Filed 4/13/18 P. v. Bishop CA5





NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOSHUA GLENN BISHOP,

Defendant and Appellant.

F076079

(Super. Ct. No. MCR056467)


OPINION

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Ernest J. LiCalsi, Judge.
Robert Navarro, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen G. Herndon and Darren K. Indermill, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant Joshua Glenn Bishop contends on appeal the trial court violated the terms of his negotiated plea agreement when it sentenced him to three years rather than the agreed-upon two. The People concede and we agree. The parties also agree, as do we, that the matter must be remanded for sentencing in accordance with the plea agreement.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On June 30, 2017, in case No. MCR056467, defendant pled guilty to misdemeanor flight from a pursuing officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.1, subd. (a); count 1) and felony receipt of a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a); count 3). The negotiated plea agreement provided that defendant would receive the middle term of two years on count 3 and credit for time served on count 1. Defendant admitted violating probation in two other cases (case Nos. MCR049130 and MCR051082), and the plea bargain provided that the court would sentence defendant on these two violations in its discretion with a potential additional two years. Defendant’s plea form stated that defendant had not been promised anything to enter into the plea other than two years on count 3 and credit for time served on count 1. The form noted that no agreement had been made for sentencing on his violation of probation admissions. The clerk noted in the minute order that defendant pled guilty on count 3 for two years, and on count 1 for credit for time served.
On July 31, 2017, at the sentencing hearing, the judge and both counsel were different than those present at the plea hearing. At this hearing, there was no mention of the plea agreement, and the discussion that took place suggested no one was aware of its existence. Defense counsel argued for the middle term, while the prosecutor argued that the probation report made a good case for imposing the aggravated term and he noted that the report erroneously referred to two years as the aggravated term. The court stated it had read and considered the probation report. We observe, however, that the report stated: “[T]he defendant has entered into a stipulated plea agreement to receive the median term of two years on Count Three. In Count One the defendant is to receive credit for time served.” The trial court discussed the aggravating factors, then sentenced defendant to the aggravated term of three years on count 3, and granted credit for time served on count 1. The court sentenced defendant to 364 days for each violation of probation, to be served concurrently to one another, but consecutively to the term on count 3.
DISCUSSION
As a general rule, a plea bargain approved by the trial court is enforceable under contract principles. (People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1024, overruled on other grounds in People v. Villalobos (2012) 54 Cal.4th 177, 183.) “When a guilty plea is entered in exchange for specific benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum punishment, both parties, including the state, must abide by the terms of the agreement. The punishment may not significantly exceed that which the parties agreed upon.” (Ibid.)
“Traditionally, courts have viewed plea agreements ‘using the paradigm of contract law. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Analogizing to contract law, courts examining plea bargains ‘should look first to the specific language of the agreement to ascertain the expressed intent of the parties. [Citations.] Beyond that, the courts should seek to carry out the parties’ reasonable expectations.’ ” (People v. Knox (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1458.) Further, “plea agreements are interpreted according to the general rule ‘that ambiguities are construed in favor of the defendant. Focusing on the defendant’s reasonable understanding also reflects the proper constitutional focus on what induced the defendant to plead guilty.’ ” (People v. Toscano (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 340, 345.)
Here, the parties agree, and the record clearly supports the conclusion, that the plea bargain promised defendant a two-year sentence on count 3 and credit for time served on count 1. The trial court’s imposition of a three-year term on count 3 significantly exceeded the agreed-upon two-year term and violated the terms of the plea agreement.

DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated and the matter remanded to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with the plea agreement. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.