Filed 9/13/17 P. v. Crooks CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael T. Smyth, Judge. Affirmed.

Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, July L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Alana C. Butler and Stephanie Chow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

The day before Todd Crooks was scheduled to be evicted from his residential hotel room, he used a hammer and crowbar in a failed attempt to open the locked front door of his room. After his eviction, hotel management observed Crooks had "gutted" the interior of his rented room. Crooks was charged with two felonies: vandalism over $400 (Pen. Code,[1] § 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)), and grand theft of personal property in excess of $950 (§ 487, subd.(a)). Following a bench trial, the court found Crooks guilty of vandalism, but not guilty of theft. The court denied Crooks's motion to treat the vandalism conviction as a misdemeanor,[2] and sentenced him to serve three years of formal probation and 365 days in local custody. As a condition of probation, the court ordered Crooks to pay restitution of $5,175.43 to the hotel owner.

On appeal, Crooks challenges the restitution condition because it purportedly includes amounts attributable to the theft count of which he was acquitted. We reject this contention and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Prosecution Case

In 2012, Crooks and his ex-wife, Barbara, began renting a room on a month-to-month basis at the Hillcrest Inn, a residential hotel. The tenancy was initially uneventful. Around late summer of 2014, Crooks obtained permission from the hotel manager to replace the dated carpet in his unit with laminate flooring. The manager did not give Crooks permission to make any other renovations. Crooks removed the carpet, but never installed the new flooring.

The tenancy soured in late 2014. Other residents complained to management about Crooks. Crooks behaved "bizarre[ly]" and was verbally "aggressive" toward the assistant manager in making requests for assistance with the electronic key system.[3] Management also observed unsightly property stored on Crooks's patio, and the manager, who lived in the unit beneath Crooks's, complained of excessive noise in the early morning hours.

Crooks failed to pay his December rent, which was due December 24. On December 25, Barbara asked the residential assistant manager to use his phone to call the police because "she feared for her life because of" Crooks. Police responded and removed both Crooks and Barbara in handcuffs.[4]

Also on December 25, management served a three-day notice to pay rent or quit. Within a week, Crooks approached the assistant manager in the hotel courtyard and said, "Anyone who comes to my door will be shot in the face. I have the right to do that."[5] Management called the police, who arrested Crooks. Based on police officers' observations during the arrest, management prepared an internal incident report on December 30 stating, "Mr. Crooks has systematically gutted the room of its entire kitchen area and removed all floor coverings, thus rendering the room in a state of questionable habitability."

After Crooks failed to cure his rent default, management's counsel commenced and prevailed in an unlawful detainer proceeding. The sheriff's department set a lockout date of February 18, 2015.

Three days before the scheduled lockout, Crooks, dressed all in black, went to the hotel owner's home and confronted him. The owner was worried—Crooks had become notorious for having "really bad" confrontations at the hotel, and the owner suspected Crooks was concealing a weapon under his dark clothing. Crooks left when the owner threatened to call the police.

The day before the scheduled lockout, the manager was in his room and heard a loud banging sound coming from upstairs. He investigated and saw that the lock system on the door to Crooks's room had been "destroyed, had been banged, and some of the wood had been damaged around the lock as well." The manager reviewed hotel surveillance footage, which showed Crooks had moments earlier entered the facility carrying what the manager believed were an ax and a chisel. The manager called the police, who found Barbara asleep inside the room. Crooks had fled the scene, but police arrested him later.

The sheriff's department completed the lockout on February 18, and the manager entered Crooks's room to inspect it. The manager noticed the battery pack had been removed from the interior mechanism of the electronic front door lock, which rendered the lock inoperative.[6] The manager also observed that Crooks had completely removed almost everything inside the room—the kitchen cabinets, the kitchen countertop, the kitchen sink, the garbage disposal, a closet system, storage cabinet doors, and wood framing and molding.

The prosecution introduced evidence of another incident involving Crooks and a former landlord. In 2009, Crooks began staying with Barbara at her apartment on Park Boulevard. Until then, Barbara had been "a fantastic tenant." But once Crooks moved in, she stopped paying rent and neighbors began complaining about Crooks's behavior. The apartment owner began eviction proceedings. Crooks believed the owners were harassing Barbara and him and were "[t]rying to swindle money out of them." After a weekend in July 2009, the apartment manager entered the onsite office and found it "completely empty"—the computers, trash cans, business records, and file cabinets were gone. Police questioned Crooks about the theft, but he lied and denied involvement. However, the stolen property was later found in Crooks's offsite storage unit, and he eventually pleaded guilty to a theft charge and was granted probation.

