Filed 1/4/18 P. v. Flores CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Tehama)
----




THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JACINTO JOSE FLORES,

Defendant and Appellant.
C083713

(Super. Ct. No. NCR97846)





Defendant Jacinto Jose Flores pleaded guilty to failing to report a change of address as a sex offender (Pen. Code, § 290.013, subd. (a)) and admitted to having been convicted of three prior strikes. He was sentenced to a 25-year-to-life indeterminate term. On appeal, he contends the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike his prior strikes and thereby violated his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The parties stipulated to a factual basis in the sheriff’s report. A summary of that report shows that an active parole warrant was issued for defendant for tampering with his electronic monitoring device. When officers attempted to find defendant at his home of record, they were told he no longer lived there. Defendant’s whereabouts were unknown.
Defendant later pleaded guilty to failing to report a change of address (§ 290.013, subd. (a)) and admitted to suffering three prior strikes. When he later invited the court to strike his prior strikes, he argued his potential 25-year-to-life sentence was extreme, grossly disproportionate to his crime, and violative of the Eighth Amendment and California Constitution.
The trial court declined to strike the priors, finding defendant fell within the spirit of the three strikes law. The court noted defendant had previously been convicted of forcible rape, vehicular burglary, criminal threats, assault with intent to commit rape, and failure to register as a sex offender. And before those offenses, he had been convicted of misdemeanor child molestation, which led to his registration requirement. The court also noted the seriousness of defendant’s current offense, in that his whereabouts were unknown despite being paroled with an electronic monitoring device.
The court imposed an indeterminate term of 25 years to life.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in declining to strike his prior strikes. He argues his sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime, which involved no violence or injury, and thus is violative of the Eighth Amendment. And while he concedes his conduct was not as passive as that of defendants whose third strike sentences violated the Eight Amendment, he maintains his sentence is grossly disproportionate.
As defendant tacitly concedes, In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524 (Coley) compels us to affirm. There, Coley failed to register as a sex offender within five days of his release from prison and was sentenced to 25-years-to-life as a third strike offense. (Id. at pp. 532, 536.) In a habeas petition, Coley challenged the constitutionality of his sentence. (Id. at p. 530.) In holding the sentence constitutional, the court reviewed cases involving challenges to life sentences imposed for failing to register as a sex offender. (Id. at pp. 537, 562.) The cases fell into two categories: where a defendant has previously provided law enforcement with accurate information of his current address and has demonstrated a good faith effort to comply with registration requirements, imposition of a 25-year-to-life term is unconstitutional for the negligent failure to affirmatively confirm existing registration information by updating information within five days of a birthday. (Id. at p. 551.) But where a defendant’s current address is unknown to law enforcement and where the defendant has failed to comply with a crucial aspect of the sex offender registration requirements, imposition of a 25-year-to-life term for the failure to register a current address is constitutionally permissible. (Ibid.) The court concluded the circumstances surrounding Coley’s triggering offense and his serious criminal history rendered the 25-year-to-life sentence neither cruel nor unusual. (Id. at p. 562.)
Here, the same result obtains. Defendant’s conviction did not stem from a negligent oversight made in the context of dutifully supplying law enforcement with accurate information. (See People v. Carmony (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1071 [defendant failed to “update” his registration within five working days of his birthday having registered the same information one month before his birthday].) Defendant’s conviction stemmed from removing his monitoring device, leaving his registered address, and failing to inform police of his new address. Further, as the trial court noted, his criminal history placed him within the spirit of the three strikes law. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and defendant’s sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.



HULL , Acting P. J.



We concur:



ROBIE , J.



RENNER , J.