P. v. Crawford
Filed 4/24/07 P. v. Crawford CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RONNIE DEMONE CRAWFORD, Defendant and Appellant. | C052446 (Super. Ct. No. 05F09606) |
A jury convicted defendant Ronnie Crawford of possessing heroin. He thereafter admitted that he had served three prior prison terms. In parallel proceedings, he had admitted that he had violated his parole and was recommitted to prison for one year; in the present proceedings, the trial court sentenced him to prison rather than grant probation for purposes of treatment, concluding that the incarceration for the violation of parole precluded this option.
On appeal, the defendant contests the courts conclusion on this issue. He also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to strike any of the enhancements for his prior prison terms. We shall affirm.
The circumstances of the defendants offense are irrelevant to this appeal.[1] We therefore proceed to our analysis of the issues tendered.
I
A trial court must grant probation to a defendant convicted of a nonviolent drug offense, conditioned on the successful completion of a drug treatment program. ( 1210.1, subd. (a).) Express exceptions to this provision include those defendants previously convicted of violent or serious felonies within the previous five years; concurrently convicted of offenses unrelated to drug possession; armed with a deadly weapon during the present drug offense; and those defendants who refuse the condition of drug treatment or who have twice previously failed to complete a treatment program successfully. ( 1210.1, subd. (b).)
We have concluded that an implicit exception to entitlement to probation exists where a defendant is sentenced to prison for an unrelated offense. We concluded it would be an exercise in futility to grant probation for a drug offense, as a defendant would not be able to comply with the treatment condition because of the incarceration.[2] (People v. Wandick (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 131; People v. Esparza (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 691, 698-699.) People v. Espinoza (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1069 concluded with a similar analysis that an implicit exception exists for defendants who are illegal aliens substantially likely to be deported, as the purpose of the statute is not the grant of probation but the provision of a treatment alternative to incarceration, which cannot be accomplished after deportation. However, where the other offense has not resulted in a prison term at the time of sentencing for the qualifying drug offense, an implicit exception is not warranted. (People v. Superior Court (Edwards) (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 518; People v. Muldrow (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1038.)
The defendant purports to distinguish parolees returned to prison for a violation of parole from probationers sentenced to prison for a violation of probation, asserting that a parolees prison term is shorter. However, the length of the prison term is not the material consideration--it is the inability of the incarcerated defendant to comply with a condition of probation from the date of the courts order granting probation.
The defendant also criticizes the reasoning in our decisions on the ground that nothing in the statute precludes a court from delaying the commencement of drug treatment until the completion of his unrelated prison term; he notes that the statute does not otherwise circumscribe a courts broad discretion in setting the conditions of probation (People v. Thurman (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1462-1463), and a court theoretically could grant probation on a present offense concurrently with a prison term for another unrelated offense (see In re Hoddinott (1996) 12 Cal.4th 992, 1000 [upon notification of other criminal conviction and prison term, court has a number of options in responding to this violation of probation, including reinstatement of probation]). This is not a cogent basis for disputing our prior holdings. As noted above, the purpose of the statute is treatment, not the mere grant of probation. This purpose is not fulfilled where the treatment condition sits suspended until the completion of a term of imprisonment. We therefore reject his argument that the trial court retained discretion to impose a delayed treatment program.
II
Comparing apples and oranges, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in enhancing his sentence for his prior prison terms when it would have placed him on probation for drug treatment if that were an option. We do not perceive any abuse of discretion.
Had the defendant been eligible, the trial court would have pronounced the appropriate prison term and then stayed execution of sentence as long as the defendant satisfied the conditions of his probation. This would reflect the appropriate sentence for his offense if he were unsuccessful on probation, and therefore involves entirely different considerations from a grant of probation. Moreover, the grant of probation would not have flowed from any motivation of leniency on the part of the trial court but from the statutory mandate for eligible defendants. As a result, the willingness of the trial court to grant probation is irrelevant to the length of the defendants prison term.
As for whether the factors relating to the defendant and his current offense warranted leniency because these factors indicate he is outside the spirit of the statute for reasons other than an antipathy to the length of the sentence (cf. People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 160-161), it is true that his present offense involved a small amount of heroin (.15 grams), and (after a 1994 conviction for aggravated assault for which the court granted probation) his convictions in 1996, 2000, and 2003 were all for either simple possession or possession for sale of illegal substances. We might also agree that the defendant had an unfortunate childhood.[3] However, an abuse of discretion exists in the denial of an invitation to strike sentence enhancements only where there is an indication that the trial court was unaware of its discretion or relied on improper factors; otherwise, the presumption in favor of applying the ordinary rules of sentencing will validate almost any decision to adhere to those norms except where the result is unreasonable. (Cf. People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374, 378.) The defendant does not identify any improper factors, and the record indicates the trial court was aware of its discretion. His arguments on appeal are therefore no more than an invitation to engage in unwarranted second-guessing. Nothing in the record reflects an extraordinary circumstance entitling the defendant to a reduced prison term, such as a blameless interval sufficiently lengthy to warrant disregard of his earlier criminal behavior. To the contrary, the defendants iterated refusals to conform his behavior to social strictures supports the Peoples interest in the ordinary extended prison commitment for repeat offenders, and his present offense, while not aggravated, is neither technical nor de minimus. (Compare People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991.)
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
DAVIS, Acting P.J.
We concur:
HULL, J.
CANTIL-SAKAUYE , J.
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[1] They may have played a role in the decision to revoke the defendants parole. This is a matter not before us in the present appeal. A parolee who commits a qualifying nonviolent drug possession offense must be reinstated on parole (conditioned on the successful completion of drug treatment), but this does not apply to those who commit a nonqualifying offense or violate a condition of parole unrelated to drugs. (Pen. Code, 3063.1, subds. (a), (d)(2) [undesignated section references are to this code].) When his parole officer arrived at the defendants home to take him into custody on a report of criminal activity, the defendant initially refused admittance; eventually, the arresting officers entered and found evidence of heroin possession. The present jury could not reach a verdict on a misdemeanor charge of resisting arrest, but (as defense counsels sentencing arguments indicate) this evidence apparently was the basis of the decision to revoke parole.
[2] The definition of qualifying drug treatment programs does not include those offered in prisons. ( 1210, subd. (b).)
[3] We disagree, however, with the defendants attempt to rely on the discredited suggestion articulated in People v. Simpson (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 919 that addiction is a mitigating factor in sentencing, because a persistent failure to address an addiction despite opportunities to the contrary is actually an aggravating circumstance. (People v. Reyes (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 957, 963-964.)
