P. v. Braun

Filed 10/24/06 P. v. Braun CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Jacqueline Stern, Judge. Affirmed.

Defendants Lynn Braun and Russell Marr, acting in propria persona, appeal from a judgment in favor of the City of Encinitas (City) following the trial court's entry of default against them in City's civil suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. City's abatement action concerned a structure located on defendants' property that City alleged was an unlawful garage conversion without a building permit. Defendants contend that during the proceedings of the case they were denied due process of law; City's inspection warrant was improperly issued and executed; City's summons and complaint was uncertain and defective; they were denied a public abatement hearing; and they were improperly subjected to a permanent injunction and a lien for excessive costs and fees. Because defendants have not shown any basis to reverse the default judgment, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND^[1]

The proceedings leading to the court's entry of default against defendants are lengthy, but we need only briefly summarize the facts and relevant proceedings from the clerk's and reporter's transcripts. On August 30, 2002, City commenced this action against defendants and Does 1 through 99. City alleged defendants co-owned property in Encinitas that was zoned for one dwelling unit per lot, and that following execution of an inspection warrant, code enforcement officers discovered that defendants maintained a garage area that had been converted into habitable space without a building permit. It alleged the converted area was being used as a dwelling unit in violation of Encinitas Municipal Code sections 30.16.010(A) and (B), 30.01.090(A) and (B), 30.08.010(A), and 30.01.090(A) and (B). City further alleged its officials gave Braun notice of the violations and an opportunity to cure, but defendants had not cured the illegal use and condition of their property. City sought a judicial declaration to clarify the parties' rights with respect to Encinitas zoning laws, and defendants' duty to bring it into code compliance or cease its use. City also requested an injunction, inter alia, requiring defendants to cease using the converted garage space until it was legalized or reconverted to garage space. The filing of City's complaint was preceded by an inspection of defendants' garage by a City code enforcement officer under an inspection warrant issued on August 20, 2002.

Defendants unsuccessfully demurred to City's complaint. In April 2003, City moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting defendants from making residential use of their garage building. In a tentative ruling, the court granted the injunction. In July 2003, it confirmed its ruling and issued a warrant for posting of the injunction after hearing oral argument from all of the parties. Thereafter, defendants filed pleadings that the court construed as a motion for reconsideration of its order, as well as an application for stay of the injunction's posting on the property. The court denied the motion and application. A week later, the court granted a continuing warrant for inspection and monitoring of the injunction's posting on the property, based on evidence indicating defendants had removed the notices.

In October 2003, City moved for and obtained an order compelling defendants to appear for their depositions. In November 2003, City applied ex parte for orders

(1) compelling defendants' depositions under specified procedures, (2) to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt based on their asserted violations of orders regarding the posting of the injunction on their property and the injunction itself; (3) requiring defendants to remove a deadbolt lock from their front gate; (4) quashing subpoenas duces tecum that defendants attempted to serve upon a City Council member and City Clerk; and (5) rescheduling the trial date. The court issued a detailed order for the conduct of defendants' depositions and document production indicating that if the order was not obeyed the court would entertain a motion to strike defendants' answer and enter a default judgment. It vacated the trial date. City later successfully quashed the subpoenas served on City officers and employees. A different superior court judge issued the order quashing the subpoenas after the previous judge recused herself from the matter.^[2]

Throughout the proceedings defendants filed responsive papers making a host of arguments for relief, mostly consisting of challenges to the sufficiency of the complaint, the propriety of the inspection warrant, and generally City's attempts to serve papers upon them.

In January 2004, City served a demand to inspect defendants' property and designated experts to conduct the inspection and interpret the residential property records. Defendants responded with a motion for a protective order or alternatively to dismiss City's case. They also objected to the inspection demand in part on grounds the time for discovery had ended. City moved to compel compliance with the inspection demand. The court denied defendant's motion for protective order. It ordered the inspection of defendants' property to proceed under specified circumstances, at a mutually agreed time.

The inspection of defendants' premises never took place despite several further court orders for the inspection obtained by City on an ex parte basis. The court was notified at trial call that the inspection had not occurred. City's counsel indicated it would seek an issue sanction that for purposes of trial it would be conclusively presumed that the residential improvements to the garage took place when there was a legal requirement for a building permit for such improvement. The trial court asked what the consequence would be if it struck defendants' answer. Later, at City's request, it issued an order shortening time for City's motion.

