Meta M. v. Superior Court

Filed 10/30/06 Meta M. v. Superior Court CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for extraordinary writ. Steven Berman, Juvenile Court Referee. Denied.

Meta M., in pro. per., for Petitioner.

Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, Larry Cory, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.

Children’s Law Center of Los Angeles and Jennifer McCartney for Minors.

INTRODUCTION

Meta M. petitions this court for an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 38.1) challenging the juvenile court’s order setting a permanent plan hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26)[1] as to her two daughters, K.M. and S.M. We deny her petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 2, 2005, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c), alleging that 16-year-old K.M. and 14-year-old S.M. were at risk of serious physical and emotional harm due to petitioner’s inability to care for them and her emotional abuse of them. According to the detention report, K.M. and S.M. lived with petitioner and her boyfriend, Michael G. Michael G. claimed to be K.M.’s biological father, although he was not listed on her birth certificate.

On April 26, 2005, DCFS had received a referral on K.M. and S.M. after they refused to go home. Petitioner and Michael G. then appeared at the DCFS office and claimed that K.M. and S.M. were acting out and disobedient; the girls were tardy to school, did not arrive home when expected and were disrespectful. They reported that the girls had left home and were staying with their maternal aunt, Stephanie M., without permission. A Children’s Social Worker (CSW) interviewed the girls and their maternal aunt. The girls said that they did not get along with Michael G., and that petitioner’s and Michael G.’s demands on them were unreasonable. They were doled out clothing on a daily basis and were awakened in the middle of the night if they did not do housework to petitioner’s satisfaction. K.M. and S.M. refused to go home and said that they wanted to go into foster care. The CSW offered them family alternative response services, but the girls refused the services. The girls were detained and placed into foster care on April 27, 2005.

At the detention hearing, counsel was appointed for petitioner, Michael G. and the girls. Ulysses R. was listed as S.M.’s alleged father. The juvenile court found a prima facie case for detention. The court ordered a DNA test for Michael G. It ordered petitioner and Michael G. to participate in classes for parents of teens/adolescents.

In the June 13, 2005 jurisdiction/detention report, DCFS reported that the DNA tests had been conducted and results were pending. Ulysses R. had been located in the Washington State Penitentiary, where he was serving a 171-month sentence for a violent act against a child.

S.M. told the CSW that one night petitioner woke her up in the middle of the night to clean the kitchen. She was cold and went to get some clothing, only to discover that her clothing and K.M.’s clothing were gone. In the morning, petitioner gave the girls their junior high school uniforms, which no longer fit them, and the girls had to beg petitioner for sweaters. Instead of going to school, the girls went to Stephanie M.’s home.[2] S.M. said that petitioner did not wake them up in the middle of the night to do chores until Michael G. moved in with them. S.M. believed that he was telling petitioner what to do. She and K.M. did not like Michael G. K.M. added that when petitioner was not with Michael G., she was “the best person in the world.” K.M. wanted visitation with petitioner, but only if Michael G. was not present. S.M. did not want to visit with petitioner, even if Michael G. was not present, because she felt that he would be influencing everything petitioner said.

Petitioner told the CSW that if “K.M. and S.M. don’t follow the rules, the book (from their parenting class) says take everything away, such as phone, clothes, computer . . . I chose one thing, their clothing. I took it all. The book says take it all, so I took everything.” She also told the CSW that she warned the girls ahead of time that if they did not complete their chores, she would wake them when she came home from work. She had awakened the girls when she came home from work, at about midnight, two to three times.

Petitioner and Michael G. expressed a desire to participate in parent education classes in order to address K.M.’s and S.M.’s behavior problems. They also wanted the girls placed on probation. They additionally told the CSW, “We want to help them learn to be successful adults, but we need protection because we are scared. All it takes is for the child to say they are being abused.” Petitioner and Michael G. wanted visitation with the girls, even if the visits were monitored.

