Filed 12/28/17 Mohamed v. Sacramento County Building Board of Appeals CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
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JOSEPH MOHAMED, SR. et al., as Co-trustees, etc.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

SACRAMENTO COUNTY BUILDING BOARD OF APPEALS,

Defendant and Respondent.



C082179

(Super. Ct. No. 34201580002090CUWMGDS)


In this case, we must determine whether a stable (designed to house at least 30 horses, with a second floor containing a horse genealogy records center, meeting rooms, trophy room, children’s play area, and snack bar) and a separate building (containing restrooms and horse-washing facilities) that are intended to be used by 16 property owners and their families and guests as part of the common area of a planned rural housing and equestrian development are “agricultural buildings” within the meaning of the California Building Code (Building Code).
Joseph Mohamed, Sr. and Shirley Mohamed, trustees of a charitable trust that owns the property upon which the stable and restroom buildings were built (the owners), appeal from a judgment denying their petition for writ of mandate with respect to these buildings and upholding the collective assessment of Sacramento County (the County) and its Building Board of Appeals (the Board) that neither building qualified for agricultural exempt permits. We affirm.
As we explain, neither building is an “agricultural building” as that term is defined in the California Building Code. While a stable is generally “[a] structure designed and constructed to house . . . livestock,” this particular stable contains essentially a second-floor clubhouse that will amount to “a place used by the public,” i.e., all members of the community of owners of units in the development project and their families and guests. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 24, pt. 2, § 202.) We need not determine whether the restroom building would generally fit into the definition of “agricultural building” because even if it did, this building is also intended to be used by the same community as the stable building and will therefore also be “a place used by the public.” (Ibid.) We further reject the owners’ additional claims they have acquired vested rights in the agricultural exempt permits they received such that the County should be equitably estopped to revoke the permits and their due process rights were violated by the Board. Finally, in the last section of the owners’ reply brief, they contend for the first time that the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear their appeal. Having solicited supplemental briefing on the matter, we also reject this contention.
BACKGROUND
Overview of the California Building Code and Agricultural Exemptions
California building standards are contained in the Building Code, the scope of which applies to “the construction, alteration, movement, enlargement, replacement, repair, equipment, use and occupancy, location, maintenance, removal and demolition of every building or structure or any appurtenances connected or attached to such buildings or structures,” with the exception of “[d]etached one- and two-family dwellings and multiple single-family dwellings (townhouses) not more than three stories above grade plane in height with a separate means of egress, and their accessory structures not more than three stories above grade plane in height,” the construction, alteration, etc., of which are governed by the California Residential Code. (§ 101.2, italics added.)
The Building Code provides for appointment of a building official (§ 103.2), who is “authorized and directed to enforce the provisions of this code,” and who “shall have the authority to render interpretations of this code and to adopt policies and procedures in order to clarify the application of its provisions.” (§ 104.1.) “The building official shall receive applications, review construction documents and issue permits for the erection, and alteration, demolition and moving of buildings and structures, inspect the premises for which such permits have been issued and enforce compliance with the provisions of this code.” (§ 104.2.)
Concomitantly, “[a]ny owner or owner’s authorized agent who intends to construct, enlarge, alter, repair, move, demolish or change the occupancy of a building or structure, or to erect, install, enlarge, alter, repair, remove, convert or replace any electrical, gas, mechanical or plumbing system, the installation of which is regulated by this code, or to cause any such work to be performed, shall first make application to the building official and obtain the required permit.” (§ 105.1.) Section 105.2 contains a list of exemptions from the permit requirement of the Building Code, none of which apply to the buildings at issue in this appeal.
With certain exceptions not relevant here, municipalities may make amendments to the Building Code. (See, e.g., Health & Saf. Code, §§ 17958, 17958.5, 17958.7.) Sacramento County has done so by adding “agricultural building[s], as defined in Section 202” to the list of exemptions contained in section 105.2. (Sac. County Code, § 16.02.080.) As defined in section 202, an agricultural building is “[a] structure designed and constructed to house farm implements, hay, grain, poultry, livestock or other horticultural products. This structure shall not be a place of human habitation or a place of employment where agricultural products are processed, treated or packaged, nor shall it be a place used by the public.” (§ 202.) The construction of such a building in Sacramento County requires issuance of an agricultural exempt permit. Applying for such a permit does not require submission of detailed plans, but only a “plot plan . . . indicating the proposed building and all existing buildings on the subject parcel and showing for each the size, use, and location on the property in relation to property lines and other buildings.” (Sac. County Code, § 16.02.080.)
The Alhambra Farms Development Project
In 2007, the owners’ engineering consulting firm applied for a meeting with the County’s Community Development Department to discuss the procedural and technical requirements for obtaining approval to begin construction on a proposed development to be known as Alhambra Farms. The application specified the proposed development was to consist of 10 homes on 25-acre lots with a common equestrian center that would have an indoor riding arena, stable building with stalls for 30 horses, private clubhouse, and a caretaker’s home. The application also specified these facilities would be built before the homes were constructed.
