Filed 4/4/18 Meehan v. Inland Counties Regional Center, Inc. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA



SHANNON MEEHAN et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

INLAND COUNTIES REGIONAL CENTER, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.
D073010

(Super. Ct. No. CIVDS1109609)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING REHEARING

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]


THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed on March 15, 2018, be modified as follows:
On page 21, after the end of the last full paragraph and prior to the Disposition, add the following:
D. The Portions of the Judgment That Are Affirmed Result from Plaintiffs' Request for Dismissal and the Parties' Stipulation
In a petition for rehearing, Plaintiffs contend that our rulings affirming portions of the judgment resulted from issues that were not proposed or briefed by the parties, and the parties were not given an opportunity to present their views through supplemental briefing. (See pts. III.B. & III.C., ante.) We disagree.

Plaintiffs appealed from the judgment, not from the order granting summary adjudication—as they must, since an order granting summary adjudication is not appealable. (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 128.) We requested supplemental briefing twice in order to determine whether the judgment in this case is final for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. Based on the input from the parties in their letter briefs, we concluded that, because the judgment terminated the trial court proceedings by completely disposing of the entire matter in controversy, consistent with the one final judgment rule, we have jurisdiction. (See pp. 8-9, ante.)

In their appeal from the judgment, Plaintiffs challenged only the order granting Defendants' motion for summary adjudication. In deciding the appeal from the judgment, we necessarily dealt with the judgment, not just the order granting summary adjudication—affirming the remainder of the judgment, because Plaintiffs requested or stipulated to the remainder and raised no issue or argument as to any of the other claims or causes of action. (See pts. III.B. & III.C., ante.)

Contrary to the petition for rehearing, Plaintiffs were given the opportunity to deal with these other claims and causes of action in response to the two requests for supplemental briefing related to these claims and causes of action. Moreover, had Plaintiffs' position been any different (as Plaintiffs appear to suggest for the first time in their petition for rehearing), our analysis of appellate jurisdiction necessarily would have been different (with perhaps a different conclusion) under Kurwa v. Kislinger, supra, 57 Cal.4th 1097, which holds that, where the parties seek appellate review of some but not all of their claims, effectively preserving their remaining claims for future litigation, the trial court's judgment is not final and thus not appealable.

There is no change in judgment.

Plaintiffs' petition for rehearing is denied.



BENKE, Acting P. J.

Copies to: All parties


Filed 3/15/18 Meehan v. Inland Counties Regional Center, Inc. CA4/1 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA



SHANNON MEEHAN et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

INLAND COUNTIES REGIONAL CENTER, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.
D073010



(Super. Ct. No. CIVDS1109609)


APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, John M. Pacheco, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