In a supplemental July 25, 2005 jurisdiction report, DCFS reported that petitioner had told several CSWs that she and Michael G. did not want to reunify with K.M. and S.M. but wanted to relinquish their parental rights. Petitioner felt it would not be safe to have the girls in her home due to allegations they were making regarding inappropriate behavior by Michael G. Petitioner needed to take action to protect herself from their conduct. The CSW added that while the girls were willing to attend counseling and were on the waiting list for counseling services, petitioner was unwilling to obtain counseling without Michael G.[3]

After the report was prepared, DCFS received the DNA test results. Michael G. was excluded as K.M.’s biological father. Based on the report, the juvenile court found that Michael G. was neither K.M.’s alleged father nor her presumed father.

On August 1, 2005, petitioner and her attorney signed a waiver of reunification services. At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing of the same date, the juvenile court sustained the allegations of the section 300 petition and declared K.M. and S.M. to be dependent children of the court. Despite petitioner’s waiver, the court ordered DCFS to provide reunification services to petitioner and the girls, including counseling for the girls. It ordered that services be conjoint with Michael G. when deemed appropriate. It also ordered DCFS to obtain the girls’ birth certificates.

The following day, the CSW reported that petitioner refused to provide her with the girls’ original social security cards. As a result, K.M. was prevented from accepting a pending job offer or enrolling in college classes for the fall. The court ordered that petitioner and Michael G. be cited to require them to bring the girls’ original social security cards, birth certificates and birth records to court. The CSW subsequently reported that she was having difficulty giving the citation to petitioner and Michael G. Eventually, Michael G. came to the DCFS office and informed the CSW that he and petitioner did not have the girls’ original social security cards or birth certificates. On August 10, 2005, the court ordered Michael G. to obtain K.M.’s social security card from the social security office.[4]

On August 26, 2006, the juvenile court ordered petitioner to get K.M.’s social security card or return to court with documentation as to why she was unable to do so. If she failed to return to court, she would be held in contempt. She produced documentation showing that she was unable to get the social security card because she did not have custody of K.M. Additionally, K.M. was unable to obtain the card because she did not have proper identification. On August 30, 2005, the court ordered DCFS to obtain K.M.’s social security card.[5]

In its December 12, 2005 status report, DCFS reported that on September 22, K.M. was arrested and charged with burglary after being caught shoplifting with a male companion. On November 15, she was removed from her foster family and placed with maternal aunt Stephanie M. Stephanie M. subsequently reported that petitioner and Michael G. were calling her and harassing her.

K.M. was receiving counseling, but S.M. refused to attend, believing that she did not need counseling. Petitioner stated that there was no need for her to attend counseling, in that she wished to relinquish her parental rights. DCFS also reported that since its involvement with the family, petitioner had visited the girls only once, on May 30, 2005. DCFS had arranged for petitioner to have weekly monitored visitation with the girls.

In response to the foregoing, petitioner submitted to the court her own status report. She challenged K.M.’s placement with Stephanie M., explaining that Stephanie M. had interfered with her relationship with the girls. She also claimed that Stephanie had threatened her and the girls in the past. Petitioner accused the DCFS of lying to her and filing a fictitious section 300 petition. She claimed that DCFS, the court and the lawyers were depriving her of her 5th and 14th amendment rights to due process of law and her fundamental right to raising and living with her children, her right to equal protection of the law and the privileges and immunities of national citizenship. She further stated that she did not want to relinquish her parental rights and have the girls adopted by anyone else.

At the December 12, 2005 hearing, petitioner made a Marsden[6] motion to have her attorney relieved. The court denied the motion. It ordered that S.M. participate in counseling. It ordered that petitioner be permitted to telephone the girls once a day, during daytime hours. It ordered that Michael G. not participate in the telephone calls or any visits with the girls. The court also ordered that Michael G. not appear at the girls’ schools, placements or places of business.[7]

On December 20, the CSW wrote to petitioner explaining that she was unable to set up visitation because she did not have petitioner’s telephone number. She was only able to contact petitioner on Michael’s G.’s telephone, via three-way calling, with Michael G. listening in. Since, pursuant to court order, Michael G. was not to participate in visitation, she needed petitioner’s direct telephone number. On January 5, 2006, petitioner wrote back to the CSW complaining that none of the scheduled visits with S.M. had taken place. Petitioner gave the CSW a list of the dates and times she wanted to visit with S.M. and specified that all visits were to take place at the North Hollywood police station.