Joseph Mohamed, Sr., (individually, Mohamed) attended the pre-approval meeting. During the meeting, County representatives informed Mohamed the area would have to be rezoned from AG-80 to AR-5 and discussed the requirements for doing so. They also discussed additional requirements for obtaining approval of the Alhambra Farms project, including making road improvements and complying with environmental requirements. According to Mohamed’s declaration, submitted in support of the writ petition, County representatives expressed “favorable views” of the proposed development but recommended the project be altered to consist of 16 homes on lots of at least 5 acres. The proposal was so altered. However, nothing was approved at this meeting. Indeed, the purpose of the meeting was simply to inform the owners of the requirements for obtaining such approval at a later date.
Litigation with a neighboring property owner delayed the project until the end of 2009. For reasons not made clear by the record, the owners did not apply for permits to build the equestrian center for nearly three more years. And at no time did the owners seek to have the area rezoned or to have the project approved by the County.
Issuance of Agricultural Exempt Permits
In September 2012, the owners applied to the County for five agricultural exempt building permits to construct the equestrian center. The permits were sought for three barns (with footprints of 11,040 square feet, 7,400 square feet, and 6,400 square feet, respectively), a riding arena (with a footprint of 30,000 square feet), and a stable (with a footprint of 34,500 square feet). Aside from footprint size, location on the property, and a valuation assessment, no details were provided regarding the proposed structures. The requested permits were issued the following month.
Despite the fact five years had passed since the pre-approval meeting with the County, aside from listing “Alhambra Farm” as the business name, none of the permit applications revealed the proposed structures were to be part of an equestrian center to be used by a number of owners and their families and guests. In connection with the permit applications, Mohamed signed an agreement stating he understood a building constructed pursuant to an agricultural exempt permit “can only be used as an exempt agricultural building . . . in conformance with Sacramento County Code Section 16.02.080.” He also wrote a letter to the County further confirming his understanding that “the ‘ag use’ of these five buildings is intended to restrict the use of the buildings to the owner’s personal uses of planting, growing and marketing of crops, raising, breeding, training and selling of livestock or other permitted agricultural uses.” The letter continued: “I will not be involved with commercial use of the property such as renting space for boarding horses or other uses in any of these buildings or allowing commercial activities on our property.” While neither the agreement nor the letter indicates there would be other owners with “rights to the beneficial use and enjoyment” of the common equestrian center, and who would also be made to understand these agricultural use restrictions, a proposed “Master Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Covenants and Restrictions” for Alhambra Farms sets forth the agricultural exempt qualifications as restrictions on use of the common areas.
After issuance of the permits, construction began on the five structures. Construction also began on a separate building housing horse-washing facilities and restrooms despite the fact no permit had issued for construction of such a building. Nor did any of the site plans submitted with these permit applications reveal such a restroom building was intended. We also note that because the site plans that were submitted merely contained footprint dimensions and location on the property, nowhere was it revealed the stable building would have a second floor or this floor would contain a horse genealogy records center, meeting rooms, trophy room, children’s play area, and snack bar.
In November 2013, the owners submitted an application for a separate permit to install various electrical service panels on the stable, restroom building, riding arena, and one of the barns. The following March, an application was submitted for a separate permit to install plumbing in the restroom building. Both permits were issued.
Permit Revocation
Around the same time, in late 2013 or early 2014, County building inspectors visited the property, formed the opinion the structures did not satisfy the requirements for agricultural exempt permits, and informed Brian Washko, the County’s building official, who conducted his own inspection of the buildings in August 2014. Following Washko’s inspection, the County revoked the agricultural exempt permits issued with respect to the riding arena and the stable, as well as the permit authorizing electrical work on these structures and the restroom building. As Washko explained: “When viewing the size and magnitude of the riding arena, restrooms, and the stables, I knew immediately that these were not supposed to be Agricultural Exempt structures. [Mohamed] was present during this inspection and he informed me that the structures in question were collectively going to form an Equestrian Center that would be used by multiple property owners and their guests. This was the first time I had heard of the Equestrian Center plan.”
In a letter Washko sent to Mohamed following the inspection, he explained the riding arena and restroom building are “not designed and constructed to house farm implements, hay, grain, poultry, livestock, or other horticultural products” and are “place[s] intended for use by the public.” With respect to the stable building, Washko explained: “This structure is two stories and is designed to house approximately 60 horses on the first floor. The second floor is designed to include multiple conference/meeting rooms. An agricultural exempt building cannot be used for commercial horse stables. The second floor cannot be a place of human habitation or a place of employment where agricultural products are processed, treated, or packaged; nor shall it be a place used by the public.”
In September 2014, Washko met with Mohamed and his attorney to discuss the permit issue. During this meeting, according to Washko’s declaration, when Mohamed again acknowledged the structures would be used by all owners and guests of the proposed development, Washko “informed him that the building permits had to conform to the intended occupancy and highest and best use,” after which “Mohamed and his attorney agreed to obtain the correct permits.” In a letter from Mohamed’s attorney to Washko, the attorney confirmed his understanding Washko “wished to permit the arena as a commercial arena, the restrooms as commercial restrooms, and the horse stables as commercial stables.” However, as of January 2015, no such permits had been obtained, prompting issuance of a notice of violation that included a stop work order.
