P. v. Castanon
Filed 7/11/13 P. v. Castanon CA2/1
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MANUEL J. CASTANON,
Defendant and Appellant.
B240764
(Los Angeles
County
Super. Ct.
No. MA051775)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County. Kathleen
Blanchard, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
______
Alex
Coolman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Linda C. Johnson and Michael
Katz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______
>
An
information, filed on April 6, 2011,
charged Manuel J. Castanon with one count of
and specially alleged that he had used a firearm while committing the offense
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). The information
also specially alleged that Castanon (1) had a prior conviction for assault
with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) that qualified as a strike under the
“Three Strikes†law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and
subjected him to a five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1);
and (2) had served a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5,
subdivision (b).
The jury
found Castanon guilty of second degree robbery.
It found not true the special allegation of firearm use. In a bifurcated
proceeding, Castanon admitted that he had a prior conviction for assault
with a firearm for purposes of sentencing under the Three Strikes law, section
667, subdivision (a)(1), and section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced Castanon to a state
prison term of 11 years, consisting of the middle term of three years for the
second degree robbery, doubled under the Three Strikes law, plus five years for
the section 667, subdivision (a)(1), enhancement. The court stayed execution of a one-year
term for the section 667.5, subdivision (b), prior prison term.
On appeal,
Castanon contends that the trial court’s omission of CALJIC No. 2.90, the
standard reasonable doubt instruction, requires reversal of the judgment. We conclude that the court’s failure to
define reasonable doubt for the jury, which amounts to state law error, was not
harmless under People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836. We thus reverse the
judgment.
DISCUSSION
The trial
court, which used CALJIC to instruct the jury, did not include CALJIC No.
2.90, explaining the presumption of innocence, burden of proof and defining
reasonable doubt, in its predeliberation instructions.
inadvertent, as Castanon represented that he did not have any instructions to
propose in addition to those listed by the trial court and no discussion
occurred regarding CALJIC No. 2.90.
According to Castanon, the failure to give the instruction is reversible
error. We agree based on the court’s
failure to define reasonable doubt for the jury.
Under
federal constitutional law, the “due process clause does not require a trial
court to use any particular phrase or form of words when instructing on†the
presumption of innocence. (
355.) When the trial court gives the
“complete text of CALJIC No. 1.00, which inform[s] the jurors in relevant part
that they must determine defendant’s guilt based on the evidence received at
trial, and not to consider the fact of his arrest or that he is being brought
to trial[,]†and thus “express[es] the substance of the presumption of
innocence, the trial court’s failure to include the standard reasonable doubt
instruction’s admonition on the presumption of innocence d[oes] not amount to
federal constitutional error.†(
doubt instruction with respect to the People’s burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, “the omission . . . will amount to a federal due process
violation when the instructions that were given by the court failed to explain
that the defendant[] could not be convicted ‘unless each element of the crime[]
charged was proved to the jurors’ satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]
When the trial court’s instructions otherwise cover this constitutional
principle, the failure to instruct with the standard reasonable doubt
instruction does not constitute federal constitutional error.†(Id.
at p. 358.) Nevertheless, “when the court’s
omission of the standard reasonable doubt instruction constitutes
principle, although mentioned elsewhere in the instructions, was not
specifically linked to the elements of a charged offense, but the court has not
instructed with a definition of reasonable doubt that effectively lowers the
prosecution’s burden of proof, the error is subject to harmless error reviewâ€
according to the principles in Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. (
As for
state law, “California law imposes a duty on the trial court to instruct the
jury in a criminal case on the presumption of innocence in favor of the
defendant and the prosecution’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. . . . A court satisfies its statutory obligation [under section 1096] to
instruct on these principles by giving CALJIC No. 2.90 or CALCRIM No. 220. . .
. [¶] . . . [¶] However, . . . a trial court’s failure to give the
does not necessarily constitute state law error. Although use of the standard instruction for
such purposes is preferred, it is not mandatory. [Citations.] . . . [A] court’s failure to
give the standard reasonable doubt instruction does not amount to state law
error when its substance is covered in other instructions given by the
court. [Citations.] [¶] Under those
circumstances in which the court’s failure to include the standard reasonable
doubt instruction in its predeliberation instructions does constitute state law
error, such error is reviewed for prejudice under the standard set forth in
837 . . . , which inquires whether there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that a
result more favorable to the defendant would have occurred absent the
error. [Citation.]†(Aranda,
supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp.
352-354, fns. omitted.) A court’s
“failure to define the term ‘reasonable doubt’ does not amount to federal
constitutional error . . . [¶] . . . [but] . . . constitute[s] an error under
state law.†(Id. at p. 374.) An appellate
court also reviews such error under the People
v. Watson harmless error analysis. (
In this
case, even assuming the instructions given to the jury covered the presumption
of innocence and the People’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on each
element of the crime of robbery, the trial court’s failure to define reasonable
doubt constituted error under state law.
(Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 374.)
Thus, the question we must answer is whether the error was harmless
under People v. Watson,
at p. 375.)
In
trial court’s failure to define reasonable doubt for the jury, either through
the standard reasonable doubt instruction or otherwise, was harmless. There, “the [trial] court gave the definition
[of reasonable doubt] when it read CALJIC No. 2.90 to the entire panel of prospective
jurors, and repeatedly explained the standard instruction’s principles during
the three days of jury selection.†(
sufficient in itself to relieve the trial court of its obligation to define
reasonable doubt for the sworn jurors during trial (and thus the court’s
omission of the definition in the predeliberation instructions constituted
state law error), the court’s remarks to prospective jurors can inform the
harmless error analysis and further add some support to our conclusion that
there is no reasonable probability that defendant would have obtained a more
favorable outcome had the court included the standard reasonable doubt
instruction or otherwise defined reasonable doubt during its predeliberation
instructions to the jury.
[Citations.]†(
The Supreme Court thus “infer[red] . . . that the jury was not left to
guess as to the meaning of reasonable doubt . . . .†(Ibid.)
We cannot
make the same inference here. The trial
court did not read CALJIC No. 2.90, or otherwise define reasonable doubt,
to prospective jurors. Although during
voir dire the prosecutor attempted to explain the concept of reasonable doubt
to the jurors, he did not use the instruction’s definition. Rather, his explanation in part stated that
proof beyond a reasonable doubt meant that the jury was “convinced by the state
of the evidence, the testimony and exhibits, that you can feel good and have
this abiding conviction that whatever verdict you return was the right
verdictâ€â€”a concept that does not fit squarely within the definition of
reasonable doubt. Under these
circumstances, in which the court did not define reasonable doubt for jurors at
any point in the proceedings, and the jury was provided an explanation that
only in part coincided with the meaning of the standard of proof, we, unlike in
Aranda, cannot “infer . . . that the
jury was not left to guess as to the meaning of reasonable doubt . . . .†(Aranda,
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 376.) The state law error in failing to define
reasonable doubt thus was not harmless under People v. Watson, supra,
46 Cal.2d at p. 836.
name="_ftnref4" title="">[4]
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is reversed. The matter is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
NOT TO
BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD,
J.
We concur:
MALLANO,
P. J.
CHANEY,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise noted.
action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of
a reasonable doubt whether [his] [her] guilt is satisfactorily shown, [he]
[she] is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.
This presumption places upon the People the burden of proving [him] [her]
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] Reasonable doubt is defined as
follows: It is not a mere possible
doubt; because everything relating to human affairs is open to some possible or
imaginary doubt. It is that state of the
case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence,
leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel
an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge.â€
