P. v.
Filed 11/14/13 P. v. Coronado CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
FIFTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
EVER ANTONIO CORONADO,
Defendant and
Appellant.
F065161
(Super.
Ct. No. MF10000A)
THE COURT
name="_ftnref1" title="">*
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court
of
Gordon B.
Scott, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael
P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and
Ivan P. Marrs, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Ever
Antonio Coronado was pulled over by the California Highway Patrol (CHP) for
towing another vehicle with a rope on a highway and for traveling at more than
70 miles per hour. Neither defendant nor
his sister operating the towed vehicle had a driver’s license. The officer intended to issue both defendant
and his sister citations for driving without a valid driver’s license and to
impound both vehicles. Prior to towing
the vehicles from the scene, inventory searches were conducted. In the vehicle operated by defendant, two
large bags of marijuana were found in the trunk. Defendant was then arrested and charged
accordingly.
In a
challenged the legality of the impoundment and resulting search. The trial court denied his motion. Thereafter, defendant pled no contest to one
count of transporting marijuana in violation of Health and Safety Code section
11360, subdivision (a). On appeal, defendant
contends the vehicle he was operating should not have been impounded, and
therefore, the inventory search of the vehicle was unreasonable and
unconstitutional. We affirm.
FACTS
name="_ftnref2" title="">[1]
On March 7, 2012, at about 5:30 p.m., CHP Officer Jason Blais responded
to a call from dispatch pertaining to a vehicle towing another vehicle upon
Highway 58 east of Highway 14 in Kern
County. Upon locating the vehicle, the officer noted
the vehicles were traveling about 70 miles per hour, and the lead vehicle was
pulling a second vehicle with a rope; the two vehicles were about three feet
apart. The rear vehicle was weaving back
and forth. Blais then initiated a
traffic stop.
Blais
contacted defendant, the driver of the lead car, a Dodge Avenger. Defendant indicated he was towing the other
vehicle—a Toyota Camry—to Boron. He did
not have a driver’s license or identification.
It was later confirmed that defendant was licensed neither in California
nor in Nevada where he resided. Next, Blais discovered that defendant’s
sister Miriam Alvarado was operating the second or towed vehicle. Like defendant, she did not possess a valid
driver’s license in either California
or Nevada. As a result, Blais testified that because
neither driver had a valid driver’s license, he determined that both vehicles
would be impounded. The officer called
for tow trucks and explained to defendant that the vehicles would be impounded.
Defendant’s
wife Jacqueline Flores was a passenger in the lead vehicle. She had a valid Nevada
driver’s license. Blais did not recall
defendant asking him if his wife could drive the Dodge, but he may have done so.
Blais and
another CHP officer conducted inventory searches of both the Dodge and the Toyota. As a result of that search, two large bags of
marijuana were located in the Dodge’s trunk. Defendant was then arrested.
DISCUSSION
Defendant
contends that impounding the Dodge Avenger was not an exercise of a caretaking
function, nor pursuant to any protocol, and thus his federal Fourth Amendment
rights against unreasonable search and seizure were violated. The People contend the trial court properly
denied the motion to suppress evidence because the applicable statute
authorizes the impoundment and, in any event, the officer’s actions also amount
to an exercise of his community caretaking function.
Legal Principles
Vehicle
Code section 22651 provides, in pertinent part, that a
“peace officer … may remove a vehicle located within the
territorial limits in which the officer … may act, under the following
circumstances: [¶] … [¶] (p) When
the peace officer issues the driver of a vehicle a notice to appear for a
violation of Section 12500, 14601, 14601.1, 14601.2, 14601.3, 14601.4, 14601.5,
or 14604 and the vehicle is not impounded pursuant to Section 22655.5.â€
The Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by
the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees
the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 829-830 (
meaning of the Fourth Amendment if “‘there is some meaningful interference with
an individual’s possessory interests in that property.’†(Soldal
v. Cook County (1992) 506 U.S. 56, 61.)
Our review
of issues related to the suppression of evidence derived from police searches
and seizures is governed by federal constitutional standards. (Camacho,
supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 830;
1229, 1291.) On review of the trial
court’s denial or grant of a suppression motion, we defer to the trial court’s
factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, but exercise our
independent judgment to determine whether, on the facts found, the search or
seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (Camacho,
supra, at p. 830;
“[I]nventory
searches are now a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.†(Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 371.) In South
Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, the majority observed that police
frequently impound vehicles as part of their “community caretaking functions,†and
an inventory search of a vehicle, once lawfully impounded pursuant to this
function, furthers three legitimate purposes: the protection of the vehicle
owner’s property while in police custody, the protection of police against
claims of loss or damage to items within the vehicle, and the protection of
police from potentially dangerous items that might be within the vehicle. (Id.
at pp. 368-369.) The
critical issue under the Fourth Amendment is whether a search is unreasonable, and
reasonableness must be determined under all the circumstances. (Id.
at pp. 372-373.) The majority concluded
that an inventory search of a locked vehicle, conducted pursuant to “standard
police procedures†after the vehicle was lawfully impounded, was not “unreasonable.â€
(Ibid.)