Appeal to the Board
The owners appealed the notice of violation to the Board. In their written submission, the owners argued: “As the County determined when it originally issued the permits, each of the structures at issue in the Notice of Violation qualifies as an Agricultural Exempt Building. That the horse stables and riding arena are structures ‘designed and constructed to house . . . livestock,’ specifically horses, is self-evident. These structures are not intended to be a place of human habitation, a place of employment where agricultural products are processed, treated, or packaged, nor a place used by the public. They are being built for the owners to house and ride their horses. Finally, the men’s and women’s restrooms are for the convenience and comfort of the owners while they are using the horse facilities. While the restrooms obviously are not technically intended for use by the horses, it certainly cannot be the true intent of the Building Code to allow horse facilities yet not provide restroom facilities for the people caring for those horses.” The owners also argued they possessed “vested rights in the agricultural exempt permits the County issued for the three buildings specified in the Notice of Violation” because they “performed substantial construction work on the riding arena, horse stables, and restrooms in good faith reliance on the permits the County issued.” Finally, the owners argued the County should be equitably estopped to revoke the permits because it “was apprised of all facts about these buildings in the initial application for the agricultural exempt building permits,” and in granting the permits either “intended . . . to induce the [owners] to rely on the permits and commence construction” or acted in a manner that caused the owners “reasonably to believe reliance was intended.”
Defending the decision to revoke the agricultural exempt permits, Washko explained in a letter to the Board: “A Riding Arena, Horse Stables, Men’s and Women’s Restrooms being used by [] multiple homeowners, who will invite friends and families to [the] facilities; trainers for the horses, and other stable staff to the facility are indeed the public. As indicated in the ‘purpose’ of the code we need to ensure firefighters and other emergency responders are able to provide services to the structures or the occupants of the buildings. The subject structures need to be accessible to these emergency responders and having the title of ‘Agricultural Exempt Structure’ does not allow for this type of review which is a disservice to the public and not the intent of the California Building Codes.”
A hearing before the Board was held in February 2015. During the hearing, the owners’ attorney argued, despite the fact the buildings were intended to be used by multiple property owners, as well as their families, guests, and other individuals hired by these property owners to train or care for the horses, the proposed development had yet to be approved by the County and the area had yet to be rezoned to permit construction of the units to be sold to the various property owners who would then, and only then, be entitled to use the equestrian center. Thus, argued counsel, it was an “assumption” and “speculation” that the buildings at issue would be used by anyone at all. However, Mohamed confirmed during his testimony at the hearing that the buildings were intended to be used by all of these people. We also note Washko, arguing in defense of the revocation decision, pointed out various site plans submitted at different times during the permitting process did not match each other. For example, as already mentioned, the original agricultural exempt permits issued in October 2012 were “based upon the site plan” submitted with those applications that did not contain any reference to the restroom building. Over a year later, in November 2013, “Mohamed came in and we -- all of a sudden you start seeing electrical work, he came in and got an electrical permit,” the application for which was the first document to mention a restroom building. And it was not until the plumbing permit was requested in March 2014 that a diagram of the restroom building was submitted. The owners’ attorney acknowledged “[t]here was an evolution . . . of [the project] over time,” but argued “the County has inspected it throughout.”
The Board voted to uphold the County’s decision to revoke the agricultural exempt permits issued with respect to the riding arena, stable, and restroom building. While, as the owners emphasize in their briefing on appeal, one of the Board members stated during their discussion of the matter, “I don’t see how this is not a commercial horse stable,” and “if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it’s a duck for me,” the motion to deny the appeal and uphold the County’s decision was based specifically on the fact the owners submitted various plans over time that conflicted with the plans submitted with the original agricultural exempt permit applications. Implicit in the decision to uphold the permit revocation on this basis is a finding the permits would not have been issued in the first instance had the original permit applications accurately represented the buildings the owners intended to construct.
Writ Proceedings
In May 2015, the owners brought a petition for writ of mandate in the trial court challenging the Board’s decision. The owners argued the Board abused its discretion in upholding the County’s decision to revoke the permits because it incorrectly construed the agricultural exemption requirements, used an inappropriate standard, i.e., “the ‘Duck Standard,’” to determine whether or not the subject buildings qualified for the exemption, did not apply that erroneous standard consistently, and did not make factual findings. The owners again argued they have acquired vested rights in the permits that the County should be equitably estopped to revoke, and added a claim their due process rights were violated because the Board did not allow them a reasonable opportunity to present evidence at the hearing.
In response, the County argued the Board did not abuse its discretion in upholding the County’s decision to revoke the agricultural exempt permits. Specifically, the County argued the Board did not use the “Duck Standard” to revoke the permits, but did so because the permits were issued based on inaccurate information that did not reveal the commercial nature of the buildings. For the same reason, argued the County, the owners have not acquired vested rights in these permits and the County should not be equitably estopped to revoke them. Finally, the County argued the owners’ due process rights were not violated during the hearing before the Board.