Law Offices of Todd Boley, Todd Boley, David W. Hamilton and Justin Young for Appellants and Plaintiffs.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Jeffrey S. Ranen and Brendan T. Sapien for Respondents and Defendants.
This is an appeal from a final judgment in a lawsuit that the plaintiffs filed as a wage and hour class action. Plaintiffs Shannon Meehan, Elsa Espinoza, and Ken Willits (Plaintiffs) filed the underlying action on behalf of themselves and two classes of unnamed plaintiffs against their employer (or, depending on the individual plaintiff, former employer), Inland Counties Regional Center, Inc. (Defendant). Plaintiffs sought remedies for Defendant's alleged violations of state "laws, rules, regulations and orders" related to overtime compensation.
Prior to any effort to certify the two plaintiff classes, each side filed its own motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiffs' first cause of action, in which Plaintiffs alleged that the alternative workweek schedule (AWS) that Defendant adopted in 1991 unlawfully deprived Plaintiffs and the first class they purported to represent (the alternative workweek class or AW Class) of overtime pay to which they were entitled. The court denied Plaintiffs' motion and granted Defendant's motion. Following those rulings, at Plaintiffs' request, the trial court entered a final judgment as follows: (1) judgment in favor of Defendant with regard to all claims involving Plaintiffs and the AW Class; and (2) dismissals with prejudice with regard to all claims involving Plaintiffs and the second class they purported to represent (the consumer service coordinator class or CSC Class).
In reviewing the judgment on appeal, we will: reverse that part of the judgment granting Defendant's motion for summary adjudication of the individual Plaintiffs' claims in the first cause of action, on the basis that Defendant did not meet its initial burden of making a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; and affirm the remaining portions of the judgment (1) dismissing the second and third causes of action, (2) dismissing all individual and class claims related to the CSC Class in the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action, and (3) entering judgment in favor of Defendant on the AW Class claims in the first cause of action and all individual and class claims related to the AW Class in the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action—all on the basis that Plaintiffs requested each of these rulings in the trial court and did not challenge or otherwise question any of them on appeal.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The claims in Plaintiffs' complaint are all based on state law that obligates employers to pay their nonexempt employees overtime compensation after a maximum number of hours in any one workday or in any one workweek. (See Lab. Code, § 510, subd. (a); Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 785, 789 (Ramirez).)
Defendant is a nonprofit corporation that provides services for individuals with developmental disabilities and their families throughout San Bernardino and Riverside counties. In May 1991, Defendant adopted the following "9/80" AWS for its nonexempt employees: For each two-week (10 workday) 80-hour pay period, affected employees work eight nine-hour days and one eight-hour day and have one day off. At that time, Labor Code former section 510 provided in relevant part that "[e]ight hours of labor constitutes a day's work, unless it is otherwise expressly stipulated by the parties to a contract." (Stats. 1982, ch. 185, p. 563, § 1.)
Also at the time Defendant adopted the 9/80 AWS in May 1991, the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC)—i.e., "the state agency empowered to formulate regulations (known as wage orders) governing minimum wages, maximum hours, and overtime pay in the State of California" (Ramirez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 795)—had enacted wage order No. 4 89 to regulate employee overtime in occupations that included Defendant's employees (Wage Order No. 4 89). (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, former § 11040, eff. July 1, 1989, Register 89, No. 17 (Apr. 29, 1989) pp. 764-772 (former § 11040).) In part, Wage Order No. 4 89 required an employer like Defendant to pay established overtime rates to employees like Plaintiffs in the event the employee was required to work more than eight hours in any one workday or more than 40 hours in any one workweek. (Former § 11040, subd. 3(A).)
At issue in this appeal is an IWC-authorized exception to this general rule, also found in Wage Order No. 4 89, former section 11040, subdivision 3(B). This exception provides in part that no employer is deemed to have violated the overtime provisions if the employer and the affected employees entered into a written agreement as to the minimum number of hours in a particular workday or workweek before payment of wages at an overtime rate, following approval of such an AWS by at least two-thirds of the employees in the affected work unit following a secret ballot. (Wage Order No. 4-89, subd. 3(B); former § 11040, subd. 3(B).)
II.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The thrust of Plaintiffs' complaint is that Defendant has not been paying certain employees required overtime wages, entitling Plaintiffs and the two classes they purport to represent to damages, penalties, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorney fees and costs under the Labor Code, the Business & Professions Code, and certain IWC wage orders. All that is at issue in this appeal is Plaintiffs' first cause of action, which Plaintiffs brought on behalf of themselves and the AW Class, alleging that, because Defendant did not lawfully adopt its 9/80 AWS in 1991, Defendant's work schedule under the 9/80 AWS violated state overtime laws.
