Filed 3/22/22 Medina-Puerta v. Goon CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on March 10, 2022, be modified as follows:

1. On page 8, following the first full paragraph, insert the following:

E. March 6, 2018 Order

On March 6, 2018, a different judge denied as moot Medina-Puerta’s pending discovery motions and related motions for sanctions “as this case is now post judgment and discovery is closed.”

2. On page 17, the first full paragraph, beginning “To the extent” is deleted and the following paragraph is inserted in its place:

As to Medina-Puerta’s own motions to compel discovery and for the imposition of discovery sanctions, he has not established that the denial of these motions as moot is an appealable order under Family Code section 3554 or Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1. (See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(B) [appellant’s brief to “[s]tate that the judgment appealed from is final, or explain why the order appealed from is appealable”].) Irrespective of this procedural defect, the substance of Medina-Puerta’s argument for reversing the March 6 order is contingent on reversal of the March 2 order striking his motion to modify child support. There being no basis for reversing the March 2 order, the March 6 order must stand as well.

3. On page 17, under heading III., the first sentence beginning “The order” is deleted and the following sentence is inserted:

The orders appealed from are affirmed.

There is no change in the judgment.

Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.

Dated: _____________________________

LIE, J.

____________________________ _____________________________

DANNER, ACTING P.J. WILSON, J.

Filed 3/10/22 Medina-Puerta v. Goon CA6 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Antonio Medina-Puerta appeals from an order striking his motion to modify child support, as a terminating sanction for his abuse of the discovery process. His claims challenge the authority of the trial judge to issue any orders in the parentage action, the procedural regularity of the order for terminating sanctions, as well as its merits. Because the record substantiates none of Medina-Puerta’s claims about the trial judge or process while amply supporting the court’s factual findings and exercise of discretion, we affirm the order.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Medina-Puerta and Goon had a lengthy litigation history in the Orange County Superior Court before their parentage action was ordered transferred to the Santa Clara County Superior Court.[1] Because that history informed the trial court determination from which Medina-Puerta appeals, we include it here.

After Medina-Puerta’s paternity was established as to minor children M. and N., Goon was ordered to pay him $23 per month in child support. Six years later, Medina-Puerta sought modification of the support order, claiming that expiration of his unemployment benefits constituted a change in circumstances. The court agreed that modification was warranted but—finding that Medina-Puerta had the ability and opportunity to earn an annual income of $95,000—ordered him to pay Goon $706 per month.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Three, affirmed that support order in an unpublished decision (Medina-Puerta v. Goon (Jun. 27, 2012, G045387) [nonpub. opn.]). It rejected Medina-Puerta’s challenge to the commissioner’s jurisdiction and impartiality and concluded that the trial court had appropriately considered Medina-Puerta’s bank records, “the production of which [he] fought tooth and nail,” to find “ ‘there has been a huge amount of secreting money, as evidenced by the litigation, over these subpoenas and the efforts by the petitioner to not have those be discovered. There is a huge source of money coming in and out of these banks over the last year or two which is totally unexplained. I think basically there is a shell game going on with money from bank account to bank account.’ ” The reviewing court further observed, “While there is no requirement a parent act in bad faith before earning capacity may be imputed [citation], bad faith has arguably been demonstrated here.”

Four months after the filing of the unpublished decision, Medina-Puerta again requested modification of child support, claiming that he was disabled and receiving Social Security disability benefits of $621.74 per month. Because a person receiving such benefits must have less than $2,000 in assets, the court in 2013 reduced his monthly support obligation to $0.

On October 1, 2015, Medina-Puerta sought further modification of child support, this time seeking payment of support by Goon, as well as modification of custody and visitation. Because by then both Goon and Medina-Puerta resided in Santa Clara County, the Orange County Superior Court in 2016 ordered the matter transferred to the Santa Clara County Superior Court, after resolving the pending custody and visitation issue, but did not rule on the requested modification of support.

In early 2017, the Santa Clara County Superior Court continued the matter for both parties to conduct discovery.