Petitioner wrote to DCFS on January 10 requesting that a different CSW be assigned to the case, in that the current one was refusing to work with her in facilitating visitation according to her schedule. Petitioner also made reports to the police accusing the CSW of violating her court-ordered visitation rights. The CSW responded to petitioner’s January 5 letter, stating that visitation would not take place until petitioner provided the CSW with a telephone number where the CSW could have a conversation with petitioner without Michael G. listening in. Thereafter, petitioner wrote back, claiming that the juvenile court’s order did not say that Michael G. could not participate in telephone calls with the CSW regarding visitation. She also complained about the treatment of Michael G. by the court and DCFS. She ended by accusing the CSW of harassing her and Michael G., lying and working against her; she asked the CSW to remove herself from the case.

On January 12, 2006, the juvenile court issued a temporary restraining order against Michael G. It found that Michael G. had appeared at S.M.’s school on numerous occasions, demanding access to her school records and harassing school personnel. Michael G. went to the DCFS office and harassed the personnel there. He and petitioner went to K.M.’s church and demanded that K.M. pose for photographs with petitioner. The court therefore ordered that Michael G. stay away from the CSW, the girls, their caretakers, their schools, places of worship and places of work.[8] The court ordered petitioner to stay away from the girls’ school and church on January 27, 2006.[9]

Petitioner filed a complaint against the Los Angeles Unified School District with the Board of Education on April 10, 2006. She claimed that the staff at the girls’ high school deprived her of her parental rights by their actions in April 2005 and thereafter. She also accused the staff of demeaning Michael G.’s character and interfering with court orders by withholding the girls’ school records from Michael G.

Petitioner wrote to the court on April 20, 2006, recounting the history of the matter as she saw it, going back to 2004. She accused DCFS and the girls’ attorneys of “constantly coming up with new lies, to the dependency court judge, with the intention of discrediting the parents and creating a criminal case based on their lies.” She complained that DCFS would not give her any information about the girls, DCFS and the girls’ attorneys were trying to deny the girls the help they needed and encourage their bad behavior. She accused one of the attorneys of committing perjury to obtain the temporary restraining order against Michael G. and restricting Michael G.’s civil rights without just cause.

On April 26, 2006, petitioner “and Alleged father and guardian Michael G[.]” in pro. per. filed a petition to quash the section 300 petition, claiming that it was based on false accusations. On May 16, 2006, petitioner’s counsel filed a request for a hearing; petitioner was requesting another Marsden hearing and a specific visitation schedule. On May 19, the juvenile court granted petitioner’s Marsden motion and appointed new counsel.

In a June 6, 2006 status review report, DCFS reported that both K.M. and S.M. were living with Stephanie M. They were attending school and performing at grade level, with neither academic nor behavioral problems. Both girls were in counseling and making progress. The girls continued to state that they did not want to reunify with petitioner as long as Michael G. was with her.

DCFS reported that the CSW was still trying to arrange visitation,[10] but petitioner would not agree to meet at any location approved by DCFS, including the DCFS office, a McDonald’s restaurant, or acceptable alternatives. Petitioner only wanted visitation at the Van Nuys police station, which was unacceptable to DCFS and the girls.

Petitioner explained she was unwilling to meet with the CSW anywhere other than the police station, because she feared for her safety. She also believed that Michael G. was an appropriate representative for her, and she wanted him to participate in telephone calls and meetings for protection.

At the June 6, 2006 hearing, petitioner’s counsel explained petitioner’s position regarding visitation at the police station. The juvenile court responded that “[t]he record should also indicate [petitioner] is certainly putting her own personal feelings and anger [at] the Department over her children . . . .” Counsel stated that petitioner disagreed with that and added that petitioner wanted K.M. and S.M. returned to her.