Plaintiffs brought the second and third causes of action on behalf of themselves individually and the CSC Class and the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action on behalf themselves and both classes.
Plaintiffs did not seek certification of either alleged class.
Plaintiffs filed, and the trial court denied, a motion for summary adjudication of their individual claims in the first cause of action. While that motion was pending, but before receiving the court's ruling, Defendant filed a motion for summary adjudication of the same individual claims in the first cause of action. In July 2013, the court granted Defendant's motion, ruling in relevant part that Defendant's 9/80 AWS was lawful and fully complied with the requirements of Wage Order No. 4 89.
The parties do not tell us what happened over the course of the following three years, although the record on appeal contains six case management statements that include the parties' "joint litigation plan"—a plan which does not indicate any effort to proceed to trial. Contrary to the parties' multiple representations to the court in the two and a half years of joint litigation plans (see fn. 6, ante), there is no indication that either side was making any effort to "proceed to Plaintiffs' remaining causes of action."
In June 2016, Plaintiffs requested the following relief: dismissal of all individual and class claims related to the CSC Class, which included the second and third causes of action and portions of the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action; and entry of judgment in favor of Defendant on all claims related to the AW Class, based on (1) the order granting Defendant's motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiffs' individual claims in the first cause of action, and (2) a stipulation between Plaintiffs and Defendant as to the AW Class claims in the first cause of action and the individual and class claims related to the AW Class in the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action. Plaintiffs made this request expressly so that "Plaintiffs would then have a Final Judgment from which to appeal."
On June 14, 2016, the court granted Plaintiffs' request. The court signed an order dismissing all of the claims related to the CSC Class and directing judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiffs on all of the claims related to the AW Class. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
III.
DISCUSSION
We requested and received supplemental briefing on the issue of appellate jurisdiction. We have accepted and relied on the following statements from counsel in their written responses: (1) Counsel have no agreements, formal or informal, regarding potential future litigation of any of the claims related to the AW Class in the fourth, fifth, or sixth causes of action following disposition of this appeal; (2) all dismissals of the claims related to the CSC Class are with prejudice; and (3) directly contrary to prior statements by Plaintiffs' counsel, the three named plaintiffs did not settle their individual wage and hour claims alleged on behalf of the AW Class. Based on counsel's representations—and consistent with the one final judgment rule (Kurwa v. Kislinger (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1097, 1105) and the requirement that only an aggrieved party may appeal (Code Civ. Proc., § 902)—we are satisfied that we have jurisdiction and will proceed.
The judgment of the trial court is presumed correct, and Plaintiffs (as the appellants) have the burden of establishing reversible error. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; Swigart v. Bruno (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 529, 535 (Swigart) [appeal from defense summary judgment].) As we explain at part III.A., post, Plaintiffs have met this burden with regard to the trial court's grant of Defendant's motion for summary adjudication of the first cause of action; and we will accordingly reverse the judgment in part. As we explain at parts III.B. & III.C., post, because Plaintiffs expressly requested the remaining relief awarded in the judgment and Plaintiffs have raised no issues on appeal as to this relief, we will affirm the remainder of the judgment.
A. First Cause of Action
In their first cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant's AWS unlawfully deprived them, individually and the AW Class they purport to represent, of overtime pay to which they are entitled. The principal issue on appeal is whether, consistent with the applicable statutes and wage orders, Defendant properly adopted its 9/80 AWS in 1991. If not, according to the complaint, Plaintiffs are entitled to overtime wages and related penalties.
Defendant contends that, prior to adopting its 9/80 AWS in 1991, it fully complied with the procedures in subdivision 3(B) of Wage Order No. 4 89 (former § 11040, subd. 3(B)), such that Defendant is not subject to the overtime requirements in subdivision 3(A) of Wage Order No. 4 89 (former § 11040, subd. 3(A)). In part on that basis, Defendant moved for summary adjudication of the first cause of action.
1. Standards of Review
Because this is an appeal from a judgment after summary adjudication proceedings, " 'we take the facts from the record that was before the trial court when it ruled on that motion.' " (Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713, 716-717 (Wilson).) We consider all the evidence in the moving and opposing papers, except evidence to which an objection was made and sustained, liberally construing and reasonably deducing inferences from Plaintiffs' evidence, resolving any doubts in the evidence in favor of Plaintiffs. (Id. at p. 717; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (c), (f)(2).)