On July 10, 2017, Goon filed a motion to compel discovery to be heard on August 11, 2017, the same date previously set for hearing on another motion by Medina-Puerta to modify custody and visitation.

A. Hearing on August 11, 2017

After protracted discussion of his request for an interim order of support resulted in that request being continued for one month, Medina-Puerta asked to continue the hearing on Goon’s motion to compel discovery and a vocational evaluation, on the ground that he was unable to proceed that day. He initially asserted a continuance was necessary because he was unable to hear the proceedings, so the trial court provided him with an assisted-listening device. He next denied having been served with Goon’s motion, and the court noted that it had set the date when both parties were present, and that he had filed a responsive declaration. He then claimed that he was “mentally incapable” of participating in the hearing, due to jetlag. The court denied that request as well, noting that Medina-Puerta “does appear to be active and alert in court and is certainly able to converse with me.”

Goon’s motion to compel was based on the asserted inadequacy of Medina-Puerta’s production of documents and his answers at his deposition on: (1) the income of his company; (2) bank accounts he had opened and had been using in his sons’ names; (3) a $15 million lawsuit against Microsoft that he had settled; (4) his disability; and (5) frequent financial contributions he received from his family. Goon also sought an order compelling Medina-Puerta to provide his Social Security statement in order to determine his projected retirement income.

The court granted the motion to compel on all issues, subject to a protective order regulating use of records Medina-Puerta produced as to his disability. The court also ordered that Medina-Puerta undergo a vocational evaluation, at Goon’s expense, for the purpose of determining his capacity to financially support the children. The court awarded Goon sanctions of $1,000 for attorney fees to be paid in installments of $50 per month.[2]

B. Goon’s Request for Order to Compel or for Terminating Sanctions

On December 19, 2017, Goon filed a request for order to compel discovery or, alternatively, to impose terminating sanctions. Medina-Puerta filed a written opposition to Goon’s request on January 5, 2018. In his opposition, Medina-Puerta raised multiple procedural objections and also answered the specifics of Goon’s claims that his performance did not comply with the court order compelling his further deposition testimony.

C. Hearing on January 17, 2018

The court heard argument by both parties as to the merits and procedural correctness of Goon’s request for terminating sanctions, then took the matter under submission. It then proceeded to matters related to contempt and child custody and visitation, which form the basis for Medina-Puerta’s claim of bias.

1. Medina-Puerta’s Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt

Medina-Puerta testified regarding two separate occasions on which he alleged that Goon was in contempt of the custody and visitation orders. The first occurred the previous summer, when Goon allowed M. to stay with her during a four-week period designated as Medina-Puerta’s parenting time. Specifically, on the morning Medina-Puerta and the boys were supposed to leave for their annual four-week trip to Spain, M., then 16 and a half, refused to go. Medina-Puerta told M., “Well, [M.], this is my custodial time so . . . while I am in Spain with [N.] . . . you are going to take your tent that you use all the time with the Boy Scouts, you are going to put it in the backyard, and you are going to be there until I come back.” Medina-Puerta asserted that Goon “intentionally and willfully disobeyed [the custody order] by taking [M.] in her house all [four weeks of Medina-Puerta’s absence] as if it were her custodial time.” The second violation occurred when Medina-Puerta went to pick up the boys at their school for the start of his custodial time but was initially unable to find them. Medina-Puerta eventually discovered the boys sitting with Goon in her car: “I saw them. They were eating. They have bags of McDonald’s with them. And the respondent acknowledges that she has been with them, she went to buy food for them, all during my custodial time.”

After Medina-Puerta rested, the trial court granted Goon’s motion to dismiss the contempt citation for insufficiency of evidence that Goon intentionally interfered with his custodial time. Medina-Puerta immediately asked the court to order that he have four additional weeks with M. the coming summer to compensate for the time that M. had stayed with Goon rather than in Medina-Puerta’s backyard. The court responded that it was appropriate for the parties to discuss that issue and try to reach an agreement, but that it would not make an order on that subject because “a modification of the custody and visitation order is not before the Court today.”