The court asked whether petitioner had participated in counseling and taken parenting classes. Counsel and petitioner said that she had done both on her own, without DCFS referrals. The court asked for documentation. Counsel said he would get it to the court in time for verification before trial.

The conversation then turned to the subject of visitation. The court saw no reason why “the police have to be brought into this; why the children have to be in a police station or why police officers should be forced to monitor a visit.” It did not understand why petitioner was afraid to visit elsewhere, unless she believed DCFS was threatening her with physical harm. Petitioner explained that DCFS “is very threatening. I’ve been taken to this court for false allegations.” The court responded that it “already found the allegations true.”

Petitioner then told the court that she was cooperating with DCFS, but DCFS was not cooperating with her. The court explained the system to her, and that her case was being handled just like all the other cases. “As far as threatening you or harm, I don’t see any evidence that you’re being treated any different than any other parent” whose children were in the dependency system. Additionally, according to school records, her children were “doing fantastic in school. So the only issue at this point is if you don’t want to cooperate with the Department, that’s fine. You are risking losing your children permanently.” Petitioner responded, “The issue is that the children need help, and the Department has refused to give them the help that they need.” The court told her that it had supervised the case, and the children “don’t need the kind of help you think they do. They are doing great in school. I’ve seen their reports, what they’ve been doing. So, frankly, at this point, it looks like you’re the one that needs the help, and you’re not getting it.”

The girls’ attorney then noted that K.M. still did not have her birth certificate and was unable to get her social security card. According to Stephanie M., K.M. was born at petitioner’s home in Portland, Oregon. Petitioner responded that K.M. was born in Pacoima, California. The court then had petitioner testify under oath as to where K.M. was born. Petitioner testified that K.M. was born at home in Pacoima then taken to a hospital in Pacoima; petitioner could not remember the name or location of the hospital. Petitioner further testified that she had never lived in Portland or been to Oregon.

The next hearing, on July 26, 2006, was a contested section 366.21, subdivision (f), hearing as to whether reunification services should be continued for another six months or whether a permanent plan hearing under section 366.26 should be set. Petitioner’s counsel noted that on June 21, petitioner “filed about a half inch thick motion which made a lot of requests.” The juvenile court indicated that it had denied the motion. Counsel then requested a continuance to enable petitioner to file a disqualification motion. The court denied the request.

Counsel for DCFS at that point stated that DCFS was willing to continue family reunification services and assist petitioner and the girls in beginning conjoint counseling. Counsel for the girls stated that they did not want conjoint counseling but would participate if ordered to do so by the court.

Petitioner then complained that she wanted another judge and she had “been railroaded in the court.” Her counsel put it on the record that he had a “total breakdown” of his relationship with petitioner. Petitioner interrupted to say that “[t]he children have not been helped. They have been in D.C.F.S. custody for one year, and they’ve not been helped.” The court told her, “The problem is not with the children. The problem is with the parent.” It added, in response to petitioner’s counsel, that it would not allow petitioner time to find new counsel. If she did not want to cooperate with her current counsel, she did not have to, but the hearing was going to proceed.

As evidence, petitioner made a statement under oath that she had not seen K.M. and S.M. in a year, because DCFS would not approve any visits and “found excuse after excuse for me not to see the children.” She further explained that the girls had behavioral problems and there were special schools to help children with such problems, but the girls were not receiving help for their problems. Petitioner felt that “the court has actually abused the children by not helping them.” In addition, the girls were mentally manipulated to the point where they said they did not want to talk to petitioner. Petitioner felt the court and DCFS destroyed her relationship with the girls. Petitioner did not know how she could participate in conjoint counseling with the girls if she had not talked to them for a year.

When petitioner complained that K.M. was almost 18 and would be on her own with nothing, the court interrupted to note that there was government funding available to help her, but petitioner refused to cooperate with the attempts to get that funding. She did not provide a birth certificate or social security card and lied about where K.M. was born; K.M.’s father stated that “he delivered the child himself in Portland, Oregon.” Petitioner continued to complain that the court should have obtained funding to get the girls the help that they really needed, but the court stopped her, explaining that “[t]his has nothing to do with the .21(f). . . . This is a contest to see whether reunification services continue.”

