Filed 4/27/17 P. v. Girgis CA4/1
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA



THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MAGDI GIRGIS,

Defendant and Appellant.
D070461



(Super. Ct. No. 13CF0340)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Patrick H. Donahue, Judge. Affirmed as modified; remanded with directions.
William J. Kopeny and Ronda G. Norris for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Meagan J. Beale, Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia and Alastair Agcaoili, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Magdi Girgis of conspiracy to commit murder (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 187, subd. (a); count 1) and first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 2). It also found true the allegations that Girgis committed the murder for financial gain and to prevent testimony. (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(1) & (10).)
The court sentenced Girgis to prison for life without the possibility of parole.
Girgis appeals. In his opening brief, Girgis argues the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during trial and closing argument. However, we find many of these challenges forfeited because Girgis's trial counsel did not object to several of the statements during the prosecution's closing argument that he now claims are misconduct. In addition, for the challenges to the prosecutor's conduct that are properly before us, we conclude they are meritless.
During the pendency of this appeal, Girgis's appellate counsel passed away and a new counsel was appointed for him. His new counsel field a supplemental brief that raised new issues. Specifically, Girgis contends the court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence in violation of Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101. Again, we find some of these challenges forfeited because Girgis did not object during trial. For those that are properly before us, we determine that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
Finally, Girgis argues that the fine the superior court imposed under section 1202.45 should be revoked because Girgis was not sentenced to a period of parole. The People concede that such a fine would not be proper here, but argue that the superior court did not impose a fine under section 1202.45. However, the People note that the abstract of judgment mistakenly includes a fine under section 1202.45. Because there is no basis for a fine under section 1202.45, we remand this matter to the superior court for the limited purpose of amending the abstract of judgment to reflect that no fine under 1202.45 was imposed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Prosecution
Ariet Barsoun, who was living in California, returned to her native Egypt and entered into an arranged marriage with Girgis on February 6, 1980. Girgis returned to California with Ariet. Girgis and Ariet had two sons, Richard and Ryan. Girgis and Ariet were rarely affectionate.
Ariet would try to show affection to Girgis, but Girgis was only affectionate after he fought with Ariet to try to make things better. Toward the end of their marriage, Girgis and Ariet slept in separate rooms.
In California, Girgis became a licensed respiratory therapist and worked long hours. He was a strict and controlling father, particularly about money. Richard characterized Girgis as secretive about money and stated that Girgis usually kept money instead of using it to support the family.
Growing up, Ryan played sports, but Girgis would not attend any of his games. Ryan explained he did not have a close relationship with Girgis because Girgis was always working and very negative.
Ariet worked in a factory and was the primary caregiver for her sons. She was a Coptic Orthodox Catholic and would take her sons to church on Sundays. Richard described his mother as a "sweet person" who always looked out for her sons.
At home, Girgis displayed an explosive and violent temper. At times, he could be harsh and angry. For example, when Richard was 10 years old and got a potato chip stain on his homework, Girgis picked Richard off the ground and tried to choke him. On another occasion, when Ryan came home late when he was 16 years old, Girgis ripped Ryan's silver chain off his neck and kicked him on the floor until Richard stopped him. In addition, after an argument involving Girgis, the rest of the family was so concerned for their safety that they slept on the bedroom floor with the door barricaded all night.
On February 3, 2004, Girgis punched Ariet in the face. Her nose was bloodied and her eye swollen. Richard took Ariet to the hospital to get treatment for her injuries. While there, Ariet told an officer what had happened to her. The police then arrested Girgis, and he moved out of his family's house.
The next day, Detective Clifford Williams of the Westminster Police Department interviewed Ariet in her home and had a protective order put in place prohibiting Girgis from contacting Ariet and going to their residence. Williams interviewed Ariet again on February 17, 2004, and she provided more details as to what happened with Girgis. Ariet asked Girgis for money for their sons, and he would not give her any. She compared Girgis to his brother and said, "Why don't you help out more with your boys?" She pointed out that Girgis's brother pays for his children's college expenses and takes his wife out to dinner and to other events. Girgis became angry and hit Ariet with a closed fist. Ariet told Williams that she was afraid Girgis would return and harm or kill her. She commented, ''He loves the money, but he doesn't love anybody. He loves the money that comes with us. Believe me when I tell you this."
Ariet remained scared of Girgis after his arrest. She made comments to Ryan concerning what he and Richard would do if Girgis killed her. She spoke of getting a divorce and moving to Northern California where her family lived.
Sometime later, Girgis, concerned about losing his license to practice in the medical field, tried to repair his relationship with Ariet. To this end, Girgis asked Richard to convince Ariet to drop the domestic violence charges by claiming that she injured herself when she fell down the stairs drunk. Richard agreed, and helped Ariet sign documents recanting her earlier statements to the police and asking that Girgis only serve jail time on the weekends, if any.
A proposed plea offer was made that Girgis serve one year in jail. He rejected the offer. Girgis made comments to Richard that he would be better off just killing Ariet. He said that if Ariet was not there to testify, the case would go away. He also felt the district attorney, police, and the entire state of California was targeting him.
Girgis made similar comments to his brother. Girgis told his brother that he had been by the house even though the protective order was in place. He also said he was willing to kill Ariet and the deputy district attorney to get the case dropped. Girgis's brother sent two anonymous letters to Detective Williams expressing his concern for Ariet's safety and the safety of the deputy district attorney. Williams tried to relocate Ariet, but she refused.
In regard to a divorce, Girgis was upset with the idea of Ariet getting half of what he worked for. In response to the possibility of having to pay child support and alimony, Girgis spoke of cutting back on his work hours and having Ryan live with him. Near to this time, Girgis began divesting the family's community property assets.
At the preliminary hearing stemming from Girgis's arrest for domestic violence, Ariet testified that Girgis hit her and she only signed the statements recanting her allegations of abuse because she was afraid of Girgis and he threatened to cut off the utilities, not pay the mortgage, and empty the bank accounts.
Girgis subsequently filed a petition for divorce. Ariet planned to move to Northern California after Ryan finished high school. However, this planned move was not to be.
On the night of September 29, 2004, Richard left his home around 9:00 p.m. as Ariet went to sleep. Ryan was out with some friends and did not return until after 1:00 a.m. on September 30. Ryan entered the house through a back sliding glass door, locked it, and went upstairs to his bedroom. He then fell asleep listening to music.
Later, Ryan heard his bedroom door open and hit the back stopper. He felt a hand over his mouth and a body on top of him. Ryan bit the hand and rolled off his bed, falling into his dresser, and knocking over the lamp. He yelled for Ariet and Richard and tried to swing at the person. The perpetrator, later identified as Anthony Bridget, kept telling Ryan to be quiet or he would hurt him. Bridget was about five inches taller and weighed nearly 100 pounds more than Ryan. As Bridget was struggling with Ryan, a second male dressed in dark clothing came in to help. Neither of them made any demands, except for instructing Ryan to stop resisting. Ryan's hands were behind his back and the two men were putting duct tape around his head when Ariet came out of the master bedroom. She sounded scared and told them to "take anything you want."
The second man bear hugged Ariet and moved her back toward her room. Ryan heard Ariet scream as she was being carried away. Meanwhile, Bridget forced Ryan into his bedroom closet. Ryan kept pleading with Bridget, "Please don't kill me." Bridget responded, "I know your circumstances. I know what you're going through. I'm not going to kill you." Bridget duct taped Ryan's feet together and noticed his hands were coming loose. He removed his glove and used shoestrings to tie up Ryan's hands. Bridget left the closet and Ryan heard a loud muffler outside.
Ryan escaped his closet, grabbed his cell phone, and ran out of the house. He noticed his mother's bedroom door was closed, but did not want to go inside and check because he was not sure the perpetrators had left. Ryan called 911 and began banging on his neighbors' doors. He ran to his friend's house a few blocks away and called Richard and Girgis. Girgis answered his phone right away and seemed alert and awake. Ryan told Girgis about being tied up and the break in, and Girgis asked if Ryan was okay.
Ariet was found dead lying on the right side of the bed in the master bedroom. She was nearly decapitated, with a number of lethal slashing injuries to her face and neck.
There was no sign of any forced entry into the house. A hide-a-key on the side of the house was undisturbed. The perpetrators did not take anything from the house. Nor did they ransack the house. At the direction of Ryan, officers found 5.21 grams of marijuana, plastic baggies, and a bong stem in his closet.
Richard and Ryan wanted to have Ariet's funeral on October 13, 2004. Girgis said he could not make it that day so the funeral was held on October 12, 2004. Girgis attended the viewing, but did not attend Ariet's burial. This was the last time Richard or Ryan saw or spoke with Girgis until his arrest eight years later.
Ryan received certain AOL instant messages before and after Ariet's death. The unidentified sender sent Ryan a message about a week before Ariet's murder, "Better watch your back. I know where you live." A second message sent said, "You are going to pay for this." After Ariet's murder, a third message was sent, "How did you like your gift? LOL."
Richard and Ryan had remained very active over the years in getting publicity for their mother's murder in hope of bringing her killers to justice. They also regularly contacted the Westminster Police Department for updates. After one such call in January 2010, Detective James Wilson got permission to work on the case. Wilson submitted certain evidence for additional DNA testing and got a hit on the shoelaces used to tie up Ryan as belonging to Bridget. Bridget, a known gang member currently in prison for manslaughter, matched the description and the composite sketch provided by Ryan and was out of custody when Ariet was killed. Having identified one of the killers, officers devised an undercover operation to pose as gang members and approach Girgis for more money.
On January 30, 2013, Long Beach police officers Victor Thrash and Jerry Carter disguised themselves as gang members and approached Girgis outside of his home and asked to talk to him. Their conversation was recorded:
"Magdi Girgis: What do you need?