City thereafter moved for a terminating sanction seeking that defendants' answer be stricken and they be declared in default, as well as a monetary sanction for the property inspector's fees. Defendants responded by filing a request for a stay or alternatively for an evidentiary hearing on the motion. The court denied defendants' request for an evidentiary hearing, and, with detailed findings, granted City's motion for terminating sanctions. It denied City's request for monetary sanctions. The court ordered City to submit notices of entry of default and schedule a default prove-up hearing within 60 days of its ruling.

The court entered defendants' default on June 7, 2004, and set a default prove up hearing, which took place on July 16, 2004. City presented testimony from the City's senior code enforcement officer, Marianne Buscemi, who had executed the inspection warrant revealing defendants' garage was being used as habitable space, and an expert appraiser from the San Diego County Assessor's Office. In part, Officer Buscemi identified photographs she had taken showing a kitchen with countertops, a refrigerator, sink and stove, and a fish tank within defendants' structure. She testified that on her personal inspection she found the unit also had a full bath, bed, knick-knacks and a fan, all indicating it was being used as habitable space. The appraiser testified that nothing in the records indicated that defendants' garage had received the requisite building permits to be converted into a dwelling.

Finding City had proved its case, the court entered a final judgment in City's favor on July 19, 2004. Thereafter, City applied for and obtained an order awarding it over $94,000 in attorney fees and costs. Defendants appeal from the default judgment and the order awarding attorney fees and costs.

DISCUSSION

I. Principles of Appellate Review

Asserting that this appeal involves "basic questions of constitutional rights and equal protection under the law" defendants ask us to review this matter de novo. They maintain that such review will reveal a "clear pattern of legal error" and "evident bias." Defendants cite no authority for this proposition and we find none.

In resolving defendants' contentions, we apply settled standards of appellate review. Specifically, "it is settled that: 'A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.' " (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)

" 'A necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.' " (Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.)

All litigants, including those acting in pro per (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247), are bound by the rule that "[t]he reviewing court is not required to make an independent, unassisted study of the record in search of error or grounds to support the judgment. It is entitled to the assistance of counsel. Accordingly, every brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration." (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 594,

p. 627.) Points are deemed abandoned when they are entirely unsupported by argument or reference to the record. (City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239; Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699; Renden v. Geneva Development Corp. (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 578, 591; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 14(a)(1)(C) ["Each brief must . . . . . . . . . support any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the record"].) And, relevant to this appeal, "[a]rguments should be tailored according to the applicable standard of appellate review." (Sebago, Inc. v. City of Alameda (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1372, 1388.)

II. Claimed Due Process Violations

Defendants contend they have been subjected to "prejudicial legal error" by a series of due process violations occurring throughout the case. They sweepingly challenge not only the court's entry of default, ensuing judgment and the award of fees and costs, but virtually every other order including the grant of preliminary and permanent injunctions, and discovery-related orders as having been entered without notice or hearing and without due consideration of their objections. Defendants characterize the proceedings as "inequitable," "incorrect," "improper," the cost award as "excessive," and claim to have suffered discovery abuse by "misconduct, oppression and intimidation." They challenge the injunctions as improper on grounds City's complaint was not verified and the inspection warrant was not returned in compliance with the law.

In short, defendants engage in broad, unsupported conclusions that we are unable to meaningfully address. Their assertions and arguments are not supported by case authorities or legal analysis demonstrating error in the proceedings. "An appellate court is not required to examine undeveloped claims, nor to make arguments for parties." (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106.) Further, although defendants provide clerk's transcript references to the court's final judgment, the order awarding costs and fees, and a portion of City's points and authorities quoting Encinitas Municipal Code section 1.08.060,^[3] their assertions of misconduct or error are entirely absent record support.^[4] In keeping with the above-stated appellate review principles, we will not draw a presumption of impropriety in the many varied proceedings challenged by defendants.

Nor will we refer back to defendants' lengthy "Statement of Facts/Procedural Background" and its record citations, to import their assertions of procedural defects. (City of Lincoln v. Barringer, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239, fn. 16.) First, in the face of such sweeping claims, we cannot undertake (and it is not our task) to pick and choose the portions of defendants' brief that we may think are applicable to each assertion. Further, the California Rules of Court require a record citation for each reference in the brief, regardless of where that reference appears in the brief. As the court in Barringer explains, "This is consistent with former [California Rules of Court,] rule 15, which required a record citation for '[t]he statement of any matter in the record.' [Citation.] Moreover, it is the only construction consistent with the purpose of the citation requirement, which is to enable appellate justices and staff attorneys to locate relevant portions of the record expeditiously without thumbing through and rereading earlier portions of a brief." (Barringer, at p. 1239, fn. 16.)

