P. v.
Filed 11/6/13 P. v. Campos CA2/7
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
SEVEN
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MANUEL CAMPOS,
JR. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
B245614
(Los Angeles
County
Super. Ct.
No. KA098209)
APPEAL
from judgments of the Superior Court
of
County,
Mike Camacho, Judge.
Affirmed.
David
Cohen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant
Manuel Campos, Jr.
Jeffrey
S. Kross, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant
Vincent Stephen Del Greco.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, James William
Bilderback II, Deputy Attorney General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
After a joint trial by jury, Manuel
Campos Jr. and Vincent Stephen Del Greco were each found guilty of conspiracy
to commit first degree burglary and
resisting, obstructing or delaying a peace officer. On appeal, Del Greco challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to support his misdemeanor conviction of resisting,
delaying, or obstructing a peace officer.
Finding the evidence is sufficient, we affirm.
Campos also filed a timely
arguable issues pursuant to People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.
Following our review of the record, we affirm.
1.
While he was off-duty, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Deputy Michael Galvan
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
moving around outside a house, belonging to Joseph Clifton and his wife, were
committing residential burglary. Galvan
notified the Sheriff’s Department and continued to watch the suspects.
Deputy Victor Iniguez responded to a radio call of the
residential burglary report by driving to the condominium complex where the
suspects’ vehicle, a tan Chevy Blazer, was last seen. Iniguez found the Blazer in a parking lot
stall and stopped his patrol car behind it at an angle, facing the passenger
side. Iniguez immediately noticed a
female in the front passenger seat.
Although it was daylight, he was unable to see any other occupants
through the Blazer’s tinted windows.
Iniguez drew his service revolver and stepped out of his patrol
car. He was in full uniform at the time.
Before Iniguez could issue any commands, the Blazer’s driver’s door opened and
Del Greco jumped out and ran away.
Iniguez did not give chase, but radioed Del Greco’s description and his
direction of flight to assisting deputies.
The deputy then yelled for the Blazer’s remaining occupants to step out
of the vehicle and to show their hands.
By the time Deputy Albert Garcia arrived in his patrol
car at the condominium complex, Campos had emerged from the Blazer
and was challenging Iniguez. Campos refused to comply with the
deputies’ orders to get down on the ground, yelled profanities and dared them
to shoot him. He then advanced on
Garcia, who, after a brief struggle, was able to subdue Campos and handcuff him. Thereafter, Del Greco, the female passenger,
who was a minor, and a fourth burglary suspect, Stephanie Martinez, were also
taken into custody.
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]
When Joseph Clifton and his
wife returned home that evening, they discovered their back screen door had
been opened several inches; otherwise the house was in the same condition as
when they left it and none of their belongings had been taken.
2. The Charges
Del Greco, Campos, and Martinez were charged in an
information with attempted first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459, 664, count
1)
first degree burglary (§ 182, subd. (a)(1), count 2). Del Greco and Campos were each charged with
resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1), count
3 (Del Greco/ Deputy Iniguez); count 4 (Campos/Deputy Garcia). The information specially alleged Del Greco
had suffered one prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning
of section 667, subdivision (a) and the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds.
(b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had served one separate prison term for a
felony (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). It was also
specially alleged Campos had served three separate
prison terms for felonies. Represented
by counsel, the defendants pleaded not guilty, and Del Greco and Campos denied
the special allegations.
3. The Verdicts and Sentences
At the conclusion of the
trial, the jury found Del Greco and Campos guilty of conspiracy to commit
burglary and resisting a peace officer, but acquitted them of attempted
burglary.
title="">[4] In a bifurcated
proceeding, both defendants admitted the special allegations.
After denying Del Greco’s motion to dismiss his prior
strike conviction (§ 1385), the trial court sentenced Del Greco to an aggregate
state prison term of nine years, consisting of four years for conspiracy (the
lower term doubled under the three strikes law) plus five years for the prior
serious felony enhancement and a concurrent term of one year for resisting a
peace officer. The court dismissed the
one-year prior prison term enhancement in furtherance of justice. (§ 1385.)
The trial court sentenced
Campos to an aggregate state prison term of five years, consisting of the lower
term of two years for conspiracy plus three years for the prior prison term
enhancements.
1. Del
Greco’s appeal
a. The
standard of review
To assess a claim of
insufficient evidence in a criminal case, “we review the whole record to
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime or special circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]
The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the
verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such
that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced
from the evidence. [Citation.] ‘Conflicts and even testimony [that] is
subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for
it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the
falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.]