A hearing on the writ petition was held in March 2016. Prior to the hearing, the trial court issued a tentative ruling indicating it intended to grant the petition with respect to the riding arena and deny it with respect to the stable and restroom building. After entertaining argument on the petition, the trial court affirmed the tentative ruling. Because the County does not challenge the trial court’s decision with respect to the riding arena, we provide its reasoning only with respect to the stable and restroom building. With respect to these buildings, the trial court concluded the agricultural exempt permits were issued “based on incorrect, inaccurate, or incomplete information.”
Regarding the stable, the trial court explained: “In applying for the permit, Mohamed described the structure as a ‘stables,’ and he agreed that use of the building would be restricted to ‘the owner’s personal uses of planting, growing and marketing of crops, raising, breeding, training and selling livestock or other permitted agricultural uses.’ Mohamed did not disclose that the stable would include a second floor, consisting of a tack room, trophy/records room, conference/meeting rooms, a ‘snack counter,’ a ‘children’s area,’ as well as space for a ‘future elevator.’ Mohamed also did not disclose that the stable is intended to be part of a common area ‘equestrian center’ for a proposed subdivision development, available to multiple property owners and their guests. [¶] The California Building Code defines an ‘agricultural building’ as ‘[a] structure designed and constructed to house farm implements, hay, grain, poultry, livestock, or other horticultural products.’ It is clear that the stable is not designed and constructed solely to house ‘livestock.’ It also has a non-agricultural purpose: to serve as ‘home base’ for persons using the equestrian center. This is not a permitted agricultural use. . . . The stable is not an ‘agricultural building,’ because a material part of the building is not ‘designed and constructed to house farm implements, hay, grain, poultry, livestock or other horticultural products.’ [¶] Mohamed cannot rely on the pre-application meeting held several years prior to the permit applications as putting the County officials on ‘notice’ of his development plans. It is clear to this court that the officials issuing the permits did not know, and had no reason to know, of Mohamed’s plans for the stable. If Mohamed wanted the information disclosed at the pre-application meeting to be considered by County officials, then it was incumbent on him to include that information in his applications. [¶] The court does not foreclose the possibility that the stable might qualify for an agricultural exempt permit if the second floor of the building were dedicated and restricted to agricultural uses, such as a ‘tack room’ for storage of horse blankets, saddles, and other equipment. However, Mohamed has failed to show that the second floor of the building will be used for agricultural purposes. The evidence is to the contrary, in that the plans include space for conference/meeting rooms, a snack counter, a children’s area, a records room, and ‘work & rest’ areas. In the court’s view, because of these proposed non-agricultural uses, the stable does not qualify for an agricultural exempt permit.”
Regarding the restroom building, the trial court explained: “The site plans submitted with the permit applications did not show or describe any standalone restroom building, and the County never issued a permit for construction of such a building. In addition, it is undeniable that a men’s and women’s restroom facility is not an agricultural building. The fact that a standalone restroom is depicted on a plot plan submitted in connection with the subsequent electrical permit did not confer a vested right to construct the restroom as a standalone building under the agricultural exempt permit for the stable.”
The trial court also rejected the owners’ argument they were deprived of a reasonable opportunity to present evidence at the hearing, explaining: “A review of the transcript from the hearing shows that Mohamed was given a fair and reasonable opportunity to litigate his claims before the Board. There is no indication in the record that the Board prevented Mohamed from presenting additional evidence or argument, except in regard to the ‘zoning’ issue, which the Board properly determined was beyond the scope of the hearing. Mohamed received a fair hearing.”
Judgment granting the writ petition as to the riding arena and denying it as to the stable and restroom building was entered in April 2016. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I
Standard of Review
“In reviewing the evidentiary sufficiency of an administrative agency’s decision—if the decision affects a fundamental vested right—the trial court must exercise its independent judgment on the evidence; the trial court must weigh the evidence and determine whether the administrative findings are supported by the weight of the evidence. This is the independent judgment test. This test is required because the importance of the right affected requires independent judicial review. On appeal, the appellate court considers only whether the trial court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.]” (Amerco Real Estate Co. v. City of West Sacramento (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 778, 782-783 (Amerco).) “If, however, the administrative decision does not substantially affect a fundamental vested right, the trial court considers only whether the administrative findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record—this is the substantial evidence test—and the appellate court on appeal performs the same review as the trial court. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 783.)
The administrative decision at issue in this case is the Board’s decision to uphold the County’s revocation of three agricultural exempt building permits and order to stop work until proper building permits are obtained. However, as mentioned, the trial court reversed the Board’s decision with respect to the riding arena, which is not challenged in this appeal. Thus, we are concerned only with the Board’s decision to uphold the revocation as to the stable and restroom building. In determining whether this decision substantially affects a fundamental vested right, we must decide whether it substantially affects a right that has been “legitimately acquired or is otherwise ‘vested,’” and whether that right is “fundamental” in the sense of “the importance of [the right] to the individual” and “the effect of the right in economic and human terms.” (Frink v. Prod (1982) 31 Cal.3d 166, 177.) As our Supreme Court has explained: “[T]he effect and importance of rights and the degree to which they are possessed are to be weighed together” and “the ‘search for “vestedness” and the search for “fundamentalness” are one and the same. The ultimate question in each case is whether the affected right is deemed to be of sufficient significance to preclude its extinction or abridgement by a body lacking judicial power.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 178.)