Even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that impropriety occurred, defendants have not affirmatively demonstrated any prejudice resulting from these claimed errors. In evaluating the effect of error we are governed by article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution, which precludes reversal unless " 'the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.' " (See Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800-802.) A "miscarriage of justice" occurs when it appears there is a reasonable probability that the appealing party would have realized a more favorable result in the absence of the error; probability in this context meaning merely a

" 'reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.' " (Id. at p. 800.) Under Cassim, we are required to examine " 'each individual case to determine whether prejudice actually occurred in light of the entire record.' " (Id. at pp. 801-802.) Defendants, as appellants here, have the burden of showing that the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (County of Los Angeles v. Nobel Ins. Co. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 939, 945; Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 105 [appellant bears the duty of spelling out in his brief exactly how the error caused a miscarriage of justice].) Defendants do not explain how the purported errors in the various pretrial proceedings ultimately contributed to or resulted in the default judgment, which was entered after the trial court concluded they had refused to permit a property inspection to take place. Defendants' unsupported and conclusory assertions that the trial court's actions caused them prejudice is insufficient to establish reversible error under these settled appellate standards.

III. Claims Relating to the Inspection Warrant

Defendants challenge the August 20, 2002 inspection warrant on several grounds. They maintain that at some unspecified point in the proceedings, they had alleged the warrant and the accompanying affidavit by Officer Buscemi was "wrongfully executed," contained irrelevant matter and intentional misrepresentations, and was procured as a result of "improper exparte communications and discovery abuses . . . ." They obscurely assert that the "improperly issued warrant was executed outside of the bounds of the language of the warrant itself, which clearly refers to the garage area, and does not specifically authorize a search of areas used for habitation, which may be attached to, but are not located within our garage area, and which have no pass-through thereto." Citing Code of Civil Procedure section 1822.50 et seq., defendants argue the warrant was not "returned within the time prescribed by law . . . or spelled out on the face of the warrant." Finally, they assert that despite several requests, they were not permitted an evidentiary hearing with an opportunity to cross-examine any expert or percipient witnesses.

As with defendants' due process challenge, these broad and nonspecific assertions are not accompanied by record citations or any coherent or meaningful legal argument. For that reason alone, we may disregard them as abandoned. Nevertheless, the nature of the warrant at issue and our review of the governing statutory scheme, the warrant's scope, and the contents of Officer Buscemi's affidavit, reveals no procedural impropriety in the August 20, 2002 inspection warrant or abuse of discretion in its issuance.

An administrative warrant is simply an inspection warrant allowing an administrative agency to conduct an assessment to determine "whether physical conditions exist which do not comply with minimum standards prescribed in local regulatory ordinances." (Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523, 530.) Such searches are "conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose," rather than as part of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime. (United States v. Davis (1973) 482 F.2d 893, 908.) As such, a lesser showing of cause is needed to obtain an administrative warrant than in the case of a criminal search warrant, and is a less hostile intrusion than the search for the fruits and instrumentalities of the crime. (Camara, at p. 530.)