2. Goon’s Request for Order Re: Boy Scouts Camping Trip

Goon then informed the court that, in contravention of a prior order, Medina-Puerta was refusing to allow M. to participate in an upcoming Boy Scouts camping trip. She asked that the court enter an order specifically directing Medina-Puerta to allow M. to do so. Medina-Puerta objected: “As you very well said, there are things that are not before the Court. There are many things I would like to bring to the Court. [¶] The question of the Boy Scouts is something that I have never objected to. He wants to go in that tent all the time, and I have no—no problem. When I tell him to go in the tent,^[[3]] he doesn’t go there.”

The following exchange ensued:

“THE COURT: No, that’s fine. I’m just asking, you know, and I understand that you have that position. My question simply is: Is there a reason why you would not want your son to attend when he is attempting to become an Eagle Scout, which is an extraordinary accomplishment for a young person his age? Can you explain to me?

“THE PETITIONER: I don’t oppose that, Your Honor.

“THE COURT: All right.

“THE PETITIONER: I oppose you to make an order, especially right after you denied my request for compensation time.

“THE COURT: Correct. However –

“THE PETITIONER: “I mean, this look[s] like[] favoritism, Your Honor.”

The court then stated: “The Court had previously ordered that [M.] would

be allowed and would—the Court’s order is that he is allowed to attend the Boy Scout events. This is simply enforcement of a previous order. I do order that he will attend the event this weekend.” Medina-Puerta objected, stating that “signing a walk-in order is not the proper way to deal with a request from the respondent . . . [and] because, as I mentioned before, there is now an appearance of favoritism and bias.” The court overruled Medina-Puerta’s objection, reiterating that “the Court had previously ordered that [M.] was to participate in Boy Scout events and that both parents were to facilitate that. This is simply an enforcement for a specific event.”[4]

Prior to the conclusion of the hearing, the judge explained to the parties that she would no longer be sitting in that court effective January 25, 2018, but anticipated the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court would make a special appointment for purposes of the judge issuing orders on any matters remaining under submission after that date.

D. March 2, 2018 Order on Submitted Matters

The court issued a written order on March 2, 2018 (March 2 order), granting Goon’s request for an order striking Medina-Puerta’s motion to modify child support as a terminating sanction. Specifically, the court found Medina-Puerta had “engaged in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process by failing to comply with the August 29, 2017, and September 7, 2017 orders compelling his production of documents and full participation in a deposition. The Court has attempted less severe sanctions, including monetary sanctions, and found them to be unsuccessful. The record in this case, including the record from the proceedings in Orange County, where this case originated, indicates any further attempts at lesser sanctions would be ineffective.”

The court explained at length the basis for its decision. It noted that, in response to Medina-Puerta’s request for modification of child support, which had been filed prior to transfer of the case from Orange County, it allowed both parties to move forward with discovery. In spite of two orders directing Medina-Puerta to comply with the production of documents and participate in a deposition, he continued his pattern of hiding sources of income and failing to provide full discovery of his true financial circumstances. He refused to answer questions about lawsuits in which he received awards or settlements. He refused to provide documents that would help identify his sources of income, his debt, and bank accounts. Medina-Puerta’s conduct forced Goon to incur further expenses to obtain information directly relevant to Medina-Puerta’s income for purposes of calculating support. The court specifically found that Medina-Puerta was untruthful, uncooperative, and abusive of the discovery process.

Noting that monetary sanctions had been ineffective in persuading Medina-Puerta to cooperate, the court found that it was unlikely that a further order for such sanctions could be enforced, given his intransigence in revealing information about his finances. Although evidentiary or issue sanctions would cause his motion to be dismissed at a hearing, Goon would incur still further expense in the meantime, without a likelihood of reimbursement. The court noted this to be precisely the type of abuse of the discovery process that may be addressed by terminating sanctions. After considering alternatives, the court concluded Medina-Puerta would not comply with discovery, despite orders from two trial courts and explicit commentary by the Fourth District Court of Appeal about his prior lack of cooperation in Orange County. Finally, the court noted that its terminating sanction was limited to Medina-Puerta’s current motion to modify child support, and that the parentage action would remain under the jurisdiction of the superior court for custody, visitation, and support at least until the children reached either 18 or 19.