“The substantial evidence test has been applied to review administrative decisions that restrict a property owner’s return on his [or her] property, or which increase the cost of doing business, or reduce profits, because such decisions impact mere economic interests rather than fundamental vested rights.” (Amerco, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 784.) For example, in San Marcos Mobilehome Park Owners’ Assn. v. City of San Marcos (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1492, the Court of Appeal held an administrative decision denying certain proposed rent increases under a rent control ordinance adopted with respect to mobile home parks did not substantially affect the fundamental rights of the park owners. (Id. at p. 1500.) The court explained: “An inquiry must be made on a case-by-case basis as to whether the property right at issue fundamentally affects the life situation of the individual, or whether it merely impacts an area of economic privilege in a less than fundamental manner. [¶] Here, there is no contention, nor does the evidence suggest, that if the Commission denied the requested rent increases, the park owners would be in such an unfavorable economic position they would go out of business. Thus, the Commission’s decision does not substantially affect the property owner’s right not to have his [or her] property taken away from him [or her]. [Citations.] Rather, the decision restricts the return he can obtain from his [or her] property.” (Id. at p. 1502; see also Standard Oil Co. v. Feldstein (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 590, 604-605 [no fundamental right to operate four rather than three refinery units where there was “no contention that Standard will be driven to financial ruin” or “that this particular facility will be forced to operate at a loss and close,” but only that “the return on its considerable investment will fall short of what it might have been”].)
“In contrast, the independent judgment test is applied to review administrative decisions that will drive an owner out of business or significantly injure the business’s ability to function.” (Amerco, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 784.) This test also applies where “an owner of property acquires a vested right to construct a building [because] the conduct of the government amounts to a representation that such construction is fully approved and legal, and in reliance on such representation the owner materially changes position,” e.g., by constructing the building. (Stanson v. San Diego Coast Regional Com. (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 38, 49.)
Here, as we explain in greater detail later in this opinion, we cannot conclude the owners have acquired a vested right to build the stable and restroom building based on the agricultural exempt permits issued in this case. While the County represented to the owners they could lawfully build an agricultural exempt stable on the property, there was no representation the stable they would actually build―including what is essentially a community clubhouse on the second floor―would qualify for that exemption. And no representation was made with respect to the construction of a separate restroom building. Nor is there any evidence in the record that requiring the owners to obtain the appropriate permits for these structures will require abandonment of their plans to develop the property into a rural housing and equestrian development. Obtaining these permits might require modifications to the buildings to bring them up to code, thereby reducing the profit to be made from the sale of the future units, but this merely “puts an economic burden on them increasing the cost of doing business.” (Mobil Oil Corp. v. Superior Court (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 293, 303-304.) The substantial evidence test therefore applies.
However, as always, questions of statutory interpretation are subject to our de novo review. (Joseph v. San Francisco Housing Authority (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 78, 81.) We use this standard immediately below in determining the meaning of “agricultural building” in the Building Code. We also exercise our independent judgment in assessing whether or not the owners were deprived of a fair hearing before the Board (Southern Cal. Underground Contractors, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 533, 542), and whether or not the Board had subject matter jurisdiction to hear their appeal. (Saffer v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1248.)
II
The Stable and Restroom Building Are Not Agricultural Buildings
The owners contend the stable and restroom building qualify for the agricultural exempt permits they originally received from the County. We conclude substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion they are not agricultural buildings within the meaning of the Building Code.
As defined in the Building Code, an agricultural building is “[a] structure designed and constructed to house farm implements, hay, grain, poultry, livestock or other horticultural products. This structure shall not be a place of human habitation or a place of employment where agricultural products are processed, treated or packaged, nor shall it be a place used by the public.” (§ 202, italics added.)
While the construction of such a building in Sacramento County does not require standard building permits, it does require issuance of an agricultural exempt permit. Section 16.02.080 of the Sacramento County Code sets forth the requirements for obtaining such a permit. At the time the permits were issued, these requirements were: (1) an agricultural exempt permit is applied for; (2) a plot plan is submitted showing for each proposed building the size, use, and location on the property in relation to property lines and other buildings; (3) the director of the Planning and Community Development Department determines the use and location of the proposed building is permitted by the Zoning Code; (4) the proposed building is not located in flood plain; (5) a processing fee is paid to cover the application, initial site check, final project inspection, and maintenance of related records; (6) separate plumbing, electrical, or mechanical permits are issued (if included with the project), in which case floor plans describing the size and use of all rooms shall be submitted; and (7) the proposed building may not be used as: (a) a building where employees process, treat, or package products, (b) a place used by the public, (c) commercial horse stables, (d) dairy buildings, (e) storage for products not grown on the premises, or (f) housing non-farm equipment in more than 20 percent of the floor area.