"Officer Carter: Check it out man, man. My homie is locked up [in] the pen right now. The police approached him about him killing your wife for you in this fucking house. Do you know what I'm saying? We don't care about that. We don't care about that. The thing is, we want to get paid for it. We not going to say shit, you know what I mean?

"Magdi Girgis: What are you talking about?

"Officer Carter: We want five racks, 5,000. You know what I'm saying? We ain't going to say shit. We ain't going to the police. We ain't going to say nothing else."

At that point, Thrash noticed Girgis's girlfriend Jackleen Husein pull up to the house and said, "Let's roll." Carter handed Girgis a piece of paper with his phone number written on it and said, "Call me tomorrow by ten o'clock.'' The officers left.
Husein asked Girgis who the officers were, and he said they came to threaten him. She said he seemed scared. Girgis put his Costco purchases inside the house, and at Husein's suggestion, they drove to find the car and get the license plate number, but they were unsuccessful. Girgis did not tell Husein he had their phone number. Husein left Girgis's house and then called Ryan, without Girgis's knowledge, and left a message, expressing concern for Girgis. Ryan called Wilson, and then returned Husein's call and told her to contact the police.
The next day, Girgis called the number left by Carter from a pay phone in Long Beach. Girgis negotiated terms with the undercover officer:
"Mr. Girgis: Yeah. What's the problem, my friend?

[¶] . . . [¶]

"Officer Carter: The problem is my boy is locked down in the pen, like I told you yesterday. We know what's going on. You know, my boy, you know, took care of a little business, you know. So we -- you know, we just trying to get paid just to keep it hush. You know what I mean?

"Mr. Girgis: I thought you got -- you got paid everything?

"Officer Carter: We got paid everything, but they -- they pushing up on my boy, man. So I got to -- we got to -- we got to try to get some (inaudible), so we can get on out of town. Five thousand ain't that much, man. I -- you know.

"Mr. Girgis: I just don't have it, that's the problem. I lost my job. And I have some, but not the -- whole amount.

"Officer Carter: You know, I got -- got --

"Mr. Girgis: I have on me 1500.

"Officer Carter: What's that?

"Mr. Girgis: Fifteen hundred I have on me.

"Officer Carter: Man, what am I going to do with 1500, man? I'm trying to get out of town, man.

"Mr. Girgis: Well, give me five to arrange the rest. And give me some (inaudible). Who's the (inaudible) middle man?

"Officer Carter: What?

"Mr. Girgis: Who was the middle man?

"Officer Carter: I -- I -- I don't -- I do -- you know every -- everybody know who the middle man was -- the middle man was. I ain't worried about that. People talk, and I -- I --

"Mr. Girgis: Well, how I going to trust them?

"Officer Carter: People -- because I got -- the information that I got, player, I can go to police, but I'm not. I'm just --

"Mr. Girgis: You can go. It's not a problem.

"Officer Carter: -- I'm -- I'm just -- I'm just trying to -- I'm just trying to get my money, so I can go."

