P. v. >Adams>











Filed 5/20/13 P. v. Adams
CA3











NOT TO BE PUBLISHED



California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.





IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE
DISTRICT

(San
Joaquin)

----






>

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. QUAWNTAY ADAMS, Defendant and Appellant.

C072638 (Super. Ct. No. SC055166B)

Appointed
counsel for defendant Quawntay Adams has asked this court to review the record
to determine whether there exist any arguable
issues on appeal. (>People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d
436 (Wende).) We find no errors and shall affirm the
judgment.

BACKGROUND

On October 21, 1992, while confined at the href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">California Youth Authority (CYA; now the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities),
defendant assaulted a youth counselor, hitting her multiple times with a sock
containing a can of beans while another ward held her down. Defendant was 17 years old when he committed
the crime. He was arraigned as an adult
on charges of assault with a deadly weapon
on a peace officer (Pen. Code,href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] § 245, subd. (c)) and battery with
serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)).

On February 18, 1993, while represented by counsel, defendant
pleaded guilty to the assault charge in exchange for dismissal of the remaining
count, and was sentenced to three years in state prison. The arrest disposition forms and the abstract
of judgment reflect defendant's birth date as September 30, 1972, as opposed to September 30, 1975.
According to those documents, defendant was 20 years old when he
committed the crime.

On March 14, 1995, defendant filed
his first of three petitions for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court,
alleging he was released from state prison on July 29, 1994, and thereafter
“arrested by [CYA] for no reason” despite the court having informed him he was
“not to return to [CYA]” and was to be released on parole.

Defendant filed his second of three
petitions for writ of habeas corpus
on April 5, 1995,
in which he reiterated the allegations contained in the first petition and
further alleged that he was 17 years old when he committed the crime. Defendant alleged that CYA felt he “was unfit
for their treatment” and “sent [him] to [adult] court for prosecution.” He also claimed he served a three-year
sentence in state prison even though he had been sentenced to “only
. . . [two] years.”

On May 2, 1995, the superior court denied both of
defendant’s petitions, ruling that “CYA’s continued supervision over
[defendant] is an administrative decision by CYA that is subject to
administrative review” and defendant “must exhaust his administrative remedies
before seeking relief from the court.”
With respect to defendant's age, the court stated, “Court records
reflect that [defendant’s] date of birth is September 30, 1972, that the assault occurred on October
21, 1992, and that
[defendant] was, therefore, 20 years of age at the time of the assault.” The
court also ruled that the record confirmed defendant’s three-year sentence.

On July 18, 1995, defendant filed
his third and final petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging he was
sentenced to state prison at the age of 17 in violation of Welfare and
Institutions Code section 602href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] because the “court believed [he] was 20 years
of age.” He further alleged that,
following the 1993 assault at CYA, he was “refer[r]ed directly to superior
court of adults” where he “filled out no papers asking [his] name or age and
[he] never stated to the court or officials that [he] was 20 years old.” He claimed that CYA “always knew of [his]
real age” and his “birth certificate has always been in [his] [CYA] file.” He also claimed he “never knew of the mistake
until now.”

On August 28, 1995, the superior
court denied defendant’s third habeas corpus petition on the ground that he
waived his right to have his case proceed in juvenile court by failing to call
to the court’s attention the fact that he was under the age of 18 when he
committed the offense.

On December 1, 2010, defendant filed a petition for writ of error
coram nobis in the superior court, alleging he was only 17 years old
when he committed the offense and requesting that the judgment be vacated. In support of the petition, defendant
attached a copy of his birth certificate reflecting a birth date of September
30, 1975.

On December 10, 2010, the superior court denied defendant’s
petition, ruling as follows: “[Defendant] previously made the same argument
based upon the same allegations in two prior [petitions for writ of habeas
corpus] filed on April 5, 1995, and July 18, 1995, both of which were denied. His third and current Petition appears to be
taking a third bite at the same apple. [¶] . . . [¶] As [defendant]
is attempting to challenge his conviction as he has previously done so twice
prior, he is presenting a new claim that could have been presented in either one
of his earlier Petitions. Accordingly,
his Petition is a ‘delayed petition’ and therefore, fails to merit relief. (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th
[750,] 769-770, 774.)”

On December 15, 2010, defendant
filed a supplemental petition for writ
of error coram nobis reiterating his earlier claims and alleging that he
exercised due diligence in raising the issue of his age. Thereafter, he filed a “Motion for Appeal and
Appointment of Counsel.”

On January 4, 2011, the superior court
denied both the supplemental petition and the motion for appeal on the grounds
that defendant made the same claims three times before, all of which had
previously been rejected; and he failed to show due diligence in filing his
petition.

Defendant
appealed the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis to this court.
In an opinion filed on October 31, 2011, this court held that defendant
“failed to satisfy his burden to produce evidence to establish the relief
sought (People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th
1078, 1101)” and that the “trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
his petition for writ of error coram
nobis.”

On
September 11, 2012, defendant filed a “Motion to Correct Error in Judgment,”
claiming that, although he agreed to a three-year sentence in February 1993, he
was in fact sentenced to two years, which is reflected in the sentencing
transcript; however, the abstract of judgment erroneously states he was
sentenced to three years. Defendant
stated that, although this sentence has long expired, it was used to enhance a
federal sentence that he was then serving.



Also on
that date, defendant filed a “Motion to Strike and Void” an August 28, 1995
“Order Denying Habeas Corpus Petition.”
In that motion, defendant claimed that, because he was not in custody
when he filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus on July 18, 1995, the
superior court lacked jurisdiction to hear and deny his petition on August 28,
1995.

On October
19, 2012, defendant filed a “Motion to File Successive Petition for Writ of
Error Coram Nobis,” arguing, in general, that the matter was within one of the
“exceptions” to the procedural bar to successive petitions mentioned in >In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 750. Attached to the motion were the documents
submitted with defendant’s previously filed petition for writ of error >coram nobis.

On November
13, 2012, the trial court denied defendant’s “Motion to Correct Error in
Judgment,” his “Motion to Strike and Void” the “Order Denying Habeas Corpus
Petition,” and his successive Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis. The court ruled that defendant’s petition and
motions “are merely duplicate, successive Petitions which are procedurally
impermissible.”

Defendant
timely appealed from the trial court’s order.

>DISCUSSION

Counsel
filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks us to
determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (Wende,
supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) Counsel
advised defendant of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of
the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days have elapsed, and we have
received no communication from defendant.
We have undertaken an examination of the entire record and find no arguable
error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.





>DISPOSITION

The
judgment is affirmed.







DUARTE , J.







We concur:







NICHOLSON , Acting P. J.







MAURO , J.