Filed 9/21/17 P. v. Chapman CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
| THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CHRISTOPHER SCOTT CHAPMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
|
G053626
(Super. Ct. No. 15WF2575)
O P I N I O N |
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, David A. Hoffer, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with directions.
Paul R. Kraus, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kathleen A. Kenealy, Acting Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., and Anthony Da Silva, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
When the trial court sentenced Christopher Scott Chapman to probation, on the condition he serve one year in county jail, he had already amassed 376 days of presentence custody credits – meaning he was left with 11 days of excess credits. On appeal, he argues the court erred by failing to apply those excess custody credits to satisfy his restitution fine and court fees – a total of $510 – pursuant to Penal Code section 2900.5.[1]
The Attorney General concedes Chapman is entitled to have his excess custody credits applied to satisfy certain fines, but argues that (1) under the applicable version of section 2900.5, he is entitled to be credited at a rate of only $30 per day of excess custody credit, rather than the $125 rate he claims, and (2) his credits cannot be applied to offset either his restitution fine or the court fees. Thus, under the Attorney General’s analysis, Chapman is not entitled to have any portion of his $510 payment obligation deemed satisfied.
We reverse the judgment and remand it to the trial court with directions to enter a new judgment reflecting that Chapman’s $300 restitution fine is deemed satisfied by application of his excess custody credits. While we acknowledge the Legislature amended section 2900.5 in 2013 (Stats. 2013, ch. 59, § 7), removing the statute’s explicit reference to restitution fines as being within the group of fines that could be satisfied through application of excess custody credits, we conclude the remaining statutory language nonetheless clearly and unambiguously included them. Thus, Chapman’s restitution fine remained eligible for satisfaction through the application of his excess custody credits. However, the remaining $210 in court fees imposed on Chapman are nonpunitive assessments, rather than “fines,” and consequently section 2900.5 does not apply to them. [2]
I
FACTS
Chapman was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree residential burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)), one count of misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subds. (a),(b)(2)(A)), and one count of misdemeanor aggravated trespass of a dwelling. (§ 602.5, subd. (b).) His crimes were committed in 2015.
The trial court sentenced Chapman “in accordance with the agreement of the parties” to serve three years of supervised probation with conditions, including the condition that he “serve one year in Orange County Jail.” The court then calculated Chapman was entitled to 188 days of actual custody credits, plus 188 days of conduct credits, for total of 376 days of custody credits. The court stated its intention was “that [Chapman] should have credit for time served that would satisfy the one year in custody that the court ordered.”
The trial court also ordered Chapman to pay a mandatory state restitution fine of $300 (§ 1202.4), a court operations fee of $40 for each of his three convictions (§ 1465.8), and a criminal conviction assessment fee of $30 for each conviction (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)) – a total of $510 in fines and fees. The court also imposed a separate $300 “probation revocation restitution fine” as required by § 1202.44, but stayed it until such time as Chapman’s conditional probation is revoked.
II
DISCUSSION
Chapman’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred by failing to apply his excess custody credits to offset the restitution fine and fees imposed on him, in accordance with section 2900.5. The parties agree Chapman’s sentence is governed by the law in effect at the time he committed his crimes. (See People v. Hiscox (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 253.)
In 2015, when Chapman committed the crimes of which he was convicted, section 2900.5, subdivision (a), provided in pertinent part: “In all felony and misdemeanor convictions, either by plea or by verdict, when the defendant has been in custody, . . . all days of custody of the defendant, . . . shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment, or credited to any fine, including, but not limited to, base fines, on a proportional basis, that may be imposed, at the rate of not less than thirty dollars ($30) per day, or more, in the discretion of the court imposing the sentence. If the total number of days in custody exceeds the number of days of the term of imprisonment to be imposed, the entire term of imprisonment shall be deemed to have been served. In any case where the court has imposed both a prison or jail term of imprisonment and a fine, any days to be credited to the defendant shall first be applied to the term of imprisonment imposed, and thereafter the remaining days, if any, shall be applied to the fine, including, but not limited to, base fines, on a proportional basis.” (Stats. 2014, ch. 612, § 5, italics added.)
Effective 2016, the Legislature amended section 2900.5 to substitute “one hundred twenty five dollars ($125) per day” for “thirty dollars ($30) per day.” (Stats. 2015, ch. 209, § 2.)
While conceding that section 2900.5 does authorize the use of excess custody credits as an offset against fines imposed, the Attorney General nonetheless argues that none of the fines and fees Chapman is currently obligated to pay qualifies for such an offset. First, the Attorney General contends that although the statute had previously listed both base fines and restitution fines as being eligible for satisfaction by the application of excess custody credits, the statute was amended, effective January 2014, to delete its reference to restitution fines. The Attorney General quotes People v. Morris (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 94, 100, for the proposition that the Legislature’s intention in doing so was “to make section 2900.5 consistent with section 1205, which provides that a restitution fine may not be satisfied by the time a defendant is in custody.” (Fn. omitted, italics added.) Based on that evidence of the legislative intent behind the amendment of section 2900.5, the Attorney General contends that as of 2015, when Chapman committed his crimes, the statute did not allow restitution fines to be offset by application of excess custody credits.