We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look
for substantial evidence.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted
unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to supportâ€â€™ the jury’s verdict.†(People
v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
b.
Section 148, subdivision (a) provides: “Every person who willfully resists, delays
or obstructs any . . . peace officer . . . in the discharge or attempt to
discharge any duty of his or her office or employment†is guilty of a
misdemeanor. To prove Del Greco violated
this statute, the People had to establish (1) Iniguez was a peace officer lawfully
performing or attempting to perform his duties as a peace officer; (2) Del
Greco willfully resisted, obstructed or delayed the deputy in the performance
or attempted performance of those duties; and (3) when Del Greco acted, he
knew, or reasonably should have known, the deputy was a peace officer
performing or attempting to perform his duties.
(See CALCRIM No. 2656; In re
Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329.) “‘The offense is a general intent crime,
proscribing only the particular act (resist, delay, obstruct) without reference
to an intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence.’†(People
v. Christopher (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 418, 431.)
Del Greco contends the evidence does not support the
finding that he resisted, obstructed or delayed a peace officer. Del Greco does not assert that “his ultimate
arrest was unlawful, or conducted without reasonable suspicion or probable
cause.†Rather, he argues because he
fled before Deputy Iniguez issued any commands, and because the People
presented no evidence his flight interfered with the deputy’s discharge of his
duties, his conviction of violating section 148, subdivision (a)(1) should be
reversed.
Flight from an officer attempting to effect a lawful
detention can constitute resisting or delaying a peace officer, provided the
person fleeing knows the officer wishes to detain him. (See People
v Allen (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 981, 985-987 (Allen) (delaying); In re
777-778 (delaying); People v. Superior
Court (Ferguson) (2005) 132
Cal.App.4th 1525, 1530-1534 (resisting).)
In Allen, police officers,
driving a marked patrol car, saw the defendant and others standing around an
open car trunk filled with jackets, and suspected the defendant was receiving
and selling stolen property. (
983-985.) When the officers began to
approach, the defendant saw the patrol car, slammed down the lid of the trunk
and began hurriedly walking away, while looking over his shoulder at the officers. The officers began to follow in their patrol
car, and the defendant ran and hid in the bushes. (Id
at p. 984, 987.) The appellate court
held this conduct was sufficient to support the defendant’s arrest for
violating section 148, subdivision (a)(1).
(Id. at pp. 986-987.) The court observed, “Since the officer had
the legal right, indeed duty, [citation] to detain appellant, appellant, if he
was aware of the officer’s desire, had the concomitant duty to permit himself
to be detained. [Citation.] Therefore, on the face of the statute, it
would appear that the physical activity that appellant engaged in, flight and
concealment, which delayed the officer’s performance of his official duty,
violated the statute.†(
Del Greco suggests, unlike the defendant in
Iniguez’s intention to detain him, in the absence of a verbal command, before he
fled from the condominium complex, and his flight therefore did not constitute willful
resistance or delay. However, it was
reasonably inferable from the evidence Del Greco saw Iniguez first pull in
behind the Blazer in a marked patrol car and then step out from the car,
displaying his service revolver. As in
the inferences Del Greco knew Iniguez wished to detain him, their imminent
encounter was one in which Del Greco was not free to leave (see
255 [127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132]; People
v. Zamudio, supra, 43
Cal.4th at p. 341) and that Del Greco fled to avoid the encounter.
Del Greco’s assertion his
flight did not violate section 148, subdivision (a)(1) because there was no
evidence his apprehension, which was effected shortly thereafter by other
officers, and thus no showing that his flight delayed or obstructed Deputy
Iniguez, does not mandate a different outcome.
Resistance and delay, as they pertain to the statute, are questions of
fact. In reviewing the record, we
conclude there is substantial evidence supporting the jury’s determination Del
Greco resisted or delayed Iniguez in the discharge of his duties by preventing
the deputy from detaining Del Greco to investigate his suspected criminal
activities.
2.
We appointed
appeal. After an examination of the
record, counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues were raised. On May 13, 2013, we advised Campos he had 30 days in which to personally submit
any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. No response has been received to date.
We have
examined the record and are satisfied Campos’s attorney has fully complied with
the responsibilities of counsel, and no arguable issue exists. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277-284 [120
S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756]; People v.
Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 112-113; People
v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed.
ZELON,
J.
We concur:
WOODS, Acting P. J.
SEGAL, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1]
name="_ftn2" title="">[2]
circumstances of Del Greco’s apprehension were not presented at trial.
