P. v. Halcromb
Filed 5/9/13 P. v. Halcromb CA2/5
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
KEVONTRE LAMONT HALCROMB,
Defendant and Appellant.
B242970
(Los Angeles
County
Super. Ct.
No. SA080323)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County.
Marsha N. Revel, Judge.
Affirmed.
Margaret E.
Dunk, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No
appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________
Defendant
and appellant Kevontre Lamont Halcromb was charged by information with
Penal Code section 211. The information
also alleged that appellant personally used a handgun, and that a principal in
the robbery was armed with a handgun, within the meaning of Penal Code sections
12022.53, subdivision (b), and 12022, subdivision (a)(1), respectively.
A jury found appellant guilty of
robbery, but found the gun allegations to be not true. Appellant was sentenced to the mid-term of
three years in state prison. Appellant appeals his robbery
conviction. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the night of March 19, 2012, Jonathan Tam
was sitting on the stairs outside his West Hollywood apartment,
playing with his phone and smoking a cigarette, when a man came running up to
him and pointed a semi-automatic handgun in his face. The man grabbed the phone out of Tam's hand
and repeatedly punched him in the face.
A second person then came onto the
stair landing, punched Tam in the face, rifled through his pockets, and took
his keys and cigarettes. After the two
men took everything Tam had on him, one of them punched him again and they ran
off together.
Tam immediately reported the robbery
to the police. Shortly thereafter, a
Sheriff's deputy drove Tam to a field show-up within a mile of his
apartment. Two males were individually
brought out into the spotlight of multiple squad cars. Tam identified appellant as the robber with
the gun who first approached him and took his phone, and codefendant William
Hanley as the robber who went through his pockets and took his keys and
cigarettes.
Before trial, appellant moved to exclude a
statement he gave to police while in custody following his arrest, arguing that
it was inadmissible pursuant to Miranda
v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
Appellant asserted three theories to bar the admission of the statement
at trial: First, because he was under the
influence of drugs and alcohol, he was unable to knowingly and intelligently
waive his rights. Second, even if he was
properly advised of his rights, he in fact did not waive them, as the statement
he signed contained no words of waiver, nor did he orally say he intended to
waive his rights. And, third, even if he
waived his rights, Detective Boagni may have used an impermissible two-step
interrogation process by obtaining a confession before Miranda warnings
were given and then having appellant repeat the confession for the record after
the warnings were given, a procedure found violative of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, as explicated in Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600, 615.
At the hearing on appellant's
motion, the court listened to Detective Boagni's recorded interview of
appellant, including the detective's question, "You don't want to talk
about what we talked about earlier?"
Appellant maintained that this question supported his assertion that
Detective Boagni elicited his confession in the morning, before he had been
advised of his Miranda rights. Detective Boagni denied that course of
events; he testified that he had two conversations with appellant, one in the
morning and the second at 3:30 in the
afternoon. The morning discussion, in the
lock-up, was very short, consisting merely of Boagni asking appellant if he had
eaten something, had made a phone call, or had any medical issues, before
telling appellant that he would talk with him later, and wanted appellant to
speak honestly. The afternoon
conversation was in the interview room at the West
Hollywood sheriff station and was recorded. Boagni advised appellant of his
waiver form before he was asked any questions about the incident. Boagni's initial statement/question during
the recorded interview regarding what they had talked about earlier referred to
the detective's admonition to appellant to be honest.
After hearing arguments, the trial
court ruled that appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his
v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 246, the court noted that appellant did
not appear to be intoxicated during the interview, that his answers seemed
responsive to the detective's questions and that he had waived his rights by
his actions, even absent an express waiver.
The prosecution introduced the
evidence summarized above through the testimony of victim Tam, Detective
Boagni, and two other police officers involved in his arrest. Appellant did not testify and offered no
witnesses or exhibits, instead limiting his defense to a continuing objection
to the admission of the recorded interview, argument that the gun was fake or a
toy, and vigorous cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses.
As noted above, appellant was found
guilty of second degree robbery, but the jury found not true both the
allegations that he personally used a handgun and that a principal was armed
with a handgun during the commission of the robbery.
Appellant
filed a timely notice of appeal. We
appointed counsel to represent him on this appeal.
After
examination of the record, appellant's counsel filed an
and requested that this court conduct an independent review of the entire
appellate record to determine whether any arguable issues exist. On December
27, 2012, we advised appellant that he had 30 days in which to
personally submit any contentions or issues which he wished us to
consider. No response has been received
to date.
We have
examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellant's attorney has
fully complied with her responsibilities and that no
v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441.)
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ARMSTRONG,
J.
We concur:
TURNER,
P. J. MOSK,
J.
