Filed 4/7/17 P. v. Bullock CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT


THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DEREK MITCHELL BULLOCK,

Defendant and Appellant.
H041632
(Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. C1241311)

I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Derek Mitchell Bullock was convicted after jury trial of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subds. (a) & (b)(2)(A)), three counts of attempting to dissuade a witness or victim (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(2)), and conspiracy to obstruct justice (§ 182, subd. (a)(5)). Defendant admitted having suffered a prior conviction for a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 (§ 666.5). The trial court found true allegations that defendant had one prior serious felony conviction and two prior strikes (§§ 667, subds. (a), (b)-(i); 1170.12). The court struck one of the prior strikes and sentenced defendant to 29 years in prison.
Regarding defendant’s conviction for unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), the evidence at trial reflected that the vehicle at issue had earlier been impounded by law enforcement and was still subject to an impound period at the time defendant drove or took the vehicle. The evidence also reflected that the vehicle could not be used by the registered owner during the impound period, and that the title owner lawfully obtained possession of the vehicle during the impound period by engaging the services of defendant, who operated a towing entity. The evidence further reflected that, after defendant recovered the vehicle for the title owner and during the impound period, he drove the vehicle for his personal use.
On appeal, defendant contends that his conviction for unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) must be reversed. First, he argues there was insufficient evidence that the title owner of the vehicle did not consent to him taking or driving the vehicle for personal use during the impound period. Second, defendant contends there was prejudicial instructional error because the trial court did not instruct the jury regarding who owned the vehicle during the impound period. Third, defendant argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request an instruction concerning legal ownership of the vehicle.
For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the judgment.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Information
In February 2014, defendant was charged by amended information with two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, a hammer and an automobile (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); counts 1 & 2), unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle with a prior conviction for the same offense (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); § 666.5; count 3), misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subds. (a) & (b)(2)(A); count 4), three counts of attempting to dissuade a witness or victim (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(2); counts 5, 6 & 7), and conspiracy to obstruct justice (§ 182, subd. (a)(5); count 8). The information further alleged that count 3, unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, took place on or about June 1, 2012. The information also alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim in count 1 (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and that he had one prior serious felony conviction and two prior strikes (§§ 667, subds. (a), (b)-(i); 1170.12).
Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the priors. During trial and outside the presence of the jury, defendant admitted the allegation in count 3 that he had suffered a prior conviction for a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 (§ 666.5).
B. The Jury Trial
Relevant to this appeal, the evidence presented at trial was as follows.
1. The June 1, 2012 incident
Defendant and Nicole Lynne Frandsen were in a romantic relationship “off and on.” On June 1, 2012, defendant went to Frandsen’s residence. At the time, Frandsen had other visitors, including Jamie Snyder and Jesus Alvarez. Alvarez had arrived at Frandsen’s residence by bicycle. After a period of time, defendant became agitated because he thought that there was something going on between Frandsen and Alvarez and that they were acting inappropriately with each other.
Snyder testified that defendant stated “he had to go pick up a truck that his friend was going to let him use” or “borrow.” Defendant left and then came back with a Cadillac Escalade.
Defendant attacked Alvarez with a hammer inside the residence. Defendant then exited the residence and got into the Cadillac Escalade. He backed up the vehicle and then drove forward toward Alvarez, who had exited the residence and was near his bicycle. Alvarez jumped out of the way, and defendant hit the bicycle and the residence with the Escalade.
Defendant subsequently drove the vehicle to another residence about five or 10 minutes away to talk to an acquaintance.
2. The Ownership of the Cadillac Escalade
The Cadillac Escalade that defendant had crashed into Frandsen’s residence was a 2003 model that Juanita Sanchez had purchased from a dealership in early 2012. Sanchez was the registered owner of the Escalade, and Infinity Funding was the title holder. Sanchez had used Infinity Funding to finance the vehicle.
Another auto dealership, Gilroy Auto Outlet, also used Infinity Funding as a lender. Jeffrey Armando Buich worked for Gilroy Auto Outlet, and he had referred defendant to Infinity Funding when Infinity Funding needed assistance repossessing vehicles. Buich had previously owned an auto dealership where defendant did some work for him such as towing and repossessions. Defendant initially used a tow truck to move vehicles, but later he usually took someone with him and moved the vehicles by driving them. The key for a vehicle might be obtained from the dealership if it had an extra set, or from the titleholder who either had an extra set of keys or authorized an extra set being made. According to Buich, defendant and Infinity Funding “worked out some kind of program to repo cars and a fee, . . . and [defendant] started doing business for [Infinity Funding].” When Infinity Funding repossessed vehicles in the area, Buich would “help” out by allowing the vehicles to be stored at a lot at Gilroy Auto Outlet.