Carter asked if Girgis had any other valuables, such as jewelry, and Girgis said he did not and he was already giving him his savings. Girgis asked him to call back on the payphone, and they could arrange for him to pick up the money, somewhere other than his house. Their call was disconnected and Girgis called Carter back. Girgis told Carter not to come to his house or the police would arrest him. Girgis suggested they meet outside the Home Depot in Long Beach the following day and explained where it was located. They agreed to meet there at 1:00 p.m.
The following day, February 1, 2013, as planned, Girgis arrived at Home Depot at 1:00 p.m. Girgis handed Carter a white envelope with 15 $100 bills. As they were making the exchange, Girgis said, "There's a person overlooking from the window there so be careful." Carter asked Girgis, "What the fuck did your wife do so mutherfucking bad to you to make you want to kill her ass? Jesus!" Girgis responded, "See you, my friend. It's at peace."
Girgis was arrested and called Husein from the police station. He told Husein he met the men in Long Beach to give them money to be quiet. Wilson interviewed Girgis after his arrest. Girgis said the two men approached him a few days earlier and threatened to hurt him and his children if he did not pay them five thousand dollars in 24 hours. They threw a piece of paper on the lawn with a telephone number written on it.
Girgis said he called them the next day and agreed to meet them at Home Depot and pay them the money, but said if he ever saw them he would call the police. Before going to meet them, Girgis wrote down the serial numbers of each one hundred dollar bill. He also wrote down the license plate number of the truck the officers were driving at the Home Depot parking lot.
Girgis's home was searched and officers located a list of serial numbers for the bills given to the undercover officers. Officers located about $10,000 cash in the master bedroom and downstairs bedroom. In the master bedroom, Girgis had replaced a patch of the carpet where Ariet had bled to death.
Defense
Detective Terry Selinske interviewed Ryan shortly after Ariet's murder. Ryan thought that he was the target of the crime because he sold marijuana. He also volunteered that earlier that evening his friend had offered him a knife for protection because a friend of theirs had been shot in Long Beach and Ryan went there regularly.
Ayad Makary had known Girgis since 1970 when they attended school together in Egypt. Makary said Girgis and Ariet were introduced through a mutual friend and not by an arranged marriage. After moving to the United States, Girgis contacted Makary and asked to live with him in Southern California because he was having problems with Ariet's family. Girgis was still in Southern California when Richard was born. Girgis had no contact with Ariet until Ariet located him to obtain child support. They reconciled and Ariet moved to Southern California.
Makary said Ryan and Richard came to his home later the day of Ariet's murder. As they were leaving, Ryan said to him, "I'm dealing with drugs, but I will stop now." Makary currently collects rents for Girgis for a 10 percent commission.
Makary's son, Michael, testified their families were close growing up. Richard called him the night of Ariet's murder, frantic. Michael later saw Richard and Ryan leaving the police station with Girgis. Girgis was crying and had his arms around his sons. Richard and Ryan came to Makary's home later that afternoon and Ryan was inconsistent about what had happened. Ryan told Makary, "I messed around and dealt drugs, but I guess I'm going to have to stop now."
Rebuttal
Detective Williams said Richard and Ryan were concerned about being alone with their father. They stayed at the station with Williams and did not leave with Girgis. Richard did not remember going to the Makary home. After leaving the police station, Ryan and Richard spent the next month staying with a variety of friends before moving to Northern California.
DISCUSSION
I
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
A. Girgis's Contentions in his Opening Brief
We begin our discussion of Girgis's contentions in a somewhat unorthodox manner in noting what is not before us. Despite spending the majority of his opening brief on a discussion of the evidence offered at trial, including detailed summaries of the testimony of several witnesses, Girgis does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. In addition, although his trial counsel did not object to many of the purported errors at trial, Girgis does not argue his counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Instead, Girgis focuses on six instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The first involves the prosecutor asking a witness an allegedly argumentative question that Girgis claims was intended to elicit inadmissible evidence. As we discuss below, we conclude the prosecutor did not commit misconduct in asking the subject question.
The second five instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct occurred during closing argument. However, Girgis glosses over the fact his trial counsel did not object to any of the portions of the closing argument he now finds objectionable. On the record before us, we determine Girgis forfeited his challenge to the prosecutor's closing. Further, the court sua sponte admonished the jury to disregard a portion of the prosecutor's closing that it found improper. Girgis does not adequately explain why the admonishment was insufficient to prevent him from being prejudiced by the prosecution's statement.
B. The Prosecutor's Examination of Husein
Husein testified on cross-examination by Girgis's trial counsel that she was Jordanian and met Girgis at a predominately Arabic community church. Girgis's counsel asked Husein about what Girgis said about his contact with the undercover officers. More specifically, counsel asked Husein what Girgis had told her in regard to the return of the undercover officers. Husein testified that Girgis told her that he was supposed to protect her because he was a man and she was a woman. Girgis's counsel tried to explore this theme of Girgis as the protector of women and Husein made references to the Arabic culture in responding to the questions. The prosecutor objected to the next couple questions concerning the Arabic culture. The trial court sustained the objections and reminded counsel that he could ask Husein what Girgis told her. However, Girgis's counsel veered back to the topic of Arabic culture, prompting the prosecutor to object again. When the objection was overruled, Girgis's counsel repeated his question:
"Q: Yes. [¶] In the Arabic culture which you and Magdi [Girgis] are in, is the -- is the idea the man protecting the woman something that is part of the culture?

"A: Yes."

