Filed 5/17/17 P. v. Garcia CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA



THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

FELIPE ANTHONY GARCIA,

Defendant and Appellant.
D071217



(Super. Ct. No. JCF36534)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County, Raymond A. Cota, Judge. Affirmed.
John E. Edwards, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Anthony DaSilva and Garrett Beaumont, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
A jury found Felipe Anthony Garcia guilty of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; count 1), and delaying a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a); count 2). Garcia appeals, contending there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of first degree burglary. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
II
BACKGROUND
Early one morning, Garcia entered a residence, walked past two children, and went into the kitchen. The house dog alerted the owner and her brother someone was in the house. The owner and her brother went to check why the dog was barking and discovered Garcia standing in their kitchen staring at the opened cabinets. The owner's brother asked Garcia what he was doing in their home and Garcia mumbled something; however, neither the owner nor her brother could understand what Garcia was saying.
After the owner's brother repeatedly told Garcia to get out of the house, the brother began pushing Garcia out. Every time the owner's brother pushed Garcia, Garcia would come back at the owner's brother trying to explain something, but neither the owner nor her brother could understand what Garcia was saying. The only statement the owner was able to comprehend was that Garcia was looking for his friend. Eventually, the owner's brother was able to get Garcia out of the house.
The owner then called the police to report a burglary in progress. Police officers arrived at the house and set up a perimeter. One of the officers spotted Garcia, told Garcia he was a police officer, and attempted to stop Garcia, but Garcia took off running. Garcia ran for about half a block before being pushed onto the ground and arrested.
During Garcia's booking, he was provided the advisements required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 478–479, and questioned about what he was doing in the house. Garcia stated he initially went in the house because he thought it was his friend's house. When he realized it was the incorrect house, he looked for a back door to exit the house. Garcia did not have any items from the house on him, and neither the owner nor her brother saw Garcia try to take anything while in the house.
At trial, the owner explained how she feared for her children, her brother, and herself because she did not know Garcia's intentions, if he had any weapons, or if he was violent. Among the court's instructions to the jury, the court informed the jury it could consider Garcia's flight from the police officers as evidence he was guilty of a crime. (See CALCRIM No. 372.)
III
DISCUSSION
A
"Every person who enters any house, …, with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary." (§ 459.) Garcia does not dispute he entered the house. The main issue on appeal is whether there was substantial evidence Garcia had the necessary intent to commit larceny when he entered the house.
To prevail on a substantial evidence challenge, the party must present "all of the material evidence on the disputed elements of the crime in the light most favorable to the People, and then must persuade [the court] that evidence cannot reasonably support the jury's verdict." (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1574 (Sanghera).) The appellate court's function is not to reweigh the evidence presented at trial or determine the credibility of the evidence or witnesses. (See People v. Sanchez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 325, 329–330.) Instead, "[a]n appellate court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the jury's determination," (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 215), and determines if there is substantial evidence to support the finding. (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131.) " ' "Evidence is substantial if it is reasonable, credible and of solid value." ' " (People v. Tuner (2004) 34 Cal.4th 406, 425.) "The appellate court presumes in support of the judgement the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce" from both direct and circumstantial evidence. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
Regarding the element of intent, it is generally a question of fact determined by the jury, and an appellate court will give deference to a "jury's finding unless the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law." (People v. Gbadebo-Soda (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 160, 169, citing People v. Walker (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 18, 19.) Appellate courts may look to an individual's conduct and the surrounding facts and circumstances of the specific case to determine if there is sufficient evidence of the individual's intent. (See Sanghera, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1574–1575.) In burglary cases, the necessary intent is "rarely susceptible of direct proof and must usually be inferred from all of the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence. Where the evidence is sufficient to justify a reasonable inference that such intent existed the verdict must not be disturbed." (People v. Smith (1948) 84 Cal.App.2d 509, 512.) Moreover, "[b]urglarious intent can reasonably be inferred from an unlawful entry alone." (People v. Jordan (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 782, 786.)
B
Garcia argues he did not have the intent to commit larceny or a felony when he entered the house because he was only looking for his friend's house. Yet, Garcia's conduct once he entered the house contradicts his argument. Garcia admitted to police officers he knew he was in the wrong house when he walked into the house and discovered two children watching TV. However, instead of leaving the house or asking to look for his friend, he continued into the kitchen and opened up several cabinets. When the owner and her brother subsequently confronted Garcia, he could not coherently explain why he was there. The jury could reasonable infer from this evidence and from his flight from the police, he had the necessary intent to commit theft when he entered the house. Accordingly, Garcia has not established there was insufficient evidence to support his burglary conviction.
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.


McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:



HALLER, J.



AARON, J.