About two months after Sanchez purchased the Cadillac Escalade, she failed to make payments for the vehicle. Infinity Funding notified her that the vehicle was going to be repossessed. Sanchez testified that Infinity Funding, as title owner of the vehicle, “had permission to give people permission” to “drive [the vehicle] if needed for purposes such as repossession and stuff like that.”
Infinity Funding gave defendant, who was from “A1 Towing,” permission to repossess the vehicle. After the vehicle was repossessed, Sanchez made the necessary payments. Infinity Funding told Sanchez to call defendant from A1 Towing to arrange to get the vehicle back. Ultimately, defendant drove the vehicle to Gilroy Auto Outlet, where Sanchez picked up the vehicle. She paid defendant for towing and other fees.
In early May 2012, the vehicle was impounded after Sanchez’s boyfriend “got a DUI” in Tracy. Infinity Funding informed Sanchez that the vehicle would be impounded for 30 days. It was Sanchez’s understanding that during the impound period, the vehicle would be “stored” and she could not drive it.
Defendant had Infinity Funding’s permission to retrieve the vehicle in Tracy and “bring it back.” Buich thereafter allowed the vehicle to be stored in a locked yard at Gilroy Auto Outlet. At the time, the vehicle was impounded due to Sanchez’s boyfriend’s DUI incident and was not being repossessed by Infinity Funding.
In the latter part of May 2012, during the impound period, the vehicle was stolen from Gilroy Auto Outlet. Because Gilroy Auto Outlet was “just a storage yard” for Infinity Funding, Buich called Infinity Funding and asked, “What do you want me to do?” He subsequently called the police. Within days, on May 23, 2012, San Jose police located the vehicle on the street. The police apparently called Buich and informed him that he could retrieve the vehicle. Buich in turn called defendant and told him where to pick up the vehicle. Defendant and his roommate arrived at the location, and the roommate signed for the release of the vehicle from the police. Although Buich did not ask defendant to store the vehicle outside of Gilroy Auto Outlet, defendant took the vehicle to his residence in San Jose.
Defendant’s roommate testified that defendant was “running a tow truck and . . . repo business.” The roommate periodically helped defendant with the business by giving defendant rides to the vehicles that he was retrieving. In particular, the roommate gave defendant a ride to pick up Sanchez’s Cadillac Escalade twice – once in Tracy and once in San Jose. On the latter occasion, after they picked up the vehicle in San Jose, they brought the vehicle to their residence. The roommate testified that defendant often brought vehicles to the residence, and that they had a gated carport area for “storage” of vehicles. When asked at trial whether he ever saw defendant driving around in the Escalade and using it as his own, the roommate testified, “I have never seen it move, no.”
At some point, Buich called defendant and asked, “Where’s the car? When are you bringing it?” Defendant indicated that the vehicle was at his house.
During Buich’s “working relationship” with defendant, when defendant assisted with repossessions, tows, or picking up vehicles, Buich never gave defendant permission to use a vehicle for his own personal use. Buich also testified that he never gave defendant permission to drive the Cadillac Escalade to his girlfriend’s home, to drive it into a mobile home, or to damage the vehicle.
On May 30, 2012, an Infinity Funding employee, whose job duties included answering calls and typing notes of the conversations into a database, noted that Sanchez’s vehicle would be available for pickup on June 5, 2012, at Gilroy Auto Outlet.
On June 1, 2012, defendant was involved in the incident that resulted in him crashing the Cadillac Escalade into Alvarez’s bicycle and Frandsen’s residence. In the early morning of June 2, 2012, the police located the Escalade across the street from defendant’s residence.
At some point, Sanchez talked to Infinity Funding about getting her vehicle back at the end of the impound period. She was referred to defendant again. Sanchez called defendant on June 6, 2012, but he never answered her calls.
