Mir v. Iungerich & Spackman
Filed 6/22/06 Mir v. Iungerich & Spackman CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
| JEHAN ZEB MIR, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. IUNGERICH & SPACKMAN, Defendant and Respondent. | B184463 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC212361) |
APPEAL from a order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Morris B. Jones, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Marks & Acalin and David T. Acalin for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Kent L. Richland and Peter O. Israel for Defendants and Respondents.
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This is the third appeal that plaintiff and cross-defendant Jehan Mir has filed in this case. Mir filed this suit against a law firm that represented him in a prior action, and the law firm, in turn, cross-complained against him for failure to pay the attorney's fees it billed him. According to Mir's opening brief in his first appeal in the instant case, his causes of action against the law firm were for legal malpractice, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, however the parties tend to characterize this case more simply as Mir's suit against the law firm for legal malpractice.
Mir and the law firm entered into a settlement agreement after mediating their claims. Under the settlement agreement, Mir would accept $45,000 on his complaint against the law firm (to be paid for by the firm's insurance carrier), there would be no admission of liability, and Mir's operative complaint would be dismissed. In turn, the law firm would pursue its cross-complaint against Mir for attorney's fees, and Mir's defenses to the cross-complaint would be limited to those based on contract, which specifically precluded a defense of legal malpractice. When Mir refused to honor the settlement agreement the law firm filed a motion to enforce it and their motion was granted. A trial was had on the firm's cross-complaint for attorney's fees, and a judgment on the cross-complaint was entered in the firm's favor whereby it was awarded (1) $57,840.78 as damages for Mir's breach of the attorney fee retainer, (2) $26,828.63 as prejudgment interest on that amount, (3) $15,750 as attorney's fees it incurred in pursuing the cross-complaint (pursuant to a prevailing party attorney's fees provision in the fee retainer), and (4) $477.65 as costs of suit on the cross-complaint.
In Mir's first appeal, which was taken from that judgment on the cross-complaint, Mir challenged the order that granted the law firm's motion to enforce the mediated settlement agreement. He contended there was a lack of mutual consent to the settlement agreement and the settlement agreement was not signed by the proper parties. We affirmed the judgment, finding the motion was properly granted.
Mir's second appeal was taken from an order awarding the law firm post-judgment fees and costs which it incurred in its attempt to enforce the judgment. We affirmed the order.
In this third appeal, Mir challenges an order that granted the law firm's motion for (1) attorney's fees it incurred in defending Mir's first appeal, and (2) attorney's fees it incurred in bringing that motion for appellate fees. Mir contends that when the trial court made its award of attorney's fees it should have allocated the attorney's fees claimed by the law firm for Mir's first appeal as between (1) fees incurred to enforce the fee retainer and (2) fees incurred relating to his malpractice claim. He asserts that fees would be recoverable for the former, but not for the latter. He also contends the amount of fees awarded was excessive.
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not allocate fees, nor did it abuse its discretion when it determined the amount of fees to be awarded to the law firm. Therefore, we will affirm the order awarding attorney's fees to the law firm.
BACKGROUND OF THE INSTANT APPEAL
In our opinion in Mir's first appeal, we addressed the law firm's claim that because the retainer agreement between itself and Mir contains an attorney's fee clause, the firm was entitled to recover the attorney's fees it incurred in defending that appeal. Concerning Mir's challenge to the firm's claim for fees, we stated Mir was â€
