Filed 3/22/18 P. v. Campbell CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE


THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CHASE IAN CAMPBELL,
Defendant and Appellant.

A149810

(Solano County
Super. Ct. No. FRC314308)


Defendant Chase Ian Campbell appeals from a judgment of conviction of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460). He contends the trial court erred first in denying his motion to suppress evidence of stolen credit cards observed during a warrantless entry into his residence and secondly in denying his motion to quash the subsequently obtained search warrant, pursuant to which the stolen credit cards were seized. We conclude the trial court did not err in denying the motions and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Police Officer John Uldall provided the following testimony at the hearing on defendant’s motions: At approximately 1:00 p.m., he was dispatched to a burglary or theft in progress at a residence in Vacaville. He arrived at the reported location in less than 30 minutes and spoke with a gentleman who knew the victim and said he was at the house doing repairs. When he heard banging at the back of the house, he went to see what was happening, saw someone forcing open a door, and gave chase. During the chase, apparel that had been covering the individual’s face fell away and he recognized defendant. He also saw defendant run into the neighboring yard. At that point, he called the police. He told Officer Uldall defendant lived at the neighboring house.
Officer Uldall, along with three other officers, went next door and knocked. By that point, Uldall had received a report that the residence was defendant’s address of record. There was no response, so the officers attempted to call the residence, and Uldall checked around the exterior of the house, including the backyard which he accessed through a gate.
Officer Uldall saw that a back door to the garage was open, and through it, he could see a door into the kitchen. The door jam of that door looked broken, as if it might have been kicked in. The kitchen lights and the heater were on, so it appeared there might be someone in the house.
Officer Uldall entered the house through the open door to make sure that residence also was not being burglarized, thinking the reporting person might have made a mistake about the location, and to ensure there was no one else inside the house. Uldall estimated that from the time he arrived at the reported location to the time he entered defendant’s residence was about 30 minutes.
The officers moved quickly through the house. In the back bedroom on a dresser, Officer Uldall saw two ATM or credit cards and a gasoline card leaning up against the mirror. He had to bend down to read the name on the cards; each had the neighboring female victim’s name. After the officers “cleared” the house, they looked in the loft area of the garage to make sure no one was hiding there. Uldall estimated it took the officers “just a few minutes” to clear the house.
Officer Uldall then left the residence to obtain a search warrant. The other officers remained at the scene. Within a couple of hours, Uldall returned with the warrant, the house was searched and the credit cards seized.
The trial court denied defendant’s motions on the ground the officers could lawfully enter defendant’s house in pursuit of a suspected fleeing felon. The court further found that even if the name on the credit cards had not been set forth in the affidavit in support of the warrant, there was still probable cause within its four corners to issue the warrant and the cards would have been seized in any event.
DISCUSSION
As he did in the trial court, defendant challenges the officers’ initial entry into the house, claiming it came within no recognized exception to the warrant requirement.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and generally precludes warrantless entry into a home. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; People v. Henderson (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d
1632, 1649 [explaining that “courts have guarded with particular zeal the right of individuals to carry on private activities within their homes without unreasonable
governmental intrusion”].) “It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court has recognized, as ‘a “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law[,]” that searches and seizures
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’ ” (Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 748–749, quoting Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S.
573, 586.)
The presumption of unreasonableness may be overcome, however, by a showing of exigent circumstances. (Minnesota v. Olson (1990) 495 U.S. 91, 100–101.) Exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless entry into a home exist when there is “an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life
or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.” (People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 276; see Welsh v. Wisconsin, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 748–753.)
“[I]n appropriate circumstances the fresh pursuit of a fleeing felon may constitute a sufficiently grave emergency to justify an exception to the warrant requirement and
make it constitutionally reasonable for the police to enter a private dwelling without prior authorization of a magistrate. [Citations.] ‘There is no ready litmus test for determining whether such circumstances exist, and in each case the claim of an extraordinary