On redirect, the prosecutor directed Husein to her conversation with Girgis's counsel on cross-examination that, in the Arabic culture, the man's role is to protect the woman. The prosecutor then asked two questions about Arabic culture, specifically what happens to women in the Arabic culture who betray their men and if there was a particular manner of death for women. The court sustained Girgis's counsel's objections on the grounds of relevance and Evidence Code section 352. Girgis's counsel then requested a sidebar. The trial court declined and permitted the prosecutor to ask another question: "Did you tell Detective Wilson that women in your culture are usually stabbed or choked?" Girgis's counsel objected and counsel proceeded to chambers to discuss the issue outside the presence of the jury.
In chambers, the prosecutor contended that Girgis's counsel had "opened the door" to questions about Arabic culture when he asked Husein about that topic during cross-examination. The trial court stated that Girgis's counsel was prohibited from "going into a whole discussion" on the topic and did not find "all that relevant what [Husein] believes the culture is." The court expressed concern that such questions would raise Evidence Code section 352 issues. Nevertheless, the prosecutor pointed out that her objections on the issue had been overruled and, and that Girgis's counsel delved into this topic fully aware of what the transcript of Husein's interview with the detectives contained.
In response, Girgis's counsel moved for a mistrial because of prosecutorial misconduct. He claimed the prosecutor intentionally asked an argumentative question after the trial court sustained the earlier objections to similar questions on relevance and Evidence Code section 352 grounds.
The trial court found that the prosecutor's question was not "even close to prosecutorial misconduct" because Girgis's counsel broached the topic of Arabic culture and the prosecutor's question was based on a statement Husein made to detectives. The trial court therefore denied the motion for mistrial, finding the unanswered question would not prevent Girgis from receiving a fair trial.
When trial resumed, the trial court admonished the jury: "I'm going to sustain the objection. The question that was asked as to the Arabic culture, disregard that question. There's no answer to it. At the end of the trial I tell you to disregard any questions that there's no answer to. So the -- it's basically irrelevant that -- what the witness thinks about Arabic culture or about the subject. So disregard the question. Okay? Don't consider it."`
A prosecutor in a criminal case can commit misconduct under either federal or state law. "A prosecutor's conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process. Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade either the trial court or the jury." (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44.)
"When a prosecutor intentionally asks questions, the answers of which he knows are inadmissible, the prosecutor is guilty of bad faith attempts to improperly persuade the court or jury." (People v. Parsons (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 1165, 1170; see People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839.) A prosecutor is also " 'under a duty to guard against inadmissible statements from his witnesses and guilty of misconduct when he violates that duty.' " (Parsons, supra, at p. 1170.)
Here, Girgis does not argue that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for mistrial. As such, that issue has been forfeited and we do not address it. Instead, Girgis argues that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by asking the question about the method of death of women in the Arabic culture. First, Girgis contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking a question that she knew would not be permitted based on the trial court's earlier ruling. We disagree. The record clearly shows that Girgis's counsel repeatedly asked Husein about the Arabic culture and whether, within that culture, men protect women. Although the trial court sustained some of the prosecutor's objections, the court allowed Husein to testify about the Arabic culture, specifically that, in that culture, men protect women.
Thus, because Husein testified about men protecting women in the Arabic culture, it was appropriate for the prosecutor to ask additional questions about the treatment of women in the Arabic culture. The court ultimately sustained defense counsel's objection to the question on relevancy and Evidence Code section 352 grounds, but we see nothing improper about the prosecutor asking the question after Girgis's counsel probed the topic during cross-examination.
Girgis also argues that the prosecutor's question was argumentative. A prosecutor cannot ask a question that is argumentative because the question is not really a question but an improper "speech to the jury" where "the questioner is not seeking to elicit relevant testimony," but talks past the witness to argue to the jury. (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 384.) However, this is not what occurred here.
Husein's earlier testimony elicited by defense counsel painted men as chivalrous in the Arabic culture. It was proper and not argumentative for the prosecutor to inquire into Husein's statements to provide the jury with a more complete picture. Put differently, it was not misconduct for the prosecutor to inquire into subject matter where he or she has the "good faith belief in its foundation." (People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1173-1174.) Here, Girgis's trial counsel asked Husein questions about the man's role as protector of women in the Arabic culture. It is undisputed that Husein is Arabic. Because defense counsel focused a portion of his cross-examination of Husein on the Arabic culture, the prosecutor clearly had a good faith belief that it was proper to ask the question, "Did you tell Detective Wilson that women in your culture are usually stabbed or choked?" There was no prosecutorial misconduct.
Further, the trial court explicitly admonished the jury to disregard the prosecutor's question and the jury was similarly instructed. " 'We presume that jurors treat the court's instructions as a statement of the law by a judge, and the prosecutor's comments as words spoken by an advocate in an attempt to persuade.' " (People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 441.) Unless presented with contrary evidence, we presume that the jury understood and followed the instructions. (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 574.) On the record before us, we find nothing that leads us to question that the jury followed the court's admonition and instructions here.
Because we determine that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct, we do not reach Girgis's claim of prejudice.
C. Prosecutor's Closing Argument
Girgis next asserts the prosecutor engaged in misconduct several times during closing argument, including vouching for a witness and making improper arguments. "Closing argument in a criminal trial is nothing more than a request, albeit usually lengthy and presented in narrative form, to believe each party's interpretation, proved or logically inferred from the evidence, of the events that led to the trial. It is not misconduct for a party to make explicit what is implicit in every closing argument." (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 207.) " ' " '[A] prosecutor is given wide latitude during argument. The argument may be vigorous as long as it amounts to fair comment on the evidence, which can include reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom. [Citations.] It is also clear that counsel during summation may state matters not in evidence, but which are common knowledge or are illustrations drawn from common experience, history or literature.' " . . . [¶] " '. . . A prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on other attorneys because of the unique function he or she performs in representing the interests, and in exercising the sovereign power, of the state.' " (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819-820.)
However, " '[a] prosecutor's . . . intemperate behavior violates the federal Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct "so egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process." ' " (People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1214, quoting People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 820.) "Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves ' " 'the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.' " ' " (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841.)
Here, Girgis's trial counsel did not object to any portion of the prosecutor's closing argument. "[T]o preserve a claim of [prosecutorial] misconduct, a defendant must make a timely objection and request an admonition; only if an admonition would not have cured the harm is the claim of misconduct preserved for review." (People v. Alfaro (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277, 1328.) This requirement extends to a claim that the prosecutor vouched for a witness. (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 741; People v. Fernandez (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 540, 561.) Because Girgis did not object to the now challenged portions of the closing argument, he has not preserved any of these issues for appeal. Further, he does not argue that had Girgis's trial counsel objected, an admonition would not have cured the harm. As such, we conclude Girgis has forfeited his contentions that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument. (See People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 120-121.)
Although we find forfeiture, we note that the trial court sua sponte admonished the jury when it found a portion of the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument was improper. The prosecutor began her rebuttal closing argument:
"I promise you I'll be very brief. [¶] Please understand that I would not be doing my job if I didn't address some of the comments by defense counsel. After all, they are hoping to fool at least one of you. That's what they want. Fool one of you, and Ariet's killer is not brought to justice. [¶] So just as I promised you . . . [t]here's a lot of smoke and mirrors in this case."

