P. v. Chavez

Filed 7/24/06 P. v. Chavez CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

Appellant Gabriel Steven Chavez was sentenced to prison for a stipulated term of five years after he pled guilty to resisting a peace officer, sale of a controlled substance and possession for sale of a controlled substance. (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (b); Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, subd. (a), 11378.) He argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress evidence, because the police officer who arrested him violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering his home without a warrant. We affirm.

FACTS

Deputy Davis of the San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's Department was patrolling in a marked car with Deputy Hall and an academy student. At about midnight, Davis noticed appellant's pick-up truck stopped at a stop sign. Appellant remained at the stop sign for about 15 seconds, which seemed longer than normal when there was no traffic in the area. Davis illuminated the inside of the truck and saw that appellant was staring down at something inside the cab.

Davis turned his car around and appellant passed him from the other direction. Appellant made two turns without slowing or signaling. Davis thought appellant might be under the influence of alcohol and began to follow him. He saw appellant speeding, going as fast as 60 miles per hour in an area where the speed limit was 25 to 30 miles per hour. Appellant drove over a curb and parked in a field near the house where he lived, leaving the headlights on and the motor running. He walked quickly away from the truck.

Intending to detain appellant to investigate his erratic driving, Davis got out of the patrol car and ordered him to stop. Appellant did not stop and responded with words to the effect of, "You guys are always harassing me." Davis saw appellant pull his hands in and out of his pockets.

Appellant entered the gate of his house and walked to a side door. Davis followed and grabbed him. Appellant yelled for someone to let him in and a woman opened the door. Appellant "threw off" Davis and went inside the house. Davis pushed the woman aside and entered the residence, where appellant was arrested after an altercation. The deputies discovered 19 grams of methamphetamine when appellant was searched incident to his arrest.

DISCUSSION

Appellant argues that the court should have suppressed all evidence discovered as a result of Deputy Davis's entry into his home. He argues that the Fourth Amendment precludes a police officer from following a suspect into his home to make an arrest for a "minor misdemeanor." We disagree.

A warrantless entry into a home to seize a person is presumptively unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment absent exigent circumstances. (Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 576-583.) "'In this context, "exigent circumstances" means an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence. There is no ready litmus test for determining whether such circumstances exist, and in each case the claim of an extraordinary situation must be measured by the facts known to the officers.'" (People v. Lloyd (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1425, 1428.)

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that exigent circumstances exist when a lawful detention or arrest is begun in a public place, but the suspect retreats into a private place in an attempt to avoid apprehension. In United States v. Santana (1976) 427 U.S. 38, 42-43, a person suspected of selling drugs was standing in her doorway when police first approached her, but then retreated inside the dwelling. The court concluded that the brief "hot pursuit" by the officers outside the home as they attempted to arrest her justified the warrantless entry. (Id. at p. 43.)

Deputy Davis had sufficient cause to detain appellant and approached him while he was in a public place. Appellant physically resisted the detention and fled inside the home. Because appellant had no right to resist the lawful detention when it commenced outside the home, Davis had probable cause to arrest him for a violation of resisting a peace officer under Penal Code section 148. Davis's "hot pursuit" into the house to effect this arrest was lawful under Santana. (See People v. Lloyd, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1428-1430, upholding warrantless entry on similar facts.)

Appellant argues that the minor nature of the underlying traffic violations did not justify a warrantless entry into the home. He relies on Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, in which the court held unconstitutional a warrantless entry to arrest a driver who had swerved off the road into an open field and was reported by eyewitnesses to have been sick or intoxicated when he left the scene. The court noted that a warrantless home entry should rarely be sanctioned under the exigent circumstances exception when the offense for which an arrest is made is a minor one. (Id. at p. 753.)

Welsh is inapposite because in that case, the defendant's first offense of driving under the influence, for which the arrest was made, was a noncriminal violation subject only to civil forfeiture under the state's law. In People v. Thompson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 811, our Supreme Court upheld a warrantless entry into a home to effect an arrest for driving under the influence because driving under the influence is more than a "minor offense" in California. (Id. at p. 821.) At the time of the entry in this case, Deputy Davis had probable cause to arrest appellant for the misdemeanor of resisting an officer under Penal Code section 148, which is, similarly, more than a minor offense under California law. Moreover, the officers in Welch did not commence the arrest in a public place and were not in hot pursuit of the defendant when they made the warrantless entry.

"Where the pursuit into the home was based on an arrest set in motion in a public place, the fact that the offenses justifying the initial detention or arrest were misdemeanors is of no significance in determining the validity of the entry without a warrant. [Citations.] [¶] It is clear that a suspect may not defeat a detention or arrest which is set in motion in a public place by fleeing into a private place." (People v. Lloyd, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at p. 1430.)

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

COFFEE, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J.

YEGAN, J.

Christopher G. Money, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Lyn A. Woodward, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Mary Sanchez, Robert F. Katz, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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