Filed 12/12/17 P. v. Hill CA2/3
Opinion on remand from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
SYDNEY JEAN HILL,
Defendant and Appellant. B262390
Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA099731
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jack P. Hunt, Judge. Affirmed.
Brad K. Kaiserman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Blythe J. Leszkay, David W. Williams, and Paul S. Thies, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________


INTRODUCTION
Defendant Sydney Jean Hill petitioned the trial court for resentencing under the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, commonly known as Proposition 47. After a hearing, the court reduced Hill’s drug conviction to a misdemeanor, but denied Hill’s request to reduce the stolen property conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor. In a prior opinion, we affirmed the court’s order. (People v. Hill (Mar. 28, 2016, B262390 [nonpub. opn.].) The California Supreme Court granted Hill’s petition for review and deferred briefing pending its decision in People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 (Romanowski). (People v. Hill (Aug. 16, 2017, No. S234180).) After issuing Romanowski, the Supreme Court transferred Hill’s case back to us for reconsideration in light of that opinion. Having reconsidered Hill’s claims on appeal, we again affirm the trial court’s order denying her Proposition 47 petition.
BACKGROUND
Hill was charged with one count of receiving stolen property in violation of Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a), a felony. The complaint also alleged that Hill suffered two drug-related prior felony convictions from 2000 and 2012 within the meaning of section 1203, subdivision (e)(4). On October 29, 2012, Hill pled no contest to the receiving stolen property charge. Hill also admitted the two prior felony convictions, and admitted violating probation in connection with the 2012 drug case. The trial court sentenced Hill to three years on the receipt of stolen property case, and eight months for the probation violation to run consecutively. However, the court suspended imposition of the sentences in both cases and placed Hill on three years formal probation.
After her October 29, 2012 plea, Hill’s probation was revoked in 2013, and, after it was reinstated, revoked again in 2014. On March 12, 2014, Hill admitted to violating probation in the stolen property case. The court then imposed the state prison term that had been suspended on October 29, 2012.
On January 6, 2015, Hill filed a petition for resentencing under Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18, subd. (a)). Hill’s petition did not allege any facts as to the value of the stolen property or even allege that the value of the property did not exceed $950. On January 26, 2015, the court held a hearing on Hill’s petition. Citing the probation report, the prosecutor informed the court that the theft was approximately $5,000. The court reduced Hill’s conviction in the 2012 drug case to a misdemeanor but denied the petition for reduction of the felony stolen property conviction.
DISCUSSION
In our prior opinion, we noted that section 1170.18 is silent on what burden of proof applies to establishing eligibility for resentencing under Proposition 47. Adopting the burden of proof that generally applies to claims seeking relief in the trial court (see Evid. Code, § 500), we held the party petitioning under Proposition 47 bears the burden of establishing eligibility to have her felony sentence reduced. Because Hill did not produce any evidence of, or even allege, the value of the stolen property at issue in her receiving stolen property conviction, we concluded the court properly denied her petition.
In Romanowski, the California Supreme Court reached a similar holding: “The ultimate burden of proving section 1170.18 eligibility lies with the petitioner. (See Evid. Code, § 500.) In some cases, the uncontested information in the petition and record of conviction may be enough for the petitioner to establish this eligibility. . . . But in other cases, eligibility for resentencing may turn on facts that are not established by either the uncontested petition or the record of conviction. In these cases, an evidentiary hearing may be ‘required if, after considering the verified petition, the return, any denial, any affidavits or declarations under penalty of perjury, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken, the court finds there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner may be entitled to relief and the petitioner’s entitlement to relief depends on the resolution of an issue of fact.’ [Citation.]” (Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 916.)
In light of Romanowski, we again conclude Hill failed to meet her burden of establishing eligibility for resentencing under Proposition 47. As noted, Hill did not allege the value of the property at issue in her receiving stolen property conviction, nor did she present any evidence addressing the value of that property, such as an affidavit, a declaration, or witness testimony. Accordingly, the court properly denied Hill’s petition. Hill is not, however, precluded from filing a new petition that makes a sufficient showing of eligibility for relief under Proposition 47. (See People v. Johnson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 954, 970–971 [affirming order denying Proposition 47 petition without prejudice to the court's consideration of a subsequent petition “that contains evidence—not limited to the record of conviction—of [petitioner’s] eligibility for relief under Proposition 47”].)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s January 26, 2015 order denying Hill’s petition is affirmed without prejudice to the court’s consideration of a subsequent petition that is supported by evidence demonstrating Hill’s eligibility for relief under Proposition 47.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS


LAVIN, J.


WE CONCUR:


EDMON, P. J.


STONE, J.*