We review de novo the trial court's ruling on a motion for summary adjudication. (Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara (2017) 3 Cal.5th 248, 273.) A summary adjudication motion "proceed[s] in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2).) As a practical matter, " ' "we assume the role of a trial court and apply the same rules and standards" ' " that govern the trial court's determination of a motion for summary adjudication. (Swigart, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 536.)
A defendant is entitled to summary adjudication on the basis that the "[cause of] action has no merit" (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1)) only where the court is able to determine from the evidence presented that "there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" (id., § 437c, subd. (c)). A cause of action "has no merit" if, as a matter of law, one or more of the elements of the cause of action cannot be established or if, as a matter of law, an affirmative defense to the cause of action can be established. (Id., § 437c, subd. (o).)
A defendant has the ultimate burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the cause of action at issue "cannot be established" or that "there is a complete defense to the cause of action." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849, 850, 853-854 (Aguilar).) In attempting to meet this burden, the moving defendant has the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar, at p. 850.) If the defendant meets this burden, then the burden of production shifts to the opposing plaintiff to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Id. at pp. 850-851.)
2. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Adjudication as to Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action
Subdivision 3(B) of Wage Order No. 4 89 contained a number of requirements for an employer to establish that it did not violate overtime regulations in adopting an AWS. (Former § 11040, subd. 3(B).) Because Defendant's ultimate burden of persuasion was that there was a complete defense to the cause of action—namely, that when it began its 9/80 AWS in 1991, Defendant had fully complied with Wage Order No. 4 89—Defendant's initial burden was to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of a triable issue of material fact as to compliance with subdivision 3(B). (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) As we explain, Defendant did not meet this burden.
To show compliance with Wage Order No. 4 89 subdivision 3(B), Defendant was required, in part, to establish the nonexistence of a triable issue of the following material fact: approval of the proposed AWS "by at least two-thirds (⅔) of the employees in the affected work unit following a secret ballot." (Former § 11040, subd. 3(B).) Defendant attempted to meet this initial burden in the trial court by quoting from a witness's testimony and arguing as follows:
"Ultimately, the AWS 'passed by the required two-thirds majority in the Colton office (161 to 26) [i.e. 161 out of 187], equaling an 86.09% pass rate and in the San Bernardino office (19 to 9) [i.e. 19 out of 28 — 67.85%].' . . . Thus, both offices individually and combined passed the AWS schedule by a two-thirds majority [180 out of 215 — 83.72%.]." (Brackets in original.)
Based on Defendant's separate statement of undisputed material facts, the evidence on which Defendant relied in support of this statement, which we describe in more detail below, included: (1) declaration testimony from Defendant's 1991 human resources coordinator; (2) minutes from a March 1991 meeting of Defendant's board of trustees; (3) a May 1991 memorandum from Defendant's 1991 assistant to the director; and (4) minutes from a May 1991 meeting of Defendant's board of trustees.
However, for the reasons explained in the following paragraphs, we agree with Plaintiffs that the foregoing evidence does not establish as a matter of law that at least two-thirds "of the employees in the affected work unit" approved Defendant's 9/80 AWS in May 1991. (Former § 11040, subd. 3(B), italics added.) That is because Defendant never submitted evidence of the number of "employees in the affected work unit." By only submitting evidence of the number of employees who voted, at most Defendant established that two-thirds of those who voted approved the proposed AWS.
First, the declaration testimony from Defendant's 1991 human resources coordinator indicates that she successfully defended Defendant against a challenge to Defendant's AWS election procedures at a hearing in San Bernardino before "a Labor Commissioner" who "rul[ed] in favor of [Defendant]" and concluded that Defendant "conducted a valid alternative workweek schedule election and maintained a valid alternative workweek schedule." However, this testimony does not establish as a matter of law that two-thirds of those potentially affected voted in favor of the proposed AWS—only that the former human resources coordinator recalled a Labor Commission hearing at which the commissioner found Defendant's AWS valid and did not levy a penalty or fine. While this is certainly evidence in support of an argument that, because of the result of the hearing, two-thirds of the affected work unit must have voted in favor of the proposed AWS, Defendant does not suggest that this testimony collaterally estops or otherwise precludes Plaintiffs from contending otherwise. In any event, the testimony is not conclusive, especially in light of the following conflicting evidence from Defendant itself.
Second, the March 1991 minutes from Defendant's board of trustees meeting describes the proposed 9/80 AWS, explaining: "The Labor Board requires a ⅔ vote of all employees before a work schedule change can be made." (Italics added.) This statement is unhelpful, since it merely describes Defendant's understanding, months before the election, of a condition or requirement for approval of the proposed 9/80 AWS, not the results of the election or the number of potentially affected employees. Moreover, this statement is inaccurate. Wage Order No. 4-89 requires a two-thirds majority "of the employees in the affected work unit" (former § 11040, subd. 3(B)); however, because the affected work unit did not include all employees (see fn. 12, ante), two-thirds of all employees does not necessarily include two-thirds of the affected employees.