Defense Case

Crooks testified in his own defense. He admitted damaging the front door and lock. He explained that when he returned home on February 17, his keycard didn't work. He suspected the manager had tampered with it in light of the lockout scheduled for the next day. Crooks bought a hammer and crowbar from a nearby hardware store and unsuccessfully tried to break into the room. He believed he was legally entitled to do so because he still had access to the room for one more day. Crooks eventually entered the room through the back door via a neighbor's balcony.

Regarding the missing interior contents, Crooks testified the manager had given him permission to renovate the entire apartment.

On cross-examination, Crooks acknowledged being involved in incidents with two former landlords (in addition to the Park Boulevard apartment theft). In 2009, a landlord entered his apartment to make repairs. Crooks believed she was concealing evidence of substandard work, so he would not let her leave.[7] This landlord evicted Crooks. In 2011, Barbara's landlord at an RV park obtained a restraining order against Crooks and evicted Barbara.

Prosecution Rebuttal Case

In rebuttal, the manager testified he never gave Crooks permission to renovate the apartment, other than to replace the flooring.

Trial Court's Findings

The trial court found Crooks guilty of vandalism over $400. In finding the $400 threshold satisfied, the court focused on the damage to the front door and lock, explaining "it does get a little bit questionable looking at the value of" the room's contents. As to theft of the contents, the court explained that although it had "strong suspicions" Crooks intended to deprive the owner of possession—particularly in light of the 2009 Park Boulevard incident, which the court found "was a clearly retaliatory move"—the court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.

Sentencing

At the sentencing hearing, the court denied Crooks's motion to reduce the vandalism conviction to a misdemeanor. The court explained that although vandalism of the "door, standing alone, is an easily reducible offense," the offense didn't occur "in a vacuum," noting Crooks has "got some pretty menacing behavior over the years and [the court has] a concern about his future conduct." Moreover, the court clarified that although it didn't find Crooks guilty of the theft count, the court "also didn't find him innocent of that charge"—that is, "[t]here was not a finding that he didn't do the things that supported that charge."

In "consider[ing] [every]thing [the court] heard"—including the evidence regarding the theft charge—and in "putting great weight on the history of" Crooks's "assaultive and menacing" conduct, the court sentenced Crooks to three years of formal probation and 365 days in local custody. The court suspended 270 days of the sentence, pending successful completion of probation. The court ordered restitution to the hotel owner in an amount to be determined at a subsequent restitution hearing.

Restitution Hearing

The prosecution requested restitution of $9,233.43, which consisted of $875 for damage to the front door and lock, and the remaining $8,358.43 for losses attributable to the removed room contents.[8] Crooks acknowledged restitution was appropriate for the damage to the front door and lock based on the vandalism conviction, but he argued the remainder was improper because it related to the theft count of which he was acquitted. Crooks also argued the amounts of the claimed losses were unsupported by evidence and were not credible.

The court awarded restitution of $200 for damage to the front door and lock, and $4,975.43 for the remainder of the claimed losses.[9] The court explained that because it granted Crooks probation, the court had "wide discretion to order restitution that . . . will assist or pursue the goal of reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer." Given this wide discretion, the court concluded it was appropriate to consider Crooks's 2009 theft conviction and the instant theft count of which he was acquitted:

"Of course we have the door he was found guilty of vandalizing. That's not a difficult thing to deal with. The other conduct that I did not find him guilty of, the theft of all of these other items, you know, I didn't find beyond a reasonable doubt he was guilty of that charged offense. But he factually did destroy the apartment, completely cleaned it out and scraped it. And whether that was in pursuit of some idea of renovating it, or some combination of renovating and destroying, none of us will know that. But his conduct in conjunction with, you know, the totality of the circumstances which included this acrimonious and growingly contentious relationship with the representatives of the victim in this case, the unlawful conduct of destroying the door and the lock on the door and, this weighs heavily for me, the prior incident of him cleaning out another unit, in that case, an office in what I considered to be somewhat of a similar circumstance[ ] as a landlord/tenant dispute that was addressed in some respects by cleaning out the unit itself and taking the stuff that was inside it and storing it somewhere. And I have that in mind in terms of the goal of reforming and rehabilitating Mr. Crooks and also the deterring of behaving this way in the future. I mean that's a major factor that I'm considering.