Sanchez eventually saw her vehicle, but it was “totaled” and she never got it back. There were also items in the vehicle that did not belong to her or her boyfriend, such as a red and white cigarette carton and a laundry basket. Defendant smoked Marlboro Red cigarettes, which are packaged in a red and white carton. The laundry basket in the vehicle contained several items, including a flashlight and an envelope with defendant’s and Frandsen’s names on it. At trial, Frandsen admitted that she had driven the Cadillac Escalade to a restaurant with defendant. She also testified that she recognized the flashlight and a GPS-type device in the vehicle. Photographs were located in the vehicle, and defendant was in at least one of the photographs. Sanchez never gave defendant permission to drive the vehicle for his personal use on June 1, 2012.
C. The Verdicts and Sentencing
In February 2014, the jury found defendant guilty of all eight counts, including unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). The jury found not true the allegation that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim of the assault in count 1. The court found true the allegations that defendant had one prior serious felony conviction and two prior strikes (§§ 667, subds. (a), (b)-(i), 1170.12).
Defendant filed a motion requesting that the court strike his prior strikes pursuant to section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. The prosecution opposed the motion.
On September 12, 2014, the trial court struck one of the two prior strikes and sentenced defendant to 29 years in prison.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that his conviction for unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) must be reversed. First, he argues there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction and that the conviction violates his federal constitutional right to due process. Defendant contends that Infinity Funding, the title owner of the Cadillac Escalade on June 1, 2012, was the only party that had the right to give or withhold permission to drive the vehicle, and there was no evidence regarding “what his agreement with Infinity Funding was” or what was “the typical arrangement with individuals who repossess cars.” He argues that Sanchez, the registered owner, did not have the right to give or withhold permission to drive the Escalade during the time the vehicle was impounded. He also argues that Buich, who worked for Gilroy Auto Outlet, did not have a relationship with Infinity Funding such that Buich had the authority to give or deny permission regarding driving the vehicle for personal use.
Second, defendant argues there was prejudicial instructional error because the trial court “never instructed the jury regarding who owned the vehicle at the time in question.”
Third, defendant contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request an instruction regarding who had legal ownership of the vehicle.
The Attorney General contends that there was ample evidence that defendant used the Cadillac Escalade as his personal vehicle without the owner’s consent after towing it. Second, the Attorney General argues that defendant’s claim of instructional error is forfeited, that it fails on the merits, and that prejudice has not been established. Third, the Attorney General contends that defendant cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
1. The standard of review
“In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence . . . we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We presume every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citation.] ‘A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness’s credibility.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 59-60.)
“An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the [factfinder] might have drawn from . . . circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.) “ ‘A reasonable inference, however, “may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work. [¶] . . . A finding of fact must be an inference drawn from evidence rather than . . . a mere speculation as to probabilities without evidence.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 891.) A trier of fact may rely on inferences to support a conviction only if those inferences are “of such substantiality that a reasonable trier of fact could determine beyond a reasonable doubt” that the inferred facts are true. (Ibid.)
2. Consent of the owner
In order to establish a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), the prosecution must prove that the defendant drove or took another person’s vehicle “without the consent of the owner,” and that the defendant had the intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of title or possession. (Ibid.; see People v. O’Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574.) Thus, the prosecution has the burden “to show by direct or circumstantial evidence the defendant lacked the consent of the owner. [Citation.]” ( People v. Clifton (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 195, 199.)
“There may be several ‘owners’ at any one time, in the sense of the word ‘owner’ as used in the Vehicle Code. [Citation.]” (McClary v. Concord Ave. Motors (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 564, 566.) An “owner” under the Vehicle Code includes (1) “a person having all the incidents of ownership, including the legal title of a vehicle whether or not such person lends, rents, or creates a security interest in the vehicle,” and (2) “the person entitled to the possession of a vehicle as the purchaser under a security agreement.” (Veh. Code, § 460; see id., § 100.) “Vehicle ownership is a fact question for the jury to determine in light of all the circumstances. [Citation.]” (Savnik v. Hall (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 733, 742-743.)
3. Analysis
Sanchez was the registered owner of the Cadillac Escalade, and Infinity Funding was the title holder. At the time defendant drove the vehicle for personal use on June 1, 2012, the vehicle had been impounded due to a DUI incident involving Sanchez’s boyfriend. It was Sanchez’s understanding that the vehicle was to be impounded for 30 days. For the first part of the impound period, the vehicle was stored at Gilroy Auto Outlet, where Buich worked. Defendant did not have Sanchez’s or Buich’s permission to drive the Cadillac Escalade for personal use.
