Filed 5/21/18 P. v. Ankney CA4/3






NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

AMBER RENNEA ANKNEY,

Defendant and Appellant.


G055196

(Super. Ct. No. 15WF2601)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Jonathan S. Fish, Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *

Defendant Amber Rennea Ankney was charged by information with one count of aggravated assault (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), and that she personally inflicted great bodily injury during the commission of the assault (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The information also alleged defendant had a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (d), & (e)(1); 1170.12, subds. (b) & (c)(1)) and two prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
A jury found defendant guilty on the aggravated assault charge, but found the great bodily injury enhancement not true. In a bifurcated bench trial, the court found the alleged prior convictions were true. The court granted the People’s motion to dismiss one of the prison priors, granted defendant’s motion to strike the punishment for the prior strike pursuant to section 1385 and struck the remaining prison prior for sentencing purposes only. The court sentenced defendant to a state prison term of seven years, comprised of the low term of two years for the aggravated assault and a consecutive five years pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Defendant was credited with 298 days of actual custody and conduct credit of 298 days for total credits of 596 days.
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal and we appointed counsel to represent her. Counsel did not argue against defendant, but advised the court he was unable to find an issue to argue on defendant’s behalf. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was given the opportunity to file written argument on her own behalf, but she has not done so.
We have examined the entire record but have not found an arguable issue on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

FACTS

In accordance with our usual standard of review on appeal, we recite the facts “in the light most favorable to the judgment . . . .” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)
The assault in this case grew out of an apparent love triangle. About one week before the stabbing incident that led to the charges in this case, defendant told Julie Cruz, the future victim, that defendant was in a sexual relationship with a man named “Junior.” She said she was letting Cruz know about the relationship because she suspected “something was going on” between Cruz and Junior. Cruz and Junior were “just friends at that time.” Defendant said “something about stabbing” Cruz, although Cruz could not remember the words defendant used. But Cruz understood the words to be a threat “to stay away from” Junior and to “not mess with him.”
Defendant and Cruz had a second interaction that day. Cruz went to a swap meet about one mile away near closing time. While there, less than an hour later, defendant approached Cruz again and “got in [her] face and was saying stuff.” Cruz again could not remember exactly what was said, but “it was still over the nonsense with Junior.”
About one week later, defendant and Cruz got into a heated telephone conversation about Junior. Defendant was accusing Cruz of “being more than friends with Junior.” After the phone call ended, Cruz went to the home of Junior’s parents. Cruz, who was homeless, usually stayed at or near Junior’s parents’ residence. Defendant pulled up in a truck as Cruz was entering the front yard of the home. Defendant got out and started coming toward Cruz. Defendant was yelling and screaming at Cruz. Junior was there at the time, and defendant told Junior she was going to stab Cruz. Junior said, “No you’re not,” and then left. Cruz swung at defendant, but did not connect. Cruz headed toward a trailer parked in the driveway, grabbed a toy guitar that was in the area, climbed up on a fender covering the trailer’s wheel, and swung the toy guitar, hitting defendant in the shoulder area. Defendant then stuck a sharp object into Cruz’s thigh, pulled the object out, and left. Cruz saw blood squirting out of her leg and she began screaming. Police and paramedics arrived and transported Cruz to the hospital. The stab wound was about one-inch long and two inches deep.
Eight days after the attack, a police officer spotted defendant and attempted a traffic stop. Defendant fled, but was later apprehended in a neighboring community. Defendant denied being at the scene of the stabbing.

DISCUSSION

To assist the court in its independent review (Anders v. State of California (1967) 386 U.S. 738), counsel suggested we consider whether the inadvertent violation of an in limine order was prejudicial, In a pretrial hearing, the court granted defendant’s motion to exclude the use of her alleged moniker, “Temper.” During trial, however, a police detective blurted out the moniker “Temper” without specifically identifying defendant as the person to which he referred.
The detective was initially called to testify about his interview with defendant following her arrest. On redirect examination, however, he was asked about another officer’s role in the investigation. Here is how he answered:
“A Officer Krok had identified that an assault had occurred on a shift that he was not on. He recognized some of the names that were involved in the case, and because of his working knowledge of the nickname ‘Temper’ —
“[Defense Counsel]: Objection. 402’s.
“The Court: Sustained.
“[Defense Counsel]: Motion to strike.
“The Court: Stricken.”
Following a sidebar discussion. The court admonished the jury, saying: “You’re ordered to — I’m striking that testimony about what Officer Krok has done. None of it really is relevant. You’re ordered not to speculate about the meaning of anything you just heard. [¶] Ask your next question please.”
The inadvertent violation of the in limine order was manifestly not prejudicial. First, defendant was not expressly identified as being the subject of the moniker. Second, the jury was properly admonished to disregard the detective’s statement. Third, the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. Not only did Cruz identify defendant as her assailant, defendant showed a consciousness of guilt when she fled, not only after the stabbing, but eight days later when the police attempted to apprehend her. Another witness testified that she dropped defendant off when defendant spotted Cruz, but then left. So defendant and Cruz were alone together, and during that time Cruz suffered a deep stab wound in her leg. It is not reasonably probable that a more favorable result would have been obtained in the absence of the detective’s inadvertent use of the moniker. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.)
After undertaking an independent review of the entire record, we are unable to find any error reasonably arguable on appeal.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.



IKOLA, J.

WE CONCUR:



O’LEARY, P. J.



MOORE, J.