Although Girgis's counsel did not object to this statement, after the prosecutor finished her rebuttal closing argument, the trial court requested the attorneys to meet at sidebar. After the sidebar, the trial court provided the jury with the following admonishment: "The other thing is there was a statement at the beginning of the People's second argument, 'They are trying to just get to one of you to prevent justice in this case,' words to that effect. Just disregard that. It's not relevant. So don't consider it, and disregard that. Okay?"
"We presume the jury understood the trial court's admonition and followed its directive not to consider the prosecutor's statement." (See People v. Thornton, supra, 41 Cal.4th 391, 441; People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 574.) Here, Girgis does not explain why this admonishment was not sufficient, but instead admits in his opening brief that "this error may not, alone require reversal[.]"
In summary, Girgis forfeited his challenges to the prosecutor's closing argument by failing to object during trial as well as not explaining why an admonishment would not have cured any prejudice.
D. Motion for New Trial
Additionally, Girgis argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial. The basis for the new trial motion was the same prosecutorial misconduct Girgis argues here. Because we do not find any prosecutorial misconduct, it logically follows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
E. Cumulative Error
Finally, Girgis contends the cumulative effect of the asserted errors regarding prosecutorial misconduct rendered the trial so unfair as to violate his federal and state constitutional rights to due process warranting reversal of the judgment. Because we hold no errors exist, this cumulative error argument necessarily fails. (See People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 377 [no cumulative effect of errors when no error]; People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 885 [rejecting cumulative effect claim when court found "no substantial error in any respect"].)
II
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
A. Girgis's Contentions in his Supplemental Brief
In Girgis's supplemental opening brief, he raises additional issues that are unrelated to the issues contained in his original opening brief. These issues involve the admission of certain evidence that Girgis claims violated Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101. Specifically, Girgis challenges the admission of testimony from Ryan and Richard that they were afraid of Girgis after Ariet's murder and were placed into witness protection. He asserts such evidence violated Evidence Code section 352. He also claims the admission of evidence of Girgis's attitude about money, his physical discipline of his children, and gun ownership violated Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101. Finally, Girgis insists the trial court committed reversible error by admitting Ariet's preliminary hearing testimony that Girgis hit her many times over the course of their 24 year marriage.
B. The Law
"Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible." (Evid. Code, § 351; People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 633 (Williams).) Relevant evidence is defined as evidence "having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." (Evid. Code, § 210.) Evidence is relevant if it tends " ' "logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference" to establish material facts such as identity, intent, or motive.' " (Williams, supra, at p. 633.) The "existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive" on the part of a witness ordinarily is relevant to the truthfulness of the witness's testimony. (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (f); Williams, supra, at p. 634.)
Evidence Code section 352 provides: "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." We have long recognized that "[t]he trial court has considerable discretion in determining the relevance of evidence." (Williams, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 634.)
Evidence Code section 352 accords the trial court broad discretion to exclude even relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724.) We review a trial court's ruling under Evidence Code section 352 for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 893; Williams, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 634-635.) A trial court's discretionary ruling "must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice." (People v. Jordan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 308, 316; italics omitted.)
Character evidence is generally admitted under Evidence Code section 1101, which provides: "(a) Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102, 1103, 1108, and 1109, evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion. [¶] (b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith believe that the victim consented) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act."
C. Evidence that Ryan and Richard Were Afraid of Girgis
During his direct testimony, Ryan stated that he was concerned for his safety after Ariet's death. He testified that he was afraid of his father and expressed this fear to the police. Girgis's trial counsel did not object to this line of questioning on relevance grounds or under Evidence Code section 352. Without any objection from defense counsel, toward the end of his direct testimony, the prosecutor asked Ryan how he felt about his father. Ryan responded: "I feel scared. I feel that he's the cause of my mom's death. I feel that he hasn't been there for me and my brother. I feel no emotional support. I don't feel any financial support. I feel terrified that he might hurt someone again."
On cross-examination of Ryan, Girgis's counsel questioned Ryan to support the defense theory that Ryan was the target of the break-in because of his past drug dealing. To this end, defense counsel asked Ryan about his lifestyle, which involved smoking and selling marijuana, a fight at school, going to parties in Long Beach, and shoplifting from his work. The night of Ariet's murder, Ryan had snuck out of the house and returned just a few hours before she was killed. He was also questioned about the prior threats and later messages received by AOL instant messenger. Before finding out about Ariet's death, Ryan thought he was the target of the attack because: (1) the assailants came into his room and threw him in the closet; and (2) he was selling marijuana. Defense counsel questioned Ryan about why he was so calm when finding out his mother had been killed, when his brother was frantic and upset.
At trial, the prosecutor asked Commander Timothy Vu whether Ryan or Richard requested police protection, prompting Girgis's counsel to object on relevance and hearsay grounds. The court overruled the objection, and Vu answered the question in the affirmative. The prosecutor then inquired of Vu, "What can you tell us about their request for protection?" Girgis's counsel objected on hearsay grounds and asked for an offer of proof. In overruling the objection, the trial court indicated that Vu's testimony went to the state of mind of Ryan and Richard. Vu testified that both Ryan and Richard asked for police protection early in the investigation and "communicated to [Vu] that they were fearful of their dad and requested protection[.]" Defense counsel moved to strike Vu's testimony, but the trial court declined, instructing the jury that it could not consider the statement for its truth, but just for the state of mind of Ryan and Richard.
Later, out of the presence of the jury, the court clarified its ruling:
"Okay. There was an objection by [defense counsel] as to the issue of Ryan and Richard calling the police and asking for protection. The court allowed that in with a limiting instruction because the court believes it goes to his state of mind. And the state of mind is relevant because it's at issue from the cross-examination as to whether -- what his state of mind was in the course of this investigation, whether he was just faking it or that type of issue. So I let it in for that reason."

Richard testified that on October 1, 2004, he spoke with the police about receiving some kind of witness protection for Ryan and himself. The composite sketches of the men who killed Ariet were being released, and he was very concerned that someone might come back to get Ryan. He became afraid of his father within the first couple of days following the murder. Richard took Ryan with him wherever he lived. At one point, they moved up north for safety. Girgis's trial counsel did not object to this testimony.
Detective Williams testified that Richard called him on October 1, 2004, and asked for protection from Girgis. Williams described Ryan and Richard as stressed and scared. Williams immediately notified the victim-witness unit and expedited their relocation. Girgis's counsel did not object to this testimony.
Here, Girgis now claims the trial court erred by admitting the evidence that Ryan and Richard were afraid of Girgis and asked for police protection. However, the only objection to this evidence to which Girgis cites is his counsel's objection on relevance and hearsay grounds to the following question of Vu: "At any time during the time that you were the case agent, did either Ryan or Richard Girgis ask you for protection?" Girgis does not address his hearsay objection on appeal. As such, we consider that issue waived. In regard to the relevancy objection, Girgis maintains the evidence regarding Ryan and Richard asking for police protection is not relevant because their state of mind was not relevant to any issue at trial. We disagree.
Vu's testimony that Ryan and Richard asked for police protection was relevant to support their testimony that they were afraid of their father. More specifically, evidence that Ryan was in fear of Girgis and this fear led to Ryan moving to Northern California was relevant to rebut Girgis's contention shown in the cross-examination of Ryan that the assailants were targeting Ryan not Ariet. Evidence establishing a witness's state of mind is relevant and may be considered in evaluating the witness's credibility. (People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1368-1369.) The fact Ryan and Richard asked for protection from their father undermined Girgis's theory that Ryan's drug dealing was the cause of Ariet's murder.
Ryan's and Richard's testimony also was relevant to the issue of Ryan's credibility. The defense cross-examined Ryan, contending he was the cause of the break-in. The defense was attempting to establish that Ryan's unlawful conduct during his high school years was serious enough to cause Ariet's murder in direct conflict with Ryan's testimony that his misbehavior was relatively minor. Ryan's fear rehabilitated his credibility as a mere victim of the break-in. Put differently, the challenged testimony supported the prosecution's theory that Ryan's activities as a drug dealer and his past drug use were not the cause of Ariet's murder.
In addition, we note Vu's testimony about Ryan's and Richard's requests for police protection bolstered their credibility that they were afraid of Girgis. Indeed, at one point during trial, Girgis's trial counsel even offered a stipulation that Ryan hated his father. Thus, the brothers' request for police protection countered the defense narrative that they simply hated their father. Accordingly, the testimony was relevant for this reason as well. (See Williams, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 634.)
Although we address the merits of Girgis's challenge to Vu's testimony on relevancy grounds, we decline to deal with Girgis's other claims regarding the evidence that Ryan and Richard were afraid of Girgis as well as Williams's testimony that they asked for police protection. Girgis did not object to this testimony on relevancy grounds. Moreover, he did not object to any of this evidence under Evidence Code section 352. Questions relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeal. (Williams, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 620.) Therefore, these challenges have been forfeited.
D. Evidence of Girgis's Attitude About Money, Physical
Discipline of his Sons, and Ownership of Guns

