph 234, alleges, “Such conduct, policies, practices and customs constituted malice, oppression or fraud, and thereby entitled plaintiff to an award of punitive or exemplary damages in an amount according to proof.” Finally, as to the twelfth cause of action (invasion of privacy), Mason, alleges that he is entitled up to three times the amount of any general and special damages subject to proof as well as punitive damages according to proof. Under the circumstances of this case, section 425.11 therefore required a statement of damages.

Because Defendants had not appeared, section 425.11 required service in the same manner as a summons, i.e., by personal delivery, by home/office delivery and mail, by mail with notice of acknowledgement, or by publication. (See generally §§ 415.10-415.50.) There is no evidence in this case that Defendants were ever served with a statement of damages by any means, including the above-mentioned methods. Consequently, Mason failed to satisfy the requirements of section 425.11 before taking the defaults of Heather, Jimmy, Tony’s, and McAllister.

It is well settled that a default judgment void for failure to comply with the requirements for notice of damages may be attacked and set aside at any time as beyond the power of the court. (California Novelties, Inc. v. Sokoloff (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 936, 940, fn. 2; Connelly v. Castillo (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1583, 1588; Plotitsa v. Superior Court, supra, 140 Cal.App.3d at p. 761; Stevenson v. Turner, supra, 94 Cal.App.3d at p. 318; see also Twine v. Compton Supermarket (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 514; Lopez v. Fancelli (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1305 (Lopez).) In Plotitsa, Twine, and Lopez, the plaintiffs served statements of damages by mail. In each case, the courts imposed a strict rule requiring personal service and vacated the defaults and default judgments. (Plotitsa, at pp. 761-762 [service of statement of damages by mail rendered default void on the face of the record]; Twine, at p. 517 [where statement of damages was served by mail, “the default judgment exceeded the court’s jurisdiction” and was void on the face of the record]; Lopez, at p. 1307 [“a default judgment, entered without personal service on a nonappearing defendant of the statutory notice of special and general damages required by [§ ] 425.11, is void” (fn. omitted)]; see also § 425.11, subd. (d)(1) [when a defendant has not yet appeared, statements of damages must be personally served before a valid default can be entered].)

In Jones v. Interstate Recovery Service (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 925 (Jones), the complaint prayed for general and punitive damages in specific amounts, but special damages according to proof. The defendant was not personally served with a statement of damages. The trial court awarded a default judgment of general and punitive damages. The appellate court affirmed a subsequent order setting aside the judgment for the plaintiff’s failure to personally serve the section 425.11 statement. Deciding the issue of “what constitutes sufficient notice of damages in order to enter a default judgment” (id. at p. 928), the court noted “[s]ection 425.11 was designed to give a defendant ‘one “last clear chance” to respond to the allegations of the complaint and to avoid the precise consequences . . . [of] a judgment for a substantial sum . . . [without] any actual notice of . . . potential liability.’ [Citation.] Leaving out a step in the process can hardly be deemed ‘one last clear chance.’” (Id. at pp. 928-929.) It added that “[w]here a default judgment is entered without defendant being informed of the potential special damages, the defendant lacks sufficient knowledge to make the decision of defending against or ignoring plaintiff’s claims.” (Id. at p. 929.)

In Lopez, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d 1305, the court found the defendant had not received proper notice of the nature and amount of recovery sought, even though the plaintiff had sent a demand letter to the defendant’s insurance carrier, outlining his special and general damages claims. The court assumed the letter “could, under appropriate circumstances, serve as a statement of damages.” (Id. at p. 1310.) It found, however, “the lack of personal service on defendants [rendered] the letter inoperative as a notice of claimed damages . . . .” (Ibid.)

The requirements for notice of damages are strictly construed. (Parish v. Peters (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 202, 207.) “Because default judgment ends the controversy, the rules leading to it are precise and should be followed to the letter. Where a plaintiff fails to adhere to those rules, a defendant need not suffer the consequences a default judgment brings.” (Jones, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at p. 928.) As the court in Jones explained, personal service of the statement of damages is intended to provide “one ‘last clear chance’” for parties to decide whether to appear before suffering the potentially severe consequence of a default judgment. (Ibid.) Mason here did not follow to the letter the requirements for obtaining a default judgment; consequently, Defendants were not provided a “last clear chance.” To have any meaning, that chance must come before default is entered. (See Hamm v. Elkin (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1343, 1346 [statement of damages must be served before clerk enters default because “knowledge of the alleged amount of damages may be crucial to a defendant’s decision whether to permit a clerk’s default”].)

