P. v. Canody
Filed 6/18/13 P. v. Canody CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
JOSEPH CANODY,
Defendant and
Appellant.
2d Crim. No.
B241669
(Super. Ct.
No. F472786)
(San
Luis Obispo County)
Joseph Canody appeals
from the order committing him for treatment as a
(MDO) (Pen. Code, § 2962).
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supporting the finding that the criminal
offense upon which his commitment is based, arson of property (§ 451, subd.
(d)), is a qualifying offense under subdivision (e)(2)(L) of section 2962. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2009,
appellant was convicted of arson of property and was sentenced to one year four
months in prison. On April 6, 2012, the
Board of Prison Hearings determined that appellant qualified as an MDO. Appellant petitioned for a hearing to
challenge that determination.
At a court trial held in
May 2012, Dr. Phylissa Kwartner testified that she met with appellant to
determine whether he met all of the criteria for MDO treatment. She described the facts of his commitment
offense, which she obtained from the probation officer's report. In November 2008, in the middle of the day,
appellant lit a fire at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) campus,
north of a loading dock near the health sciences center. The fire was "four feet tall with smoke
extending higher than that."
Appellant was warming his hands over the fire, which was consuming
brush. An officer approached and
arrested appellant after he admitted that he started the fire. Dr. Kwartner later asked appellant why he set
the fire. He explained that he took out
his lighter to light a cigarette, but could not find one. While he had his lighter out, he decided to
light a piece of paper instead.
The prosecutor argued
that any arson conviction would support an MDO commitment. The court agreed with the prosecutor but also
rejected appellant's claim that his arson of property did not pose a
substantial danger of injury to others.
The court's finding follows:
"He did start a fire at UCLA, . . . that reached four feet in
height on the campus and certainly it doesn't take a lot to assume that that's
dangerous to other people." The
court further found that appellant met all of the criteria for MDO treatment
and accordingly denied his petition.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends his
MDO commitment must be reversed because the evidence is insufficient to support
the finding that his commitment offense, arson of property, is a qualifying
crime under subdivision (e) of section 2962.
He argues that the facts underlying the conviction fail to sustain a
finding that "appellant's act of arson created a danger of physical harm
to persons, as opposed to property."
We disagree.
In considering the
sufficiency of the evidence to support MDO findings, we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine if there is any
reasonable, credible evidence to support the challenged finding. (People
v. Beeson (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1398.) We do not reweigh the evidence. (People
v. Clark (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1082-1083.)
To commit a prisoner
under the MDO law, the prosecution must prove among other things that he was
convicted of a qualifying offense.
Section 2962, subdivision (e)(2)(L) enumerates "[a]rson in
violation of subdivision (a) of Section 451, or arson in violation of any other
provision of Section 451 . . . where the act posed a substantial danger of
physical harm to others."
Substantial evidence
supports the finding that appellant's offense qualified him for treatment under
section 2962, subdivision (e)(2)(L) of the MDO law. In People
v. Macauley (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 704, we concluded that
"overwhelming" evidence supported the finding that the acts resulting
in the prisoner's conviction under section 451, subdivision (d) posed a
substantial danger of physical harm to others.
In reaching that conclusion, we reasoned: "The record reveals that [the prisoner]
poured gasoline over his wife's car and set it on fire while it was parked in a
residential neighborhood 'very close' to the house where her boyfriend lived. The fire caused about $2,000 in damage to the
car. An expert witness on arson
testified that car fires are inherently dangerous because they can get out of
control very quickly and the flammable liquids create a risk of explosion. This risk was enhanced by the use of gasoline
to set the fire. Appellant's arson
offense posed a substantial danger to the occupants of nearby structures, and
thus falls within section 2962, subdivision (e)(2)(L)." (Macauley,
at p. 709.)
Appellant started a fire
on the UCLA campus in the middle of the day.
The fire was at least four feet tall and consumed brush as well as
paper. Although no expert witness
testimony on the subject of arson was presented, it is common knowledge that
brush is highly flammable, and that brush fires spread quickly. The trier of fact could easily infer that the
fire posed a substantial danger of spreading to areas occupied by students and
faculty, and thereby posed a substantial danger of physical harm to others.
Citing
Cal.App.4th at page 709, People v. Baker (2012)
204 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1244, and other authority, appellant also argues that the
trial court erred by concluding that appellant's arson would support his
commitment whether or not it posed a substantial danger of physical harm to
others. Here, however, the court stated
that the commitment offense was simply an arson under section 451, subdivision
(d) but that it was "dangerous to other people." That is all that is required. (See People
v. Singh (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1381 ["'"[a] decision right
in result will not be reversed even though the reason stated is
wrong"'"].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment (order of
commitment) is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
PERREN,
J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
YEGAN, J.
>
Ginger
Garrett, Judge
Superior
Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
Gerald J. Miller, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris,
Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, James William Bilderback II, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Alene M. Games, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
otherwise stated.