Third, although the May 1991 minutes from Defendant's board of trustees meeting reflect the Defendant's conclusion following the election—namely, that "the employees voted for a 9/80 [alternative] work schedule"—we do not consider this evidence, because the trial court sustained Plaintiffs' evidentiary objection, and Defendant does not challenge that ruling on appeal. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Wilson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 717.) In any event, without evidence of the number of employees in the affected work unit, Defendant's statement that certain unidentified employees voted in favor of the proposed 9/80 AWS is not evidence that two-thirds of the affected work unit approved it.
Fourth, the May 1991 memorandum from Defendant's assistant to the director (set forth above and quoted in part by Defendant to the trial court) provides: "The 9/80 work schedule passed by the required two-thirds majority in the Colton office (161 to 26) and in the San Bernardino office (19 to 9)." Again, however, we do not consider this evidence, because the trial court sustained Plaintiffs' evidentiary objection to this fact, and Defendant does not challenge that ruling on appeal. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Wilson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 717.) In any event, with no indication from Defendant of the number of employees in the affected work unit, the number of votes and voters does not establish the requisite two-thirds majority of the affected employees.
Finally, we note that in the April 1991 memorandum to all staff—in which Defendant defined the potentially affected employees (see fn. 12, ante)—Defendant affirmatively, albeit mistakenly, represented that "[t]wo-thirds (⅔) of those voting must approve this new work schedule before it can be implemented." (Italics added.) A reasonable inference from this evidence, which we must accord Plaintiffs in our appellate review (see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Wilson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 717), is that, following the election, Defendant implemented the new work schedule based on a two-thirds majority of those voting, not the required two-thirds of the affected work unit.
Very simply, there is no evidence—let alone uncontradicted evidence—that establishes the material fact that two-thirds of the affected unit approved the 9/80 AWS in the 1991 election. Thus, Defendant did not meet its initial burden of establishing, as a matter of law, its compliance with Wage Order No. 4 89 subdivision 3(B)'s requirements for lawfully adopting its 9/80 AWS. In concluding otherwise, the trial court erred, and we will reverse that portion of the judgment
3. Plaintiffs Forfeited Appellate Review of the Trial Court's Denial of Their Motion for Summary Adjudication of Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action
On page 47 of their 48-page opening brief brief, as part of their formal "Conclusion," Plaintiffs present the following 20-word argument on an issue not otherwise mentioned in their brief: "Furthermore, the undisputed facts establish the illegality of [D]efendant's AWS; thus, [P]laintiffs' motion for summary adjudication should have been granted."
Significantly, this argument contains neither record references to Plaintiffs' motion or the evidence in support of the motion nor citations of legal authority in support of the motion. However, each point raised in an appellate brief must be supported "by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority" and by "reference to a matter in the record . . . where the matter appears." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C).) As here, where the brief raises a point but fails to support it " ' "with reasoned argument and citations to authority," ' " we deem the party to have forfeited appellate review of the point. (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.)
To the extent Plaintiffs are relying on the presentation in their reply brief, such reliance is misplaced. On this record, we will not consider an argument that Plaintiffs failed to develop in their opening brief. (See Raceway Ford Cases (2016) 2 Cal.5th 161, 178 [appellate arguments raised for first time in reply brief "generally" not considered]; Supervalu, Inc. v. Wexford Underwriting Managers, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 64, 84, fn. 5 [point not presented in opening brief "abandoned or waived"].)
For these reasons, Plaintiffs forfeited appellate review of the trial court's order denying their motion for summary adjudication.
B. That Portion of the Judgment Dismissing the Claims Related to the CSC Class Claims Is Affirmed
Plaintiffs expressly requested—and the trial court ordered—a dismissal of the second and third causes of action in their entirety and of the claims related to the CSC Class in the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action. In letter briefs concerning appellate jurisdiction, Plaintiffs and Defendant agreed and confirmed to this court: All dismissals are with prejudice and apply to both the individual and class claims.
In their briefs on appeal, Plaintiffs do not mention any potential error associated with these dismissals. For this reason, Plaintiffs have forfeited appellate review of the dismissals. (Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 216, fn. 4 (Tiernan); Lyons v. Chinese Hospital Assn. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1336, fn. 2 (Lyons).)