Medina-Puerta timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction to Issue March 2 Order

Medina-Puerta challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction to issue the March 2 order on two grounds. First, he contends that trial judge’s appointment to the Sixth District Court of Appeal in late January 2018 precluded her from issuing the order. Second, he claims that the judge was disqualified from deciding these matters because of bias and favoritism towards Goon.

1. Appointment to Court of Appeal

The trial judge informed the parties that she would be leaving the Santa Clara County Superior Court effective January 25, 2018, and that, as for any matters she had under submission, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court would authorize her to complete the outstanding orders. “The Chief Justice may provide for the assignment of any judge to another court but only with the judge’s consent if the court is of lower jurisdiction.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 6, subd. (e).) Medina-Puerta questions whether such an assignment occurred. But “[a] judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) The burden is accordingly on the appellant to overcome that presumption by demonstrating, “on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) Medina-Puerta has not met this burden.

Even if Medina-Puerta had been able to affirmatively demonstrate error, his challenge to the trial judge’s continuing jurisdiction is not cognizable on direct appeal. (People v. Bowen (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 783, 789 [“Since 1866 our courts have held the proper method of challenging the right of a judge to hold office is by a quo warranto proceeding.”]) “Under the ‘de facto’ officer doctrine the attack on the judge’s qualifications is deemed collateral and must be raised separately. [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 789-790.) Furthermore, “ ‘ “[t]he lawful acts of an officer de facto, so far as the rights of third persons are concerned, are, if done within the scope and by the apparent authority of office, as valid and binding as if [s]he were the officer legally elected and qualified for the office.” ’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 790.) Medina-Puerta’s challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction is therefore both procedurally defective and without merit.

2. Disqualification

Medina-Puerta next challenges the judge’s authority to issue the March 2 order on the grounds that she was disqualified due to her bias and lack of impartiality. In support of his argument, he contrasts the court’s refusal of his impromptu request for an additional four weeks of custody, with the grant of Goon’s proposed order for the Boy Scout camping trip. But the parties’ respective requests differed materially in ways other than the court’s treatment of them.

As the court explained at the hearing, its prior order that both parties facilitate M.’s participation in scouting authorized it to order Medina-Puerta to permit M. to attend the Boy Scout trip in question. It is well-settled that “[e]very court has power to compel obedience to its judgments and orders (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 128, subd. 4, 177), and a court of equity retains inherent jurisdiction to oversee and enforce execution of its decrees. [Citations.]” (Brown v. Brown (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 82, 84.) The order for the Boy Scout camping trip represented specific enforcement of the court’s prior order dated April 18, 2017. In contrast, Medina-Puerta first made his demand for an additional four weeks of parenting time after the court had already ruled that he had failed to establish that Goon had interfered with his custodial time and that M.’s resistance, as an older teen, to spending four weeks with his father, was not a matter within Goon’s control.

Finally, even if there had been any merit to Medina-Puerta’s allegations of bias against the trial judge, his claim of disqualification is neither timely nor appealable. “A party seeking to disqualify a trial judge for cause must file a statement of disqualification at the ‘earliest practical opportunity’ after discovering facts constituting the grounds for the disqualification. [Citation.]” (Eckert v. Superior Court (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 262, 265.) Contrary to Medina-Puerta’s suggestion, merely accusing a trial judge of favoritism, whether the claim is made at a hearing or in a pleading filed on demand, does not suffice to disqualify the judge from proceeding. “[T]he statement [of disqualification] shall be served on each party or his or her attorney who has appeared and shall be personally served on the judge alleged to be disqualified, or on his or her clerk, provided that the judge is present in the courthouse or in chambers.” (Code. Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (c)(1).) If the allegations are thereafter disputed, the question of disqualification is determined by another judge. (Code. Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (c)(6).) Moreover, “[t]he determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate[,]” not by direct appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d).)

