Filed 3/29/17 P. v. Grimaldo CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ALFREDO GRIMALDO,

Defendant and Appellant.
H043534
(Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. C1519373)
Defendant Alfredo Grimaldo was charged by felony complaint with two counts of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(4). He pleaded no contest to the first count, and the second count was dismissed. As called for in the plea agreement, the court suspended imposition of sentence and granted defendant probation, conditioned on service of six months in county jail and payment of various fines and fees. Defendant also was to be eligible to have his offense declared a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b)(3), after 18 months of successful probation.
In this timely appeal, defendant challenges only an order made at sentencing, imposing a $129.75 criminal justice administration fee payable to the City of San Jose. He argues, as he did below, that there was insufficient evidence that this “booking fee” reflected “the actual administrative costs of booking or processing.” Finding no error, we will affirm the judgment.
Government Code sections 29550, 29550.1, and 29550.2 authorize the imposition of a “criminal justice administration fee” (i.e., booking fee) on an arrestee who is ultimately convicted, in order to cover the expenses involved in booking or otherwise processing the arrestee in a county jail. “Which section applies to a given defendant depends on which governmental entity has arrested a defendant before transporting him or her to a county jail. The factors a court considers in determining whether to order the fee payment also vary depending on whether or not the court sentences the defendant to probation or prison. (See Gov. Code, §§ 29550, subd. (d)(1) & (2), 29550.1, 29550.2, subd. (a).)” (McCullough, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 592.)
At sentencing, the probation department recommended that a “$129.75 Criminal Justice Administration [f]ee to the City of San Jose be imposed pursuant to Government Code [sections] 29550, 29550.1 and 29550.2.” The trial court adopted that recommendation in orally imposing the booking fee, but without citing a specific statute. Defendant assumes that the fee was imposed under section 29550.2, which limits the county’s recovery to “actual administrative costs.” The record indicates, however, that defendant was arrested and booked by the San Jose police; it thus appears that section 29550.1 applies to the circumstances presented here. That section does not expressly include the requirement that only actual costs be recoverable from the defendant, but the amount is nonetheless determined in accordance with section 29550, which does limit the county’s ability to seek reimbursement from the city to actual administrative costs. (§ 29550, subd. (a)(1).) Accordingly, we presume for purposes of this appeal that the same limitation governs a section 29550.1 recovery by the city from a defendant.
In Aguilar, our Supreme Court explained, after reaffirming the application of the forfeiture rule, that as to the evidence of the administrative costs embedded in the booking fee, “the trial court correctly relied on the fee schedule set by the county board of supervisors based on actual cost data submitted by the county sheriff.” (Aguilar, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 869.) The same result must be acknowledged here. This court has already taken judicial notice of the 2010-2011 recommended budget for Santa Clara County and the Board of Supervisors resolution adopting the $259.50 booking fee in 2006. The “half-rate” was designated as $129.75, the amount of the fee charged to defendant. We presume that the trial court found this evidence sufficient to meet the statutory requirement of “actual administrative costs.” Defendant does not convince us otherwise.
The judgment is affirmed.




_________________________________
ELIA, ACTING P.J.

WE CONCUR:



_______________________________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.



_______________________________
MIHARA, J.












People v. Grimaldo
H043534