[¶] . . .

"But what I'm looking at is deterring conduct [that] . . . is improper and all part and parcel with the . . . aggressive behavior of the defendant. [¶] . . . I believe that the order of restitution that goes beyond the door is appropriate in this case and I'm going to do that . . . ."

DISCUSSION

Crooks challenges the restitution award other than the $200 for the damage to the front door and lock. Citing the Lent standard for reasonable probation conditions (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 (Lent)), he contends restitution based on losses attributable to the removed contents is unreasonable because it is not related to the crime of which he was convicted (vandalism), not criminal in and of itself, nor reasonably related to future criminality. The Attorney General argues the restitution is proper under the first and third Lent prongs. We agree with the Attorney General.

A. Relevant Legal Principles

"Under California law, '[c]onvicted criminals may be required to pay one or more of three types of restitution.' " (People v. Martinez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1093, 1100 (Martinez).) "They may be required to pay a restitution fine into the state Restitution Fund, to pay restitution directly to the victim, or to pay restitution as a condition of probation. The statutory requirements vary depending on the type of restitution at issue." (Ibid.) We are concerned here with the third variety—restitution as a condition of probation.

"A trial court's power to order restitution in probation cases is . . . broader than its power to order direct victim restitution . . . in cases in which the defendant receives a nonprobationary sentence." (Martinez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1101.) " 'n granting probation, courts have broad discretion to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety,' including the power to 'regulate conduct "not itself criminal" ' but ' "reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality." ' " ([i]Ibid.; see Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) "This discretion . . . has long been held to include the power to order restitution 'even when the loss was not necessarily caused by the criminal conduct underlying the conviction,' including in cases in which 'the loss was caused by related conduct not resulting in a conviction [citation], by conduct underlying dismissed and uncharged counts, and by conduct resulting in an acquittal [citation].' " (Martinez, at p. 1101.) "[A]n order of restitution is permitted even if the act for which the defendant is ordered to make restitution was not committed with the same state of mind as that required for the crime that proximately caused the loss." (In re I.M. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1210, italics omitted.)

We review a trial court's restitution order for abuse of discretion. (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663; People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121.)

B. Analysis

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding restitution for losses based on the removed property. First, this category of restitution relates to the crime of which Crooks was convicted. Although Crooks attempts to confine the vandalism count to the damage to the front door and lock, the record shows the case was not tried on so narrow a theory. For example, when Crooks's trial counsel asserted that the prosecutor's "theory has always been the grand theft charge was the inside of the unit" and the "vandalism charge was the damage to the lock," the prosecutor disagreed. Defense counsel's questioning of Crooks at trial also belies such a stark delineation between the counts. And both parties' closing arguments treated the vandalism count as potentially applying to the removed property. Thus, although the trial court focused on the damage to the front door and lock for purposes of satisfying the $400 threshold for the vandalism count, it is not clear that the parties considered the count as being limited to this damage.

But even if the vandalism count were so confined, we would still find that the losses attributable to the removed property are related to that conviction. Crooks tries to focus the vandalism claim strictly on his conduct on February 17, when he thought he was wrongfully locked out one day early. But the record shows the landlord-tenant relationship had deteriorated months earlier, precipitating eviction proceedings and Crooks's threat to "sho[o]t in the face" anyone who came to his door. In viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the parties' relationship, we find the losses attributable to the removed property are related to the deteriorating landlord-tenant relationship that culminated in the damage to the front door and lock. Thus, the losses are related for purposes of imposing restitution.[10]

Second, even if not related to Crooks's conviction, the restitution for losses attributable to the removed property is reasonably related to deterring similar conduct in the future. The record shows Crooks has a lengthy history of acrimonious and confrontational relationships with landlords. Indeed, the trial court "put[] great weight on th[is] history" in ordering restitution. Holding Crooks accountable for his outbursts in this case appears reasonably calculated to deter similar conduct in the future. (See Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486 ["an order for restitution, i.e., attempting to make a victim whole, has generally been deemed a deterrent to future criminality"].)

DISPOSITION

Affirmed.

HALLER, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

AARON, J.