It was at the hearing of January 17, 2018, that Medina-Puerta became aware of the facts he claims indicate bias, but he nevertheless waited until March 14, 2018—several days after both service of the order striking his motion to modify support and a further court appearance on March 6, 2018—to file a statement of disqualification. Even the date on which Medina-Puerta professed to sign this statement, February 27, 2018, is approximately 40 days after the hearing at which he discovered the purportedly salient facts. The record does not include a certificate of service of the statement of disqualification, nor does the register of actions reflect that Medina-Puerta ever filed proof of service or otherwise sought a determination on the disqualification issue.

Accordingly, we conclude that neither the trial judge’s appointment to the Court of Appeal nor any other basis for disqualification warrants reversal of the March 2 order.

B. Propriety of the Ruling

On the merits of the March 2 order, Medina-Puerta disputes the trial court’s findings of noncompliance with the court’s prior orders and argues that, even if he had failed to comply, the court should have first imposed lesser sanctions. He asserts procedural defects as well, contending that he had been denied adequate notice of the motion for sanctions and that the resulting order “lacked specificity” by referring to the motion by the date he filed his request to calendar the motion.

“We review the trial court’s ruling on a discovery sanction under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] We will affirm the sanction order unless it is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or demonstrates a ‘ “manifest abuse exceeding the bounds of reason. . . .” ’ [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Chakko (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 104, 108.)

When a party misuses the discovery process, the Civil Discovery Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.010 et seq.) empowers the court to impose (1) monetary sanctions (§ 2023.030, subd. (a)), (2) “issue sanctions” (id., subd. (b)), (3) “eviden[tiary] sanctions” (id., subd. (c)), or (4) “terminating sanction[s]” (id., subd. (d)). “[S]ection 2023.010 provides that the following, among others, are misuses of the discovery process: failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery; making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery; making an evasive response to discovery; and disobeying a court order to provide discovery.” (Department of Forestry & Fire Protection v. Howell (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 154, 191 (Howell), disapproved on another ground in Presbyterian Camp & Conference Centers, Inc. v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 493, 516, fn. 17.)

It is true that “sanctions are generally imposed in an incremental approach, with terminating sanctions being the last resort. [Citation.]” (Howell, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 191.) Accordingly, “[r]epeated failure to respond to discovery and to comply with court orders compelling discovery provides ample grounds for imposition of the ultimate sanction. [Citations.]” (Jerry’s Shell v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1069 (Jerry’s Shell).) On review, however, we do not ask whether “the trial court should have imposed a lesser sanction; rather, the question is whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the sanction it chose. [Citation.]” (Do It Urself Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Brown, Leifer, Slatkin & Berns (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 27, 37 (Do It Urself), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573.) Merely because more lenient sanctions were available “does not establish that the imposition of a more severe sanction was an abuse of discretion.” (Waicis v. Superior Court (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 283, 287.) Medina-Puerta “bears the burden of showing that the sanction was undeserved.” (Ibid.) He has not done so.

1. No Abuse of Discretion

Based on the precepts outlined above, Medina-Puerta’s arguments that the trial court could not impose terminating sanctions without either more flagrant noncompliance or imposition of lesser sanctions first are without merit. We look only to whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sanction it did. (Do It Urself, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 37.)

Contrary to Medina-Puerta’s characterization of the record, the trial court had ample evidence to support its finding that he “has continued his pattern of hiding sources of income from [Goon] and failing to provide full discovery of his true financial circumstances” and was moreover “untruthful, uncooperative, and abusive of the discovery process.”[5] Despite the court’s express order of August 29, 2017, that he “answer any and all questions” regarding his bank accounts, accounts in his sons’ names, his company Multivision Research, his settlement with Microsoft, money provided to him by his family, his disability, and “past or present medical conditions,” Medina-Puerta elected to read his own parameters into the court’s order. He refused to answer questions about his or his sons’ bank accounts on “grounds of privacy” and “relevancy.” He refused to produce the ordered records for Multivision Research, that would purportedly substantiate his claim that it generated neither income nor operating expenses. As for the Microsoft settlement, he claimed that attorney fees and expert fees had reduced his net recovery to a negligible sum, despite having represented himself for much of the litigation, and yet refused to answer questions about the fees actually incurred or even the number of experts retained, citing attorney-client privilege and attorney work product. Although he claimed that his income was limited to his social security disability benefit, requiring him to resort to credit card debt to meet his stated living expenses, he refused to answer questions about his credit card debt on the ground that this was “outside the scope” of the order because “You’re supposed to find out what my income is, not what my debt is.”