The prosecutor argued to the jury that, “just because someone is allowed to tow and store a vehicle doesn’t mean they get to use the car. It doesn’t mean they get to put miles on the car, miles which decrease the vehicle’s value.”
Defendant argued to the jury that Sanchez “was not in a position” to give or withhold permission to drive her vehicle because it had been impounded and she was not allowed to possess it at that time. He also argued that “it wasn’t [Buich’s] decision” as to who could drive the vehicle. Rather, defendant and Infinity Funding “had the relationship . . . over this car.” Defendant argued that Infinity Funding had “the control and the possession of this car and makes the decisions on who gets to drive it and the scope of that permission” but that “no one came here from Infinity Funding” to testify about the scope of defendant’s permission to use the vehicle.
The prosecutor responded by arguing that Buich was the “intermediary” between Infinity Funding, “who is the legal owner,” and defendant when the vehicle was first impounded and when it was recovered after being stolen from the lot at Gilroy Auto Outlet. As the “intermediary,” Buich never gave defendant permission to use the vehicle for personal use. The prosecutor further argued that while the vehicle was impounded for Sanchez’s boyfriend’s DUI, “it doesn’t mean that somebody else gets to drive it around and use it for their personal use.” The prosecutor also argued that, although Sanchez could not use the vehicle, she remained the registered owner.
The statutory basis for the impounding of the vehicle is not clear from the record. On appeal, defendant contends that the vehicle was impounded pursuant to Vehicle Code section 14602.6. The Attorney General does not expressly address this point and instead observes that a vehicle may be impounded for 30 days pursuant to Vehicle Code section 23109.2. A vehicle impounded under either statute may be released early to the “legal owner” of the vehicle, or the legal owner’s agent, if certain conditions are met. (Veh. Code, §§ 14602.6, subd. (f), 23109.2, subd. (d).) A “legal owner” under these statutes includes a “bank, credit union, acceptance corporation, or other licensed financial institution legally operating in this state or . . . another person, not the registered owner, holding a security interest in the vehicle.” (Veh. Code, § 14602.6, subd. (f)(1); see id., § 23109.2, subd. (d)(1).) Under Vehicle Code section 14602.6, the legal owner may not release the vehicle to the registered owner until after the termination of the 30-day impound period. (Id., subd. (g)(1).)
Although the record is not clear regarding whether either of these statutes was the basis for the impound of the Cadillac Escalade, the undisputed evidence at trial reflected that Infinity Funding was able to obtain possession of the vehicle during the impound period through one or more of its agents, and that Sanchez could not drive the vehicle during the impound period.
We need not reach the issue of whether Sanchez, as a registered owner whose vehicle was impounded, or Buich, as a person who had working relationship with Infinity Funding and defendant, had a right to give or withhold consent concerning the driving of the vehicle. Even if, as defendant argues, only Infinity Funding could have consented to him driving the Cadillac Escalade during the impound period, we determine that substantial evidence supports a finding that defendant did not have Infinity Funding’s consent to drive the vehicle for personal use.
First, Buich’s testimony supports a reasonable inference that defendant did not have Infinity Funding’s consent to drive the vehicle for personal use. Buich testified that he previously owned an auto dealership, that he had a direct business relationship with defendant, and that the business relationship included towing and repossessions. Buich testified that during his “working relationship” with defendant, he never gave defendant permission to use a vehicle for defendant’s own personal use.
Later, when Buich worked at Gilroy Auto Outlet, his working relationship with defendant involved the storage of vehicles that defendant had collected on behalf of Infinity Funding. In particular, upon the Cadillac Escalade being impounded for Sanchez’s boyfriend’s DUI, defendant brought the vehicle to Gilroy Auto Outlet for storage. After the vehicle was stolen from Gilroy Auto Outlet’s lot, and sometime after Buich told defendant where to recover the vehicle from the police, Buich called defendant to ask where the vehicle was and when the vehicle would be brought back to the lot.