situation must be measured by the facts known to the officers.’ ” (People v. Escudero (1979) 23 Cal.3d 800, 808–809 (Escudero).) And, while a “ ‘fresh pursuit’ of a fleeing felon must be substantially continuous and afford the law enforcement authorities
no reasonable opportunity to obtain a warrant, it is not necessary that the suspect be kept physically in view at all times.” (Id. at p. 810.) In fact, cases denying suppression motions based on exigent circumstances sometimes involve substantial time delays from the first notification of law enforcement until the warrantless search and seizure occurs. (See, e.g., People v. Johnson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 444, 452 [entry into a residence without a warrant occurring 75 minutes after a shooting was reported to police comported with the
exigent circumstances doctrine]; People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Cal.2d 690, 706–707 [warrantless entry of residence approximately two hours after robbery reported constituted fresh pursuit], judgment vacated on other grounds in Gilbert v. California (1967) 388 U.S. 263; People v. White (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1199, 1204 [warrantless entry into rape suspect’s home a half-hour to an hour after crime constituted “ ‘hot pursuit’ ”].)
Escudero, supra, 23 Cal.3d 800 is instructive. In that case, the defendant was committing a residential burglary at approximately 12:40 a.m. when he was interrupted
by the victim’s houseguest. The defendant fled in his car but the witness chased him in his own car. When the defendant abandoned his car and took off on foot, the witness contacted police and provided them with information about the defendant and his car which led them to the defendant’s home, where he was arrested at approximately 1:40 a.m. (Id. at pp. 804–807.) On these facts, our Supreme Court found that the warrantless entry of the burglary suspect’s home an hour after the crime was committed was justified by the fact that officers “were in ‘hot pursuit’ of defendant throughout the events in
question.” (Id. at pp. 808–809.) In concluding that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applied, the Escudero court explained: “Throughout the events in question the police were pursuing a man whom they suspected of having broken into an occupied private home in the middle of the night to commit a burglary; this is a serious crime, with an ever-present potential for exploding into violent confrontation. The need to prevent the imminent escape of such an offender is clearly an exigent circumstance within the doctrine here invoked.” (Id. at pp. 810–811.)
Here, too, the facts established by the evidence support the trial court’s conclusion that the officers were in fresh, if not hot, pursuit of defendant throughout the events that culminated in the warrantless entry. As soon as the officers finished speaking with the gentleman at the victim’s house, they went next door, with Officer Uldall pausing only to check whether defendant was associated with that residence. The officers sought entry, and receiving no response to knocking and attempted phone contact, Uldall entered the backyard. He saw the door to the garage was open and looking in, saw the broken door jam of the kitchen door and that that door was open, as well. The officers entered and conducted a sweep of the residence. Thus, the officers’ actions were “substantially continuous.” And the amount of time that elapsed between when the officers learned defendant was the apparent perpetrator and where he had last been seen, and their entry into his house, a period of less than 30 minutes, was also entirely reasonable under the circumstances. (See Escudero, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 805–806 [officers interviewed witness and ran records search to determine defendant’s address; 40 minutes passed between witness interview and entry into defendant’s residence].)
There is no merit to defendant’s assertion that his suspected offense was not particularly dangerous and the officers should have done additional investigation of his criminal background and concluded he posed no danger. A residential burglary, whether during the day as occurred here or at night as occurred in Escudero, is a dangerous offense. (See People v. Rodriguez (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 121, 132–133 [burglary of “ ‘inhabited’ ” dwelling is first degree burglary and a “serious” felony for purposes of sentencing; fact structure is used as a home increases the danger because a resident is more likely to defend his or her home].) Defendant cites no authority for the proposition officers looking for a just-identified fleeing felony suspect must defer pursuit until they have obtained a criminal history.
Nor is there any merit to defendant’s suggestion that because defendant had not been successful in entering the victim’s property, the officers had no reason to suspect there would be evidence of any crime in his house and therefore should have first obtained a warrant. As the Supreme Court stated in Escudero in rejecting a similar argument, “[t]he hot pursuit doctrine is designed to prevent the escape of fleeing felons; a consequential seizure of evidence, disposable or otherwise, is merely incidental to that purpose.” (Escudero, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 810, fn. 6.)
In sum, we conclude the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress and thus, in turn, properly denied his motion to quash the search warrant.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.






_________________________
Banke, J.


We concur:


_________________________
Humes, P.J.


_________________________
Dondero, J.























A149810, People v. Campbell