Filed 4/2/18 P. v. Chauncey CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO


THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
RICHARD CHAUNCEY,
Defendant and Appellant.

A151210

(San Francisco City and County
Super. Ct. No. SCN 227361)


Having pled guilty to second degree burglary and receiving stolen property, defendant Richard Chauncey was admitted to probation upon specified conditions, one of which was that he serve 90 days in the county jail. He was given 38 days of actual custody credits (Pen. Code, § 2900.5), which both sides agree should be 39. Over his objection, defendant was also ordered to pay $150 for the probation officer’s presentence report (Pen. Code, § 1203.1b, subd. (a)). This order he contends should be stricken because there is not substantial evidence that he had the ability to pay it.
“Section 1203.1b provides in relevant part that when a defendant is convicted and granted probation or a conditional sentence, and has been the subject of any preplea or presentence investigation and report, the probation officer—taking into account any amount the defendant is ordered to pay in fines, assessments and restitution—must make a determination of the defendant’s ability to pay all or a portion of the reasonable cost of probation supervision and the preparation of the presentence report. (§ 1203.1b, subd. (a).) . . . The court orders the defendant to pay the reasonable costs if it finds, based on the probation officer’s report, he or she has the ability to pay them. (Ibid.)” (People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 855.)
The statute defines “ability to pay” as “the overall capability of the defendant to reimburse the costs, or a portion of the costs, of conducting the presentence investigation, . . . and shall include, but shall not be limited to, the defendant’s: [¶] (1) Present financial position. [¶] (2) Reasonably discernible future financial position. In no event shall the court consider a period of more than one year from the date of the hearing for purposes of determining reasonably discernible future financial position. [¶] (3) Likelihood that the defendant shall be able to obtain employment within the one-year period from the date of the hearing. [¶] (4) Any other factor or factors that might bear upon the defendant’s financial capability to reimburse . . . the costs.” (Pen. Code, § 1203.1b, subd. (e).)
The trial court’s implied finding that defendant had the ability to pay $150 reimbursement must be upheld if it has the support of substantial evidence in the probation officer’s report. (E.g., People v. Hoover (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1473; People v. Phillips (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 62, 71.) Concerning defendant’s history of employment, the probation officer advised the court: “The defendant has worked odd jobs in carpentry through the Carpenter’s Union Local 22. He is currently unemployed. The defendant stated that upon his release from custody he plans to seek employment once again.” The probation officer seemed to think this was feasible: “the defendant could benefit from a highly structured case plan that includes counseling and cognitive behavioral therapy to address his anti-social tendencies. The defendant possesses skills that can help him support himself once those issues are addressed.” This is substantial evidence that in the nine or so months following release from jail defendant could earn $150.
The order of probation is modified to show that defendant “is to receive credit for time served of 39 day(s.)” As so modified, the order is affirmed.



_________________________
Kline, P.J.


We concur:


_________________________
Richman, J.


_________________________
Stewart, J.