A reasonable inference arises that, as in the situation of defendant recovering vehicles directly for Buich, when defendant subsequently recovered vehicles for Infinity Funding, and specifically the Cadillac Escalade, there was no agreement for defendant to use the vehicle for personal use. If there had been such an agreement when the Escalade was impounded after the DUI incident, presumably Buich would have been aware of it given (a) the nature of Buich’s relationship with Infinity Funding in storing the Escalade at Gilroy Auto Outlet, and (b) Buich’s communications with Infinity Funding and defendant regarding the Escalade. When the vehicle was initially impounded, Buich authorized its storage at Gilroy Auto Outlet. When the vehicle was subsequently stolen, Buich communicated with Infinity Funding, and later with defendant after the vehicle was located by San Jose police. Buich told defendant where to get the vehicle, and later Buich called defendant to question him about when he was going to bring the Escalade back to the lot. Under the circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that Buich would have been informed by Infinity Funding or defendant if Infinity Funding had given defendant permission to drive the Escalade for personal use. Instead, Buich believed the vehicle would continue to be stored at Gilroy Auto Outlet after it had been located by San Jose police.
It was only after Buich called defendant to find out when he was returning the vehicle to Gilroy Auto Outlet’s yard that Buich learned that defendant had the vehicle at his residence. Defendant’s roommate testified that defendant often brought vehicles to the residence. However, there was no evidence that either Buich or defendant’s roommate were aware that defendant was driving the vehicle for personal use or that he had authorization from Infinity Funding to do so.
Second, evidence relating to Infinity Funding supports an inference that it did not consent to defendant’s personal use of the Cadillac Escalade. Infinity Funding stored the vehicle continuously at Gilroy Auto Outlet during the impound period until it was stolen. On May 30, 2012, after defendant had recovered the Escalade from the police and before he caused damage at Frandsen’s residence, Infinity Funding’s records reflected that the vehicle would be available for pickup on June 5, 2012, at Gilroy Auto Outlet. This evidence is consistent with an inference that Infinity Funding expected the vehicle to be at Gilroy Auto Outlet and not driven around by defendant for personal use. If there had been an agreement between Infinity Funding and defendant that he could use the vehicle for personal use, presumably Infinity Funding’s records would have reflected such an agreement, rather than indicating that the vehicle would be at Gilroy Auto Outlet, consistent with the storage of the vehicle during the first part of the impound period. Moreover, a reasonable inference arises that Infinity Funding would not want to increase the mileage on the vehicle, except to the extent necessary to recover the vehicle or to return it to the registered owner, because greater mileage on the vehicle could reduce the vehicle’s value, which would be contrary to Infinity Funding’s financial interest in the vehicle. Further, allowing the vehicle to be used by the tow operator for personal use would pose a risk of damage to the vehicle, whether by intentional or accidental conduct, which would also run counter to Infinity Funding’s financial interest in the vehicle.
Third, Sanchez’s testimony regarding her communications with Infinity Funding supports the inference that Infinity Funding did not give defendant consent for personal use of the Cadillac Escalade. When Sanchez was initially notified by Infinity Funding that the vehicle was going to be repossessed because she was not making payments, Sanchez understood that Infinity Funding had “permission to give people permission” to “drive it if needed for purposes such as repossession and stuff like that.” (Italics added.) When Sanchez was later informed by Infinity Funding that the vehicle had been impounded in Tracy and that the impound was for 30 days, Sanchez understood the 30-day impound to mean that she could not drive the vehicle and that it would be “stored.”
In sum, the individuals who were associated with the Cadillac Escalade in some way during the impound period, that is, Buich of Gilroy Auto Outlet where the vehicle was initially stored, defendant’s roommate who helped recover the vehicle, and Sanchez the registered owner, believed the vehicle would be stored during the impound period. Indeed Infinity Funding’s own records indicated that the vehicle would be available for pick up at Gilroy Auto Outlet. There was no suggestion in Infinity Funding’s records that it had authorized defendant to drive it for personal use during the impound period. In view of this record, we determine that substantial evidence supports the finding that defendant drove or took the Cadillac Escalade for personal use without the consent of Infinity Funding.
Defendant further argues that there was no evidence that he had the “intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle.” (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).)
Although defendant had permission to retrieve the vehicle in Tracy and in San Jose during the impound period, as we have explained substantial evidence supports a finding that defendant drove or took the Cadillac Escalade for personal use without the consent of Infinity Funding. Substantial evidence similarly supports a finding that when defendant made personal use of the vehicle without Infinity Funding’s consent, such as by visiting Frandsen’s residence on June 1, 2012, defendant had the intent to temporarily deprive Infinity Funding of possession of the vehicle.
