Filed 4/13/18 P. v. Alvarez CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Amador)
----




THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BLACKIE FLORENCIO ALVAREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.
C085363

(Super. Ct. Nos. 17CR25830, 16CR25415)




Defendant Blackie Florencio Alvarez appeals from a judgment entered after his no contest plea to carrying a concealed dirk or dagger and admission to a probation violation based upon the same conduct. The trial court issued a certificate of probable cause for defendant’s challenge to the revocation of his pro. per. status preceding these pleas.
Defendant argues the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562] when it revoked his pro. per. status without adequate reasons. He also requests the court correct the probation order to conform to the trial judge’s oral pronouncement striking a $63.50 fee.
Because we find the trial court erred in revoking defendant’s right to represent himself resulting in an automatic reversal under People v. Butler (2009) 47 Cal.4th 814 (Butler), we do not reach the fee issue.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was on probation when on April 3, 2017, the People filed a felony complaint charging him with carrying a concealed dirk or dagger. The same day, the People filed a petition to revoke defendant’s probation for failure to obey all laws based upon this new offense. He appeared in custody on these matters and declined the court’s offer to appoint him an attorney, instead electing to proceed “pro per.”
On June 8, 2017, defendant appeared before Judge Renee Day. The court noted it had reserved time for defendant’s Penal Code section 995 motion, but that no such motion had been filed. In response, defendant objected, stating: “When I requested judicial review, it was not under guidelines of a 995 motion. It was to seek judicial review of your decision [¶] . . . [¶] [a]nd I filed a writ.” The following exchange then occurred leading up to the court’s revocation of defendant’s pro. per. status.
“[Defendant]: And I object to appointing of -- dictating my right to represent myself, Sixth Amendment, and my First Amendment right to address grievances with the government, the Fourteenth Amendment, due process, Fifth Amendment, due process, as well as protections of the laws. It’s kind of causing a bind -- it’s causing a binding, and it’s unfair to the officers and I’m in the county jail, to represent myself.
“THE COURT: All right. Appreciate your comments and objection. Mr. Alvarez, the Court granted your request to represent yourself. Along with that right comes the responsibility to provide effective representation for yourself.
“[Defendant]: Absolutely.
“THE COURT: And the Court finds that that’s not happening.” (Italics added.) The court provided no alternative justification for the revocation.
Thereafter, on June 22, 2017, defendant appeared before a different judge, while represented by counsel, admitting and pleading no contest to carrying a concealed dirk or dagger in both cases. The court sentenced him for both offenses at the same hearing, giving him credit for time served.
DISCUSSION
It is well settled that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments give criminal defendants the right to represent themselves. (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 807, 821 [45 L.Ed.2d at pp. 566, 573-574].) However, it is equally true that the right of self-representation is not limitless. (People v. Becerra (2016) 63 Cal.4th 511, 518.) Relevant to the arguments presented in this case: “ ‘[The] government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer.’ ” (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 253, quoting Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist. (2000) 528 U.S. 152, 161.) As such, deliberate “ ‘serious and obstructionist misconduct’ ” by a defendant may justify revocation of pro. per. status. (Butler, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 825.)
“A ruling revoking a defendant’s in propria persona status is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and ‘will not be disturbed in the absence of a strong showing of clear abuse.’ ” (People v. Doss (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 46, 54, quoting People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 735.) Nonetheless, a trial court abuses its discretion if it bases its revocation ruling on an erroneous understanding of the law. (Doss, at p. 55.)
Here, as noted above, the trial court revoked defendant’s right to represent himself because: “the Court granted your request to represent yourself. Along with that right comes the responsibility to provide effective representation for yourself. [¶] . . . [¶] And the Court finds that that’s not happening.” (Italics added.) This is an error in law. Neither a defendant’s “ ‘technical legal knowledge’ ” nor his “effectiveness” in his defense is relevant to the Faretta inquiry. (Butler, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 824, 828.) “Defendants untrained in the law may well provide themselves with inept representation. But Faretta gives them the right to make a thoroughly disadvantageous decision to act as their own counsel, so long as they are fully advised and cognizant of the risks and consequences of their choice.” (Id. at p. 828.)
The People urge there is ample evidence in the procedural record from which this court may find the trial court impliedly determined defendant was intentionally delaying and obstructing proceedings, thus impinging on the orderly administration of justice.
The court’s review of the record reveals no such evidence. While defendant’s self-representation lasting a few months exhibited his lack of legal training, including mistakes such as an untimely attempt to disqualify the judge pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 and difficulty confining his cross-examination questions to the scope of direct examination, we see nothing from which this court could infer that defendant engaged in the kind of misconduct that threatened to “impair the core integrity” of the proceedings. (See People v. Carson (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1, 11, 13 [recognizing in-court misconduct may be gleaned from the record; court to question whether “misconduct seriously threatened the core integrity of the trial”].)
The People also argue defendant’s hostility toward the judge justifies the revocation of his pro. per. status. After revocation and seemingly in response to the People’s inquiry regarding the trailing probation violation, the defendant stated: “Guard yourself, sister.” Putting aside the ambiguity of the statement and to whom it was made, it is irrelevant to the propriety of the court’s completed ruling. (People v. Becerra, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 520 [subsequent conduct irrelevant to completed and unsupported revocation ruling].)
Erroneous revocation of defendant’s Faretta right is reversible per se. (Butler, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 824-825.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.



/s/
Robie, Acting P. J.



We concur:



/s/
Murray, J.



/s/
Duarte, J.