P. v. Baca

Filed 6/21/06 P. v. Baca CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

Daniel Emil Baca appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court found he was a mentally disordered offender (MDO) and committed him to the California Department of Mental Health for treatment. (Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq.)^[1] Appellant contends the evidence does not support the finding that his severe mental disorder was not in remission or could not be kept in remission without treatment. (§ 2962, subd. (a).) We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2000, appellant was charged with attempted murder, found not guilty by reason of insanity, and committed to a state hospital for treatment. (§ 1026.) While at Napa State Hospital, he assaulted two female staff workers in an escape attempt. Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, served a prison sentence, and paroled to Atascadero State Hospital (ASH) for treatment. (§ 2962.)

At ASH, appellant attacked a fellow patient with a homemade weapon. Appellant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, served a prison sentence, and was transferred back to ASH for treatment.

On July 20, 2005, the Board of Prison Terms (BPT) certified that appellant was an MDO. Appellant filed a petition challenging the BPT finding and waived jury trial. (§ 2966, subd. (b).) It was undisputed that appellant was subject to a dual commitment based on the section 1026 hold for attempted murder and the MDO hold (§ 2962) for aggravated assault at Napa State Hospital.

Doctor Robert Knapp, appellant's treating psychiatrist, testified that appellant suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia, a severe mental disorder. Appellant was receiving antipsychotic medication, Risperidone, which controlled the more overt symptoms of the mental illness such as auditory hallucinations and multiple delusions. Doctor Knapp opined that appellant met all the MDO criteria and "would not take medications were it not for the fact that the [section] 1026 hold allows us to prescribe medications involuntarily."

Failure to Voluntarily Follow Treatment Plan

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the judgment, we resolve all evidentiary conflicts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court's decision. (People v. Poe (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 826, 830.) In a sufficiency of the evidence appeal, we may not redetermine the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. (Ibid.) The testimony of a single qualified expert is sufficient to support the trial court's findings. (See e.g., People v. Valdez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1017.) Appellant argues that the lack of remission criteria was not met because he takes his medication and exhibits no overt symptoms of the mental disorder. Doctor Knapp testified that the "flagrant" symptoms appear to be controlled but appellant continues "to show a massive denial of illness, which is a component of the illness." Even with the medication, appellant shows signs of mental illness such as thought disorganization and blunting of affect. Doctor Knapp stated that appellant was "reluctant" to take his medication, had to be carefully monitored, and was not voluntarily following the prescribed treatment plan. Appellant contends that his "reluctance" to take the medication is not a refusal and that he is following his treatment plan. The argument is without merit. Doctor Knapp testified that appellant takes his medication "only because it's been given to him involuntarily" based on the 1026 commitment. (See e.g., In re Locks (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 890, 893 [defendant subject to section 1026 involuntary commitment has no right to refuse medication], criticized on other grounds In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 26-27 & fn. 6.) Hospital staff have not had to force medication down his throat because appellant is aware of his section 1026 commitment terms.

The MDO Act provides that a defendant's failure to voluntarily follow his treatment plan may be grounds for finding that he cannot be kept in remission without treatment. (§ 2962, subd. (a)^[2]; People v. Beeson (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1400; People v. Burroughs (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1405.) That is the case here. Appellant takes his medication, but not on his own volition. He told Doctor Knapp that he only takes his medication because he is forced to do so. Appellant denies that he is mentally ill or needs his medication and continues to show signs of mental illness. "A reasonable person, whose mental disorder can be kept in remission with treatment, must, at minimum acknowledge if possible the seriousness of his mental illness and cooperate in all the mandatory components of his treatment plan." (People v. Beeson, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1399.)

Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that appellant met all the MDO criteria, was not in remission, and was a substantial danger to others. In the words of Doctor Knapp, appellant "has a well established pattern of dangerousness, [is] impulsive, very hard to predict, . . . [and] has no apparent qualms about using whatever level of force he feels necessary to accomplish his end."

The MDO law is intended to protect the public from certain prisoners with dangerous, treatable mental disorders and to provide treatment for those prisoners. (People v. Superior Court (Myers) (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 826, 830.) Appellant's dual status as a section 1206 hospital patient does not exempt him from the requirement that he voluntarily and reasonably follow his treatment plan. (§ 2962, subd. (a); In re Qwai, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 24; People v. Beeson, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1399-1400.)

The judgment (order of commitment) is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J.

PERREN, J.

John A. Trice, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Mary Sanchez and Robert F. Katz, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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^[1] All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

^[2] Section 2962, subdivision (a) provides that a person cannot be kept in remission without treatment where the person "has not voluntarily followed the treatment plan. In determining if a person has voluntarily followed the treatment plan, the standard shall be whether the person has acted as a reasonable person would in following the treatment plan."