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial
court issued a written order, denying the motion to suppress:
“Motion
to suppress evidence is denied.
“Vehicle
Code section 22651 states, ‘A peace officer … may remove a vehicle located
within the territorial limits in which the officer or employee may act, under
the following circumstances:
“‘(p) When
the peace officer issues the driver of the vehicle a notice to appear for a
violation of Section 12500 … and the vehicle is not impounded pursuant to
Section 22655.5.’
“In
the Court noted:
“‘Bertine
finally argues that the inventory search of his van was unconstitutional
because departmental regulations gave the police officers discretion to choose
between impounding his van and parking and locking it in a public parking
place. The Supreme Court of Colorado did
not rely on this argument in reaching its conclusion, and we reject it. Nothing in Opperman
or [Illinois v.] Lafayette [(1983) 462 U.S. 367] prohibits the exercise of police
discretion so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard
criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of
criminal activity. Here, the discretion
afforded the Boulder police was exercised in light of standardized criteria, related
to the feasibility and appropriateness of parking and locking a vehicle rather
than impounding it. There was no showing
that the police chose to impound Bertine’s van in order to investigate
suspected criminal activity. (
“Likewise,
in the instant case, it is obvious that the officer did not choose to impound
the vehicle in order to investigate suspected criminal activity. In fact, when watching the traffic cam video
of the incident (defense exhibit B) it is quite clear that Officer [Blais] is
very surprised when the second officer opens the trunk and finds the
marijuana. Furthermore, in exercising
his discretion to impound the vehicles, the officer was confronted with the
fact that there were two vehicles, one of which was disabled, there were two
unlicensed drivers operating the vehicles, and the one licensed driver was not
operating the vehicle because, according to her husband ‘it was too
complicated.’ The situation was further
exacerbated by the fact that the vehicles were parked on the side of a busy
freeway where large tractor trailers were passing by. Clearly the vehicles had to be moved from the
side of the freeway. Officer [Blais]
exercised his discretion to impound the vehicles so they could be safely moved
from the area.
“The
instant case is distinct from People v.
Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th [756] where … ‘the car was legally parked
in front of appellant’s residence, appellant had a valid driver’s license, …
and [the officer] had no reason to believe appellant was not in lawful
possession of the car.’ (
the officer could have safely left the car parked in front of appellant’s
residence. In the instant case, the cars
had to be removed from the side of the freeway.
While the officer had discretion to release one of the vehicles to the defendant’s
wife, he was not compelled to do so.
“In
887, the court noted that Vehicle Code section 22651(p) allowed an officer to
remove a vehicle from a highway ‘when the peace officer issues the driver of
the vehicle a notice to appear for a violation of Section 12500, 14601 …
who has a valid driver’s license and authorization to operate the vehicle.’
(emphasis added) (Id.
at p. 890.) However, 2012 Vehicle Code
section 22651(p) does not include the section regarding a passenger who has a
valid license. It is obvious the statute
has been changed to provide more discretion to the officer in determining when
to impound a vehicle. Officer [Blais]
reasonably exercised his discretion to remove the two vehicles from the side of
the freeway by having them impounded.
His actions were reasonable under the circumstances.†(Fn. omitted.)
Analysis
Here, Officer
Blais conducted a traffic stop because defendant’s vehicle was towing another
vehicle upon the highway with a rope in excess of the applicable speed limit. The officer soon discovered that neither
defendant nor the driver of the towed vehicle possessed valid driver’s
licenses. On that basis, the officer
testified he decided to impound both vehicles.
“‘There
is little doubt that law enforcement authorities under certain conditions have
the right, and often the duty, to impound a motor vehicle.’ [Citation.] An officer may exercise discretion in deciding
when to impound an automobile ‘“so long as that discretion is exercised
according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than
suspicion of evidence of criminal activity….†[Citation.]’ [Citation.] … Vehicle Code section 22651, subdivision (p),
authorize[s] peace officers to impound a vehicle ‘[w]hen the peace officer
issues the driver of a vehicle a notice to appear for a violation of Section
12500 [driving without a valid driver’s license]….’ This is a clear statement of the circumstances
under which the Legislature determined that a police officer may impound a vehicle.