Accordingly, we determine that substantial evidence supports defendant’s conviction for unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and that no due process violation has been shown.
B. Instructional Error and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant contends that his conviction for unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) should be reversed because the trial court “never instructed the jury regarding who owned the vehicle at the time in question.”
The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1820 as follows: “The defendant is charged in Count 3 with unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle, in violation of Vehicle Code § 10851. To prove that the defendant is guilty of that crime, the People must prove that: [¶] One, the defendant took or drove someone else’s vehicle without the owner’s consent. [¶] And two, when the defendant did so, he intended to deprive the owner of possession or ownership of the vehicle for any period of time. [¶] Even if you conclude that the owner had allowed the defendant or someone else to take or drive the vehicle before, you may not conclude that the owner consented to the driving or taking . . . on June 1st, 2012, based on that previous consent alone. [¶] A taking requires that the vehicle be moved for any distance, no matter how small.”
Defendant argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury with language of Vehicle Code section 460, and that the error was prejudicial under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18. According to defendant, if the jury had been properly instructed, it would have determined that permission to operate the vehicle must come from the title owner, Infinity Funding, and not the registered owner, Sanchez, who had lost the right of possession while the vehicle was impounded. Defendant further contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request such an instruction “regarding legal ownership of the vehicle.”
The Attorney General contends that defendant forfeited the claim of instructional error because he did not request a clarifying instruction below. The Attorney General also argues that the trial court was not required to instruct the jury with the language of Vehicle Code section 460 in the absence of evidence that “anyone who could conceivably have been the legal owner had given [defendant] consent to drive the Escalade.” The Attorney General further contends that the error was harmless under the standard articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson). Lastly, the Attorney General argues that defendant fails to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In view of defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we will analyze the substance of his claim concerning instructional error.
“In a criminal case, a trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on ‘ “ ‘ “the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] The ‘general principles of law governing the case’ are those principles connected with the evidence and which are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case. [Citations.] As to pertinent matters falling outside the definition of a ‘general principle of law governing the case,’ it is ‘defendant’s obligation to request any clarifying or amplifying instruction.’ [Citation.]
“. . . ‘[T]he language of a statute defining a crime or defense is generally an appropriate and desirable basis for an instruction, and is ordinarily sufficient when the defendant fails to request amplification. If the jury would have no difficulty in understanding the statute without guidance, the court need do no more than instruct in statutory language.’ [Citations.]
“The rule to be applied in determining whether the meaning of a statute is adequately conveyed by its express terms is well established. When a word or phrase ‘ “is commonly understood by those familiar with the English language and is not used in a technical sense peculiar to the law, the court is not required to give an instruction as to its meaning in the absence of a request.” ’ [Citations.] A word or phrase having a technical, legal meaning requiring clarification by the court is one that has a definition that differs from its nonlegal meaning. [Citation.] Thus, as the court in People v. Richie (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1347 explains, terms are held to require clarification by the trial court when their statutory definition differs from the meaning that might be ascribed to the same terms in common parlance. [Citation.]” (People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 574-575, italics omitted.)
In this case, the jury was instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1820 and the language of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), which requires that a defendant drive or take someone else’s vehicle without the “owner’s” consent. Vehicle Code section 460, which defendant argues should have been the basis for an additional jury instruction in this case, states in part: “An ‘owner’ is a person having all the incidents of ownership, including the legal title of a vehicle whether or not such person lends, rents, or creates a security interest in the vehicle; [or] the person entitled to the possession of a vehicle as the purchaser under a security agreement; . . . .”
First, we are not persuaded by defendant’s argument that the jury should have been instructed with the language of Vehicle Code section 460. According to defendant, such an instruction would have advised the jury that Sanchez, the registered owner, did not have the right to give (or withhold) permission to drive the vehicle. Defendant contends that Sanchez lost the right of possession while the vehicle was impounded and therefore only Infinity Funding, the title owner, could give permission to drive the vehicle.
It is not clear, however, that the jury would have understood from the language of Vehicle Code section 460 that Sanchez was not an “owner” within the meaning of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) at the time of the incident, such that she did not have the right to give or withhold permission to drive the vehicle prior to the end of the impound period. The undisputed evidence reflects that Sanchez was told by Infinity Funding that she could pick up the vehicle on June 5 or 6, 2012, apparently after the impound period terminated. She was therefore still “entitled to the possession of [the Cadillac Escalade] as the purchaser under a security agreement” by June 5 or 6, 2012. (Veh. Code, § 460.)