Girgis next argues that the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting certain evidence regarding his attitude about money, his discipline of his sons, and his gun ownership. This evidence was introduced through the testimony of Ryan and Richard. In his supplemental brief, Girgis summarizes the testimony that he now claims the trial court improperly admitted. However, for the vast majority of this evidence, he fails to cite to the record where he made any objections to it. Our review of the record also revealed that Girgis's counsel failed to object to most of this evidence. Without a specific and timely objection below, we deem these evidentiary challenges forfeited on appeal. (Williams, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 630.)
Although we find almost all of Girgis's claims forfeited here, our review of the record found that Girgis's counsel objected to: (1) a portion of Richard's testimony regarding a specific interaction with Girgis involving discipline; and (2) a portion of Richard's testimony about a particular instance with Girgis showing Girgis's frugality. Nevertheless, in his supplemental brief, Girgis does not directly cite to these objections or adequately discuss this portion of the record. As we discuss below, a more robust explanation of the record would have been helpful because the testimony, objections, and the trial court's ruling and response creates somewhat of a muddled record that hampers our ability to analyze Girgis's specific challenges here.
Before we examine the relevant testimony and objections, we observe that an "[a]ppellant has the burden of showing error by an adequate record." (People v. Mack (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1032.) Also, "the absence of an adverse ruling precludes any appellate challenge." (People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1179.)
During Richard's direct testimony, the prosecutor asked Richard about a specific instance in which Girgis was a "harsh" disciplinarian. This topic lead to the following exchange:
"Q. Now, Mr. [Richard] Girgis, turning your attention to your relationship with your father. How would you describe your relationship with your father growing up?

"A. Well, growing up, I mean, there was some moments that were good and there were some moments that were bad. Like, I mean, I do remember some good moments. I remember playing soccer with him, like, when we were younger. And, you know, I do remember him. He taught me math and stuff, like, at a young age. [¶] But then, on the other end, I do remember some bad times, though. Like, he was very harsh. I do remember one time, like, I got a potato stain -- I was eating potato chips - -

"[Defense counsel no. 1]: Objection, your honor. Irrelevant. Move to strike.

"[Defense counsel no. 2]: 1101.

"The Court: Well, it's nonresponsive. So sustained.

"By [prosecutor]:
"Q. You described your father as harsh. Can you talk about -- a little bit about that? Is it discipline that he was harsh at?

"A. Very harsh on discipline. There are times, like -- there are times, I got a stain on homework. And then he like --

"[Defense counsel no. 1]: Objection. No question pending.

"The Court: Sustained.

"[Defense counsel no. 1]: Move to strike.

"By [prosecutor]:
"Q. Can you give us an example?

"[Defense counsel no. 2]: Well, it's a 402 issue, your honor.

"The Court: Overruled.

"By [prosecutor]:
"Q. You may answer.

"A. One time I remember that I got a potato stain -- like, I was eating potato chips and the oils were on my finger, and then I ended up getting it on the top of the paper. And then he got so, like, mad. Like, there was a side to him where he would get, like, really upset. His eyes would light up and he would just, like, totally like -- like, he had rage. And he literally picked me up off the ground. And I remember Teta (phonetic), which was his mom, was living there. She came over and she was trying to break him off. And he was, like, really -- just had me up like he was trying to choke me. And it's, like -- you know, all that was off of a potato stain on the homework. It wasn't even nothing big. [¶] And then I remember another time, too, like --

"[Defense counsel no. 1]: Your honor, I'll object as a specific instance of conduct. Move to strike under 352 and having a continuing objection.

"The Court: Well, it's nonresponsive at this time. So --"

The prosecutor asked another question and the court did not finish its comment. Girgis's counsel did not ask the court to clarify its ruling or specifically address the motion to strike.
Later during Richard's testimony, the prosecutor asked him about an incident that occurred when Richard was studying and Girgis's counsel also objected:
"Q. And do you recall a time where you were studying in nursing school and you had a light turned on? Do you remember that time?

"A. Yeah, I do remember studying like that. Yeah. It was like -- he was so like -- he was so concerned about the electric bill and about the money that it was, like, all the lights would have to be turned off. And I remember I would be sitting there, studying and I'd have to have just one light bulb on. I remember even times -- I remember times before, I turned on the other lights so I could see a little better. It's, like, hard to read all that stuff just like that. And he would get so upset. He would be, like, you're not paying the electric bill. And you're not this, and you've got to turn this off. So it was like --

"[Defense counsel no. 1]: Your honor, I'll object. It's inappropriate specific instances of character evidence. Move to strike, 352.

"The Court: It's nonresponsive."