We also reject Medina-Puerta’s contention that the trial court erred by considering earlier findings of the Orange County Superior Court and the legal conclusions reflected in the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s unpublished affirmance of the Orange County child support order. That prior final judgment, which is included in the record on appeal, “ ‘render[s] conclusive matters which . . . “were actually litigated and determined in the first action.” ’ ” (Taylor v. Hawkinson (1957) 47 Cal.2d 893, 895-896.) To the extent Medina-Puerta alternatively asks us to treat the March 2 order striking his motion as an order for below-guideline child support and reverse based on the omission of findings that would have been required under Family Code sections 4056 and 4057,[6] he cites no authority by which we may thus treat the imposition of a terminating sanction as an order on the merits of the stricken pleading. Nor are we aware of any. His argument instead would require us to presume that—despite his persistent unwillingness to permit routine, court-ordered investigation of his claim of indigency—a determination on the merits would have vindicated a stated income belied by his lifestyle and history.

Medina-Puerta does dispute service of the court’s September 7, 2017 order and contends that this alone is sufficient to establish that the court abused its discretion in considering it. Absent a certificate of service establishing the manner or date of service, we assume that Medina-Puerta did not actually receive the September 7, 2017 order. But the September 7, 2017 order was merely what Goon had prepared following the August 11, 2017 hearing, apparently before the court’s issuance of its own August 29, 2017 order, which Medina-Puerta demonstrably received. He was thus aware of his obligations to comply with discovery as detailed in the court-prepared order. His failure to do so constituted a misuse of the discovery process. Whether or not he received the September 7, 2017 version, the trial court properly recognized his conduct as continuing the pattern of noncompliance begun in Orange County Superior Court where Medina-Puerta fought the production of bank records and financial information “tooth and nail,” playing “ ‘a shell game . . . with money from bank account to bank account.’ ” This pattern of abuse is sufficient to support terminating sanctions. (Jerry’s Shell, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1069.)

The record does not support a conclusion that the trial court’s decision to strike Medina-Puerta’s motion to modify child support was arbitrary or capricious or otherwise exceeded the bounds of reason. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the March 2 order.

2. No Due Process Violation

We also dispose of Medina-Puerta’s claim that his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s order striking his motion to modify child support. The basis of this argument is that Goon’s motion failed to specify that it sought terminating sanctions and alternatively, that he was not properly served with that motion.

Due process “guarantees that any person against whom a claim is asserted in a judicial proceeding shall have the opportunity to be heard and to present his defenses.” (Motores De Mexicali v. Superior Court (1958) 51 Cal.2d 172, 176.) Goon filed her motion for terminating sanctions on December 19, 2017, concurrently with proof of service on Medina-Puerta by overnight mail. Medina-Puerta filed a written response, which he expressly stated was “an opposition to a Motion requesting order ‘terminating sanctions/compel discovery’ set for hearing on 1/17/17.” After laying out various procedural objections to Goon’s motion, Medina-Puerta addressed its substance, with a point-by-point refutation of the discovery issues raised therein. Medina-Puerta appeared at the hearing, again raised both procedural objections and substantive arguments in opposition. He therefore had both actual notice and an opportunity to be heard on the motion. Moreover, “ ‘t is well settled that the appearance of a party at the hearing of a motion and his or her opposition to the motion on its merits is a waiver of any defects or irregularities in the notice of motion. [Citations.] This rule applies [i]even when no notice was given at all. [Citations.] Accordingly, a party who appears and contests a motion in the court below cannot object on appeal or by seeking extraordinary relief in the appellate court that he had no notice of the motion or that the notice was insufficient or defective.’ ” (Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697, italics added.) Accordingly, even if the record supported Medina-Puerta’s claim that he had no notice of the motion for sanctions, he waived any claim that notice was deficient. His constitutional claim therefore is without merit.