Petitioner’s counsel argued that even though petitioner was difficult to work with, DCFS should have made a greater effort at providing reunification services and not simply acquiesced to the girls’ desire not to reunify with her. He concluded that petitioner “is an intelligent woman who has obviously been thinking carefully about her position . . . . And [she] may not be the easiest client for the Department to deal with but, nevertheless, they still owe it to this family to make an effort. My argument is they didn’t make that effort.”

The court responded, “Unfortunately, the only thing your client thought out was her positions. If it’s not her position being followed, [she] wants no part of it. She has blamed the children; talked about how the children are doing so poorly; yet, all the recent reports said they are doing well in school. They are doing well with whatever probationary problems they had. They are doing well with their lives. . . . Unfortunately, [petitioner] doesn’t see that.”

The court added that the basic problem was Michael G. trying to control the case. Even after DNA tests showed he was not K.M.’s father, he refused to accept it and tried to control the case.

The court further pointed out that there could have been additional funding for the girls, but petitioner refused to cooperate in obtaining the funding. Visitation was ordered, but petitioner only wanted to visit at the police station, which was an inappropriate location. The court believed that petitioner “didn’t care about the visitation. [She] didn’t care about the girls. [She] cared about her position because her position was set in stone. Unfortunately, the court can see why the children didn’t want to deal with [petitioner].”

When the court stated that petitioner did not care about the girls, but only her opinion and Michael G.’s opinion, she responded that she did care; she asked for help, and that showed that she cared. When the court asked her to show she cared by turning over K.M.’s birth certificate, petitioner argued, “You say they are doing well. They are not doing well. Look at my school records, discipline records, attendance record, and school grades.” The court pointed out that the records were from the previous year.

The court then specifically found that continued jurisdiction was necessary, in that there was a substantial risk to the girls’ physical or emotional well-being if returned to petitioner’s custody. It found DCFS had made reasonable efforts at reunification and that petitioner had partially complied with her case plan. It further found no reasonable probability the girls could be returned to petitioner by the 18-month date, so it terminated reunification services and set the case for a permanent plan hearing.

DISCUSSION

On a petition for extraordinary writ under rule 38.1 of the California Rules of Court, the questions before us are whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that return of the girls to petitioner’s custody would create a substantial risk of detriment (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762) and whether reasonable reunification services were provided (Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1164). In resolving these questions, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s determinations, drawing all reasonable inferences as well in favor of the determinations. (Cf. In re Ronell A. (1995) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1361; In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.)

The factual history of the case, recited at length above, provides ample support for the juvenile court’s determinations. Petitioner initially stated that she wanted to relinquish custody of the K.M. and S.M. and waived reunification services. She only changed her mind when the girls were placed with her sister, whom she blamed for the problems she was having with them. At that point, as the court noted, her only concern was for her own positions. She would only accept visitation at the police station, even though this was unnecessary, inappropriate, and unacceptable to the girls. She only wanted to make plans for visitation with Michael G.’s participation, even though he was not the girls’ father and had been ordered not to participate in visitation. Additionally, petitioner refused to acknowledge any documented improvement in the girls’ scholastic performance or behavior, insisting that their behavior was out of control and they needed the special schools she had researched.

Petitioner was oblivious to or unconcerned with the girls’ needs and cared only about her own beliefs as to what was proper or needed. This supports the juvenile court’s finding that there was a substantial risk of harm if the girls were returned to her. (In re Ronell A., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1363, fn. 3; Angela S. v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 763.)