Girgis's trial counsel did not ask for further clarification from the court or address his motion to strike.
Here, the record is less than clear that the trial court gave Girgis an adverse ruling. During Richard's testimony about the potato chip incident, Girgis's counsel objected on relevancy and inadmissible character evidence (Evid. Code, § 1101) grounds. The court stated that the testimony was unresponsive and sustained the objection. During Richard's response to the next question, Girgis's counsel objected to a portion of the answer, claiming no question was pending. The court sustained this objection. Defense counsel objected to the next question, citing Evidence Code section 402. The court overruled this objection. Finally, after Richard testified in further detail about the potato chip incident, Girgis's counsel objected that the testimony was a "specific instance of conduct" and moved to strike the testimony under Evidence Code section 352. The court noted that at least a portion of the testimony was "nonresponsive at this time" but then appears to have been cut off by the prosecutor asking the next question.
In regard to Richard's testimony about the potato chip incident, the only objection that the court overruled was under Evidence Code section 402. Girgis does not challenge that ruling here. In contrast, the court sustained the first objection (although perhaps on different grounds). In response to Girgis's counsel's objections under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352 later in Richard's testimony, the court appeared to agree with him that at least a portion of the testimony was not admissible, saying it was nonresponsive. However, the next question was asked while the court appeared to be in midsentence or at least contemplating what to say next. As such, there does not appear to be an actual ruling as to the specific grounds of the objection or the motion to strike, let alone an adverse ruling. If anything, the court suggested the evidence was not admissible, essentially tacitly sustaining the objection on other grounds. Girgis's counsel did ask the court to strike the testimony, but the court did not rule on that motion and defense counsel did not press the issue. Therefore, we are left with a record where it appears the court actually sustained defense counsel's objection but then failed to rule on a motion to strike. Here, Girgis does not explain how this presents an issue for review. "In other words, when, as here, the defendant does not secure a ruling, he does not preserve the point. That is the rule. No exception is available." (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 259.)
Likewise, we have similar concerns about Girgis's counsel's objection to Richard's testimony regarding studying under one light bulb. During Richard's testimony, defense counsel objected that the testimony was "inappropriate specific instances of character evidence" and moved to strike under Evidence Code section 352. The court appeared to agree that the evidence was inadmissible, stating that it was nonresponsive. The court did not address the motion to strike. However, the prosecutor asked the next question without the court offering further explanation or defense counsel requesting clarification. On this record, we determine that Girgis did not preserve this issue for appeal by obtaining a ruling on his motion to strike or an adverse ruling on his counsel's objection. (See People v. Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 259; People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1179.)
In addition, even if we were to determine these issues are properly before us, we nevertheless would not find that the court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) prohibits evidence of a person's character, including specific instances of conduct, when offered to prove a defendant's conduct on a specified occasion. However, Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) allows the admission of evidence when it is relevant to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Here, Girgis's attitude about money, as shown by the light bulb incident, is relevant to his motive. One of the prosecutor's theories was that Girgis had Ariet murdered for financial gain, i.e., he wanted to avoid having to pay alimony and child support if she divorced him. Offering a specific instance illustrating Girgis's parsimoniousness would be relevant to support this theory. Indeed, before trial, Girgis's trial counsel agreed with such a conclusion.
Similarly, the testimony regarding the potato chip incident was admissible to show motive as well. Another prosecution theory was that Girgis liked order and did not want to be challenged. When Girgis's lost control of a situation, he would respond violently. Thus, the prosecution posited that Ariet's willingness to divorce Girgis and testify against him in the domestic violence case, upset his control of the situation and he responded by hiring two individuals to kill Ariet. To this end, Ryan testified, without objection, that Girgis did not like to be "tested at all" and "[a]ny time he [was] tested, he [was] definitely enraged more." Ryan also conveyed that Girgis was "very explosive" and "violent." Richard's testimony about the potato chip stain was a specific instance of conduct that supported this prosecution theory. In other words, it was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).
Finally, Girgis has not carried his burden showing that he was prejudiced by the admission of Richard's testimony. To satisfy this burden, Girgis must show he would have obtained a more favorable result if the evidence was excluded. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) He does not address the impact of the admission of Richard's testimony about the potato chip stain and the single light bulb studying incident. Instead, he argues prejudice as to all the evidence he now challenges. We address that argument below. However, as to the portion of Richard's testimony at issue here, we cannot say that Girgis would have obtained a more favorable result considering the mountainous evidence supporting the jury's finding of Girgis's guilt.
E. Evidence that Girgis Hit Ariet Throughout Their 24-Year Marriage
Girgis next argues that evidence Ariet was afraid of Girgis after the February 2004 domestic violence incident should have been limited to her preliminary hearing testimony. In addition, he identifies other evidence the trial court admitted, which he now claims should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352. We find these challenges lack merit.
The prosecution's primary theory at trial was that Girgis hired two individuals to kill Ariet to prevent her from testifying against him in a domestic violence case and for financial gain by avoiding the financial impact of a divorce. Before trial, Girgis moved to exclude evidence that Ariet suffered a broken arm in 1984 in an alleged domestic violence incident and was involved in a pushing and shoving incident with him in December 2003. Girgis maintained this evidence was "overly prejudicial" under Evidence Code section 352 and should not be admitted under Evidence Code section 1109. Girgis also insisted that Ariet's entire preliminary hearing testimony from the domestic violence case should not be read to the jury.
In ruling on Girgis's motion, the court found that evidence regarding Ariet's broken arm in 1984 was too remote in time and "more prejudicial than probative." However, the court determined evidence of the pushing and shoving incident in 2003 as well other evidence of domestic violence was admissible because the evidence helped to explain why Ariet signed statements that recanted her claims of abuse. The court stated that the evidence was admissible under the forfeiture of wrongdoing exception (see People v. Banos (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 483, 485, 491-493; Giles v. California (2008) 554 U.S. 353, 359-360), but specifically concluded the evidence was not admissible under Evidence Code sections 1109 and 1370.
In regard to the reading of Ariet's preliminary hearing transcript, the court determined that the transcript could not be read into evidence under Evidence Code section 1291. Nevertheless, the court ruled that portions of the transcript could be read to the jury, which concerned questions and answers that addressed: (1) Ariet's recanting of her statements, (2) her fear of Girgis, and (3) the statements that said Girgis hit Ariet and she recanted because of fear. The court explained these portions of the preliminary hearing transcript were admissible, under Evidence Code section 1250, as evidence of Ariet's state of mind.
At trial, before portions of the preliminary hearing transcript were read for the jury, the court instructed the jury that the preliminary hearing testimony was not admitted "for the truth but for the mental state of Ariet." The court further explained the testimony was allowed so the jury could determine whether Ariet "was in fear or not."
Among other testimony from the preliminary hearing, the jury heard Ariet's testimony that she had not been truthful with the police when she told them that Girgis had not hit her in 24 years of marriage. She stated that Girgis had hit her on her arm and "beat [her] many, many times." Ariet also testified that Girgis had hit her many times and she wanted to divorce him. She said she was afraid that she might end up disabled from the abuse.
