Filed 1/31/18 P. v. Fairchild CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Placer)
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THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DANIEL J. FAIRCHILD,
Defendant and Appellant.
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C082818
(Super. Ct. No. 62134937B)
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Defendant Daniel J. Fairchild challenges the trial court’s imposition of an incarceration fee after he entered a negotiated no contest plea and was sentenced to serve four years in state prison. We shall remand the matter to the trial court to prepare an amended minute order and an amended abstract of judgment that clearly sets forth the statutory basis for all fees and fines imposed, including the incarceration fee. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A recitation of the facts underlying defendant’s convictions is unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal.
Defendant was charged by amended information with assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)—count one), battery with serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)—count two), and attempting to dissuade a witness (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (a)(2)—count three).[1] The amended information also alleged defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and intended to cause great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) in the commission of count one, and sustained two prior strike convictions (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d) & 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The trial court subsequently struck one of the prior strike allegations and, on the People’s motion, dismissed the special allegation of intent to cause great bodily injury.
Defendant entered a negotiated plea of no contest to battery with serious bodily injury (count two) and admitted the prior strike and the allegation he personally inflicted great bodily injury in exchange for a maximum term of four years in state prison, dismissal of all remaining charges and allegations against him, and the court’s assurance it would issue a certificate of probable cause permitting him to challenge the use of his juvenile conviction as a prior strike.
The trial court denied probation and sentenced defendant to serve the lower term of two years, doubled for the prior strike, for an aggregate term of four years in state prison. The court awarded defendant presentence custody credit and imposed fees and fines, including a $105 “incarceration fee.”
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court granted his request for a certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the incarceration fee should be reversed because the trial court did not state a statutory basis for the fee and, in any event, there is no valid statutory basis for the fee. The People concede the absence of a stated statutory basis, but argue the trial court was empowered to impose the fee under section 672 and the matter should therefore be remanded to allow the trial court to correct the error. We agree.
The trial court must provide a “ ‘detailed recitation of all the fees, fines and penalties on the record,’ ” including their statutory bases; the same is true for the commitment minute order and the abstract of judgment. (People v. Eddards (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 712, 717-718; see People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200.)
Here, the probation report recommended imposition of an incarceration fee of $105, but provided no statutory authority for imposing the fee. At sentencing, the court imposed the $105 incarceration fee without providing a statutory basis for that fee. While both the August 19, 2016 minute order and the abstract of judgment reflect imposition of the $105 incarceration fee, neither document reflects a corresponding statutory provision.
We reject defendant’s contention the $105 fee was unauthorized and could not otherwise have been imposed under another statute, such as a fine under section 672 that provides: “Upon a conviction for any crime punishable by imprisonment in any jail or prison, in relation to which no fine is herein prescribed, the court may impose a fine on the offender not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) in cases of misdemeanors or ten thousand dollars ($10,000) in cases of felonies, in addition to the imprisonment prescribed.” As the People aptly note, defendant pleaded no contest to violating section 243, subdivision (d), an offense for which no fine is prescribed. As such, the trial court was empowered to impose a fine as to that conviction pursuant to section 672.
At sentencing, the trial court orally imposed other fees and fines, some with and some without corresponding statutory bases. In addition to the incarceration fee, the statutory basis for the presentence report fee and booking fee is not specified.
On remand, the trial court is directed to prepare an amended minute order and an amended abstract of judgment that sets forth the statutory basis for all fees and fines imposed, including the $105 incarceration fee, $350 presentence report fee, and $459 booking fee.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the trial court to prepare an amended minute order separately listing all fees and fines imposed along with the corresponding statutory basis of each. The court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy of the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
/s/
HOCH, J.
We concur:
/s/
RAYE, P. J.
/s/
ROBIE, J.
[1] Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.