Additionally, since the dismissals were obtained at Plaintiffs' request, under the doctrine of invited error, Plaintiffs are " 'estopped' " from contending on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing the claims related to the CSC Class. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 403.) In Geffcken v. D'Andrea (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1298 (Geffcken), for example, following adverse evidentiary rulings during trial, plaintiffs' counsel said that " 'there's nothing left' " and submitted all of the issues for the court to determine whether judgment should be entered in favor of the defendants. (Id. at p. 1312.) On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the trial court erred in entering a defense judgment on certain of the causes of action, because the evidentiary rulings were not dispositive of the claims in those causes of action. (Ibid.) Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs were "estopped from contending that the trial court erred," since their trial attorney had "invited" the entry of judgment. (Ibid.) Here, too, based on Plaintiffs' request to the trial court to dismiss all claims related to the CSC Class, Plaintiffs are estopped from contending the dismissals are somehow erroneous.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm that portion of the judgment dismissing all of the individual and class claims based on the CSC Class claims—i.e., the entirety of the second and third causes of action, and the claims related to the CSC Class in the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action. Based on the parties' written responses to this court's questions, in order to reflect Plaintiffs' counsel's intent at the time he requested the dismissals, we will direct the trial to enter an order nunc pro tunc to June 14, 2016, clarifying that the dismissals filed June 14, 2016, are with prejudice.
C. That Portion of the Judgment in Favor of Defendant on the AW Class Claims in the First Cause of Action and Claims Related to the AW Class Claims in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action is Affirmed
Based on a stipulation between the parties, Plaintiffs expressly requested—and the trial court ordered—judgment in favor of Defendant on the "remaining AW[ C]lass claim" in the first cause of action and the "claims for penalties and damages related to the AW[ C]lass arising out of the" fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action. The difference in the language used as to the first cause of action and the fourth through sixth causes of action emphasizes that Plaintiffs' request was directed to the class claim in the first cause of action and to both the individual and class claims in the fourth through sixth causes of action. Consistently, in their letter briefs to this court, Plaintiffs and Defendant agreed and confirmed that the judgment in favor of Defendant as to the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action included all claims unrelated to the CSC Class—namely, the claims by the Plaintiffs individually and on behalf of the AW Class. Any other interpretation would mean that the judgment was not final (and thus not appealable), because it would not have disposed of all claims between all parties. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 577 [a judgment is the "final determination of the the rights of the parties in an action"], 904.1, subd. (a)(1) [no appeal from an interlocutory judgment].)
As in part III.B., ante, the doctrines of forfeiture and estoppel apply to the AW Class claim in the first cause of action and the individual and class claims related to the AW Class in the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action. Thus, because Plaintiffs do not mention on appeal any potential error associated with the judgment on these claims, Plaintiffs have forfeited appellate review of this portion of the judgment. (Tiernan, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 216, fn. 4; Lyons, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 1336, fn. 2.) In addition, Geffcken, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th 1298, is directly on point: By requesting entry of judgment on various unlitigated claims (in the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action) based on a ruling in a different claim (in the first cause of action), Plaintiffs invited any error that might be associated with the requested relief and, accordingly, are estopped from contending this portion of the judgment is erroneous. (Id. at p. 1312.)
Accordingly, we will affirm the portions of the judgment in favor of Defendant on the AW Class claim in the first cause of action and on the individual and class claims related to the AW Class in the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action.
DISPOSITION
That portion of the judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiffs' individual claims in the first cause of action is reversed, and on remand the trial court is directed to vacate its July 11, 2013 minute order granting Defendant's motion summary adjudication as to Plaintiffs' first cause of action and enter an order denying the motion. In all other regards, the judgment—which (1) dismissed the second and third causes of action and the individual and class claims related to the CSC Class in the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action, and (2) was entered in favor of Defendant on the AW Class claim in the first cause of action and the individual and class claims related to the AW Class in the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action—is affirmed. The trial court is directed to enter an order nunc pro tunc to June 14, 2016, clarifying that all of the dismissals filed June 14, 2016, are with prejudice. Thus, on remand, all that will remain of Plaintiffs' complaint is Plaintiffs' individual claims in the first cause of action.
The parties shall bear their respective costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278 (a)(3), (5).)


IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:




BENKE, Acting P. J.




O'ROURKE, J.