Additional support is provided by People
v. Benites [(1992)] 9 Cal.App.4th 309, 327-328 and People v. Burch (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 172, 176, wherein the courts
held that officers, acting pursuant to Vehicle Code section 22651, subdivision
(p), in deciding to impound automobiles had followed standardized criteria
within the meaning of Colorado v. Bertine[,
supra,] 479 U.S. 367, 371.†(People
v. Green (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 367, 372-373.)
Given the conditions facing Officer Blais—two unlicensed
drivers and two vehicles, one of which was inoperable—the officer had the right,
and in fact a duty with regard to the impaired vehicle, to impound the vehicles.
Defendant
complains his “wife was licensed and could have driven the rental car†and, as
a result, “there was no issue of securing the vehicle or removing it from being
a potential hazard on the road.†While
defendant’s wife apparently possessed a driver’s license, Officer Blais was not
required to offer to allow a passenger to drive the vehicle away after he
determined its driver did not have a valid driver’s license. In 1994, the California Legislature omitted
language from Vehicle Code section 22651, subdivision (p) calling for peace
officers to impound a vehicle where the driver lacks a valid driver’s license
and where no passenger in the vehicle has a valid driver’s license. (Stats. 1994, ch. 1221, §§ 16, 17.) Therefore, since 1995, a peace officer may
impound a vehicle when the peace officer issues the driver of a vehicle a
notice to appear for a violation of Vehicle Code ection 12500 and the vehicle has
not been impounded pursuant to section 22655.5.
Here, Officer Blais issued a citation to defendant and to his sister for
a violation of Vehicle Code section 12500.
Officer Blais was not obligated by the Fourth Amendment to determine
whether the other occupants of the vehicle could drive the rental car
away. “The fact that there may be less
intrusive means of protecting a vehicle and its contents does not render the
decision to impound unreasonable.†(
Defendant
claims there was “no evidence whatsoever that the agency had a protocol of any
sort when making a determination whether or not to tow the vehicle.†It is established that Vehicle Code section
22651 provides the required standardized criteria governing vehicular
impoundment. (People v. Green, supra, 46
Cal.App.4th at p. 375; People v. Benites,
supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 327;
720, 723.) Moreover, the record reveals
references to the protocol followed by the officer. After testifying that once he realized
neither driver had a driver’s license and that “both vehicles were going to be
impounded,†in response to the following question, “Per your protocol when you
impound vehicles is there an inventory search that you do?†Officer Blais
responded affirmatively. The officer
also referenced his practice of calling for a tow truck for impound whenever a
driver is found to be operating a vehicle without a license. Further, defense exhibit B, admitted during
the hearing on the motion to suppress, reveals Officer Blais and the second
officer referring to CHP form 180 pertaining to impoundment.
Officer
Blais reasonably exercised his discretion according to standard criteria and
protocol and in the absence of any suspicion of evidence of criminal
activity. Defendant acknowledges the
latter, and the record confirms as much.
This court
further notes that the car being driven by defendant was a rental vehicle.
defendant’s mother. Yet defendant’s
mother was not present and available to drive the rental car. No information exists in the record to
indicate that defendant’s wife was approved or permitted to operate the rental
vehicle as per the rental agreement. As
pointed out by the People, had Officer Blais permitted defendant’s wife to
drive the Dodge away, there is no reason to believe defendant or his sister, neither
of whom possessed a driver’s license, would not subsequently get behind the
wheel. Defendant could not have been an
approved driver of the rental car given the fact he was unlicensed, yet that
did not deter him from driving it and using it as a tow truck.
We are not
persuaded by defendant’s citations to People
v. Williams, supra, 145
Cal.App.4th 756 and People v. Torres
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775 in support of his arguments. Both cases are factually distinguishable. In Torres,
the defendant did not have a valid driver’s license when he was stopped for
making an unsafe lane change and failing to signal a turn. The defendant consented to a search of his
person whereupon the officer found four cellular phones and $965 in cash. The officer decided to impound the vehicle, placed
the defendant in the back of the patrol vehicle, and conducted an inventory
search that revealed methamphetamine and evidence of
v. Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th
at p. 780.)