In California, Code of Civil Procedure section 1822.50 et seq. governs inspection warrants. An inspection warrant by definition "is an order, in writing, in the name of the people, signed by a judge of a court of record, directed to a state or local official, commanding him to conduct any inspection required or authorized by state or local law or regulation relating to building, fire, safety, plumbing, electrical, health, labor, or zoning." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1822.50.) Unless other state or federal standards apply, an inspection warrant must be issued upon cause and supported by affidavit particularly describing the premises to be searched and the purpose of the inspection, and containing a statement that consent for the search was sought and refused or circumstances justified the failure to seek consent. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1822.51.) Cause is deemed to exist if "either reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting a routine or area inspection are satisfied with respect to the particular place . . . or there is reason to believe that a condition of nonconformity exists with respect to the particular place, dwelling, structure, premises, or vehicle." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1822.52; see also Michigan v. Clifford (1984) 464 U.S. 287, 294, fn. 5.) "The statutes governing administrative warrants vest substantial discretion in the court to determine probable cause and provide special protections not present in the criminal context." (County of Contra Costa v. Humore, Inc. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1351.) The judge may examine the affiant and any other witness before satisfying him or herself that there are grounds to issue the warrant. (Ibid.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1822.53.) Further, "the civil warrant is less intrusive: the owner or occupant must be present -- and forcible entry is prohibited -- except upon express authorization to the contrary by the judge upon a reasonable showing; and, where prior consent has been sought and refused, notice that a warrant has issued must be given 24 hours before execution unless 'immediate execution is reasonably necessary in the circumstances shown.' " (County of Contra Costa, at p. 1351, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 1822.56.) In Officer Buscemi's affidavit for the inspection warrant, Buscemi averred her belief that defendants' garage had been illegally converted to a habitable space based on her having personally viewed the garage area from a public right-of-way and from reports by neighbors. She specified that a garage conversion without building permits was in violation of Uniform Building Code section 106.1. She stated based on attached e-mails from defendant Braun that Braun had a hostile attitude toward her and City, and would not consent to the inspection without a warrant. These assertions sufficiently demonstrated cause, i.e., "reason to believe that a condition of nonconformity exists with respect to the particular place," and complied with the above-referenced standards requiring a showing as to why consent was not obtained. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1822.51, 1822.52; accord, Department. of Toxic Substances Control v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1425.) Defendants have not shown otherwise. Further, the warrant at issue provided it was valid for fourteen calendar days commencing at the time of signing. Other than their bare assertion the warrant was not "returned" in a timely fashion, defendants have not shown by reference to the record that the warrant at issue was not "executed and returned to the judge by whom it was issued within the time specified in the warrant . . . " (Code Civ. Proc., § 1822.55.) Absent such a showing, we presume in City's favor that the warrant was returned in a timely manner.

As for defendants' contention they were denied a hearing, they have not identified any authority entitling them to an evidentiary hearing with the right to cross-examine witnesses. Assuming they were referring to the right to a hearing under Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 (Franks), we conclude they have not demonstrated on appeal that they made the requisite showing in the trial court to justify such an evidentiary hearing. Under Franks, "[w]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request." (Franks, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 155-156.) If the defendant establishes perjury or reckless disregard by a preponderance of the evidence, and the affidavit's remaining content after its false statements are excised is insufficient to justify a finding of probable cause, the search warrant is voided, and the evidence excluded. (Ibid.) However, affidavits supporting search warrants are presumed valid. (Franks, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 171.) And in order to secure an evidentiary hearing, the defendant must make more than conclusory allegations, and the claims must be supported by more than "a mere desire to cross-examine." (Ibid.) The defendant must allege deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth, not merely negligence or innocent mistake, accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons. Affidavits should be furnished, or their absence explained. (Ibid.) Whether a defendant's showing is sufficient to require a Franks hearing is a question of law and is reviewed de novo upon appeal, as is the trial court's determination whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. (People v. Box (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 177, 183.) Defendants do not describe the showing they made before the trial court, and we are not required to search the record to ascertain the reasons, if any, they gave for such a hearing. We reject their assertion for lack of any demonstrated basis justifying an evidentiary hearing on the veracity of the warrant affidavit.

IV. Summons and Complaint

Defendants contend City's complaint was improperly served, absent cognizable causes of action, unverified, and erroneously combined remedies into a "quasi-criminal action." They further assert its allegations were uncertain. We disregard these conclusory and disjointed assertions. Defendants' arguments should be made in the context of a challenge to the trial court's order overruling the defendants' demurrer to City's complaint. But defendants make no meaningful attempt to discuss the legal requirements or appellate review standards for a demurrer, how those standards were met, how the court erred in overruling the demurrers, and how any error resulted in prejudice. There is no basis to reverse the judgment on the stated grounds.

V. Public Hearing

Without record citation or case authority, defendants assert they did not have an opportunity to participate or offer testimony in a "public abatement hearing" before code enforcement officials or the City Council before City took action against them. They do not provide us with any support for the proposition that they were entitled to such a hearing, and we will not create arguments for them. Defendants' bare assertion does not provide any basis to reverse the judgment.

VI. Award of Costs and Attorney Fees

Defendants challenge the trial court's award of attorney fees and costs to City, which assertedly resulted in recordation of a lien on their property.^[5] They argue the lien "is not specifically allowed by law" and was imposed without notice and without a prayer for such a lien in City's complaint. Defendants argue that the Encinitas Municipal Code section on which City relied in its application for attorney fees did not become effective until March of 2003, after City filed its complaint, and that the relevant code section did not provide for City's recovery of reasonable costs and attorney fees.