For purposes of this opinion, we assume the owners satisfied the first six requirements for obtaining agricultural exempt permits for the stable and restroom building and focus on whether or not these buildings satisfy the definition of an “agricultural building” or instead are intended to be “used by the public” (§ 202), thereby falling outside the definition.
“Rules of statutory construction govern our interpretation of regulations promulgated by administrative agencies. [Citations.] ‘We give the regulatory language its plain, commonsense meaning. If possible, we must accord meaning to every word and phrase in a regulation, and we must read regulations as a whole so that all of the parts are given effect. [Citation.] If the regulatory language is clear and unambiguous, our task is at an end, and there is no need to resort to canons of construction and extrinsic aids to interpretation. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Our primary aim is to ascertain the intent of the administrative agency that issued the regulation. [Citation.]” (Hoitt v. Department of Rehabilitation (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 513, 523.)
Here, there can be no doubt a stable generally qualifies as “[a] structure designed and constructed to house . . . livestock . . . .” (§ 202.) The restroom building, however, was designed and constructed to provide restroom and horse-washing facilities for those using the equestrian center. The owners argue that because the list of acceptable uses for an agricultural building is phrased in the disjunctive, the definition is “very broad and open ended,” encompassing “virtually any agricultural use.” Under their reasoning, a restroom building with horse-washing facilities is similar enough to a building “designed and constructed to house farm implements . . . or other horticultural products” to qualify under the definition. We need not decide the question because, even assuming this to be the case, we conclude both the stable and restroom building are intended to be “used by the public.” (§ 202.)
“When attempting to ascertain the ordinary, usual meaning of a word, courts appropriately refer to the dictionary definition of that word. [Citations.]” (Wasatch Property Management v. Degrate (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1111, 1121-1122.) Section 202 uses the noun form of the word “public.” Merriam-Webster defines this form of the word to mean (1) “the people as a whole: POPULACE” or (2) “a group of people having common interests or characteristics,” specifically, “the group at which a particular activity or enterprise aims.” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2006) p. 1005, col. 2.) Thus, the phrase, “a place used by the public” in section 202 could mean a place used by the entire populace or a place used by a group of people at which the owners’ enterprise aims. The owners’ enterprise of creating a rural housing development with a community equestrian center is aimed at all future owners of units in the proposed development. And this community of owners, as well as their families and guests, will collectively use the equestrian center. The stable and restroom buildings will therefore be “used by the public” within the second meaning of the word “public.”
Nevertheless, the owners rely on Bauer v. Ventura County (1955) 45 Cal.2d 276 (Bauer) and San Francisco v. Western Air Lines, Inc. (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 105, in arguing that “public use” means use by every member of the general public, i.e., the entire populace. Such reliance is misplaced. Bauer interpreted the phrase “public use” in the eminent domain provision of our state Constitution, explaining: “ ‘Public use’ within the meaning of [that provision] is defined as a use which concerns the whole community or promotes the general interest in its relation to any legitimate object of government,” and concluded the taking of private property for the purpose of building a storm drainage system amounted to a taking for public use. (Bauer, supra, 45 Cal.2d at p. 284, abrogated on another point as stated in Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 550, 562.) Western Air Lines interpreted the phrase, “public utility” in the San Francisco Charter and determined the San Francisco International Airport qualified as a public utility. There, quoting Allen v. Railroad Com. (1918) 179 Cal. 68, the court specifically distinguished between “public use,” broadly meaning, “ ‘everything upon which man bestows labor for purposes other than those for the benefit of his [or her] immediate family,’ ” and a “public utility” that additionally requires “ ‘[t]hat the devotion to public use must be of such character that the public generally, or that part of it which has been served and which has accepted the service, has the right to demand that that service shall be conducted, so long as it is continued, with reasonable efficiency under reasonable charges.’ ” (Western Air Lines, supra, 204 Cal.App.2d at p. 129.) Thus, it was in the context of describing the sort of public use that also amounts to “ ‘a true public utility’ ” that the court stated: “ ‘Public use, then, means the use by the public and by every individual member of it, as a legal right.’ ” (Ibid.) Here, we are not concerned with any imminent domain issues; nor is there any assertion the equestrian center would qualify as a public utility. Bauer and Western Air Lines are therefore entirely inapposite.
Our conclusion that the phrase, “place used by the public” in section 202 is not limited to places used by the populace as a whole, but instead encompasses buildings designed and constructed to be used by a specific community of people with a shared right of use, is bolstered by the stated purpose of the Building Code: “The purpose of this code is to establish the minimum requirements to safeguard the public health, safety and general welfare through structural strength, means of egress facilities, stability, access to persons with disabilities, sanitation, adequate lighting and ventilation and energy conservation; safety to life and property from fire and other hazards attributed to the built environment; and to provide safety to fire fighters and emergency responders during emergency operations.” (§ 1.1.2.) These safety concerns are minimal in the context of true agricultural buildings. However, here, where substantial evidence supports the conclusion the stable was designed and constructed to include what is essentially a second-story community clubhouse to be used by all owners and their families and guests, and the restroom building was designed and constructed to provide restroom facilities for the same community of people, potentially dozens of people using these structures at any given time, the public safety purpose of the Building Code is clearly implicated.
Substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion the County properly revoked the agricultural exempt permits issued with respect to the stable and restroom building.
III
Vested Rights and Equitable Estoppel
The owners also claim they have acquired vested rights in the permits they received such that the County should be equitably estopped to revoke the permits. Not so.
“It has long been the rule in this state and in other jurisdictions that if a property owner has performed substantial work and incurred substantial liabilities in good faith reliance upon a permit issued by the government, he [or she] acquires a vested right to complete construction in accordance with the terms of the permit.” (Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Com. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 785, 791.) “The rule is grounded upon the constitutional principle that property may not be taken without due process of law.” (Aries Dev. Co. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 534, 543.)
A vested right may also be acquired through the doctrine of equitable estoppel. (Stanson v. San Diego Coast Regional Com., supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 49 [equitable estoppel argument “is a ‘refinement of the vested rights principle’”].) The equitable estoppel doctrine “generally requires ‘ “(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he [or she] must intend that his [or her] conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he [or she] must rely upon the conduct to his [or her] injury.” ’ [Citation.] In other words, an owner of property acquires a vested right to construct a building where the conduct of the government amounts to a representation that such construction is fully approved and legal, and in reliance on such representation the owner materially changes position. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the conclusion the owners have not acquired a vested right to build the stable and restroom building based on the agricultural exempt permits issued in this case. The record demonstrates the site plans submitted in connection with the initial permit applications did not reveal the owners intended to build a separate restroom building. Nor was an agricultural exempt permit issued for such a building. Electrical and plumbing permits were issued, but those were incidental to the agricultural exempt permits already issued with respect to the stable, riding arena, and barns. Moreover, because the site plans submitted in connection with these permit applications merely contained footprint dimensions and location on the property, nowhere was it revealed the stable building would have a second floor or this floor would contain a horse genealogy records center, meeting rooms, trophy room, children’s play area, and snack bar. And while the owners engaged in a pre-approval meeting with the County regarding Alhambra Farms, this meeting took place five years before they applied for the agricultural exempt permits and nothing was approved at this meeting. We agree with the trial court the owners should have referred to the information provided at this meeting in the permit applications if they wanted the County to know the buildings were to be part of a community equestrian center.
Simply put, while the County represented to the owners that they could lawfully build an agricultural exempt stable on the property, there was no representation the stable they would actually build―including what is essentially a community clubhouse on the second floor―would qualify for that exemption. And no representation was made with respect to the construction of a separate restroom building. Thus, it cannot be said the owners relied in good faith on the permits they obtained in constructing these buildings. For this reason, we must reject their vested rights and equitable estoppel arguments.
IV
Due Process Claim
We also reject the owners’ assertion their due process rights were violated by the Board.
A.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction Argument Raised in the Reply Brief
As a preliminary matter, as part of the due process section of their reply brief, the owners claim for the first time that the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear their appeal. Because such a challenge may be raised at any time, and must be addressed whenever brought to a court’s attention (Saffer v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1248), we directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the issue. Having reviewed their submissions, we reject the claim.
The owners’ jurisdictional argument is premised on the assertion the Board “only had jurisdiction to hear appeals relating to ‘Technical Codes’ of Title 24, not the ‘Administrative Codes.’ ” Therefore, they argue, “any determination by the [Board] about the County’s Administrative Code relative to Ag Exempt Permits was null and void as a matter of law.” Not so.
As the County points out in its supplemental brief, section 113 of the Building Code creates a board of appeals “to hear and decide appeals of orders, decisions or determinations made by the building official relative to the application and interpretation of this code.” (§ 113.1.) As already stated, municipalities are authorized to make amendments to the Building Code and the County has done so in section 16.02.080 of the Sacramento County Code. This section amends section 113.1 to provide in relevant part: “In order to hear and decide appeals of orders, decisions or determinations made by the Building Official relative to the application and interpretation of the technical codes, there shall be and is hereby created a board of appeals.” (Sac. County Code, § 16.02.080, italics added.) This version of amended section 113.1 was enacted by County ordinance on February 11, 2014 as part of an update to the Building Code that occurs every three years. (Sac. Ord. No. 1546, repealing and reenacting Sac. County Code, § 16.02.080 <http://qcode.us/codes/sacramentocounty/revisions/1546.pdf> [as of December 21, 2017]; see also Health & Saf. Code, § 18942.) The previous version of amended section 113.1, enacted January 11, 2011, provided in relevant part: “In order to hear and decide appeals of orders, decisions or determinations made by the Building Official relative to the application and interpretation of the technical codes and Administrative Code, there shall be and is hereby created a ‘Regional building Inspection board of appeals.” (Sac. Ord. No. 1475, italics added <http://qcode.us/codes/sacramentocounty/revisions/1475.pdf> [as of December 21, 2017].)