As to the fourth cause of action (unfair business practice), Mason alleged, “These actions have caused a loss of employment and loss of income to the plaintiff and a loss of investment returns and future income,” without stating the exact amount of damages suffered by Mason. Later, Mason, alleges, “Additionally, the defendants have placed a ‘lis pendens’ lien against the property, compounding the situation. . . . These actions have caused the plaintiff to lose in excess of $500,000.00 of estimated value in the property, which he is unable to sell.” In the “Prayer for Relief“ (capitalization altered) section, Mason, asserts, “That the Court find in favor of plaintiff and against all defendants, jointly and severally, in an amount equal in excess of $10,000,000.00 and equal to the damages suffered by plaintiff as a result of the defendants’ wrongful conduct.” These allegations of the damages in Mason’s complaint were insufficient to give Defendants notice of the compensatory damages sought by Mason as to the non-personal injury cause of action. (See Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 829-830 (Greenup).) Because the record does not establish that the first amended complaint was ever served on Defendants, the amended complaint cannot have given Defendants notice. Regardless, the first amended complaint alleged the exact same allegations as to relief and damages sought. Specification of the damages sought under this claim could not provide notice sufficient to support the trial court’s award of $1.6 million damages for unfair business practices.

A complaint must state the amount of money damages or other relief it seeks. (§ 425.10.) The statutes preserve the defendant’s right to contest an action and protect the defendant from unlimited liability. “Section 580, and related sections 585, 586, 425.10 and 425.11, aim to ensure that a defendant who declines to contest an action does not thereby subject himself to open-ended liability.” (Greenup, supra, 42 Cal.3d 822, 826.) “The notice requirement of section 580 was designed to insure fundamental fairness.” (Becker v. S.P.V. Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 494.) Our Supreme Court has concluded that “due process requires notice to defendants, whether they default by inaction or by wilful obstruction, of the potential consequences of a refusal to pursue their defense. Such notice enables a defendant to exercise his right to choose -- at any point before trial, even after discovery has begun -- between (1) giving up his right to defend in exchange for the certainty that he cannot be held liable for more than a known amount, and (2) exercising his right to defend at the cost of exposing himself to greater liability.” (Greenup, at p. 829.) “It is a fundamental concept of due process that a judgment against a defendant cannot be entered unless he was given proper notice and an opportunity to defend. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Lippel (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1160, 1166.) The federal constitutional standard is whether the notice is “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances” to apprise the defendant of the relief sought. (Dusenbery v. U.S. (2002) 534 U.S. 161, 168; see also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 313-315.)

Regardless of whether formal notice is constitutionally required, formal notice is statutorily required. (§§ 425.10, 425.11 & 585.) Formal notice is “an essential prerequisite to a valid default judgment [citations].” (Engebretson & Co. v. Harrison (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 436, 443.) We conclude that Mason failed to give Defendants sufficient notice of the damages sought on his 12 causes of action.^[6]

The inescapable conclusion is that the default and judgment against Defendants were nullities and open to attack at any time. The court was obliged to set them aside.

III

DISPOSITION

The order setting aside the defaults and default judgments is affirmed. Respondents are awarded costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RICHLI

J.

We concur:

HOLLENHORST

Acting P.J.

McKINSTER

J.

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^[1] The Pressman defendants and Stephen C. Peretz are not parties to this appeal.

^[2] The record does not indicate that Defendants joined in the demurrer.

^[3] All future statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.

^[4] We reject Mason’s objection to French’s answer on the grounds that the answer was “filed on demand” (capitalization omitted) and that French signed the proof of service. These points were not raised in the trial court below, and we will therefore not consider them on appeal. We note the record on appeal contains no reporter’s transcript.

^[5] All of the causes of action named all of the parties to this appeal, as well as individuals who are not parties to this appeal. While Mason specifically named some of the individual defendants for some of the causes of action, he alleged generally that all “defendants” committed the alleged wrongful acts and caused him to suffer monetary damages. He named the defendants to this appeal on the face of the original complaint and identified them on pages 5 and 6 of the original complaint under the heading “Parties.” In the first amended complaint, Mason specifically named all the defendants to this appeal on pages 5 through 8 under the heading “Introductory Allegations” and noted that the defendants “either collectively or severally, personally or through their agent or agents” participated in the alleged wrongful acts against him.

^[6] Mason’s brief does not address this issue or discuss this subject at all. (See Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99 [“[i]ssues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, we consider the issues waived”].)