In support of his claim that the order for sanctions “lacks specificity,” Medina-Puerta argues that the order imposing terminating sanctions misidentified the filing date of his motion to modify child support. Medina-Puerta originally filed his motion to modify both support and custody on October 1, 2015, in the Orange County Superior Court. Due to a calendaring error, Medina-Puerta on March 21, 2016, filed a request for order to calendar the remaining issue of support, which was set for hearing on April 27, 2016, still in Orange County. The parties exhibit no confusion about the nature of the sanction imposed, because the order is explicit: “The Court hereby GRANTS Respondent’s request for an order striking Petitioner’s motion to modify child support as a terminating sanction.” Medina-Puerta himself acknowledges that the order’s use of the March 21, 2016 filing date (or more accurately, the April 27, 2016 hearing date), rather than October 1, 2015, is “of little consequence” except, in his view, for its significance as to “cumulative fatal deficiencies.” He offers no citation to authority by which we would be entitled to treat the discrepancy he notes as legally significant, let alone a basis for reversal. We see no basis in the record or legal authority to conclude that the order was insufficiently specific to be enforceable.

C. March 6, 2018 Order

To the extent that Medina-Puerta, in his briefing, challenges the propriety of a successor judge’s order at a hearing on March 6, 2018, denying as moot his motion to compel production and his request for order imposing terminating and monetary sanctions against Goon, we note that his notice of appeal identified only the March 2 order striking his motion to modify child support as the order appealed from. Nor has he established that the denial of these motions would constitute an appealable order under Family Code section 3554 or Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1. (See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(B) [appellant’s brief to “[s]tate that the judgment appealed from is final, or explain why the order appealed from is appealable”].) Moreover, even if we assume that the threshold requirement of appealability were met, Medina-Puerta’s argument for reversal of the March 6 order is predicated entirely on the claimed defects of the March 2 order striking his motion to modify child support. His attempt to appeal from the March 6 order is therefore both procedurally defective and without merit.

III. DISPOSITION

The order striking Medina-Puerta’s motion to modify child support is affirmed. Goon shall recover her costs on appeal.

LIE, J.

WE CONCUR:

DANNER, ACTING P.J.

WILSON, J.

Medina-Puerta v. Goon

H045755

[1] The parties’ dissolution action, which predated Medina-Puerta’s filing of the parentage action, does not appear to have been transferred.

[2] The court’s initial written order, filed on August 29, 2017, laid out its ruling on Goon’s motion to compel, but did not address the order to undergo a vocational evaluation or the sanctions awarded to Goon. Those matters were addressed in a supplemental order filed on September 7, 2017. The September 7, 2017 order does not include a proof of service, but the court orally pronounced its rulings on those matters in Medina-Puerta’s presence at the August 11, 2017 hearing.

[3] We understand Medina-Puerta to be referring to his instruction that M. live four weeks in his tent for refusing to accompany him to Spain.

[4] The court was apparently referring to an order entered April 18, 2017, directing the parties to “facili[t]ate attendance for Eagle Scout and Boy Scout[s] for [M.]”

[5] In light of these findings, we reject as implausible Medina-Puerta’s suggestion that the trial court nonetheless did not consider his noncompliance with the prior orders to be “willful.”

[6] Although not required, the trial court did expressly find that “the children’s basic needs are more than met, . . . are essentially supported by [Goon], and that the Court’s imposition of terminating sanctions will not impact the minor children in any negative way.” The court further found that “[c]ontinuing the litigation would reduce the funds that [Goon] has available to support the children appropriately and to provide enrichment for them.”