But we have no occasion to examine the Legislature’s intention when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous on its face. “When interpreting statutes, we begin with the plain, commonsense meaning of the language used by the Legislature. [Citation.] If the language is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.” (Voices of Wetlands v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 499, 519; see Santa Ana Unified School Dist. v. Orange County Development Agency (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 404, 408-409 [noting that plain meaning controls even when the Legislature has altered the statutory language].)
In this case, the 2015 version of section 2900.5 in effect when Chapman committed his crimes stated that excess custody credits “shall be credited . . . to any fine, including, but not limited to, base fines.” (Italics added.) The statute’s reference to “any fine” could not be more clear. As our Supreme Court has stated “the word ‘any’ means without limit and no matter what kind.” (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798; see California State Auto. Assn. Inter–Ins. Bureau v. Warwick (1976) 17 Cal.3d 190, 195 [“From the earliest days of statehood [the court has] interpreted ‘any’ to be broad, general and all embracing”].) Stated simply, “any fine” includes all fines.
A restitution fine is not only denominated a “fine,” it is a species of punishment. (People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 361 [“the Legislature intended restitution fines as punishment”].) Thus, it unquestionably falls within former section 2900.5’s reference to “any fine,” and we have no power to look beyond those unambiguous words to discern a different statutory meaning.
Our conclusion that the 2015 version of section 2900.5 did not exclude restitution fines is bolstered by the fact the Legislature again amended section 2900.5 in 2016, replacing the phrase “credited to any fine, including, but not limited to, base fines, on a proportional basis” with the phrase “credited to any base fine.” (Stats. 2016, ch. 769, § 2, italics added.) As of the effective date of that amendment, section 2900.5 no longer applies to any fine other than base fines.
We consequently reject the Attorney General’s assertion that the 2015 version of section 2900.5 did not allow Chapman’s $300 restitution fine to be satisfied by application of his excess custody credits. It did. [3]
The Attorney General also argues that Chapman’s court operations fee of $40 for each of his three convictions (§ 1465.8), and his criminal conviction assessment fee of $30 for each conviction (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)) are ineligible for offset under section 2900.5. This time we agree.
The 2015 version of section 2900.5 specified excess custody credits could be used to satisfy fines, not fees, and the statute has never been intended to allow excess punishment credits to be applied to satisfy nonpunitive administrative assessments. (People v. Robinson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 401, 406-407 [Former section 2900.5 “‘encompasses state and county penalty assessments’”], superseded by People v. McCoy (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 431, 437-438.)
Neither the trial court operations fee, nor the criminal conviction assessment fee imposed against Chapman in this case is denominated a fine, and neither operates as punishment. (People v. Wallace (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 867, 875-876 [fee imposed pursuant to section 1465.8 is nonpunitive]; People v. Castillo (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1413-1414 [fee imposed pursuant to Government Code section 70373 is nonpunitive].) Consequently, section 2900.5 does not authorize the use of excess custody credits to satisfy those fees.
Chapman argues that basic notions of equity suggest he should be able to apply his excess custody credits to offset whatever amounts he is obligated to pay the government that wrongfully incarcerated him beyond the period of his sentence. As he points out, it makes little difference to him whether the amounts he is obligated to pay are considered punitive or administrative, and allowing him to rely on his excess custody credits to offset that financial obligation would at least give him a measure of compensation for the encroachment on his liberty. We do not necessarily disagree, but the argument is one that is required to be made to the Legislature. Section 2900.5 allows excess custody credits to be applied only to fines, not fees, and we cannot ignore the clear statutory language on the basis that we believe a different rule would be more fair.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court with directions to enter a new judgment reflecting that Chapman’s $300 restitution fine, imposed under section 1202.4, is deemed satisfied by application of his excess custody credits. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
ARONSON, J.
FYBEL, J.
[1] All further statutory references are to this code, unless otherwise indicated.
[2] We need not decide the issue of which daily rate – $30 or $125 – Chapman would be entitled to claim in satisfaction of his fines under section 2900.5. Chapman asserted in his opening brief that he is entitled to $125 for each day of excess custody credit, based on the current version of section 2900.5. However, after the Attorney General countered that the measure of financial credit Chapman is entitled to claim must be assessed in accordance with the version of the statute in effect in 2015, when he committed his crimes, Chapman conceded the correct amount of credit would be $30 per day. We do not necessarily agree with that concession (see People v. Smith (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1464-1465 [“a legislative amendment that lessens criminal punishment is presumed to apply to all cases not yet final (the Legislature deeming its former penalty too severe), unless there is a ‘saving clause’ providing for prospective application”].) However, as we have otherwise determined that Chapman’s $300 restitution fine is the only part of the $510 obligation Chapman has challenged in this appeal that is eligible for satisfaction under section 2900.5, the distinction is irrelevant. Even at a rate of $30 per day, Chapman’s 11 days of excess custody credits are sufficient to satisfy that $300 fine.
[3] Somewhat confusingly, the Attorney General also claimed the statute would allow Chapman to use his custody credits to satisfy the “probation revocation restitution fine,” which was separately imposed on him but then stayed pending a future revocation of his probation. The Attorney General offered no explanation as to why that specific restitution fine would be eligible for satisfaction using excess custody credits under the statute, when the statute purportedly excluded all restitution fines. However, we need not grapple with the apparent inconsistency because, as we have explained, we conclude the 2015 version of section 2900.5 does authorize the use of excess custody credits to satisfy restitution fines.
