[1] In a related petition for writ of habeas corpus (case No. A154207), defendant argues the trial court erred in granting his request to represent himself and denying him access to ancillary services necessary to his defense. We deny the petition today by separate order.
[1] All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
[1] Defendant criticizes the Faretta waiver form because (1) item No. 5 on the form indicates defendant was “aware of the consequences” should he be convicted but does not spell out what the consequences were; (2) contained checkmarks but not defendant’s initials by items Nos. 6 through 8 concerning the charges, facts, and defenses; and (3) the trial court did not complete the “Findings and Order” section of the form. As to (1), item No. 5 states: “I am aware of the consequences should I be convicted (maximum possible sentence).” Defendant wrote immediately above item No. 5 that he understood he was charged with “Posetion [sic] of narcotics in jail 10 yrs” and “Robery [sic] Life.” Further, defendant indicated at the Faretta hearing he was aware he was facing a 17-year-to-life sentence. Thus, the record demonstrates defendant was aware of his maximum possible sentence. (See, e.g., People v. Jackio (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 445, 454–456 [advisement defendant was exposed to life sentence was not ambiguous; court was not required to specify “ ‘the range of allowable punishments’ ” where defendant was informed of maximum sentence].) As to (2), defendant argues he did not initial items Nos. 6 through 8, but the form does not provide a space for initials, only “yes” or “no” checkboxes, which he marked in the affirmative. As to (3), though the court failed to sign the prepared findings and order on the Faretta form, it clearly found defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel by granting the motion. On appeal, we review de novo whether that finding is supported by the entire record. (People v. Bush (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 457, 469; Sullivan, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 547–548.)
[1] Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).
[1] Because we conclude the record reflects defendant was adequately warned about the dangers of self-representation, we do not address the parties’ arguments concerning whether a Faretta violation would require automatic reversal or application of the Chapman harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)
[1] Curiously, defendant relies on Simmons, a case from this division, in his reply brief, but incorrectly argues we affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw. In Simmons, we concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a motion to withdraw a plea. (Simmons, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1466.) We also, however, reiterated the general legal principles governing challenges to section 1018 rulings, which, as here, “usually arise where a defendant pleads guilty, later unsuccessfully tries to withdraw the plea, and then appeals the trial court’s denial of the motion to withdraw.” (Simmons, at p. 1466, italics added by Simmons.)
