P. v. Gonzalez
Filed 8/29
P. v. Gonzalez
Filed 8/29/06 P. v. Gonzalez CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
| THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CARLOS GONZALEZ, Defendant and Appellant. | E038742 (Super.Ct.No. RIF120723) O P I N I O N |
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Helios J. Hernandez, Judge. Affirmed.
Dennis L. Cava, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, David Delgado-Rucci, Deputy Attorney General, Ronald A. Jakob, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350), admitted a prior strike allegation (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (c), (e)), and was sentenced to four years. He appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence.
FACTS
On December 6, 2004, an officer stopped defendant’s vehicle for failing to signal before changing lanes. After learning defendant was on parole, the officer searched him and found a baggie containing five grams of cocaine. At the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence, the officer testified he was following a length and a half behind defendant when he saw the defendant move from the right to the left lane without signaling, stop at a red light, and then turn left. The officer stopped defendant for failing to signal within 100 feet of turning under Vehicle Code[1] section 22107 (no signal before right or left movement), but acknowledged that defendant’s failure to signal also implicated Vehicle Code section 22108 (failure to signal 100 feet before turn).
DISCUSSION
We must uphold the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion if the facts and circumstances available to the officer at the time of the detention were sufficient to support a reasonable belief that appellant committed a traffic violation. (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 926.) We decide “what legal principles are legally relevant, independently apply them to the historical facts, and determine as a matter of law whether there has been an unreasonable search and/or seizure.” (Id. at p. 922.)
Defendant contends the detention was illegal because his failure to signal before changing lanes was not a traffic violation and, therefore, not a justification. This contention is based solely on a further contention that neither of sections 22107 or 22108 can be violated unless the movement of another vehicle was actually affected by the failure to signal. Since no one testified that another vehicle was affected, neither section was violated and the stop was unjustified. We disagree with this interpretation, and hold that defendant’s unsignaled lane change violated sections 22107 and 22108 and justified the detention.
Section 22107 prohibits a driver from turning a vehicle from a direct course or from moving a vehicle right or left “until such movement can be made with reasonable safety and then only after the giving of an appropriate signal in the manner provided in this chapter in the event any other vehicle may be affected by the movement.” (Italics added.) Section 22108 states: “Any signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.” Defendant contends these sections must be read together in that section 22108 sets forth the “appropriate signal” for turning right or left as “continuously during the last 100 feet traveled. . . .” Even if defendant’s contention is correct in this regard, he is not entitled to relief. The italicized language in section 22107 requires only that another “may” be affected by the movement, not “actually” or “in fact” be affected. Thus, section 22107’s language rejects defendant’s other contention that neither section is violated unless the movement of another vehicle is actually affected. (See People v. Miranda, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 930 [traffic stop was justified even if vehicle was not driving in a dangerous manner because “failure to properly signal where another ‘may be affected by the movement’ is prima facie unsafe, for it creates the possible danger the statute was designed to prevent”].)
In any event, defendant was clearly required to signal his lane change if there were any vehicles in his vicinity. As the court noted in People v. Miranda, “the primary benefit of the signal requirement is for the vehicles to the rear of the signaling vehicle.” (Ibid.) The officer testified he was following one and a half car lengths, at most, behind defendant’s vehicle, and could have been affected by defendant’s failure to signal. Thus, the facts and circumstances available to the officer at the time of the detention were sufficient to support a reasonable belief defendant committed a traffic violation, and the traffic stop was justified.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
/s/ Ramirez
P. J.
We concur:
/s/ Hollenhorst
J.
/s/ McKinster
J.
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[1] All further statutory references will be to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise indicated.
/06 P. v. Gonzalez CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
| THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CARLOS GONZALEZ, Defendant and Appellant. | E038742 (Super.Ct.No. RIF120723) O P I N I O N |
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Helios J. Hernandez, Judge. Affirmed.
Dennis L. Cava, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, David Delgado-Rucci, Deputy Attorney General, Ronald A. Jakob, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350), admitted a prior strike allegation (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (c), (e)), and was sentenced to four years. He appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence.
FACTS
On December 6, 2004, an officer stopped defendant's vehicle for failing to signal before changing lanes. After learning defendant was on parole, the officer searched him and found a baggie containing five grams of cocaine. At the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence, the officer testified he was following a length and a half behind defendant when he saw the defendant move from the right to the left lane without signaling, stop at a red light, and then turn left. The officer stopped defendant for failing to signal within 100 feet of turning under Vehicle Code[1] section 22107 (no signal before right or left movement), but acknowledged that defendant's failure to signal also implicated Vehicle Code section 22108 (failure to signal 100 feet before turn).
DISCUSSION
We must uphold the trial court's denial of the suppression motion if the facts and circumstances available to the officer at the time of the detention were sufficient to support a reasonable belief that appellant committed a traffic violation. (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 926.) We decide â€