We are again without reference to case law or other authority for defendants' contentions. Assuming defendants sought to raise an issue of improper retroactive application of a municipal code to the present circumstances, there is simply no discussion of the principles applicable to that topic. "Where a point is merely asserted by counsel without any argument of or authority for its proposition, it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion." (People v. Ham (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 768, 783, disapproved on another ground in People v. Compton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 55, 60, fn. 3; People v. Sierra (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1690, 1693, fn. 2.)

We are sympathetic to the difficulties of litigants who elect or are forced to represent themselves in litigation. However, as we have stated, " 'When a litigant is appearing in propria persona, [s]he is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys. . . . Further, the in propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney.' " (Bianco v. California Highway Patrol (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1125-1126.) Applying these standards, we are compelled to uphold the default judgment, as defendants have not affirmatively shown any prejudicial error.

VII. Defendants' Other Filings

A. Objections to City's Post-Briefing Submissions

Defendants object to City's June 1, 2006 lodgment of exhibits on appeal and to a letter filed on June 7, 2006, in which City's counsel addresses his understandings regarding whether defendants had properly submitted a motion to strike City's brief. With respect to the exhibits, defendants apparently assert they are not the same exhibits as those provided by City at the default prove-up hearing, and the record does not show they were filed, admitted into evidence, refused or lodged as to be properly transmitted to this court under California Rules of Court, rule 18. Defendants further assert they were "not given an adversarial hearing" in the trial court to make objections or challenge the exhibits proffered at the default prove-up hearing. City has lodged with this court a binder containing Exhibits 1 through 12. Our review of the record shows that the binder was provided to the trial court and all but Exhibits 4, 5 and 7 were referenced and relied upon by City and its witnesses at the default prove-up hearing. Based on the record, there is no merit to defendants' contention that these exhibits were not lodged in the trial court. Because we have not relied upon City's exhibits in reaching our conclusions, we need not further address defendants' objections.

As for City's letter addressing whether or not defendants had properly filed a motion to strike City's brief, two days later counsel for City advised this court that the defendants' motion to strike had been found; that at the time of his letter the motion had been misplaced in City's internal mail processing system and he was prepared to file a formal response. As a result, we have not considered the contents of the challenged letter, and need not address defendants' objection.

B. Defendants' Motions to Augment and Request for Judicial Notice

In two separate filings, defendants have moved to augment the record and request that we take judicial notice of various documents, California Rules of Court, San Diego Superior Court rules, statutes and constitutional provisions.

Defendants' August 14, 2006 request consists of a lengthy rehash of their varied due process assertions which would assertedly show a "pattern of prejudicial error"; they broadly ask us to judicially notice all pleadings and exhibits they filed, all minutes and orders in the Clerk's Transcript and all documents they lodged with this court, and make various "finding[s]" as to the constitutionality and propriety of their and City's conduct on the day the property inspector arrived to inspect their property, as to the veracity of Officer Buscemi's affidavit in support of the inspection warrant, and as to the propriety of notice given defendants on many other varied occasions. They attach what appear to be re-typed provisions of the California Constitution and Code of Civil Procedure provisions on inspection warrants and discovery. We grant defendants' request for judicial notice of those laws as they appear in the official codes. We deny their request as to the remaining attached documents for lack of an adequate showing of relevance.

As for the requests filed on August 21, 2006, defendants ask us to judicially notice a January 1999 letter from the Director of Code Enforcement for the City, as well as California Rules of Court, rules 211 (pertaining to the conduct of case management conferences) and 207.1 (pertaining to the time for service of the complaint) and San Diego Superior Court local rules pertaining to "General Polices and Procedures" and special case procedures. They argue the documents, particularly the letter, are relevant in that they show City's "neglect," and to the "fact that jurisdiction of this case is barred by the Statute of Limitations." Setting aside defendants' unsupported request that we make various credibility findings concerning Officer Buscemi's testimony and the difficulty we have in grasping their arguments, we observe defendants did not make a meaningful statute of limitations argument in their opening appellate brief, and thus even assuming we were to grant the request for judicial notice, we would conclude there is no relevance in the requested court rules. Further, we deny defendants request to augment the record with the 1999 letter on grounds this court is not the forum for the presentation of evidence that was not before the trial court. (See Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184, fn. 1; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal,

§ 578, p. 613.) While defendants assert City had the 1999 letter on file and claim it was "referenced" by Braun in a hearing and in an e-mail appearing in the record, there is nothing indicating the letter or its contents were before the trial court.