Essentially, the owners’ argument is that because section 16.02.080 of the Sacramento County Code that added agricultural buildings to the list of exemptions contained in section 105.2, is part of Chapter 16.02, “known as the ‘Administrative and Enforcement’ portion of the technical building codes” (Sac. County Code, § 16.02.10), their challenge to the County’s determination that the subject buildings did not qualify for such permits is an appeal not of the building official’s determination relative to his interpretation of “the technical codes,” but of his determination relative to his interpretation of the “Administrative Code.” Under this theory, they acknowledge the Board would have had subject matter jurisdiction under the 2011 version of section 113.1, but argue such jurisdiction was removed with the 2014 revision. They are mistaken. “Technical Codes” refers to, among other codes, the Building Code. (Sac. County Code, § 16.02.070.) While the short title used for Chapter 16.02 is “Administrative Code,” section 16.02.080 makes substantive changes to Chapter 1 of the Building Code that in turn deals with the scope and administration of the remainder of the code. Thus, it amends and is part of the technical Building Code. Moreover, the owners’ appeal challenges the determination of the building official relative to his or her interpretation of the definition of “agricultural building” that is contained in section 202, part of Chapter 2 of the Building Code. There is nothing administrative about Chapter 2 of the code.
Simply put, the 2014 revision of section 113.1 did not divest the Board of subject matter jurisdiction to hear challenges to the building official’s determinations relative to his interpretation of the Building Code, even those aspects of the code that were amended as part of the County’s “Administrative Code.” Indeed, despite the short title, Chapter 16.02 acknowledges it is part of “the technical building codes.” (Sac. County Code, § 16.02.10.) Thus, removing “Administrative Code” from section 113.1 simply removed a redundancy.
B.
Due Process Arguments
We now turn to the due process arguments raised in the owners’ opening brief.
“Due process principles require reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard before governmental deprivation of a significant property interest.” (Horn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 612.) “Unlike some legal rules, due process ‘ “is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstance.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Rather, it ‘ “is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Determining whether a particular administrative procedure is constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private interests involved: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and any probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. [Citation.]” (Southern Cal. Underground Contractors, Inc. v. City of San Diego, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 543.)
The owners argue their due process rights were violated because the Board did not provide them “a reasonable opportunity to present [their] evidence,” but do not state what additional evidence they wished to present, except to dispute the trial court’s observation the Board properly determined “the ‘zoning’ issue . . . was beyond the scope of the hearing.” Having reviewed the transcript of the hearing, we conclude the owners were given ample opportunity to be heard. And while, as the owners observe, section 16.02.080 of the Sacramento County Code sets forth as one of the requirements for obtaining an agricultural exempt permit that the use and location of the proposed building must be permitted by the Zoning Code, there was no dispute the parcel of land was zoned AG-80. Thus, the question for the Board was not one of zoning, but rather whether or not the specific structures were agricultural buildings within the meaning of the Building Code. The Board did not violate the owners’ due process rights by encouraging their attorney to focus on that issue.
The owners also argue the Board incorrectly construed the law by employing an erroneous “Duck Standard” to the question of whether the stable qualified for an agricultural exempt permit. This argument is belied by the record. As previously noted, while one of the Board members stated during their discussion of the matter, “I don’t see how this is not a commercial horse stable,” and “if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it’s a duck for me,” the motion to deny the appeal and uphold the County’s decision was based specifically on the fact the owners submitted various plans over time that conflicted with the plans submitted with the original agricultural exempt permit applications. Thus, while ducks were mentioned during the hearing, the Board did not employ an erroneous “Duck Standard” in upholding the permit revocation decision.
Finally, the owners argue the Board committed a prejudicial abuse of discretion because its decision is not supported by any findings. However, implicit in the Board’s decision to uphold the permit revocation on the basis of conflicting plans is a finding the permits would not have been issued in the first instance had the original permit applications accurately represented the buildings the owners intended to construct. Implicit in this finding is a further finding the buildings actually constructed did not meet the criteria for agricultural buildings. And the reasons the buildings did not meet those criteria were stated in Washko’s letter to the Board, i.e., they were intended to be used by “multiple homeowners, who will invite friends and families to [the] facilities; trainers for the horse[s], and other stable staff to the facility are indeed the public.” We have already concluded substantial evidence supports these implied findings. As the trial court concluded, this case is analogous to Temple of Inspired Living v. Department of Social Service (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 564, in which the Court of Appeal rejected a similar argument where “[t]he reasons for denial of [a gaming] license were fully set forth in the hearing officer’s report and recommendations” that the court concluded were “obviously incorporated” by the manager of the Department of Social Services who denied the license, thus satisfying “the requirement for findings sufficient to permit judicial review.” (Id. at pp. 571-572.)
The owners’ due process rights were not violated by the Board.
DISPOSITION
The judgment granting in part and denying in part the petition for writ of mandate is affirmed. The County of Sacramento is entitled to costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)



/s/
HOCH, J.



We concur:



/s/
NICHOLSON, Acting P. J.



/s/
BUTZ, J.