Filed 5/10/17 Miguel T. v. Superior Court CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

MIGUEL T.,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF STANISLAUS COUNTY,

Respondent;

STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY SERVICES AGENCY,

Real Party in Interest.

F075044

(Super. Ct. No. 517346)


OPINION

THE COURT*
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for extraordinary writ review. Ann Q. Ameral, Judge.
Miguel T., in pro. per., for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
John P. Doering, County Counsel, and Maria Elena Ratliff, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
-ooOoo-
Miguel T. (father) in propria persona petitions for extraordinary writ relief from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested 12-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f)(1)) terminating his reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to his now 20-month-old son Clayton. Father contends the Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) failed to consider his learning disability and the effect it had on his ability to complete reunification services. We conclude father forfeited the issue for appellate review and dismiss the petition.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY
In August 2015, the agency took newborn Clayton into protective custody after he and L.R. (mother) tested positive for methamphetamine and the hospital staff reported that mother was not attending to him. Mother had untreated mental health issues and intended to relinquish custody of Clayton to his maternal grandmother. She identified several men as alleged fathers, including father. She also claimed Cherokee Indian ancestry.
The juvenile court ordered Clayton detained pursuant to an original dependency petition and ordered father to undergo paternity testing. The agency placed Clayton in a foster home.
The juvenile court continued the dependency action over the ensuing six months to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). During that time, the Cherokee Nation determined that Clayton was eligible for tribal enrollment but was not considered an Indian child until he was enrolled. Also, the agency placed Clayton with his maternal grandmother and genetic testing established father’s biological paternity. In addition, the agency referred the parents for parenting education classes, substance abuse assessments and random drug testing.
In March 2016, the juvenile court sustained the dependency petition, ordered Clayton removed from parental custody and ordered the parents to participate in reunification services. Father’s services plan required him to be evaluated for domestic violence, mental health and substance abuse services, complete a parenting program, and participate in random drug testing.
In its report for the six-month review hearing, the agency recommended the juvenile court terminate reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. Mother had shown no interest in reunifying and father had only recently begun addressing his drug abuse despite numerous referrals for treatment. In addition, the agency was concerned about his mental health because the staff had seen cut marks on his arms on several occasions and he was hospitalized after becoming suicidal.
In September 2016, the juvenile court conducted the initial six-month review hearing and set it as a contested matter. The court noted for the record that Clayton was an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma and found the ICWA applied. At the contested hearing, the court continued services, set the 12-month review hearing for December 2016 and ordered the agency to submit an updated plan. Father’s amended case plan required him to complete residential treatment, followed by outpatient treatment while residing in a sober living program.
In November 2016, the Cherokee Nation filed its notice of intervention.
The parents’ compliance with their services plans remained poor. Mother made no attempt to engage in her services and visited Clayton once during the reporting period. Father’s progress was only slightly better. He completed residential drug treatment in November 2016, but was discharged from outpatient treatment and sober living for violating the rules. In addition, he had not completed mental health and domestic violence assessment or a parenting program. The agency recommended the juvenile court terminate reunification services at the 12-month review hearing.
The juvenile court set a contested hearing for January 2017. In the interim, the agency reported that father tested positive for marijuana and methamphetamine and was referred to a 52-week domestic violence offender group.
Father appeared at the contested hearing and through his attorney made an offer of proof that he realized he was slow to engage in services but wanted to continue reunification efforts. He was participating in a parenting class, attending weekly Narcotics Anonymous meetings and working with a sponsor, regularly visiting Clayton, and was scheduled to begin domestic violence classes later in the month. The court accepted his offer of proof. Mother did not personally appear and her attorney objected to the agency’s recommendation without evidence.
The juvenile court found that returning Clayton to parental custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to him, that the agency provided the parents reasonable reunification services and there was not a substantial likelihood he could be returned to their custody with continued services. The court found the agency engaged in active efforts to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that Clayton’s placement with the maternal grandmother met the ICWA preferred placement preference. The court terminated reunification services and set the section 366.26 hearing.
DISCUSSION
Father contends the agency failed to consider his learning disability in evaluating his ability to complete his reunification services in the time provided. He states:
“I have been in special education classes since I was 6 years old. Learning has been difficult for me. It was about 2014 it was identify [sic] by a doctor I suffer from ADHD. I suffer from low self-esteem which has led me to make bad choices. I believe at no time did the county take this into consideration.”
Father also attached supporting documentation to his petition: a letter dated February 22, 2017, concerning his attendance at parenting classes, a medical assessment dated March 25, 2016, and a psycho-educational evaluation dated March 16, 2005. Father seeks an order from this court vacating the section 366.26 hearing and directing the juvenile court to continue reunification services for him.
We construe father’s argument as a challenge to the reasonableness of the reunification services provided by the agency. Further, we confine our review to the record that was before the juvenile court when it issued its ruling. Since the documents father attached to his petition were not part of that record, we will not review them. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405.)
The juvenile court must review reunification services at intervals of no less than six months and determine, among other things, whether reasonable services have been offered. (§§ 366, subd. (a)(1); 366.21, subds. (e)(8), (f)(1)(A); 366.22, subd. (a)(3).) In making its determination, the juvenile court considers not only the appropriateness of services offered but also the extent to which the agency facilitated utilization of the services and the extent to which the parent availed him or herself of the services provided. To be reasonable, the services provided need not be perfect. The “standard is not whether [they] were the best that might have been provided, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances.” (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) Services are reasonable when the supervising agency identifies the family’s problems, offers services targeting those problems, maintains reasonable contact with the parent(s), and makes reasonable efforts to assist in areas where compliance is difficult. (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.)
On a challenge to the juvenile court’s reasonable services finding, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent, indulging all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the verdict. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) If substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding, we will not disturb it. (Ibid.) As father bears the burden of demonstrating error on appeal (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632), he must show that the juvenile court’s finding that the agency made reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification services is not supported by substantial evidence.
The agency had a duty to provide services designed to treat father’s known problems. Those problems concerned his mental health, substance abuse and parenting skills. There is no evidence father or his attorney mentioned his learning disability to the agency. Indeed, there is no mention of his learning disability at all in the record. Consequently, the agency cannot be expected to address problems that are not disclosed. Further, the juvenile court found the agency provided father reasonable services at the six-month review hearing in October 2016 and neither father nor his attorney voiced concern about his learning disability to the agency or the court at that time or subsequently by filing a petition to modify the case plan. (§ 388, subd. (a).) By failing to bring it to the juvenile court’s attention, father deprived the court the ability to correct it. Consequently, father forfeited the issue for appellate review and is foreclosed from raising it now for the first time. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339.)
 
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is dismissed. This opinion is final forthwith as to this court.