Filed 3/6/18 P. v. Aguilar CA4/3






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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RODOLFO AGUILAR,

Defendant and Appellant.


G054708

(Super. Ct. No. 14CF2174)

O P I N I O N
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, John S. Adams, Judge. Affirmed.
Stephen M. Hinkle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
A jury convicted Rodolfo Aguilar of carrying a loaded, stolen firearm in public (Pen. Code, § 25850, subds. (a), (c)(2); all statutory citations are to the Penal Code), and found he committed the crime for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). Aguilar contends there was insufficient evidence he knew or had reasonable cause to believe the firearm was stolen. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm.

I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In September 1996, someone broke into a Mission Viejo residence and stole several firearms, including a Ruger .22 caliber semiautomatic handgun.
On June 8, 2014, around 1:30 a.m., Officer David Fernandez saw a vehicle driven by Elizabeth Mojica commit a traffic violation. During a brief pursuit, the vehicle stopped and Aguilar fled from the right rear passenger side of the vehicle. Fernandez’s partner Officer Nick Lopez pursued Aguilar and detained him. The officers removed a stolen gun from Aguilar’s front waistband and found that it was loaded.
Mojica believed Aguilar was a gang member. She heard Aguilar say he had a gun and he told her to “go, go, go.” She panicked and drove away from the officers.
Detective Edward Zaragosa testified the gun was originally purchased by another person in Nebraska in 1971. He further testified a private party cannot legally sell a gun to another private party because all transfers must go through a licensed dealer.
Lopez testified as a prosecution gang expert. Based on Aguilar’s prior admissions, gang (STEP) notices, tattoos, and other information, Lopez opined Aguilar was a member of a criminal street gang, and his companion in the vehicle, Danny Catalan, also was a member of the gang. Lopez explained a “gang gun” belongs to the gang, and is routinely passed from gang member to gang member. Lopez testified most guns are not legally possessed by gang members and some of these guns are stolen.
In January 2017, the jury convicted Aguilar as noted above. In March 2017, the court found Aguilar had suffered a prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i) & (c)(5), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) The court struck the gang enhancement (§ 1385) and imposed a four-year prison term, comprised of the two-year midterm for the firearm offense doubled because of the strike prior.

II
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Aguilar contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for carrying a loaded, stolen firearm in public (§ 25850, subds. (a), (c)(2)). He states “there was no evidence presented as to where the gun had been or who had possession of it in the 18 years since it was stolen, nor any evidence that [he] was aware or had reasonable cause to believe that the gun was stolen.” We disagree.
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, “we review the whole record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime or special circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict – i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value – such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] . . . ‘We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support’” the jury’s verdict. [Citation.]” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
Section 25850 provides in relevant part: “(a) A person is guilty of carrying a loaded firearm when the person carries a loaded firearm on the person or in a vehicle while in any public place or on any public street in an incorporated city or in any public place or on any public street in a prohibited area of unincorporated territory. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) Carrying a loaded firearm in violation of this section is punishable, as follows: [¶]. . . (2) Where the firearm is stolen and the person knew or had reasonable cause to believe that it was stolen, as a felony.” (See CALCRIM No. 2541.)
Knowledge that property has been stolen can seldom be proved by direct evidence. (People v. Vann (1974) 12 Cal.3d 220, 224.) Guilty knowledge that property is stolen “‘need not be that actual and positive knowledge which is acquired from personal observation of the fact.’” (People v. Boyden (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 278, 287.) “‘[P]ossession of stolen property, accompanied by no explanation or unsatisfactory explanation, . . . will justify an inference that the goods were received with knowledge that they were stolen. Corroboration need only be slight and may be furnished by conduct of the defendant tending to show his guilt. [Citations.]’” (People v. Shope (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 816, 821.) “‘Possession of stolen property, accompanied by suspicious circumstances, will justify an inference that the property was received with knowledge that it had been stolen.’” (People v. Barnes (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 740, 745; see People v. Martin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 687, 696 [“Possession of a stolen item in and of itself is a factor which could assist a reasonable person in formulating a strong suspicion that the recipient knew the item was stolen”]; People v. Scaggs (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 339, 352 [“It is also the law that the requisite guilty knowledge can be inferred from circumstantial evidence”].)
Suspicious circumstances abound in this case. Detective Zaragosa’s testimony reflected no one had legally transferred the firearm to Aguilar and it was not registered to him. He was a criminal street gang member, and Officer Lopez noted some guns possessed by gangs and gang members are stolen. (See People v. Stollmack (1937) 18 Cal.App.2d 471, 477 [knowledge may be inferred where property obtained from a person of questionable character].) Most significantly, Aguilar fled from the vehicle while in possession of the gun after police officers attempted to stop the vehicle for a traffic violation. (People v. Taylor (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 979, 983-984 [defendant’s knowledge gun was stolen reasonably could be inferred from his apparent flight].) No evidence suggested an innocent explanation for Aguilar’s possession of the stolen weapon. (See People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1019-1020 [knowledge element routinely inferred from the defendant’s failure to explain how he came to possess a stolen item or his offer of an unsatisfactory explanation or from suspicious circumstances attendant upon his possession of the item].) The jury reasonably could have inferred a gang member who fails to register his firearm and runs from police officers “knew or had reasonable cause to believe” the firearm was stolen. We disagree with Aguilar’s claim the “only reasonable inference” the jury could draw from his failure to register the firearm and his running from police officers was that “he was prohibited from possessing” the gun because he had a prior conviction. As Aguilar notes, the prior conviction allegation was tried to the court. He does not explain how the jury could have drawn this inference.


III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.


ARONSON, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:



FYBEL, J.



IKOLA, J.