Second, even if the trial court should have instructed the jury with the language of Vehicle Code section 460, we determine that any error in failing to do so was harmless under any standard of review. (See People v. Ryan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1320 (Ryan) [an instruction omitting a required definition of an element of an offense is harmless only if “ ‘ “it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained,’ ” ’ ” meaning the error is “ ‘ “unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record” ’ ”); People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 830, 831 (Larsen) [“ ‘misdirection of the jury, including incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly omitted instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error are reviewed under the harmless error standard articulated’ in Watson” to determine whether “ ‘ “it appears ‘reasonably probable’ the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the error not occurred” ’ ”].)
According to defendant, the evidence that Sanchez did not give him permission to drive the vehicle “was irrelevant to the charge of vehicle theft.” If such evidence was legally irrelevant, then any finding that the jury made regarding whether Sanchez consented to defendant using the vehicle was simply unnecessary to the verdict.
Moreover, the jury was instructed that it had to determine whether defendant drove or took the vehicle without the “owner’s” consent. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); CALCRIM No. 1820.) The undisputed evidence at trial reflected that Infinity Funding was the title owner of the vehicle. Therefore, notwithstanding any unnecessary finding the jury may have made concerning Sanchez’s consent, the prosecution still had to prove that Infinity Funding, the title owner, did not give consent. In this regard, the prosecution acknowledged in argument that Infinity Funding was the title owner of the vehicle, and that Infinity Funding had the authority to give consent to the driving of the vehicle. The prosecution never argued that Sanchez’s lack of consent alone was sufficient to find defendant guilty in this case. For example, the prosecution argued to the jury: “You have significant evidence in this case between the registered owner, Ms. Sanchez – because even though she couldn’t physically use it, she was still the registered owner, and Mr. Buich, who was working as the intermediary between Infinity Funding and the defendant[,] the defendant didn’t have permission to use that vehicle, and he was . . . driving it to his girlfriend’s house and to his friend’s house with his stuff in it, which he just can’t do.” (Italics added.)
As we have explained, on the issue of Infinity Funding’s consent, there was ample evidence that it did not give defendant permission to drive the Cadillac Escalade for personal use. The evidence included Buich’s understanding about where the vehicle would be stored, in view of his communications with Infinity Funding and defendant about the Escalade and the parties’ prior dealings. The evidence also included Infinity Funding’s records of May 30, 2012, which was after the vehicle was stolen from Gilroy Auto Outlet’s lot and after defendant had recovered the Escalade from the police, showing that the vehicle would be available for pickup on June 5, 2012, at Gilroy Auto Outlet, consistent with where it had been stored during the first part of the impound period.
The only evidence that defendant points to as suggesting that he did have consent from Infinity Funding is the “testimony that he routinely stored the vehicle in his carport, an alternative that was appropriate after it had just been stolen out of the lot at Gilroy Auto Outlet.” However, evidence that defendant stored the Cadillac Escalade at his residence as an alternative to storing it at Gilroy Auto Outlet does not support an inference that he had consent from Infinity Funding to take or drive the vehicle for personal use.
In sum, even assuming the trial court should have instructed the jury with the language of Vehicle Code section 460 concerning ownership of the vehicle, any purportedly erroneous finding by the jury regarding whether Sanchez had the right to withhold consent to the driving of her vehicle would have been irrelevant and unnecessary to the verdict, in view of defendant’s arguments on appeal. Further, regardless of the jury’s finding on whether Sanchez had the right to withhold consent, the jury would have still had to determine whether Infinity Funding consented to defendant driving the vehicle for personal use. The evidence in this case gave rise to only one reasonable inference: Infinity Funding did not consent to defendant taking or driving the vehicle for personal use. Under the circumstances, “ ‘ “it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the [instructional] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained’ ” ’ ” (Ryan, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320), nor does it appear “ ‘ “ ‘reasonably probable’ the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the error not occurred” ’ ” (Larsen, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 831). We also determine that defendant has failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction with the language of Vehicle Code section 460, as defendant fails to show a “ ‘ “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional error[], the result of the proceeding would have been different.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966.)
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.



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BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.





WE CONCUR:




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ELIA, ACTING P.J.







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MIHARA, J.