During the
hearing on the motion to suppress, the officer asserted he impounded the
vehicle because the defendant was driving without a valid driver’s license, but
he admitted a narcotics officer had asked him to find a reason to stop the
defendant. The officer knew he had to
impound the vehicle in order to search it. The officer admitted “he was ‘basically using
the inventory search as the means to go look for whatever narcotics-related
evidence might be in the [vehicle].’†(
The
defendant argued the inventory search was a ruse to search for narcotics related
evidence. The appellate court described
the issue as whether it was reasonable for the officer to impound the vehicle, noting
“‘[A]n inventory search conducted pursuant to an unreasonable impound is itself
unreasonable.’ [Citation.]†(People
v. Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th
at p. 786.) According to the appellate
court, “The purpose behind the decision to impound is crucial because of the
reason for condoning inventory searches of impounded cars,†which was to secure
or protect the car and its contents. (
vehicle must be justified by a community caretaking function ‘other than
suspicion of evidence of criminal activity’ [citation] because inventory
searches are ‘conducted in the absence of probable cause’ [citation].†(Id.
at p. 787.) “Statutes authorizing
impounding under various circumstances ‘may constitute a standardized policy
guiding officers’ discretion’ [citation], though ‘statutory authorization does
not, in and of itself, determine the constitutional reasonableness of the
seizure’ [citation].†(
In applying
these concepts, the appellate court described the relevant inquiry as the
officer’s motive for impounding the vehicle. (People
v. Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th
at p. 789.) It concluded the record “shows
an investigatory motive. The deputy
testified he decided to impound the [vehicle] ‘in order to facilitate an
inventory search’ because narcotics officers had asked him to ‘develop some
basis for stopping’ defendant. The
deputy agreed he ‘basically us[ed] the inventory search as the means to go look
for whatever narcotics-related evidence might be in the [vehicle].’ [Citations.]†(Id.
at pp. 789-790.) The appellate court
also rejected the officer’s testimony suggesting the vehicle was impounded
because the defendant was an unlicensed driver. (People
v. Torres, supra, at p. 790.)
In
to wear a seatbelt while driving a vehicle. He stopped the vehicle at the curb in front of
his residence. The defendant had a valid
driver’s license, but did not have the registration or proof of insurance for
the vehicle since it was a rental. The
vehicle was validly registered to the rental car company and had not been
reported stolen. The officer discovered
there was an active arrest warrant for the defendant, so he arrested him and
impounded the vehicle. A loaded gun was
found in the backseat during the inventory search that the defendant sought to
suppress. (Id. at p. 759.)
At the
suppression hearing, the officer explained he impounded the vehicle pursuant to
Vehicle Code section 22651, subdivision (h)(1) because the defendant was being
arrested. The officer admitted the
vehicle was legally parked and that it could have been locked and left where it
was instead of being impounded. The
officer also admitted his department did not have a written policy about when a
vehicle should be impounded, the decision being left to the individual officer.
(People
v. Williams, supra, 145
Cal.App.4th at pp. 759-760.)
The
that the impoundment in that case was unreasonable:
“No community caretaking function was served by
impounding appellant’s car. The car was
legally parked at the curb in front of appellant’s home. The possibility that the vehicle would be
stolen, broken into, or vandalized was no greater than if [the officer] had not
stopped and arrested appellant as he returned home. In this regard, it is significant that other
cars were parked on the street and that it was a residential area. The prosecution made no showing that the car
was blocking a driveway or crosswalk, or that it posed a hazard or impediment
to other traffic. Because appellant had
a valid driver’s license and the car was properly registered, it was not
necessary to impound it to prevent immediate and continued unlawful operation. [Citations.] No other justification that would further a
community caretaking function was offered or supported by evidence. Indeed, [the officer] admitted he decided to
impound the car simply because he was arresting appellant and almost always
impounded the cars of drivers he arrested. The prosecution simply did not establish that
impounding appellant’s car served any community caretaking function. It therefore failed to establish the
constitutional reasonableness of the seizure and subsequent inventory search.†(People
v. Williams, supra, 145
Cal.App.4th at pp. 762-763.)
First, unlike
People v. Torres, there was no
evidence Officer Blais had any investigatory motive when he impounded the
vehicles driven by defendant and his sister.
In fact, defendant has conceded this point. Second, unlike People v. Williams, defendant did not have a valid driver’s
license. Third, unlike both
remain parked there. Furthermore, as
explained above, Officer Blais was not required to release the rental car to
defendant’s wife. In any event, he had
no information indicating defendant’s wife had permission to operate the rental
vehicle. Hence, had Officer Blais
released the vehicle to defendant’s wife to drive, such a release may not have
prevented immediate and continued unlawful operation of the rental vehicle.
In sum, Officer
Blais’s decision to impound both vehicles was reasonable. Vehicle Code section 22651, subdivision (p) permits
such an impoundment. Further, the
evidence establishes Officer Blais did not impound the vehicles for
investigatory purposes. Thus, the
officer’s decision to impound the vehicles was supported by his community
caretaking function and was reasonable under all the circumstances presented. The trial court did not err in denying
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
name="_ftn1" title="">*Before
Levy, Acting P.J., Cornell, J. and Peña, J.
name="_ftn2" title="">[1]The
facts are taken from the testimony offered at the hearing on the motion to
suppress evidence.
