Filed 7/25/17 Olson v. Siskiyou County CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Siskiyou)
----




KIMBERLY R. OLSON,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

SISKIYOU COUNTY et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.
C075122

(Super. Ct. No. SCCVCV1200991)





After moving unsuccessfully for the return of her marijuana, seized as part of a criminal matter, plaintiff Kimberly R. Olson brought the instant civil suit against Siskiyou County and additional parties. Siskiyou County successfully demurred, and the trial court entered judgment against Olson. Olson now appeals, contending the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer. However, because Olson’s causes of action all stem from an issue already litigated and decided, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars her claims. We affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
We first note that Siskiyou County’s request for judicial notice of additional court records is granted. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
In 2003, Olson’s marijuana was seized, and arising from that seizure, she was later charged in a criminal matter.
In 2011, as part of that criminal matter, Olson moved for the return of her marijuana. On September 19, 2012, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied her motion, finding that Olson had not established the amount of marijuana she had possessed was medically necessary and reasonable. Olson sought review by petition for writ of mandate. On January 3, 2013, this court denied the petition on the merits.
Five months earlier, on August 8, 2012, Olson brought the instant action, alleging multiple causes of action--all pertaining to her entitlement to the return of her marijuana. The trial court construed the complaint as attempting to allege seven causes of action: (1) “Declaratory Relief,” (2) “Unreasonable Seizure,” (3) “Deprivation Without Due Process,” (4) “Bane Act (Civil Code §§ 52 & 52.1),” (5) “Conversion,” (6) “Civil Rights--Unreasonable Seizure (42 U.S.C. § 1983),” and (7) “Civil Rights--Equal Protection (42 U.S.C. 1983).”
On April 30, 2013, the trial court sustained Siskiyou County’s demurrer, allowing Olson leave to amend some of the counts. On August 27, 2013, after Olson represented that she could not amend her complaint, the trial court dismissed the action.
Olson appeals.
DISCUSSION
I
Collateral Estoppel
On appeal, Olson contends the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer. But the lynchpin of all of Olson’s causes of action is her entitlement to the return of her marijuana. That issue has already been litigated and decided against Olson. Thus Olson’s claims are barred by collateral estoppel. We will affirm on that basis.
Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue where five requirements are met: “(1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding.” (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)
Here, these requirements are met. Olson’s entitlement to the return of her marijuana was litigated and decided when she moved unsuccessfully in the trial court during the course of the criminal proceedings brought against her for the return of her marijuana.
Accordingly, the first three requirements for collateral estoppel are satisfied.
As to the fourth requirement, the decision was final and on the merits. Olson sought review by petition for a writ of mandate, which was her only means of redress. (See People v. Hopkins (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 305, 308 [the only avenue of redress for a denied motion for return of property is a writ of mandate].) Because the writ petition was her exclusive means of review, its summary denial constitutes a final decision on the merits. (See Leone v. Medical Board (2000) 22 Cal.4th 660, 670 [when a writ petition is the only avenue for redress, the summary denial of that writ constitutes a final decision on the merits].)
Finally, Olson is the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted. Accordingly, all five requirements are met.
Nevertheless, where the minimal requirements for collateral estoppel are satisfied, “courts will not apply the doctrine if considerations of policy or fairness outweigh the doctrine’s purposes as applied in a particular case [citation], or if the party to be estopped had no full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.” (Zevnik v. Superior Court, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 82.) But, here, Olson had a full and fair opportunity to litigate her entitlement to the return of the marijuana (including by way of an evidentiary hearing). Here considerations of policy and fairness do not outweigh the doctrine’s purposes. (See Roos v. Red (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 870, 880.)
The underlying issue for each of Olson’s claims, having been decided, she is collaterally estopped from bringing those same claims again in this proceeding.
II
Recusal
Olson also contends the trial court erred in refusing her request that it recuse itself. This claim is not properly raised, as Olson may only seek review of her unsuccessful motion to disqualify a trial judge by writ. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d); Roberts v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 474, 487.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.



HULL , J.



We concur:



RAYE , P. J.



DUARTE , J.