C. Objections Pertaining to Title of Action

Defendants have filed objections to "[City's] improper altering of the correct title of this action with respect to Plaintiff/Respondent's identity and official capacity," which defendants assert was changed "without leave of court" after the case had been deemed at issue. Their criticism seems to be that the caption of the action did not originally reflect that the action was being brought on City's behalf, was improperly changed later to do so, and that the error caused confusion over who was actually a party to the case. Defendants also object to what they claim is City's noncompliance with a myriad of California and San Diego local court rules, which they assert has caused some unspecified prejudice. Defendants again ask us to take judicial notice of various California Rules of Court and San Diego Superior Court Local Rules based on the attachment of re-typed provisions, as well as a photocopied excerpt from the California Style Manual (4th ed. 2000) section 6:11, pages 220-221. As before, we grant judicial notice of the court rules, but only as they appear in the official codes.

Interspersed with defendants' objections are claims that the superior court showed a "pattern of bias," that City's complaint was not properly served, that City's request for entry of default was not properly served, that the case management conference was not timely accomplished, and that the court "unjustly" awarded costs and fees.

We have searched defendants' lengthy paper for their showing of prejudice, and it appears to be this from defendant Braun: "I know that I have been prejudiced because Plaintiff did not verify its complaint and did not allow an evidentiary hearing, after Defendants' noticed motion, which would allow for cross-examination of witnesses, to determine the true nature of the party identified as Plaintiff, now as Respondent. . . .

. . . "The fact that Plaintiff/Respondent has not complied with the rules has caused confusion and delay and has severely prejudiced low-income defendants/appellants, in that the Superior Court, long after discovery should have been statutorily concluded, terminated Appellants defenses, allegedly due to our 'discovery abuse.' " Braun also states: "I know that I have been confused by the lack of accountability of Plaintiff/Respondent, and the City of Encinitas. I know that I have not been fairly

heard . . . through an evidentiary hearing, through a trial, or before Encinitas City Council, at an open, agendized hearing, where I have been allowed to provide conclusive evidence that the improvements on my property were permitted, and that I have not done any enhancements or additions which would require a permit, or violate any zoning ordinance."

Such statements do not establish error or prejudice with respect to City's actions or conduct on appeal. Rather, they constitute a reiteration of arguments from defendants' briefs, which we decline to address.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

O'ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, Acting P. J.

NARES, J.

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Analysis and review provided by Escondido Property line attorney.

^[1] Defendants provide a lengthy and rambling recitation of the proceedings in this matter that is heavily interspersed with unsupported assertions and conclusory arguments suggesting procedural improprieties. The factual summary is unhelpful because defendants do not tie it in any way to their appellate contentions. As stated below, we will not refer back to defendants' factual statement in an attempt to identify relevant proceedings, but even if we elected to do so, we would be unable to apply the arguments because they unaccompanied by comprehensible or reasoned legal analysis.

^[2] The court's order of recusal states that the court was verbally accosted by defendants in the parking lot where Braun's deposition was being taken at Encinitas City Hall, and that defendants took photographs of the judge without her permission.

^[3] This citation is made in reference to defendants' apparent assertion that the court entered an "incorrect monetary judgment for damages" without prior notice or hearing to them. The referenced code section was cited in City's points and authorities in support of its application for costs and fees, and provides that, "In seeking a civil judgment against any person who creates, causes, commits or maintains a public nuisance within the City, the City may seek an award of damages in an amount equal to the expenses incurred by the City in abating the nuisance, including court costs, related administrative costs, and reasonable attorney's fees." (Encinitas Muni. Code, § 1.08.060.) Defendants do not explain (and we do not see) how this code section supports defendants' claim of error.

^[4] Defendants assert without supporting record citations, for example, that "[t]hroughout the case, Defendants/Appellants objections have been overruled without hearing, or have been completely unaddressed; motions for protective orders, evidentiary hearing [sic] were denied, all showing an escalating pattern of prejudicial legal error. Although a final judgment of default was entered and our defenses were terminated, Defendants/Appellants have not been proven to have committed discovery abuse; rather we have suffered discovery abuse by misconduct, oppression and intimidation against us. The lack of any fair hearing, with cross-examination, in a court of law, amounts to prejudice per se."

^[5] In this section of their brief, entitled "Case was not ever properly put at issue," defendants also make reference to the "improperly imposed and served permanent injunction" and further assert "there is no evidence of a garage conversion or a zoning violation." The first argument is so conclusory that we are unable to meaningfully address it. The latter is simply without any analysis of the evidence produced at the default prove-up hearing or any other matter demonstrating compliance with City zoning laws or any other applicable City code or regulation. We need not address these assertions.