P. v. Clarke

Filed 5/2/07 P. v. Clarke CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Shasta)

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Defendant Lee Kelly Clarke resisted strenuously when officers detained him while investigating a report that defendant was carrying a knife and banging on his neighbors doors. Defendant pled no contest to a misdemeanor violation of resisting, obstructing, and delaying a public officer in the performance of his or her duties, and was sentenced to time served while in custody pending trial.

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence against him on the ground his detention was unlawful. We shall affirm the judgment.

FACTS

The prosecution presented the following evidence at the hearing on defendants motion to suppress evidence:

Sheriffs Deputies Marc St. Clair and Kenneth Koenen responded to a report that defendant, who lived in a mobile home park, was yelling and banging on neighbors doors while armed with a knife. The disturbance ended before they arrived, but the officers decided to contact defendant and the neighbors to see if anyone wanted to file a complaint. St. Clair, who was familiar with defendant from prior contacts, knocked on defendants door and announced his presence. Defendant answered the door and stepped outside carrying a large knife. The officers directed defendant to drop the weapon. He refused, stating that he had a right to defend himself. Defendant then went back into the trailer and returned about one minute later without the knife. St. Clair asked what precipitated the disturbance earlier, and defendant replied that a woman owed him money.

Meanwhile, Koenen determined that two individuals wanted to file a citizens complaint against defendant for disturbing the peace. However, defendant said Fuck this, Im going back inside the trailer. Concerned that defendant would retrieve the knife, St. Clair told him to stop. When defendant refused to do so, St. Clair grabbed his arm, did a wrist control lock and placed him onto the ground. When Koenen attempted to grab one of defendants arms, defendant went into the fetal position and refused to place his arms behind his back so that the officers could handcuff him. Due to defendants size and strength, the officers feared they would be injured. Thus, they backed up and St. Clair activated his taser and asked defendant to place his arms behind his back. When defendant did not comply, St. Clair fired the taser at him. Defendant then did as requested, and St. Clair placed him under arrest.

The trial court found that (1) the officers had sufficient information to justify knocking on defendants door; (2) defendant voluntarily talked to them; (3) defendant greeted the officers with a knife and stated a neighbor owed him money, which tended to confirm the report that defendant had been knocking on neighboring trailer doors while armed with a knife; (4) the officers learned two citizens wanted to press charges; and (5) defendant began heading back into his trailer where the knife was located. Based on these facts, the court ruled that the officers had reasonable cause to detain defendant and complete their investigation and, for purposes of officer safety, they could prevent him from going back inside where the knife was located. Accordingly, it denied the suppression motion.

DISCUSSION

In reviewing the trial courts denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the courts factual findings where supported by substantial evidence, but exercise our independent judgment to determine whether, under those facts, a search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362 (hereafter Glaser).

A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity. (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231; see also Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [20 L.Ed.2d 889].) To determine whether defendants detention meets the ultimate standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment (Michigan v. Summers (1981) 452 U.S. 692, 699-700; [69 L.Ed.2d 340, 348]), we balance the extent of the intrusion against the government interests justifying it, looking in the final and dispositive portion of the analysis to the individualized and objective facts that made those interests applicable in the circumstances of the particular detention. (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 365.) Officer safety during the execution of a search warrant is an important governmental interest justifying the intrusion of a detention under certain circumstances. (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 364.)

Although [t]he scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 500 [75 L.Ed.2d 229, 238]), a detention does not necessarily become a de facto arrest simply because law enforcement officers stop a person at gunpoint, handcuff him, or force him to the ground. (See People v. Celis, (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 675; People v. Soun (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1517.) Rather, we must consider the totality of the circumstances [citation] to determine if the means used by the police, including detention at gunpoint, were justified by the need of a reasonably prudent officer [citation] to protect himself and others involved in the search. (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 366.)

Based upon information the officers received from dispatch, they reasonably suspected that defendant had committed the crime of disturbing the peace (Pen. Code, 415) by banging on his neighbors doors while displaying a knife. Their suspicion was confirmed during their initial contact with defendant, who was armed with a knife and explained what precipitated the disturbance. The officers learned that two people were willing to press charges, at which point defendant attempted to retreat into his residence where the officers knew he had placed the knife. For their own safety as well as that of the residents in the mobile home park, the officers reasonably detained and restrained defendant before they contacted the two complainants in order to pursue the necessary formalities for making a citizens arrest.

Therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that the detention was lawful and properly denied the suppression motion.

Defendant disagrees, claiming that his detention was unlawful because, until the officers contacted the people who were willing to press charges and they actually made a citizens arrest, the officers could not arrest defendant for the misdemeanor charge of disturbing the peace since it was not committed in the officers presence. (Pen. Code, 836, subd. (a)(1), 837, subd. 1.) The flaw in defendants analysis is that the officers did not arrest him when they prevented him from going into his trailer; they only detained him. It is irrelevant whether the officers ever contacted the two complainants and whether they made a citizens

arrest, as long as the officers had cause to detain defendant to investigate the report that he had disturbed the peace. They did.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

SCOTLAND, P.J.

We concur:

RAYE , J.

ROBIE , J.

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