After Ariet's preliminary hearing testimony was read for the jury, the court reminded the jury that Ariet's testimony could not be considered for the truth of the matter asserted, but only to show her state of mind as to her fear of Girgis and whether it explains the recanting of her statements to the police that Girgis never hit her.
Here, Girgis argues Ariet's preliminary hearing testimony "went far beyond what was necessary to make [the] tangential point" to explain why Ariet recanted her earlier accusations. To support this position, Girgis points out that the court ruled inadmissible evidence that Ariet suffered a broken arm in 1984 because it was too remote and more prejudicial than probative. Because the court ruled the broken arm evidence was inadmissible because it occurred too long ago, Girgis argues the court erred in admitting portions of Ariet's preliminary hearing testimony where she stated Girgis hit her throughout their 24-year marriage. We are not persuaded.
Girgis provides no authority to support his claim that the court's ruling precluding evidence of the 1984 broken arm dictates the admissibility of Ariet's preliminary hearing testimony. Before trial, these issues were presented separately to the court, and the court ruled accordingly. At that time, Girgis's trial counsel did not argue that the court's ruling on the 1984 incident did or should limit the admission of portions of Ariet's preliminary hearing testimony. Further, there is a difference between admitting evidence of a specific incident of domestic violence occurring 20 years before the victim's death and general references to Girgis hitting Ariet several times over the course of their 24-year marriage. Indeed, the 1984 incident would not necessarily be helpful in showing that Ariet was afraid of Girgis some 20 years later. However, the fact that Girgis beat Ariet numerous times throughout their marriage would be useful to show Ariet was afraid of Girgis near the time of her death. In addition, this history of abuse was effective to explain why Ariet recanted her claims of abuse and lied to police in saying that Girgis never hit her. In short, we find little support for Girgis's claim that the evidence of his years of abusing Ariet should have been excluded because its probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. (See Evid. Code, § 352.)
Finally, we are not impressed by Girgis's contention that the prosecutor offered so much "repetitive evidence" of Ariet's fear that the jury could not only consider the evidence for the limited purpose of Ariet's state of mind. Girgis emphasizes that several witnesses testified that Ariet had told them that she was afraid of Girgis. However, Girgis overlooks the fact that he did not object to this testimony at trial, forfeiting any challenge to it on appeal. (Williams, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 620.) Further, Girgis's argument is entirely speculative. The court told the jury on multiple occasions that it could only consider the evidence for the limited purpose to establish Ariet's state of mind and explain her recantation of abuse. There is no indication in the record that the jury was confused by these instructions or had any questions about them. Under California law, we presume the jury was able to understand and follow the court's instructions. (See People v. Ibarra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1183.) Girgis provides no persuasive reason to question this presumption.
F. Prejudice
As a threshold matter, we note that Girgis does not address the prejudicial impact of individual pieces of evidence. Instead, he lumps all the evidence together and claims that he would have obtained a more favorable result if that evidence was excluded. (See People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) As we discuss above, Girgis forfeited many of his challenges here by failing to object during trial. Thus, most of the evidence on which he relies to claim he was prejudiced is beyond our consideration. For this reason alone, Girgis has not shown he was prejudiced by the errors he claims.
Moreover, even if we consider the potential impact of all the evidence Girgis challenges here, we still would not find that he proved he was prejudiced by its admission. Simply put, the evidence establishing Girgis's guilt was overwhelming. Girgis's statements to the undercover police officers illuminated his guilt. Girgis called the number given to him by the undercover officers posing as gang members from a payphone and said that he thought they got paid everything. He also asked them who the middle man was. His statements to the undercover officers show that he knew about an earlier agreement to have his wife killed. Girgis also paid the officers as they requested.
We observe the evidence showed that Girgis would not pay the officers the entire amount they demanded, but ironically, this evidence underscores the prosecution's theory that he was thrifty and had Ariet killed for financial gain (e.g., to avoid having to pay alimony and child support after the divorce). Nevertheless, the fact that he did not question the officers' request for additional money further demonstrated that he had contracted to kill Ariet.
Girgis selected a neutral location to pay the officers the money, asking them to meet him in the Home Depot parking lot. After the fact, he lied and claimed the undercover officers threatened him and his family if he did not pay them.
Girgis's decision to have Ariet killed followed his reaction to the domestic violence charge and the possibility of divorce. He was livid when Richard took Ariet to the hospital and she reported being hit. Girgis was arrested and forced to move from his home to Long Beach with his brother. He became obsessed with the thought of being incarcerated for his abuse of Ariet and losing half of the family estate in a divorce. Girgis then tried to decrease the amount of money and property available to be split after the divorce. He went so far as to bribe Ryan to live in Long Beach with him so he did not have to pay child support.
Girgis believed that if Ariet recanted about the domestic abuse, his charges would disappear so he intimidated her to the point that she agreed to sign a letter recanting her earlier statements to the police and claiming the officers pressured her into blaming him. At the same time, he believed her refusal to testify would resolve everything and told numerous people as much. Girgis's anger was so unnerving that his own brother sent two anonymous letters to the police expressing concern for Ariet's safety.
After Ariet testified at the preliminary hearing, Girgis filed for divorce. However, Girgis expressed concern about losing half of what he deemed to be his property. Moreover, he did not take responsibility for the events leading up to his filing for divorce, but instead, he felt the police and the District Attorney's Office was out to get him. This evidence showed that Girgis was concerned about the impact of divorce and was looking for some way to avoid its consequences. So, he took advantage of the fact he lived in a gang infested part of Long Beach and hired two Long Beach gang members to kill Ariet.
Ariet's murder was executed with precision. Bridget and his partner entered the gated community and the Girgis home without incident or forced entry. The assailants murdered Ariet, but they did not take any property. They carefully subdued Ryan, but did not seriously hurt him, even when he resisted. In contrast, when Ariet emerged from her bedroom and was completely submissive, she was immediately brought back to her bedroom and brutally stabbed to death and nearly decapitated.
Against this backdrop, even if the jury did not know that Girgis's sons feared him after their mother's murder and wanted protection from him, that Girgis hit his wife throughout their 24-year marriage, and Girgis was extremely frugal and possessed guns, we are not convinced that Girgis would have received a more favorable result. (See People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) The evidence against him simply was devastating.
III
THE PAROLE REVOCATION FINE
Finally, Girgis contends the trial court imposed a $200 fine under section 1202.45, which requires the imposition of a fine in a case in which the court imposes a sentence that includes a period of parole. (§ 1202.45.) Girgis points out that he was sentenced to an indeterminate term of life without the possibility of parole, and thus, the fine was improper. (See People v. Oganesyan (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1184-1185.)
The People agree that a fine under section 1202.45 would not be proper here because of Girgis's sentence. Nevertheless, the People claim that the court did not impose any such fine, but the court's minutes and the abstract of judgment erroneously included one.
Here, the court ordered a $200 state restitution fine (among others). The abstract of judgment indicates a $200 restitution fine per section 1202.4, subdivision (b) and a $200 restitution fine under section 1202.45. The court's minutes reflect the same two fines. Thus, the minutes and the abstract of judgment each contain a clerical error and both parties agree that no fine under section 1202.45 should have been levied. As such, we will order the superior court to amend the minutes and abstract of judgment accordingly.
DISPOSITION
The superior court is ordered to modify the minutes and abstract of judgment consistent with this opinion. In addition, the court is to forward the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is affirmed as modified.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:




NARES, J.




HALLER, J.