ORourke v. RMH Partnership
Filed 2/26/10 ORourke v. RMH Partnership CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
JOHN OROURKE,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A125013
v. (City & County
of San Francisco
RMH PARTNERSHIP, LLC Super. Ct. No. CGC
et al., 08482170)
Defendants and Respondents.
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John ORourke appeals from an adverse judgment in a construction dispute. He contends the courts ruling was legally unsupported. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDRUAL BACKGROUND
The background of this case has been difficult to ascertain because appellants brief contains no citation to the record. As best as we can tell, Richard Hohl (Hohl) and Jean ORourke agreed to form RMH Partnership, LLC, (RMH) in order to operate a caf on Divisadero Street in San Francisco. Under the terms of their agreement, Hohl would contribute money to the venture, and Jean ORourke would contribute the construction work of her husband, appellant, who would perform the renovations that were needed to prepare the premises that had been leased.
Appellant performed work on the caf from January 2, 2008, through April 12, 2008. The caf then opened for business on April 19, 2008.
The relationship between Hohl and Jean ORourke began to deteriorate soon after the caf opened. It eventually became so bad that Hohl was forced to obtain a restraining order to prevent appellant and his wife from threatening him physically.
On August 26, 2008, appellant recorded a mechanics lien against the property on which the caf was located. Then, in November 2008, appellant apparently filed a civil complaint against RMH.[1]
RMH filed a motion to invalidate the lien and to dismiss appellants complaint. It argued it was entitled to prevail as a matter of law for three reasons: (1) appellant was not a licensed contractor for the entire time that he performed work at the caf, (2) appellant failed to timely file his mechanics lien, and (3) appellant did not expect to be paid for his work because it was provided in lieu of his wifes capital contribution. The trial court conducted a hearing on RMHs motion and granted it. The court ruled appellants mechanics lien was invalid and dismissed the complaint he filed.
II. DISCUSSION
Appellant raises three arguments on appeal. First he contends he was entitled to file a mechanics lien because he was a licensed contractor as of February 22, 2008 the date that he contends substantial work on the caf began. We reject this argument because it is procedurally defective. Appellant has not cited any case authority to support his argument, and while he does briefly mention two statutes (Business and Professions Code section 7031 and Civil Code section 3115) appellant has not quoted any language from either statute, and he has made no attempt to explain how those statutes advance the (very brief) argument he makes on this point. We deem the point forfeited. (Berger v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 989, 1007.)
Next, appellant seems to argue the court erred when it found that his mechanics lien was not timely filed. The trial court did not state that untimeliness was the basis for its ruling; however, the point is not pivotal. Lack of timeliness was only one of three arguments RMH made in support of its position in the trial court and appellant has not presented a cogent argument that would support the conclusion the court erred if it based its decision on either of the other two grounds. On appeal, we are required to presume the trial court based its decision on the other two grounds (Brewer v. Simpson (1960) 53 Cal.2d 567, 584), and absent argument to the contrary, we must presume the courts ruling on those other grounds was correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
Third, appellant argues that even if the trial court correctly ruled he could not validly assert a mechanics lien, the court should not have dismissed his complaint but should have allowed him to pursue a cause of action under a quantum meruit theory. Appellant never raised this issue in the trial court. He has forfeited the right to raise it on appeal. (Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 212, 226.) Indeed, because appellant has not cited any authority to support his position, it is doubly forfeited. (Berger v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007.)
We conclude appellant has not carried his burden of demonstrating that the trial court erred when it ruled his mechanics lien was invalid, or when it dismissed his complaint.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
_________________________
Jones, P.J.
We concur:
_________________________
Simons, J.
_________________________
Needham, J.
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[1] We say apparently because the record appellant has provided does not include a copy of the complaint.