Petitioner refused to avail herself of the reunification services offered, because DCFS did not offer her what she wanted. As discussed above, DCFS was unwilling to arrange visitation on her terms, so she simply refused to avail herself of visitation. Even at the final hearing, DCFS offered to arrange conjoint counseling. Instead of taking advantage of the opportunity offered, she challenged the usefulness of such counseling. The problem was not the inadequacy of services offered but that petitioner failed to avail herself of the services offered. This problem cannot be blamed on DCFS or the trial court. (In re Ronell A., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1363; Angela S. v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 763.) “The trial court is only required to order that reasonable reunification services be provided; it cannot make the parents accept those services.” (In re Joanna Y. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 433, 442.)

In her petition for extraordinary writ, petitioner challenges the juvenile court’s original exercise of jurisdiction over K.M. and S.M. As the court pointed out, it already made those findings. The time to challenge them is long past. (In re Daniel K. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 661, 666-667.)

Petitioner also appears to be asking this court to help her place K.M. and S.M. into the “Teens at Risk” program. Not only do we have no power to do so, but the failure of anyone to place the girls in this program during the dependency proceedings is not reviewable on the rule 38.1 petition. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the girls currently require placement in such a program, or that their placement in such a program is all that stands in the way of their reunification with petitioner.

We note in addition, that petitioner continues to refer to herself and Michael G. as the girls’ parents. DNA tests showed that Michael G. is not K.M.’s father, and the juvenile court made a finding to that effect. Until petitioner realizes that the proceedings involve her and the girls, and not Michael G., she will be unable to resolve the problems that led to dependency jurisdiction in the first place.

It is true that “[m]aintenance of the familial bond between children and parents--even imperfect or separated parents--comports with our highest values and usually best serves the interests of parents, children, family, and community.” (In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 76.) “However, when parents provide so inadequately for their children that the children must be removed from their homes, and the parents fail to overcome such inadequacies after reasonable assistance by public agencies, the state’s interest shifts from preserving the family to providing a stable, permanent alternative home for the children.” (In re David H. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 368, 377, citing In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306-307.) As the Supreme Court has noted: “Children, too, have fundamental rights--including the fundamental right to be protected from neglect and to ‘have a placement that is stable [and] permanent.’ [Citations.] Children are not simply chattels belonging to the parent, but have fundamental interests of their own that may diverge from the interests of the parent. [Citation.]” (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 419, cert. den. (1995) 514 U.S. 1097.) At this point in the proceedings, the balance weighs more heavily in favor of the children’s interests than the parent’s. (In re Baby Boy L. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 596, 609.)[11]

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

JACKSON, J.*

We concur:

MALLANO, Acting P. J.

VOGEL, J.

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[1] All further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

[2] According to a May 2, 2005 letter from the principal of the girls’ school to Michael G., Michael G. had gone to the school demanding information about a child abuse report to DCFS. When told that such information was confidential, he began screaming and using profanity toward school staff. The principal informed him that he no longer was welcome on campus unless he first made an appointment with the principal.

[3] A letter from a counseling service indicated that petitioner had attended five counseling sessions in May and June of 2005.

[4] Michael G. later wrote to the court complaining that he was having trouble getting K.M.’s social security card because he did not have her identification. He also complained about his treatment by the DCFS and the court.

[5] Petitioner in pro. per. filed a notice of appeal from this and previous orders of the juvenile court on December 8, 2005.

[6] People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

[7] The court also found that neither petitioner nor Michael G. was in compliance with their case plans, and that DCFS was likely to have a permanent plan in place by June 12, 2006. Petitioner and Michael G., in pro. per., filed notices of appeal from the December 12, 2005 order. Michael G.’s notice of appeal also stated that he was appealing rulings back to May 2, 2005.

[8] The court reissued the temporary restraining order on March 9, 2006 and again on June 6, 2006. On June 6, the court noted that Michael G. had “repeatedly misrepresented to various agencies and entities that he is the Father of the children and therefore entitled to [educational and placement] information, despite DNA evidence indicating he is not the Father.”

[9] Petitioner through her counsel filed a notice of appeal from this order.

[10] A new CSW had been appointed to the case.

[11] DCFS has requested that we dismiss the petition for failure to comply with the requirements for such petitions under rule 38.1(a) and (b). We decline the request.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.